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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 State-Building in Afghanistan 
 
Today, Afghanistan represents one of the most poor, instable and insecure countries of 
the world. It is important to notice that the negative impact of its problems (e.g. terrorism, 
drug trafficking and migration) do not remain exclusively within its borders but also have 
worldwide effects. The terrorism issue in particular following the attacks of September 
11th 2001 in the United States attracted the special attention of the international 
community and convinced them that such threats recognize no international borders. 
More importantly, however, this issue raised consensus among the major powers that 
weak or failed states are the source of many of the world’s most serious problems, from 
poverty to AIDS to drugs to terrorism (FUKUYAMA 2005: xvii). Therefore, in a joint 
attempt with the international community the US declared the so called ‘War on Terror’ 
and put forward state-building in Afghanistan as a priority task on the agenda.  
 
In September 2001 the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and helped the Rabbani led 
government to oust the Taliban from Kabul. At the same time with the help of the 
international community, different Afghan political groups (those inside the country and 
those who were in exile) met in Petersberg, near Bonn, and signed the ‘Bonn Accord’. 
The meeting resulted in a plan based on which an interim administration was established 
for a period of six months, to be followed by a transitional administration governing the 
state for two years. In this period two Loya Jirgas (traditional tribal councils) were held, 
an emergency and a constitutional one. The latter approved the new constitution. With 
two elections, a presidential and a parliamentary that were held in 2003 and 2004 
respectively, the Bonn Accord was fully implemented. According to the new constitution 
Afghanistan became an Islamic republic. 
 
This sort of top-down state-building or nation-building process is nothing new in 
Afghanistan. Looking back more or less the same process started in the late 19th century1  
when the external powers (Russia and Britain) drew the boundaries of Afghanistan and 
agreed upon the existence of this territory to be a buffer state ( map 7) between their areas 
                                                 
1 There are different opinions among the authors with regard to the first state building process in Afghanistan. Here I 
preferred to take the year 1880 as the first attempts in modern state-building process. For details see Chapter 2. 
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of interest. The colonial rivalries between Russia and Britain in the 18th to mid 20th 
century, the so-called ‘Great Game’, triggered foreign invasions, interventions and finally 
the emergence of Afghanistan as a buffer state between the two powers. In fact from 
1809-1879 Britain treated Afghanistan as a satellite or buffer state against Russia 
(LENCZOWSKI 1980: 230-231). Prior to 1880, the country that would become 
Afghanistan had neither a name (ELPHINSTONE 1998: 151-152) nor a fixed boundary. 
The demarcation of the boundaries was made official after Britain’s attempts to colonize 
and maintain its direct rule in Afghanistan repeatedly failed,  particularly following the 
two Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839- 1842 and 1878- 1879). However, the fighting within 
rival Mohammadzais for the political power helped the British not to totally lose control 
of the land. By installing Abdurrahman (reigned from 1880-1901), one out of many rival 
figures, as Amir of Afghanistan, the British reached many of their goals. They found a 
way to safely return to their bases, something they could not achieve in the earlier 
periods. The new Amir deliberately accepted both the demarcation of the boundaries and 
the British control over the external relations of the country. Supporting Abdurrahman 
with money and arms helped to eliminate all Britains enemies in Afghanistan (cf. Chapter 
2.2.2). From 1881-1896 Abdurrahman carried out 17 military campaigns (DUPREE 
2005: 418-419) in which he expanded his influence in the country and put off many 
rebellions. 
 
Based on these facts, some say that “in 1880 Afghanistan became a unique client state” 
(GREGOREAN 1969: 117). Others believe that Amir Abdurrahman created the modern 
state of Afghanistan (DUPREE 1977: xix, RUBIN 2002: 265, SCHETTER 2003: 216, 
2005: 54, 2006: 22) with weapons and cash supplied by the British for their own strategic 
reasons (RUBIN 2002: 265). Nevertheless, it is significant that state-building and nation-
building were foreign projects, implemented by external players in order to maintain their 
own strategic goals. This is what TILLY describes as “war drives state formation and 
transformation”, or “war made the states and vice a versa” (TILLY 1992: 20, 67). It was 
extensive financial and arm support from the British that made it possible for 
Abdurrahman, the ‘Iron Amir’ to succeed his rival cousin Ayoub Khan, the ruler in 
Kandahar-Herat region. Furthermore the British also guaranteed to defend the ruler and 
his territory against any foreign invasion. In August 1907, Russian formally recognized 
Afghanistan as a British sphere of influence (HOPKIRK 1999: 520). 
 
After the third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 Afghanistan became an independent and 
sovereign state recognized by many European and Asian countries. However, it remained 
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weak due to meagre financial and human resources. Amir Amanullah (reigned from 
1919-1928) carried out many attempts towards building Afghanistan as modern 
functioning nation-state. But he lacked financial resources since the country’s 
independence resulted in a cut in the regular subsidies that were provided by the British 
to Abdurrahman and Habibullah. To fill the gap and to implement his modernization 
plan, he made a U-turn and established close relationships with the Soviet Union, both 
the European and the Islamic countries hoping political support would eventually lead to 
gaining financial support. Immediately after its independence in 1919, Afghanistan was 
one of the first countries to recognize the Bolshevik regime (BLACK, CYRILE, 
DUPREE, ENDECOTT-WEST, MATUSZEWSKY, NABY and WALDRON 1991: 185) 
and in March 27th 1919 the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognize the 
independence of Afghanistan (GHUBAR 1968: 756). The two countries established 
diplomatic relations. Later Afghanistan signed treaties of diplomatic relations with 
France, Italy, Germany, Britain, Poland, Switzerland, Turkey, Egypt and Iran.2  
 
The country’s independence and its relationship with the outside world provided 
opportunities to introduce modernization to Afghanistan. This opportunity was especially 
prominent after the country suffered many years of ‘virtual isolation’ for the first time in 
history (BLACK, CYRILE, DUPREE, ENDECOTT-WEST, MATUSZEWSKY, NABY 
and WALDRON 1991: 185) in the previous three decades. The modernization program 
included the establishment of institutions like executive judiciary and legislative bodies 
of the state.  For the first time the national assembly was established and a constitution 
was promulgated. On the other hand these modern state institutions desperately needed 
capable staff to run them. In order to respond to this challenge, special attention was 
given to the introduction and expansion of modern education in the country. Modern 
schools were established; the Amani high school built by the Germans, Istiqlal was built 
by the French, while the Habibia high school was built before the country became 
independent. The development of education produced intellectuals who constituted a new 
political elite in a society where until then, traditional and religious elites existed as the 
two dominant actors. 
 
The implementation of reforms and institution building came to its climax just after 
Amanullah returned from his trip to Russia and Europe, where he was inspired by the 
development in Western countries. The intellectuals mostly favoured Amanullah’s 
                                                 
2 These letters of agreement between Afghanistan and the mentioned countries are available at the National Archive in 
Kabul.  
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modernizations, while dominant religious and traditional groups criticized some of the 
reforms and regarded them as unnecessary for the country. The tensions erupted when the 
government supported by the intellectuals, began to oppress the religious and traditional 
elites. This oppression marked the end of Amanullah’s rule since the tribal and religious 
leaders carried out many rebellions. This was the first time in the modern Afghan history 
that the state turned against the society (excluding the tiny number of intellectuals) and 
vice versa.  
 
For a period of nine month the religious groups gained power under the rule of 
Habibullah II (reigned January - October 1929). The rise of religious elites in power 
alarmed both Russia and the British since they feared that a similar situation would arise 
in the Muslim populated territories they occupied. In order to end this, both Russia and 
Britain tried place figures loyal to them in Kabul. From the north, Russians first invasion 
failed  to bring Amanullah back in to power (HAMMOND 1984: 9). From the south, the 
British provided all necessary support for Nadir Khan, one of Amnullah’s generals 
together with his brothers. This enabled them to establish their family rule (Musahiban 
rule 1929-1973). Until the end of th British rule in India in 1947, Afghanistan remained a 
weak buffer-state between two powerful neighbours under the rule of an absolute 
monarchy loyal to the British. In order to sustain his rule Nadir Khan relied on tribes 
from the south while he also gave privileges to the religious establishment. However, the 
intellectual elite was the victim of his policies.  They were killed, tortured, and sent to 
exile (into remote areas of the country). Nadir Khan’s and his brothers’ way of rule is 
known as ‘the reign of terror’ by the intellectuals of that period. Later, Amanullah’s 
loyalists assassinated Nadir Khan in Kabul and one of his brothers in Berlin. These 
events increased the number of executions of political opponents which aroused 
widespread disgust with the regime.  
 
During WWII, the Germans repeatedly visited Kabul through Turkey and Iran. They 
encouraged the Afghan monarchy to join the axis with promise to regain the lost 
territories of Ahmad Shah Durrani west of the Indus river. The number of German 
diplomats and experts in the country increased, which raised the concern of both the 
Russians and the British. To minimize the influence of the Germans in Afghanistan, 
Russia and Britain cut the communication route of the Germans through Iran in a joint 
attempt. The situation created a dilemma within the ruling family circle. The younger 
members of the royal family like Daoud and Naim immediately wanted to join the axis. 
But the elder members of the monarch’s family, cautious about the result of WWII, 
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officially proclaimed a policy of neutrality. The contact with the Germans installed the 
ideology of an Aryan race in Afghanistan and attracted the attention of prominent Afghan 
writers. At this point in time Afghan nationalism emerged in the form of territorial claims 
to ‘Greater Afghanistan’.  Following the British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent 
and the creation of India and Pakistan in 1947, Afghanistan raised its territorial claim 
over tribal areas west of the Indus.  The Afghan rulers who remained silent in the past 
decades concerning the British rule of India, voted against Pakistan’s membership in the 
United Nations. The emergence of the Pashtunistan issue became a central point for 
Afghanistan and determined its foreign relation strategy. Pakistan became a member of 
the British Commonwealth and relied on the West in its foreign relations. The Afghan 
monarchy in order to maintain their irredentist ambitions searched for help from the 
USSR as an alternative choice.  
 
In the 1950s Afghanistan became strategically important to the major global rival powers. 
It became one of the playgrounds of ‘the Cold War’ in the region. The Western and 
Eastern block countries (the USA and the USSR with their respective allies) competed to 
invest their capital in many development projects in Afghanistan.  This was a historical 
opportunity for the development of the country. The basis for much of the infrastructures 
still in use today was laid in this period. The Eastern and Western blocks countries also 
invested in the human resources of the country. Thousands of Afghans were sent abroad 
to Eastern and Western countries. However, the number of those who went to the USSR 
and other Eastern countries was higher than of those went to Western states. The USSR’s 
closeness to Afghanistan facilitated its intensive investment and contacts. Moreover the 
oligarchic regime of monarchy helped the spread of communist ideology in Afghanistan. 
At the same time many Islamic movement started their activities.  Many of the leading 
figures of these movements were among the teaching staff or the students of Kabul 
University. The political stability was deteriorating as a result of the anti-monarchy 
activities of intellectual groups in political movements and parties.  
 
In the 19th century during the Great Game the British benefited from the tribal, kinship 
and family rivalry to maintain their strategic goals in Afghanistan. Likewise, in the Cold 
War the USSR used the same cousin-rivalry as a potential opportunity to end the 
monarchy and install a puppet government in Kabul. From here on the influence of the 
USSR grew in Afghanistan, while in the South in newly established Pakistan, the West, 
led by USA, the former British colony was slowly replaced. The USSR increased its 
influence and presence in Afghanistan. It was as a result of this influence that Daoud (the 
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rival cousin of King Zahir Khan) was able to end the monarchy in 1973 and to establish 
the first republic. This coup became the starting point for many bloody coups and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The change in geopolitical balance of the region 
which triggered the fall of the monarchy also ended an era of relative stability in the 
country which has not been regained as of yet.  Later, Daoud’s U-turn policy failed to end 
the strong ties with the USSR and to start relations with the West. In 1978, the 
communists carried out a bloody coup, overthrew Daoud and proclaimed the Democratic 
Republic of Afghanistan.  
 
Therefore, external invasions and pressure added to the long existing internal rivalry and 
disorder to undermine stability, sovereignty, and the effective functioning of state in 
Afghanistan. Every attempt to cope with these challenges failed because state-building 
was a foreign funded project developed only to maintaining these states own strategic 
goals. Moreover the rivalries between tribal, religious and intellectual elites over political 
power provided opportunities for foreigners to exploit the situation for their own 
interests. As a result the elite in power could maintain its rule as long as it received 
foreign support. The end of external support and intervention resulted in institutional 
malfunction, state failure, and even collapse. According to RUBIN, “foreign powers 
whose main strategic interests centred on Europe also furnished weapons, cash, and 
training to Daoud, Taraki, Amin, Karmal, and Najibullah, enabling them to pursue 
domestic projects that met the strategic goals of the suppliers. When the Soviet Union 
broke up at the end of 1991, so did the Russian Empire in Asia. Bipolar strategic conflict 
ended, and the European imperialist map of Southwest Asia was redrawn. Foreign aid to 
Afghanistan from competing, Euro-Atlantic powers ceased, and along with it the century 
old project of building a foreign aid-funded, Pashtun-led, centralized buffer state’ 
(RUBIN 2002: 265).” Furthermore, state-building and nation-building projects were 
always implemented from the top by governments who usually had legitimacy problems. 
Thus the top-to-bottom state-building process repeatedly failed because the key role of 
population was largely ignored. As a result, on several occasions during such intense 
state-building processes the society turned against the state authorities.  
 
These above mentioned regimes lacked legitimacy and the support of the population. In 
order to maintain and sustain their rule, they and their foreign supporters heavily invested 
in and relied upon military institutions.  It is significant to see, that after the disintegration 
of military all of the institutions of the state collapsed. For example, the fall of the 
communist regime in 1992 initially started with the disintegration of the armed forces and 
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was followed by that of the civil institutions. Due to this factor 1992 is referred to as the 
time when the state utterly collapsed (ENGLEHART 2007: 144). In fact the 
disintegration of a state as a political institution occurs when it can no longer perform the 
functions required for it to pass as state (ZARTMAN 1995: 5). This was the case in 
Afghanistan in 1992 and continues to be so until the fall of the Taliban in 2001. 
 
State-building in Afghanistan, especially after the fall of the communist regime and the 
disintegration of institutions, was a challenging task for the successor Mujahidin regime. 
In a symbolic act in 1992 the remnant of the communist regime in Kabul transferred the 
power to the interim government of the Mujahidin. Although the new government 
proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) it could not rule 
effectively in the country because it inherited no functioning institutions. Army, police 
and security forces which comprised the backbone of the communist regimes had already 
disintegrated. The leading figures of the regime and its security institutions either joined 
different Mujahidin parties, or left the country for exile. Furthermore, the Mujahidin did 
not consist of a unified homogenous force. Instead, there were many political armed 
groups with different socio-religious and ethno-linguistic backgrounds. Any attempts to 
unify them proved to be difficult.  
 
Unlike former regimes the ISA lacked a strong foreign supporter. Instead, like the 
internal Mujahidin fractions, their external sources were also composed of many rival 
players in the region. In particular the rivalry between Pakistan and India, Saudi Arabia 
and Iran provided not only an external motivation for the conflict, but also intensified it. 
At this stage the US and its western allies and Russia remained in the background and 
kept a low profile, while countries like Turkey and the central Asian states further added 
problems in the already complicate situation by supporting one side in the conflicts. India 
backed the Rabbani led Mujahidin government while Pakistan and Saudi Arabia 
supported the Hekmatyar led opposition Mujahidin groups. At this point in time Iran was 
playing a double role by supporting the Shii parties either on the side of the government 
or those in the oppositions. However, neither side succeeded a victory. Instead, Kabul, 
where the main conflict took place, was badly destroyed and its population badly affected 
by its outcomes. Later Hekmatyar’s repeated failure disappointed Pakistan and prompted 
its attempt to create the Taliban militia in 1994 (MALEY 2002: 219, RUBIN 2002: xviii). 
The Taliban militia consisted of Pashtuns both from Afghanistan and Pakistan together 
with foreigners (Pakistanis, Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens etc.). It succeeded in bringing 
larger parts of Afghanistan including the capital and other major cities under its control. 
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However, the regime failed to get international recognition from the United Nations and 
the international community. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
recognized the Taliban regime, something they declined following the September 11th 
events in the United States.  
 
Today, Afghanistan has a government which enjoys international recognition and 
receives special attention from the international community. However, the major 
challenges of state-building seem to be far from over. The government has little control 
beyond the capital, while in the last few years the security situation has deteriorated in the 
capital as well. The unemployment rate is high and those in the payroll of the government 
receive an insufficient salary. Like in the 1980s, in 2007 Afghans once again constituted 
the largest part of refugee population with 3.1 million or 48 percent of the world’s 
refugees (UNHCR 2007: 27, 43).3 State institutions are ineffective, corruption is 
booming and people have lost their confidence in their elected government and 
parliament. The new constitution remains merely a on paper and the criminals are out of 
the reach of the law. The production of opium is increasing and the government’s 
attempts to reduce it have proved little success in the past few years. The reconstruction 
and provision of social service is undermined by the growing insecurity and corruption. 
This situation continues in the country despite the government not being alone but backed 
by the international community. There are thousands of foreign troops led by NATO and 
ISAF fighting the Taliban insurgents, trying to maintain security and to help the 
government expand its rule across the country. In order to demonstrate that their mission 
is to provide peace and security, the US led forces have established a Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) which carries out some humanitarian assistance and a 
reconstruction program. At the same time hundreds of NGOs are also involved in 
reconstruction and aid programs in the country.  
 
In recent interdisciplinary publications, these problems are studied using the terms “state-
building” and “nation-building”. For a better analysis of these problems it is crucial to 
identify and clarify the right terminology employing a political and geographical 
perspective. Meanwhile, this study will research whether there is a certain model of 
statehood or nationhood in modern political geography, which will help to assess the 
status of Afghanistan as a state and its people as a nation. 
                                                 
3 According to UNHCR report about half of all refugees are in protracted situation. Even though Afghan refugees are 
located in over 70 countries, only those in Pakistan and Islamic Republic of Iran meet the UNHCR definition of living 
in protracted situation (UNHCR 2007: 43). 
 15 
 
 
 
1.2 State-Building or Nation-Building: Terminology  
In order to focus on the main topic of research it is crucial to identify and use the right 
terms for the research area. There are two terms within literature dealing with the post 
conflict reconstruction process that are most frequently discussed and used for countries 
like Afghanistan. These two terms are “state-building” and “nation-building”. It is not 
easy to find a generally accepted definition for either of these terms. Usually any attempt 
towards ending a military conflict,  rebuilding and reconstruction programs in a country 
or the supporting and strengthening of a government in a weak state is considered as 
nation-building or state-building. Watson defines nation-building as “ending military 
conflicts and rebuilding economic infrastructures, along with basic services, to include 
the armed forces, police, government, banks, transportation networks, communications, 
health and medical care, schools, and the other basic infrastructure” (WATSON 2004: 9).  
 
Meanwhile, there is some confusion regarding the usage of state-building and nation 
building if both terms are used for the same purpose. For example, the term nation-
building is used as meaning the formation and establishment of new states as a political 
entity: “nation-building is both formation and establishment of a new state itself as a 
political entity and the processes of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, 
achievement, and a sense of national identity, among the people” (BELL and FREEMAN 
1974: 11). FUKUYAMA repeats the same confusion today when he uses these two terms 
state-building and nation-building while he referes to only one concept. In his book 
(State-Building) he defines: “state-building is the creation of new government institutions 
and strengthening of existing ones.” (FUKUYAMA 2005: xvii). But in his recent book 
‘Nation-Building’ he uses both together with a comprised meaning: “What we mean by 
nation-building is usually state-building coupled with economic development” 
(FUKUYAMA 2006:3). HIPPLER believes that nation-building is a process of socio-
political development, which takes place over a long historical time span (HIPPLER 
2005: 6). This definition seems to be based on the very old concept which considered 
‘nation to have a common history’, an idea which is different from the modern concept of 
nation.  
 
This confusion in usage makes it hard to distinguish the difference between the two 
terms. So if nation-building is state-building, then what is state-building? It seems that 
the confusion between ‘nation-building’ and ‘state-building’ stems from the already 
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existing confusion over the term ‘nation’ and ‘state’. GLASSNER, a political geographer, 
believes that this confusion is not only prominent among the nonspecialists but also 
among scholars in many disciplines. They are confused in differentiating the term 
‘nation’ from ‘state’ or even ‘State’ from ‘state’ (GLASSNER 1993: 35).4 For example 
according to RICHMOND sociologists find it hard to maintain a distinction between 
‘state’, ‘nation’, and ‘ethnic group’, due to the fact that they frequently overlap in 
historical reality (RICHMOND 1987: 4).  On the other hand political scientists also admit 
that in common speech ‘nation’ is often used loosely to mean ‘state’, as it does in phrases 
such as ‘United Nations’ (MILLER 1998: 657 and CRAIG 1998: 657). 
 
Besides the terms ‘nation-building’ and ‘state-building’ there is also the modern term 
‘nation-state building’ which is a combination of nation + state = nation-state (PENROSE 
and MOLE 2008: 273-275). These varieties of terminology complicate the distinction and 
use of the right and appropriate terminology in this study. In order to overcome this 
problem it might be better to look for a precise definition of state and nation first. This 
will make it rather easier to find an answer to questions like “is it possible to build a 
nation or a state or even a nation-state?”  
 
Nation 
The term ‘nation’ stems from Latin ‘natio’ meaning race, people and tribe (Geschlecht, 
Volk, Volksstamm) (BECK 1986: 617). In the historical concept of the nineteenth century 
the term ‘nation’ was often used interchangeably with the term ‘race’. The British 
referred to themselves as “an island race” different from “the Irish race” etc. (COX 2002: 
168). However, the modern concept of the term ‘nation’ varies from the historical one. It 
developed with the changing modes of practice associated with the dominance of 
modernism (JAMES 2006:370). Modern ‘nation’ is a multidimensional concept as a 
result of which scholars from different fields define it according to their own 
perspectives. This means it usually depends on from which perspective one looks at the 
‘nation’. With regard to different perspectives, ‘nation’ is defined by state, by language 
and culture, by common history and heritage, by territory, and by common aims (BENN 
1972: 443-444). As a result this provides a variety of definitions for the term ‘nation’. At 
the same time such definitions resulting from particular perspectives can hardly provide 
                                                 
4 GLASSNER believes that “in much of the discussion, not only among nonspecialists but even among scholars in 
many disciplines, the term ‘State’ is confused with ‘state’ or ‘nation’.  Often the ‘State’ or ‘state’ or ‘nation’ is used 
interchangeably with ‘nation-state’ and sometimes the hyphenated word is used rather pompously in place of simpler 
one (GLASSNER 1993: 35).”   In the context of this study, the term ‘state’ is used as a political organization. That is 
too important for a footnote.  
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its complete criteria. That is why within scientific literature certain criteria which are 
mentioned for the term ‘nation’ are confusing. 
 
In considering the multidimensional concept of ‘nation’, SMITH defines it “as a named 
human population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a 
mass, public culture, a common culture, a common economy, a common legal rights and 
duties for all members (SMITH 1991: 43).” In this definition special emphasis is placed 
on the common inclusion of a few criteria for ‘nation’, especially ‘culture’ while the term 
‘culture’ is not clarified. Culture itself is understood to involve complex layers of shared 
meaning and experiences. Societies generally include many subcultures defined in terms 
of region, status, ethnicity and other factors, such as occupation and gender 
(RICHMOND 1987: 4).  
 
If ‘common culture’ were a criterion for ‘nation’ it would be possible to find it not only 
in one country but in many countries e.g. in the Middle East as well as Arab States. The 
Arabs, despite having a shared culture (language, religion, history and customs), are 
divided into many separate states. Formally they are regarded as the Egyptian nation, the 
Libyan nation and the Iraqi nation etc. More significant is that they share in general a 
common identity as ‘Arabs’. The difference among them may be seen more in terms of 
urban and rural life a phenomenon that is also present in countries with homogenous 
population.  A similar situation can be seen in Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. 
Furthermore, there are large homogenous group of people who live within many 
countries but they are not regarded as separate nations. The Kurds living in Iraq, Turkey, 
and Iran, or the Baluch people, living in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, are such 
examples. 
 
However, countries can also be found that have a variety of cultures (multi-ethnic and 
multi linguistic) while they posses one state, and share one identity like the Indian nation. 
The USA called a ‘melting pot’, which is another example of a population of more than 
300 million with a different backgrounds coming from Europe, Asia, and Africa is 
considered to  be ‘the American Nation’. In some cases religion become the reason for 
establishing both a nation and a state. For example, in Pakistan and Israel religion was the 
basic reason for forming a new nation.  
 
A territorial reference is another necessary component of the idea ‘nation’ mentioned in 
the above definition. The same criterion with a historical association is also considered as 
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sine qua non (RICHMOND 1987: 4). However, this does not necessarily coincide with 
the boundaries of a particular state.  In other words, the geographical parameters of a 
given nation may not always be as clearly defined as those of the state.  
 
Another major characteristic of the term ‘nation’ is that its members tend to identify with 
one another, feel closer to one another than to outsiders, and to believe that they belong 
together. They are clearly distinguishable from others who do not share their culture 
(DICKEN 2004: 123). This is what IBN KHALDON noticed and called it as ‘group 
feeling’ when he compared the sense of togetherness among the Bedouins and of urban 
people (IBN KHALDON after ROSENTHAL 2005: 98-99). Further criteria of a ‘nation’ 
include political, social and economic institutions. 
 
Nevertheless with these criteria mentioned in the above, the question still remains 
whether it is possible to form or to build a nation or not. To sum up the definitions, 
generally there are two views with regard to the nation, a subjective and an objective 
view. According to subjective view nations are essentially voluntarily associations of 
people held together simply by the continuing will of their members. Nation is formed 
because its members want to be politically associated. On the other side, according to 
objective view, nations are marked out by certain objective characteristics that their 
members share – racial descent, by language, religion, common traits of character, and so 
forth (MILLER 1998: 657-658). The latter seems to be similar to the old concept of 
‘nation’ from the nineteenth century, when ‘race’ and ‘nation’ were used 
interchangeably.  
 
There is no doubt that those who fevor the objective view, can hardly believe in forming 
and building a nation out of different cultural, linguistic, and religious groups. The 
objective view is similar to what COX considers as “nation in biological terms”, through 
the perspective of which many people almost conceive the construction of nation as a 
very odd and even bizarre idea (COX 2002: 168). In addition to that, this is a nationalistic 
view of the nation which proclaims that the nation and state should be congruent. 
Nationalism holds that the legitimate rule is based on the sovereignty of a culturally or 
historically distinct people in a political system that expresses and protects those 
distinctive characteristics (SNYDER and BALLENTINE 2001: 65). However, nations 
with such distinct characteristics hardly exist in the world today. One can find tiny 
minority groups who practice their own customs and posses their distinct culture in 
almost every country of the world. 
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An alternative and compromising view was mentioned earlier by MEINECKE who 
considered two types of nation; a ‘cultural nation’ and a ‘state nation’. Members of a 
‘cultural nation’ are bound by a common culture (language, science, art, religion, way of 
life) without having a common ‘state’ (BECK 1986: 617). Members of a ‘cultural nation’ 
can extend beyond the political boundaries of a particular state (e.g., Germany, Austria, 
and Switzerland, Arab countries, or Afghanistan with its neighbours in Central Asia, Iran 
and Pakistan). The idea of a ‘cultural nation’ is similar to the ‘objective view’ and ‘nation 
in the biological term’ which is often abused by nationalists to support their ideology. 
With such an ideology, often nationalist groups often consider territories beyond their 
own country, where people with similar ultural trait live as part of their country. 
Sometimes, if a nationalist group dominates power, they follow an irredentist move in 
which they merge their neighbouring countries, partly or totally, to their own territory 
through military acqusitions. There are many examples of such an irredentists policy 
carried out in the past e.g., Germany against its neighbours during WWII, Iraq against 
Kuwait, or the continuous border disutes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, India and 
Pakistan, and India and China. 
 
Members of a ‘state nation’ are politically organized into a common sovereign state 
(BECK 1986: 617). This definition similar to ‘subjective view’ or considers nation as ‘a 
social product’. According to this view, ‘nation’ and the sense of belonging to a particular 
‘nation’ are socially constructed. This is the gist of such commonly held notions as the 
US as a ‘melting pot’: the idea, that Americans are made and not born, that they are 
socialized through school, fellow workers, friends, and the media, etc. into becoming 
Americans (COX 2002:168). In other words it is the modern state that builds the nation. 
Modern states are quite crucial players in the development of a sense of nationhood 
(COX 2002: 178). Therefore, states precede the nations and they are prerequisite for the 
development of a sense of nationhood. In order to grasp the further details of the role of 
state in building the nation it is important to first define the term state itself.  
 
 
State 
State is a familiar phenomenon that has been developing for thousands of years in 
different parts of the world (GLASSNER 1993: 43). On the basis of historical 
development, states are known as ‘traditional states’ and ‘modern states’ (PIERSON 
1996: 39), although there are different opinions over the exact date of origin of both 
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forms. It is believed that Greek philosopher Aristotle developed the theory of the city-
state about 350 BC in his book Politics where he argued that a natural logic dictated that 
societies should have governments, or political rule, and that governments, in turn, led 
inevitably to the emergence of  ‘city state’ (BLACKSELL 2006: 38).5  
 
The traditional states took a variety of forms, and they were qualitatively different from 
their modern equivalent (PIERSON 1996: 39, 40). HELD (1992: 73) identifies “five main 
clusters of the state system:” 
 
 Traditional tribute-taking empires 
 Feudalism: system of divided authority 
 The polity of estates 
 Absolutist states 
 Modern nation states.6  
 
However, these five clusters of state systems can not be generalized everywhere. 
Different parts of the world had different state systems. A rather clear model is presented 
by (MUIR 1982). It shows the development of state systems in particular countries. 
Figure 1 shows a modified model based on MUIR (1982), including changes and 
expanded through the example of Afghanistan. 
 
 
                                                 
5 PIERSON claims that the development of state dates back to 6000-800 BC and the modern state to not much than 300 
years ago (PIERSON 1996: 39). 
6 COOPER believes to the extension of empire to the 20th century and they consider Mongol, Mogul, British, and 
USSR as empire. See COOPER 2003: 18-21. 
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Figure 1: The development of state             
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) modified after MUIR 1982 
 
Therefore the processes of state development from the traditional to the modern form, 
have not taken place in a unilinear path, even where similar forms emerged in the end. 
This means that state formation should certainly not be seen as a process which tended 
automatically towards the modern form of the states. Historically, many other forms of 
state emerged, grew, and declined: city-states, absolutist monarchies, empires, satellites, 
religious governments and other rose and then, for the most part, fell (PAINTER 1995: 
36). Furthermore the process of state development and its transformation from the 
traditional to the modern form became a criterion for political geographers in identifying 
the factors which seem to be crucial to the formation and emergence of a state. On the 
basis of such analysis, PAINTER believes state formation to be the result of a ‘social 
process’ or a ‘product of war’ (PAINTER 1995: 35, 43). A semilar view is also held by 
TILLY: ‘war drives state formation and transformation’, or ‘war made the states and vice 
a versa’ (TILLY 1992: 20, 67). As illustrated in Fig. 1, in most of the cases, including 
Afghanistan, wars that occurred at different periods play a key role in both - the 
formation and transformation of states.  
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Through the course of history the form of the state has changed and so did its concept. 
Despite ‘state’ being an old phenomenon, it is still not easy to define it precisely and to 
determine its defining aspects and criteria. Although there are many definitions there is 
no universally accepted one. In part this is because, as with all objects of social scientific 
investigation in the social sciences, different writers adopt different perspectives and 
understandings, and these inform their definitions (PAINTER 1995: 33-34).  According 
to WEBER, state is a compulsory political association with a continuous organization in 
which its administrative staff successfully uphold a claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order (WEBER 1964: 154) 
within a given territory (CORBRIDGE 2008: 107). KRADER concludes after analyzing 
views of experts from different field that anthropologists believe that the state is the 
central and highest political authority for regulation of a given society. It acts through a 
governmental machinery with defined agencies and divisions of functions. Furthermore 
all mentioned sources agree that state is distinct from society and from government in 
general (KRADER 1968: 26-27). 
 
Geographers have a more distinct vision of the term ‘state’. They believe that state 
consists of three main elements: territory, people and organization or an effective 
mechanism of government (POUNDS 1963: 7, DE BLIJ 1967: 134). Traditional political 
geography was largely organized around the trilogy of territory – state – nation, and 
behind every successful territorial state there was a vibrant nation (TAYLOR and FLINT 
2000: 192). Furthermore, the three elements state, land and people are also considered as 
a geographical paradigm.  Next to these main elements, state is supposed to have an 
organized economy, circulation system, sovereignty and recognition (GLASSNER 1993: 
35-36, DICKEN 2004: 123). State is also a concept represented by certain symbols and 
demanding the loyalty of people (GLASSNER 1993: 35-36). Such symbols include 
historical monuments, memorials for important events and prestigious personalities who 
played their role in political, social and cultural events of the country.  
 
Nowadays, state is the most accepted model of territorial organization and the key 
determinant in the world political map (JOHNSTON, KNIGHT and KOFMAN 1988: 3). 
Furthermore it is the basic unit of political control and legitimacy in the modern world. 
The international system is primarily composed of states that recognize each other’s 
sovereignty, that is, ultimate legal authority over a demarcated territory. According to 
international laws and norms, the exercise of this sovereignty imposes obligations to 
respect the rights of citizens, other people, and other states, according to the law of 
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nations. Yet no state can carry out these obligations unless it has certain capacities  
(WORLD BANK 2005: 45). Nevertheless, these definitions highlight some of the main 
criteria of ‘state’. However, in modern studies there is a variety of terminologies used to 
describe ‘states’ in terms of their functions and performance in the international system. 
In order to understand this better, it is crucial to analyse such a typology and identify the 
right term for the case of Afghanistan. 
 
 
1.3 The Two Ends of a State: State’s Effective Function as Determinant of its 
Ideal Form  
States meeting all of the above mentioned characteristics are ‘the ideal form of states’ or 
‘the states of modernity’ and are usually referred to as nation-state (TAYLOR and FLINT 
2000: 373, PIERSON 1996: 60-61). Such states are usually stable, secure, sovereign, and 
independent both politically and economically. They perform their basic functions (e.g. 
maintaining security, rule of law and public order, public services) effectively and 
efficiently. However, there are also states that face political, economical, social, and 
cultural challenges which pose serious threats to their stability. Such states are usually 
referred to as ‘weak-states’, ‘failed-states’ or ‘fragile-states’ and even ‘collapsed states’, 
which leads to confusion in using the right term for certain cases.  
 
State collapses, for instance, usually occur as a result of many factors, namely a 
government’s malfunction, loss of its control over political and economical space or the 
power shift from the centre to peripherial groups (ZARTMAN 1995: 9-10). At the same 
time, countries “lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to 
sustainable and equitable economic growth; to establish and maintain legitimate, 
transparent, and accountable political institutions; to secure their populations from violent 
conflict and to control their territory; and to meet the basic human needs of their 
population” are referred to as ‘weak states’ (RICE and PATRICK 2008: 8). Alternatively,  
countries facing serious challenges in their development were mainly seen as fragile 
states, this is particularly the case before September 11, 2001 (OECD 2006:17). 
 
The above definitions are just examples of many other available definitions in the salient 
publications. Despite a variety of terminology used in literature (ranging from collapsed 
to weak state), their characteristics mentioned seem to be more or less similar. According 
to the OECD the defining features of state fragility are to be found in a state’s inability or 
unwillingness to provide physical security, legitimate political institutions, sound 
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economic management and social services for the benefit of its population. While there 
are differences in the way these states are described (“weak,” “failing,” “failed,” 
“collapsed,” “fragile,” “at risk,” or “precarious”). Such states are linked to a range of 
threats that are not limited to their own territories but have ramifications for regional and 
global security (OECD 2006:17). The events of September 11th, 2001 attracted major 
international attention to the problem of fragile states. Particularly because their problems 
were no longer seen as an internal issue within their geographical borders, but they could 
expand and expose serious threats to the security of the world.   
 
A study carried out by Department for International Development (DFID) in 2005 
proclaims that most of the developing countries including Afghanistan are considered as 
fragile states where the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the 
majority of its people, including the poor. According to this study the most important 
functions of the state for poverty reduction are territorial control, safety and security, 
capacity to manage public resources, delivery of basic services, and the ability to protect 
and support the ways in which the poorest people sustain themselves (DFID 2005: 7). 
Table 1 below identifies some of the main characteristics of fragile states. 
 
• Access to public service for 
specific regions of the country or 
groups is deliberately limited
• The state levies less than 15% of 
GDP in tax.
Administrative capacity 
to deliver services
• There is no transparency in the 
public management of natural   
resource extraction.
• Weak or partial public financial 
management tools, such as a budget 
cycle and planning processes.
Economic management
• Major groups are systematically 
excluded from political process.
• The power of executive is not 
subject to controls, either through 
informal (political party) or  
formal (legislator) channels.
• There are no effective channels for 
political participation.
Effective political 
power
• One of more groups are 
systematically subjected to  
violence or deliberately not  
provided security by the state
• The state lacks clear international   
sovereign status.
• The state cannot control its 
external border or significant 
parts of its internal territory
State authority for 
safety and security
WillingnessCapacity
 
Table 1: Indicative features of fragile states     
Source: Department of International Development (2005: 8) 
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Furthermore the DFID categorizes most of the developing countries into four broad 
types: 
• ‘good performers’ with capacity and political will to sustain a development  
   partnership with the international community 
• ‘weak but willing’ states with limited capacity 
• ‘strong but unresponsive’ states that may be repressive 
• ‘weak-weak’ states where both political will and institutional capacity pose    
    serious challenges to development (DFID 2005: 8). 
 
This categorization identifies certain characteristics of fragile states. But still, it is not 
complete and cannot demonstrate all aspect of fragility. It has very materially oriented 
categorizations and gives no reason why these factors create fragility. In other words, it 
shows how these states are rather than why they are so and how the situation can be 
improved. This requires the analysis of institutional capacity which is considered to be 
the fundamental problem in the fragility of states. Such analysis will highlight the driving 
factors behind the fragility of states. 
 
1.4 The Role of Institutional Capacity  
In order to understand the role of institutional capacity it is important to know the 
institutions first and then analyse and understand the driving factors behind state fragility 
and stability. According to WEBER, a modern state is characterized by a set of 
institutions and a regularized staff to administer them (WEBER quoted in PENROSE and 
MOLE 2008:275). To better explore the institutions of state, the functional approach 
presented by HARTSHORNE provides a theoretical framework. According to this 
approach  
the fundamental purpose of any state, as an organization of a section of land and a section of 
people, as RATZEL first put it, is to bring all the varied territorial parts, the diverse regions of the 
state-area, into a single organized unit. In all cases, it attempts to establish complete and exclusive 
control over internal political relations – in simplest terms, the creation and maintenance of law 
and order. Local political institutions must be conform with the concepts and institutions of the 
central, overall, political organization (HARTSHORNE 1950: 104).  
 
The importance of this approach has been further emphasized in later studies (Cf. 
COHEN 1975:15, GLASSNER and DE BLIJ 1980:67).  
 
While HARTSHORNE’S functional approach highlights the importance of functions of 
the state it does not name any particular institutions of the state. Another study carried out 
by SHORT emphasizes the important goals and functions of a state while it also identifies 
institutions which should carry out these functions (table 2). At the same time he believes 
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that the ability of a state to pursue these goals and functions depends upon the position of 
the state in the political and economic world order (SHORT 1994: 71). As illustrated in 
table 2, SHORT identifies some institutions but not all of them: some especially 
important institutions of state, namely the legislative, is missing and the government (also 
known as the machinery of state) function is considered to be external. 
Police force, armed services, judiciary
Education and mass media 
(propagating essential rightness of existing system)
Internal
Maintain law and order
Maintain belief system
Diplomatic service, armed services
Diplomatic services, armed services, government agencies 
which sign trading agreements, give aid to domestic 
producers, create tariff to keep out foreign competitors
External
Defend the country
Maintaining favourable trading 
relations
State apparatusFunctions
 
Table 2: Internal and external functions of state           
Source: SHORT (1994: 71) 
 
Another study that identifies the functions of modern nation-states and the role of 
institutional capacity is mentioned by PENROSE and MOLE. They emphasize the role of 
institutions and regularized staff mentioned by WEBER and add that one of the key 
functions of nation-state building is to establish these institutions as well as the 
bureaucracy capable of running them. According to their opinion nation-state building 
always involves at least five main processes that include: 
1. Establishing the overtly political structure of the nation-state, namely institution of the 
government and system of representation, 
2. The second main mechanism of nation-state building involves a monopoly over the legitimate 
use of force (a key characteristic of a modern state) by creating ‘national’ military and police 
forces, 
3. Establishment of a national system of education through a standardized curriculum, 
4. Standardized language is also fundamental to the fourth and fifth mechanism of nation-state 
building, 
5. The building of an effective nation-state is aided by symbols, shared meanings and memories 
that are identified, and/or created, to confirm the existence of the nation-state and to invite 
personal allegiance to it (PENROSE and MOLE 2008:275). 
 
While these five processes present the importance of institutional capacity in a nation-
state, they give few hints hints as to how such institutions should be created. In other 
words, these approaches highlight the role of institutions in the formation of modern 
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nation-states but they give no further information how such institutions can be established 
in different countries with different socio-political backgrounds. Particularly in cases like 
Afghanistan a geographically diverse country with a fragmented society the creation of 
such institutions is one of the biggest challenges in the formation of stable states.  
 
 
1.5 Research Question and Hypothesis 
Afghanistan presents a very complex case for the state-building process. Recent studies 
categorize it among the countries in the world that are regarded as failed states, failing 
states, collapsed states, weak states, fragile states, crisis states (ZARTMAN 1995: 1-11), 
(GOODSON 2001: 183), (MILLIKEN 2003:3, 16), (HANHIMAEKI and WESTAD 
2004: 631), (UNDP 2004a: 134), (UNDP 2004b: 23),  (UNDP 2005: 12), (FUKUYAMA 
2OO5: 125), (DFID 2005: 5), (MILLEN 2005: 1), (USAID 2005: 13), (RIPHENBURG 
2005: 31), (CRISIS STATES RESEARCH CENTRE 2005: 12) (WORLD BANK 2005: 
16, 44), (IEG-World Bank 2006: 4), (YAMAGUCHI 2006: 10), (ZARTMAN 1995:1-2), 
(ZEITLER 2007: 143), (ENGLEHART 2007: 133-144, 138), (GHANI and LOCKHART 
2008), (IRO 2008: 15), (RICE and PATRICK 2008: 13-16), (HAIMS, GOMPERT, 
TREVERTON and STEAMS 2008: 1-2, 33), (RUTTIG 2008: 12) while the international 
media refer to it as a puppet-state or a narco-state.   
 
Despite Afghanistan becoming independent in 1919 it never became a stable and 
functioning state. Many other states in the world emerged decades later, but are now 
more stable and functioning successfully while Afghanistan still struggles. Why did 
Afghanistan fail to become a stable state and a unified nation? Why did state-building 
efforts fail in the past and why are they not succeeding now? What makes Afghanistan 
such a complicated case for state-building? Despite many attempts which were carried 
out either by Afghans themselves or by foreigners through military interventions (e.g., 
the British, the Russians, and the US plus EU and UN), why has the project repeatedly 
failed and why is it failing again now?  
 
In the last eight years, all attempts by the international community to stabilize 
Afghanistan have not been successful. The recently established institutions like the 
executive, legislative and judiciary branch of the government based in the capital city, 
have little or no influence and presence in the entire country. Despite the number of 
Afghan National Army (ANA), and Afghan National Police (ANP) having increased in 
the last seven years, there are still large gaps to be filled. The monopoly over the 
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legitimate use of force by the elected government is not achieved yet. Taliban attacks 
have increased and even reached the capital, deteriorating the security situation there. The 
government has little or no control beyond Kabul city.  
 
The institutions in the country are weak and do not perform their functions effectively.  
The main reason for the weaknesses of institutions is the inadequate number of staff, 
especially the well qualified staff. In addition to that, the very low monthly salary (USD 
40-60) paid to the staff makes jobs in government institutions less attractive and opens 
the way for corruption and brain drain. Particularly the police and the judiciary branch 
are among the most corrupt institutions of the state. Unemployment is booming and the 
demand of the growing population for job and public services increases.  
 
After more than seven years the incapability and ineffectiveness of the central 
government is one of the major challenge both for Afghans and the international 
community. Afghanistan continues to rely on human and financial resources provided 
from the outside. The incapability and inefficiency of national institutions to provide 
security, rule of law and basic services for the population continues. This situation exists 
despite the fact there are more than 100,000 foreign troops from over 40 countries, over 
2,000 NGOs and international organizations in support of central government. Among 
the foreign countries five leading donor-nations have taken primary responsibility for five 
sectors: military (US), police (Germany), demobilization, disarmament and reintegration 
(DDR) (Japan), counter-narcotics (UK), and judicial reform (Italy). This means the US 
troops fights against the Taliban insurgents and trains the ANA and security forces. 
Germany trains the ANP and carries out de-mining activities. The UK troops combat 
against drug production; Japan carries out the disarmament demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR); and Italy trains judges and lawyers, helps the government in 
regulating and organizing the judiciary system. The International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) composed of different European countries maintains security in Kabul and 
other major cities. The remaining tasks of the government are carried out by over two 
thousand international and national NGOs. In other words Afghans do not run their own 
country. The high salary paid by the NGOs has caused many officials to leave their jobs 
in the government and to get employed in NGOs. This situation in particular has created 
the problem of brain-drain for the government.  
 
The present situation is so fragile that if there is no more funding from the international 
community, the government has no ability even to pay the salary of its staff, which is the 
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only visible task the government does. Meanwhile, if there are no more foreign troops, 
the newly built state institutions will disintegrate and the country will become a subject to 
international terrorism and a playground for the drug mafia. But how long should there be 
funding from the international community? How long should the international troops 
keep security and order? If this continues, what is the role of the government? The 
continuation of this situation will further undermine the legitimacy of the first and only 
government and parliament ever elected. One day, Afghanistan should stand on its own 
feet without the presence and support of international troops. As long as the institutional 
capacity of the state is not improved both qualitatively and quantitatively, the externally 
imposed state-building project will fail again. 
 
My argument is that Afghanistan needs, at this point, to develop its social capital both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. Afghans can only run their state when they have enough 
capacity, capability and representative institutions. Lack of this capacity will lead to more 
intervention from outside powers, which will destabilise the situation in the country. To 
be a stable state, Afghanistan needs national institutions to function effectively, 
efficiently, transparently and with accountability. It needs a national army, national police 
forces and qualified people in government institutions. The question is, however, how 
such national institutions can be created in view of Afghanistan’s diversities. In other 
words, diversity is one of the main challenges or obstacles towards creating national 
institutions. Diversity is a factor that either causes or sustains fragility of the state (fig. 2).  
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Figure 2: The role of institutional capacity        
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
In figure 2 institutional capacity represents the ability and will of the actors (human 
resource) who play their part in the creation or reform of institutions and economic 
mobilizations. At the same time there are other factors like economic resources, types of 
institutions and organizations which have close relationship to institutional capacity.  
 
Political geographers carefully study and analyse the factors behind stability and 
instability or fragility of states. Such analysis will not only help to understand the impact 
of diversity on the stability of state better, but will also identify factors which decrease 
and minimize its impact on state institutions. HARTSHORNE is among the pioneers of 
this theory which identifies centrifugal and centripetal forces as the two most important 
factors behind the stability and fragility of state. He believes that ‘every state represents a 
complex mixture of centrifugal and centripetal forces, the former promoting inter-
regional division and discord and thereby pulling the constituent regions apart, and the 
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latter contributing to pull the regions together by promoting shared interests and values’. 
State functions effectively when it overcomes the centrifugal forces through the cohesion 
provided by prevalent centripetal forces, which bind it together. Centrifugal forces exist 
in every state; in some states they are so powerful that they disrupt the state system 
completely (GLASSNER and DE BLIJ 1980:67). The division of population into 
contrasting cultures, religious, and linguistic communities sometimes leads to conflict 
which threatens the stability and even the existence of the state (POUND 1972: 13-14). 
At the same time a state’s geography and history can also play a role in enforcing 
fragility. There are other factors, such as regional influences that are linked with fragility 
(VALLINGS and MORENO-TORRES 2005: 4) as well. This depends heavily on the 
geopolitical position of the country. 
 
On the other side are the centripetal forces that contribute to the stability of a state. 
HARTSHORNE identified state idea or raison d’etre (reason for existence), the concept 
of nation and the concept of core area as centripetal forces (HARTSHORNE 1950: 109 -
116) that bring divided populations together. According to this study Afghanistan is a 
fragile state where the centrifugal forces have dominated the centripetal forces.7 
 
1.6 Methodology: How to Focus on State-Building in Afghanistan - Status of 
Research 
The research methodology used in this study includes reviews of literature on state-
building, field research, distribution of questionnaires and interviews with experts.  The 
available literature is in Farsi and Pashtu written by prominent Afghan former writers like 
GHUBAR, FARHANG, and KOHZAD. GHUBAR’s book Afghanistan dar Maseer-e 
Tarikh (Afghanistan in the course of history vol. 1-2) and FARHANG’s book 
Afghanistan dar seh Qharn-e Akheer (Afghanistan in the last three centuries vol. 1-2) 
present an internal perspective and provide a lot of insight on the political developments 
in Afghanistan from early history to the mid 20th century. Furthermore, these two books 
are referred to quite often because the authors were the eyewitnesses of many events, and 
they are among the most reliable resources in the country. The review of recent literature 
was also considered. One of the books referred to was written by TANIN, a journalist for 
the BBC Persian Service. This book is in fact the published version of a series of 
programs that dealt with Afghanistan in the 20th century and consisted of interviews with 
the political figures of the country. 
                                                 
7 These factors are studied in detail in Chapter 5. 
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There has been much research on Afghanistan by Western writers following the end of 
the World War II. There are at least two detailed books still quite often used by many 
researchers on Afghanistan; one was written by GREGORIAN 1969 and another was 
written by DUPREE 2005, who spent many years inside Afghanistan. These two books 
provide detailed information on the 1950s to 1970s. For the analysis of later periods from 
the Soviet invasion to the rise and fall of the Taliban, salient books written by OLESEN 
1995, RUBIN 2002, RASHID 2002, ROY 1990 and MALEY 2002 will be referred to as 
well. However, these are only a few examples of a long list of literature which is 
mentioned in the bibliography. To gain access to these publication many libraries were 
visited in Germany were visited (in Bonn the library of the Geography Department and of 
the University of Bonn, in Duesseldorf the University Library, in Berlin the 
Staatsbibilothek of Potsdam, in Freiburg the University Library, and the University 
Libraries in Giessen), in Denmark (University of Aarhus and Moesgaard Museum), in 
Kabul (Kabul University Library and Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit AREU).  
 
In order to get access to the statistics and maps many related ministries and offices were 
visited. Statistical data was received from the Central Statistic Office in Kabul. 
Furthermore, the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office was repeatedly visited 
and necessary information and maps were received. In addition, the AIMS office in 
Kabul was visited for required maps, data and information. 
 
For quantitative and qualitative analysis field research was carried out in 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009. A questionnaire was prepared in which necessary questions were 
posed in both English and Farsi. However, in the field only the Farsi questionnaires were 
distributed. The target group consisted of students and professors at Kabul University. 
This special place and target group was taken into consideration because; 
 
 Kabul University provided a more secure and open atmosphere for this purpose.  
 The target group was educated and qualified to answer the questions. 
 In terms of official permission Kabul University was easy to choose since I spent 
many years teaching there. Furthermore, other places either needed special 
permission or it was not easy to find many people under one roof. Of course 
security was another problem.  
 Many top students were invited to Germany, under a DAAD programme called 
“Lucky Sixties”. At one occasion I was invited to participate as well. This made it 
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possible for me to distribute my questionnaire to these students and get their 
reply. Since these students represented all universities of Afghanistan, this helped 
to shift the focus of questionnaire away from Kabul and to reach other target 
groups in Afghanistan. There were altogether 247 completed questionnaires with 
available answers. 
  
Further field research was done in 2007 and January 2008. During these visits, the 
political situation was evaluated through participating in meetings, visiting places and 
collecting of local media, and NGOs reports. This helped to refresh the earlier analysis 
and provided the possibility for a comparison with the result of the past visits. Finally, in 
December 2008 and January 2009 I did the last field research. This time I carried out 
expert interviews. The result of the interviews is available in written and audio format.  
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2 Afghanistan's Diversity as a Determinants of State-Building Processes 
 
2.1 Geopolitical Determinants of Diversity 
2.1.1 The Geostrategical Implications of the Region 
Afghanistan is usually referred to as the ‘great crossroad of Asia’ (ARNEY 1993: 3), 
‘highway of conquest’ (FLETCHER 1966, HABIBI 1970:30) the ‘crossroad of 
civilizations and religions (HAGER 1983: 93, PANDJSHIRI 2005: 6, EMADI 2002: 1-
2), and the ‘roundabout of the ancient world’ (ARNOLD TOYNBEE quoted in HYMAN 
1984:3), as consisting of various trade routs linking Europe with the Far East and the 
Indian subcontinent (GREGORIAN 1969: 10-11) or as the ‘heart of Asia’ (AREZ 
1974:169, SHAHRANI 2001: 214). These views reflect the important geographical 
position this land has always possessed. At various periods in time, it has attracted the 
attention of different empires. It is mentioned for the first time in reports about the 
conquests of the Achaemenids under Cyrus, those of Alexander the Great, the Arabs, as 
well as the Mongols. The Great Game led to British invasions and the Cold War led to 
the Soviet invasion; this demonstrates the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan in the 
last two centuries. At the same time, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Afghanistan gained further strategic importance in the region due to the enormous energy 
and mineral resources in the Central Asian states. This situation was the begninng of a 
new era of regional competition and conquests for energy that is coined as ‘the New 
Great Game’. The main players of the New Great Game were Russia, the USA, Europe, 
China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran (PAHLEVAN 1998: 75-84). Since 
the events of September 11th the attention of the rival powers has diverted and focused on 
to ‘the War on Terror’ in which Afghanistan plays a pivotal role (map 1). 
 
Apparently Afghanistan’s geographic position has made it vulnerable to many invasions 
from Central Asia and the West (GREGORIAN 1969: 10-11) as well as from South Asia. 
Afghanistan has a triangle shape in which Hindu Kush mountains stretch from the 
Northeast and continues to the West. In the East it is surrounded by the Hindu Kush and 
its branches. In the North Amu Darya forms its border around 1200 km, while the rest of 
the land is surrounded mostly by desserts from the Northwest, West and South. Therefore 
the borders are easy to cross and hard to be patrolled. This vulnerability is the heritage of 
the 19th century delimitation of borders by the British and Russians. The British brought 
under their control major passes like Chitral, Khybar, and Bolan all of which were 
strategically important for defending their hold on India.  Following its creation in 1947, 
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Pakistan inherited these passes and Afghanistan continuously remained a landlocked and 
vulnerable country. In the same way the Russian occupation of Panjdeh from the North 
was mainly aimed due to its strategic importance.  
 
 
 
Map 1: The importance of geopolitical position of Afghanistan from the past to the present 
 
The delimitationns of borders carried out by the British and the Russians in the late 19th 
century was based on political and strategical purposes rather than ethnic or economic 
ones (GREGORIAN 1969: 10-11, EHLERS 1990a: 17). Due to this reason in particular 
DUPRRE believes that Afghanistan is an artificial country, created out of tribal kingdoms 
as a buffer state by the British and Russians in the nineteenth century. The boundary 
commissions largely ignored cultural entities (DUPREE 2005: 518).  
 
Furthermore these boundaries make it hard to clarify Afghanistan’s regional location in 
Asia. Different resources consider it as part of the Middle East, Central Asia or South 
Asia. However there is no dispute that Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries in the North 
(Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are part of Central Asia; Iran in its west is part 
of Middle East; and finally Pakistan is part of South Asia. The difficulty lies in the 
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position of Afghanistan between these countries, which also makes the definition of these 
three regions confusing, especially in terms of their geographical extension. Therefore 
neither the land nor its people can be understood without reference to the three great 
regions against each of which Afghanistan has its borders (HYMAN 1984: 3). This is 
because of the geographical, historical and cultural phenomena of these regions are very 
closely intertwined and linked, making it difficult to find any clear border.  
 
There is little doubt that Afghanistan gains much of its importance and much of its 
trouble from its location. It can be argued that the security, stability and sustainability of 
any political system in Afghanistan is highly dependent on the stability of the above 
mentioned regions and its neighbouring countries.  
 
2.1.2 The Impact of Neighbours and Borders 
Until 1947, Afghanistan neighboured two powerful colonial powers, in the north Russia, 
and in the south British India. They were the cause for both stability and instability in 
Afghanistan. The reign of any ruler was heavily dependent on the approval and assistance 
he received from either rival side. Shah Shuja, Dost Mohammad, Jaqoub Khan, 
Abdurrahman Khan, Habibulah Khan and Nadir Khan were all either enthroned or 
assisted by the British. Consequently, the British viewed Shir Ali Khan and Amanullah 
Khan as pro-Russian and anti-British rulers of Afghanistan because both had established 
close ties with Russia. In 1929, the British again succeeded in enthroning Nadir Shah by 
providing him money, arms and tribal militia. Russian attempts to return Amanullah to 
power failed because Britain had better access to Afghanistan since its core areas, like 
Kabul, were much closer to Khybar pass. Russia had to cross the Hindu-Kush, a great 
natural obstacle. It took them many decades to build the Salang tunnel and later Hairatan 
bridge over the Amu Darya river which they crossed in 1979, capturing the capital and 
enthroning a communist regimes loyal to them.  
 
Therefore, stability in Afghanistan was dependent on the balance of power between its 
two rival colonial neighbours. As long as they existed, they could prevent any possible 
intervention by a third party in Afghanistan. For example, Germany, when noticing the 
strategic importance of Afghanistan, tried in two different times to use it as vital a base 
against the British in India. The first time this happened when a German and Turkish 
mission visiting Kabul provoked the Afghan authorities against Britain in India. This 
caused both Russia and Britain to cut the communication route they used from the West 
through Iran and central Afghanistan to Kabul. During the World War II the Germans 
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once again became interested in Afghanistan as a strategic location and wanted to use it 
as a base against the British rule in India. Encouraging the Afghan royal family, the 
Germans promised to help the Afghan monarchy regain what they called its lost 
territories. After this strategy failed to influence the Pro-British Musahiban family, the 
Germans began to use Pashtun tribal areas as a base and backed the tribes to return and 
enthrone Amanullah.   
 
However, it was not always up to the foreign neighbouring powers to decide on who 
should rule in Afghanistan. During the Cold War and the competition between the East 
and the West block development projects to the emergence of different radical ideologies. 
Especially through the expansion of education system, thousands of Afghans were sent to 
Western and Eastern countries. However, the number of those who went to the USSR 
was far higher than that of those who went to the West. As a result of these contacts 
many political parties were formed that were against the existent political structure in the 
country. These parties mainly included the communists (Khalq and Parcham), the 
Islamic movements (Ikhwan-ul-Muslemin or Muslim Brotherhood), and the ethno-
nationalist parties (Afghan Melat and Setam-e-Mili). They all had one thing in common:  
they were against the monarchist regime, while also being fundamentally against each 
other’s existence. Although the communist and the Islamic movements were more in 
number and influence, they could not undermine the monarchist regime. The Islamic 
movements were severely oppressed by the regime while the communists enjoyed some 
extent of freedom for their activities. This was because of Soviet’s strong involvement in 
this period. In 1978, the communist parties gained the power and the Islamic movements 
migrated to Pakistan and Iran, following massive and brutal oppressions. At the same 
time the Mujahidin were not able to form a unified party, instead they founded seven 
Mujahidin parties in Pakistan and eight in Iran.  
 
The communist regime failed to avoid the persistent fractional rivalry. The same rivalry 
existed between the Mujahidin parties in Pakistan and Iran. In Kabul the communist 
fractions fought for the position of leadership while in Pakistan and Iran the Mujahidin 
fought amongst themselves about the distribution of arms and money they received from 
Western countries. In 1992, following the collapse of the communist regime, they fought 
among themselves over the power in Kabul. Therefore, the different Afghan political 
parties in different periods of time could not succeed in eliminating their fractional 
rivalry through armed conflicts. They failed to develop a common idea and a strategy 
which could bridge the gaps of confidence that existed among them. Instead the country 
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was still a playground for the strategies of foreigners.  Undoubtedly this persistent 
internal animosity was used to as an open door for interventions by the powerful players 
in the regions and especially for the neighbours.  
 
Another problematic issue, that continuously undermines the establishment of a friendly 
relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, is the dispute over the Durand border line 
between the two countries. Since the rise of the Pashtunistan issue no Afghan government 
has ever recognized it. Following the British withdrawal from India, Afghanistan voted in 
the UN against the creation of Pakistan in its East to Southern border. Instead, Afghan 
authorities called the area between the Durand line and the Indus River ‘Pashtunistan’ or 
the ‘land of the Pashtuns’.8 This issue from in combination with Afghanistan’s traditional 
friendship with India led Pakistanis to believe that their country is surrounded by 
enemies. The establishment of seven Mujahidin parties in Pakistan following the Soviet 
Invasion in 1979 provided a unique chance for Pakistan to influence the seven respective 
Mujahidin leaders and persuade them to support its interests. However, once in power the 
Mujahidin leaders formed the government which also had close ties with India. Only 
Hekmatyar remained loyal to Pakistani interests who opposed the government. This led 
to a proxy war between the Rabbani led government and Hekmatyar led opposition 
groups in 1992-1994. Later Hekmatyar’s failure to gain the power prompted to the 
creation of a more radical group of Taliban in Pakistan.  
 
The initial emergence of the Taliban was brought about to secure the transit route for 
Pakistani goods through Quetta, Kandahar, Herat and Ashkhabad, linking Pakistan with 
Turkmenistan and Central Asia.  According to Nasirullah Babur who is also considered to 
be the ‘god father’ of the Taliban militia, the United States fully supported Pakistan’s 
policy of creating and backing the Taliban from the very beginning (KLEVEMAN 2003: 
243). It was 9/11 that changed the politics in the region, otherwise the Taliban could have 
been a better tool to maintain the strategic goals of Pakistan and the US. According to the 
9/11 Commission Report, ISI (Inter-Service Investigation or Pakistani secret service) set 
up the first contacts between bin Laden and the Taliban’s leader, Mullah Omar, when bin 
Laden returned in 1996. Part of ISI’s motive was to get bin Laden’s help with non-
Afghan groups they had jointly worked with in the past (RIEDEL 2008: 35). Therefore, 
Afghanistan provided a safe haven for international terrorists, Pakistanis, Kashmiris, 
Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens and other states in the region.  
                                                 
8 For details please see Chapter 2.2 
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It is not only the border dispute that causes Pakistan to maintain its influence in 
Afghanistan, but also its growing demand for energy resources in Central Asia. Since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the region of Central Asia has acquired immense strategic 
importance in particular for its huge energy and mineral resources (MUKARRAM 1998: 
63). The significance of Afghanistan as a vital transportation route has attracted the 
attention of powerful players in the New Great Game. After the Taliban had taken control 
of Kabul many projects were planned to extend pipelines from Central Asia via 
Afghanistan to the Arabian (map 2). Through direct interference in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan, giant oil companies like UNOCAL of California, Bridas of Argentina and 
Delta Oil of Saudi Arabia attempted to maintain their interests in the region through 
financing and managing the proxy war (SHARANI 2001: 215-216). However, the 
Taliban failed to hold their control in entire Afghanistan and to get international 
recognition. This factor, along with growing instability and insecurity posponded those 
plans for uknown future.  
 
In addition, these Pakistan has always used the blockade of the transportation of goods 
via the port of Karachi as a means to put pressure on Afghan governments, thus forcing 
them to realize that Afghanistan is highly dependent to its Eastern neighbour. This 
Pakistani strategy was successful in the past, during the monarchy and even in recent 
years, especially as a response to the government in Kabul who blamed Pakistan of 
supporting terrorists. In order to overcome this permanent challenge, Afghanistan started 
to build a highway that links Nimroz province in the Southwest with Chabahar port in 
Iran as an alternative to Pakistani ports (map 2). So far, this project has been supported by 
India and Iran while Pakistan is very concerned for many reasons. First, Afghanistan will 
no longer have to succumb to pressure by Pakistan. Second, India will benefit from this 
project and find new trade-routs to Afghanistan. More important, Central Asia and Iran 
will profit from import export transit between countries in the region. The bombing of the 
Indian embassy in Kabul in July 2008, and the  repeated kidnapping and killing of Indian 
engineers employed in construction projects highlight the geopolitical tension in the 
region. 9 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Indian engineers involved in the development of this project were killed and abducted. 
 40 
 
 
Map 2: Major oil and gas pipelines with communication routes between Afghanistan and its neighbors 
 
With the independence of Central Asian states in the region, Afghanistan is now 
neighbored in the North by Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Thus it is no more 
the only landlocked country in the region because its neighbouring countries in the North 
also have no access to the sea. Despite their independence, these countries remain 
exclusively dependent on Russian communication routes for their exports and imports. 
This is something they eagerly want to change in order to reduce their level of 
dependence. Therefore, a communication route through Afghanistan and Pakistan that 
leads to the Arab sea is a strategic alternative. Furthermore, the developing economies of 
India and Pakistan have also created growing demands for energy. At the same time there 
is a rivalry between Pakistan and India based on trying to maintain their influences on 
Afghanistan. The same strong rivalry exists between Iran on the one side and Saudi 
Arabia and the US on the other.  The EU, Russia, Turkey and China also have their 
interest in Central Asia and its natural resources. Therefore, the New Great Game by 
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different rival players weakens the possibility of stability and security in the region 
difficult. 
 
At the same time the War on Terror is far from succeeding due to the growing strategic 
interests in the regions. The rivalry between the regional players still exists strongly in 
post Taliban Afghanistan. After more than seven years of attempts in Afghanistan, 
thousands of foreign troops under NATO command have failed to establish security and 
stability in the country. In the beginning, Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries supported 
the so called War on Terror and the US established military bases in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan.  However, since a few years Russia and China with their regional alliance 
have voiced their concern about the presence of NATO for a longer period. As a result of 
pressure by Russian and Uzbek authorities, NATO forces evacuated their bases in 
Uzbekistan in 2006. In the summer of 2009 the Kyrgyz government also gave a deadline 
for NATO to withdraw from its soil.  This happens in at a time  when the communication 
route of NATO force via Pakistan has been under repeated attacks by militants in the 
tribal areas of Pakistan. To break this isolation NATO discussed using Russian railways 
that link Europe to Central Asia. Even the possibility of opening a corridor via Iran has 
been discussed as an alternative.  
 
Moreover, taking into account cultural issues, the new Central Asian states are largely 
Muslim nations, This issue has created the possibility for religiously conservative 
countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia to compete in maintaining their influence on 
Afghanistan. Thus Afghanistan again provides a strategic corridor for such a purpose, not 
only because it has long borders that can be easily crossed, but also because it has a 
historical and cultural ties with the Central Asian states. An example is the emergence 
and spread of religious movements (e.g. Hezb-ut-Tahrir) in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
since their independence. Afghanistan has been playing a fundamental role both for 
religious movements and their supporters, from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to gain access 
to these countries.  
 
2.2 Historical Determinant of Diversity: The Changes in Ruling Systems from 
1747 to 1973 and Their Influence on Institution 
About the initial process of state-building in Afghanistan, authors generally have two 
opinions. Many non-Afghan authors believe that the modern state of Afghanistan was 
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founded by Ahmad Shah Abdali10 in 1747 (CAROE 1958: XV,  KLIMBURG 1966:32, 
SNOY 1974: 186, GROETZBACH 1990, ARNEY 1990: 6). Furthermore they believe 
that the first group of people who invaded this land were the Indo-Aryans around 1600 
BC (NEWELL1972: 35). They designated their land as “Aryanum Vijoo”, “Ariana” 
(FLETCHER 1966: 28, 302) or Aryana. According to this opinion modern Afghanistan is 
the Ariana of the ancient Greeks. STRABO states that “Ariana is bounded on the east by 
the Indus, on the south by the Great Sea on the north by Parapamisus and succeeding 
chains of mountains as far as the Caspian Gates, on the west by the same limits by which 
the territory of the Parthians is separated from Media, and Karmania from Paratakana and 
Persia” (BELLEW 1891: 3)11 (map 3).  
 
 
Map 3: The world according to Strabo (64/63 BC-after AD 21) 
Source: BUTLIN (1993: 11) 
 
These sources influenced many prominent Afghan authors to follow the same idea in 
their writings. According to these writers, Afghanistan existed as a state through the 
course of history.  Especially in the seventh and eighth century, there was a strong and 
populous state (e.g., the Bactrian State) (GHUBAR 1967: 39, 40).  According to this 
                                                 
10 The name Abdali is used both for a tribe and a dynasty coming from the same tribe. It is generally believed that 
Ahmad Khan (later Ahmad Shah) e got the title of Dur-e Durran a Farsi word meaning Pearl of Pearl from the same 
tribe during his rule. This title was shortened in usage to Durrani as Ahmad Shah Durrani and was used for his 
descendents as well as the Abdali tribe. Both Abdali and Durrani are interchangeably used in this text. 
11 BELLEW quotes ERATOSTHENES who in turn quotes STRABO (BELLEW 1891: 3). 
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claim the long history of Afghanistan begins with Ariana from 1000 BC to the fifth 
century, followed by Khorasan to the late 19th century and finally Afghanistan from 1880 
until now. Whatever happened in between is considered as foreign invasion and 
occupation. More important Afghanistan used to have natural borders, e.g., to the North 
with Amu Darya, to the South with the Arabian Sea, to the East with the River Sindh and 
to the west with the Iranian desert.  The Aryans settled in Balkh about 4000 BC and 
established the first Afghan state. The Abdali dynasty in 1747 were the last rulers who 
could extend the territory of Afghanistan to its natural boundaries (GHUBAR 1967: 6-9, 
PANJSHERI 2005: 3, KOHZAD 2008: 32-33). The discussions about Ariana still exist 
among Afghans who believe their land historically existed as Ariana from 1600 BC to 
700. Not only the land but also the people existed as a nation (Arian) with one religion 
(Zoroasterian) and finally one language (Avesta).12 The idea of Ariana and Arian was and 
still is found attractive in neighboring Iran, which changed its old name Persia (Parsua or 
Fars) to Iran in 1935 and their nationality from Persian to Iranian. The same customs as 
mentioned are also strongly common in Iran and Tajikistan.  
 
However, DUPREE disagrees with both the non-Afghan as well as the Afghan scholars. 
While criticizing the Western authors, he calls the imitation by the Afghan authors as 
“sheep-like following of western authors” (DUPREE 2005: xix). It is hard to prove these 
claims, particularly tracing and linking the history of today’s Afghanistan with Ariana 
and Khorasan. These two names identify a geographical location, they do not refer to any 
state as a political unit. Particularly, the word Khorasan is used to refer to the territories 
where the sun rises, or East of Persia, a name commonly used by the Arabs following 
their invasions.  From this period onward mostly the name of a ruler, the name of his clan 
and the place where his capital city was located were used to indicate the dominant ruler 
and his territory. No one has ever mentioned the ‘state of Khorasan’, instead  there is 
mention of the Safaarids, the Tahirids, the Ghaznavids, Ghorids, Moguls,  Afsharids, 
                                                 
12 The traces of the Zoroaster culture are still visible in a mixed form with Islamic culture. For example, the Islamic 
calendar that is based on the Lunar Year and the migration of the Prophet Mohammad from Mecca to Medina has been 
changed in Afghanistan (also in Iran) to the Solar Year system modifying both the Islamic calendar and the Zorastarian. 
Thus each year begins on the first day of spring or the 21st of March. The names of the months unlike, the Islamic 
calendar, are Aries, Taurus, Gemini, Cancer, Leo, Virgo, Libra, Scorpio, Sagitarius, Capricorn, Aquarios and Pisces. 
The special celebration of the first day of the new years (Naw Roz or new day) is a mixture with Islamic tradition, e.g., 
setting the flags in the holy shrine, believed to belong to Ali the fourth caliphate of Islam, in Mazar-e-Sharif and some 
other holy places in Kabul which are linked with the fourth caliphate, cooking special dishes (Samanak and Haft 
Mewa), going outdoors - walking on the grass, for picnics, visiting the cemeteries etc. The same customs as mentioned 
are also very common in Iran and many parts of Central Asia. In Afghanistan, these customs are very common in 
Northern, Western, and central Afghanistan including the capital and its surroundings. In the South these customs are 
not very wide spread due to the existence of tribal traditions. That is why the Taliban coming from the South banned all 
of these customs and formalized the year on the basis of the Islamic calendar. 
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Hotakis, Abdalis, Sadozais, Mohammadzais and their political systems as empires, 
dynasties, emirates or kingdoms.   
 
Today, what is seen as the diverse social structure of Afghanistan is inherited from its 
past, which is called a “crowded past” (FLETCHER1966: V). History has provided 
Afghanistan with a mosaic of people, traditions, religions and languages. What is known 
today as Afghanistan became part of Achaemenid Empire from 545 BC until 333 BC 
(TYTLER 1967: 17, GHUBAR 1968: 39).   In 330 B.C., Alexander the Great invaded 
this country and merged it with his Empire.  Then for many centuries Giu-Shangs 
(Kushans), Sassanids, Ephtalites, Scythians, and Parthians ruled and fought each other in 
this region. The statues of Buddha in Bamiyan, the art of Graeco-Bactrians or Graeco-
Buddhist are among the visible traces of those eras. However these empires left no visible 
traces among the ethnic groups of Afghanistan, but some believe they are the progenitor 
of the people in Afghanistan (FLETCHER 1966: 32-33).  
 
The Sassanid Empire came to an end as a result of the Arabs invasion in 642 when all 
Eastern Iran fell into Arab hands. The Arabs and th independent dynasties loyal to them 
e.g., the Tahirids, Samanids and Safaarids (DUPREE 1973: 313) introduced the religion 
of Islam and Arabic language into the entire region and added a new culture to the 
already mixed culture of the Zoroastrian, Greek and Buddhist culture. Some 
revolutionary figures revolted against the Arab occupations like Abu Muslim Khorasani 
and Yaqub Lais Safaari are considered to be historical champions against the Arab 
invasion. They are also among the first who used Farsi13 language with Arabic letters and 
promoted its use parallel to the Arabic that had been established as the Lingua Franca 
after the Arab invasion. 
 
2.2.1 The Role of Mosques as Socio-Religious Institutions and Their Influence on 
Political Power 
After the Arab invasion and the convertion of the people in Afghanistan, Islam influenced 
all governing institutions heavily. The Shariah (Kitab, Sunna and Ijtihad)14 was seen as 
the constitution for the ruling system. The mosques were the centres of religion and 
                                                 
13 Cf. Ch. 2.3.1 
14 By Kitab the Holy Koran is meant, the Sunna are the speeches (Hadith) and behaviour of the Prophet Mohammad, 
while Ijtihad means a decision made by a group of Islamic scholars and experts (Ulama) on special cases that can not 
be directly extracted from Kitab or Hadith. What these Ulama say is called as religious Fatwa (pl. Fatawa) for special 
political purposes, it is sometimes even issued against rulers who are considered to be illegitimate. 
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education. At the same time the legitimacy of every ruler had to be verified through the 
mosque, which had to accept these rulers as the First Leader (Caliphate or Uol-ul-Amr). 
This leader was considered to be as the substitute for the prophet Mohammad (IBN 
KHALDUN after ROSENTHAL 2005: 170).   
 
The institutions that fell under the government of the caliphate, which carried a royal 
authority, had many functions such as leadership of the prayer, the office of Mufti, the 
office of the judge, the police, market supervision and the mint (figure 3). Among them 
the leadership of the prayer was and in some countries still is, regarded more highly than 
the royal authority (IBN KHALDUN after ROSENTHAL 2005: 170-171) because the 
declaration of leadership of the leader with his name had to be announced in the friday 
sermon (Khotbah Jumah). The people were aware of the declaration through participation 
in the mosque and listening to the speech had to accept his leadership.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Tradtional Durbar structure            
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
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This process of legitimizing of the ruling system through the mosque was practiced 
during the era of the four caliphates 632-661 (Abu Bakr, Omar, Othman and Ali). During 
the Umayyad caliphates, 661-750, especially in the beginning, this process of legitimacy 
was practiced. In that period when the territories of western Afghanistan were conquered, 
Baghdad played the central role for all the territories occupied by Muslims. The territory 
was divided into many provinces (Welayat) run by different governors (Wali, Hakem) 
who were loyal to the caliphates and sent taxes, tributes (Maliyaat wa Ghanayem) and 
income directly to Baghdad. The orders (Amr wa Farman) issued by the caliphates were 
sent to all governors and were announced publicly through the mosques. However, in 
later period of the Umayyad, the process of legitimizing leadership remained a theory, 
while in practice this process was as an instrument for Arab supremacy. This supremacy 
was rejected by the non-Arab Abu Muslim, known as Khurasani who revolted against the 
Umayyad caliphate and ended their rule by replacing them with the Abbasids. 
 
The Abbasids, 750-1517, coming to power killed Khurassani and ruled like the 
Umayyads, following the policy of Arab supremacy. But the revolts were continued by 
Yaqoub Lais Safaar from Sistan, South of Herat, who put an end to the direct Arab rule 
and established his own dynasty that is known as the Safaarid Dynasty (GHUBAR 1968: 
90-100). However, in terms of leadership of prayer he had to follow Baghdad caliphate 
just like the first leader.  
 
Later, the rise of nationalism in the non-Arab world, especially in Persia and its Eastern 
plateau, brought many dynasties and sultanates of its own which were semi-independent 
or independent of the Baghdad caliphates. By 1200 the Arabs’ control ended in central 
Asia (DUPREE 1977: 315). The role of mosque remained as the highest central 
institution in legitimising the leadership and the ruling system remained.  Among the big 
independent sultanates or dynasties were the Ghaznavids, Ghorids and Timorids, which 
all practiced the Sunni school of Islam. However, the Safavid was the first big Shii 
dynasty established in Persia and ended the direct land contact between the Sunnis of 
Central and South Asia with Baghdad.  
 
The Ghaznavid Empire (962-1148) is highly important because for the first time the 
capital of an Islamic empire was based in Ghazni (Afghanistan). During this period, 
Islam was introduced in India and the Islamic and Indian cultures were mixed. This was a 
brilliant period for cultural and scientific development. Ghazni, the capital, was filled 
with men of great learning: among these 900 scholars were the scientist-historian 
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Albiruni, the poet Firdausi, and the historian Al-Utabi (DUPREE 1977: 314). Thus, 
Ghazni was called the Hazar Shahr-e Elm or thousand city of knowledge (PANJSHIRI 
1986). Much of the governmental system is indebted to this period since military, 
judiciary and civil affairs were the three basic parts of the Empire. However, this system 
was inherited from the earlier Islamic period, with some improvements that had been 
made, as previously mentioned. The law was based on the Islamic Shariah sources (e.g., 
Kitab, Sunnah and Ijtihad) (figure 3). 
 
The Ghorids (1148-1214), a local governor of Ghanznavid, revolted against its 
neighboring dynasties and was able to defeat them and bring them under their control. 
The ruling system of the Ghorid was similar to that of the Ghaznavid (GHUBAR 1968: 
135). Khawrezm Shah (1214-1219) was among the last rulers in the region untill the 
Mongols defeated him.  After that, Timurid (1370-1506) ruled the region. Then, for two 
hundred years, the territory of today’s Afghanistan was ruled by three dynasties namely 
the Uzbek Shaibanids in the North, the Persian Safavids in the West and the rest by the 
Moguls who ruled in India (map 4).  
 
Among them the Safavid (1501-1722) were the first Shii dynasty in the region that 
proclaimed the Shii as the official religion and forced people to convert to Shii not only in 
Persia, but also in Southern Afghanistan (Kandahar). This policy turned the Sunni 
Muslims, especially the traditional Pastuns, to revolt against Gorgin Khan, the Safavid 
governor in Kandahar for the first time in the history. Mirwais, the head of Ghilzai tribe, 
rebelled, killed Gorgin and declared himself independent. In this rebellion he received 
support from Awrangzeb, the Mogul Empire (1658-1707) as well as from other Sunni 
religious leaders (YARSHATER 2006: 236-237) in Kandahar. He received major support 
from the religious elite because prior to his rebellion he went to Mecca, from where he 
brought a Fatwa15 against Shii domination in Kandahar (FARHANG1993: 77). In 1722, 
Mahmud, his son, ended the rule of Safivids in Persia  and conquered most of its 
territory, including Esfahan, the capital, where he ruled for fourteen years 
(YARSHATER 2006: 236-237). 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Fatwa is an Islamic religious declaration issued by religious experts (Ulama) on important issues.  
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Map 4: Safavid, Mogul and Shaibanid empires 1520- 1700 
 
 
However, this brief and unstable rule came to an end when Nadir Shah (1728-1747) 
emerged as a powerful force and brought Persia under his control. He held a Jirga to 
which he invited all political leaders who then elected him as king. Following his 
election, he discussed his plans with the political leaders. His major plan was to unify 
Persia and Afghanistan. The only obstacle in achieving that goal was the Shii school of 
Islam in Iran, which he as Sunni strongly opposed. So he proclaimed the Sunni religion 
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again as the only official religion in his dynasty (GHUBAR 1967: 350). His policy 
enabled him to subdue the traditional Pashtun tribes (mainly the Abdali and Ghilzai) and 
later served as part of his troops. Nadir Shah’s assassination in 1747 provided the 
opportunity for the Abdali and Ghilzai to organize their own rule in their territory.  
 
The time from the Arab invasion until the rise of the Abdalis is considered as an Islamic 
period. It is believed that the country was called ‘Khorasan’ and the people, as one 
nation, were referred to as ‘Khorasani’, and that one language Farsi, established itself as 
lingua franca (GHUBAR 1968: 9, 535, FARHANG: 31-39). However, the history of 
Afghanistan until the rise of Abdalis is interspersed with constant invasions by different 
empires and rulers, ranging from the Greek to the Chinese, from Indians to Arabs, Turks, 
Persians and Moguls. These different cultures, religions, languages and traditions were 
mixed with each other. Within these intermixing cultures, Islam remained as the 
dominant religion and the Farsi language16 survived all invasions and remained as the 
lingua franca. However, as a result of so many invasions in the course of history some 
believe that there are at least thirty distinct languages native to Afghanistan which are 
spread among four language families, although the Iranian tongues are by far the most 
widely known (NEWELL 1972:13-14, RAHMATI 1986: 252). History also left a mosaic 
of people composed of different ethnic groups in the country. Among these ethnic groups 
the Pashtuns, under the leadership of Abdaly tribe, gained the power through a tribal 
confederation in the mid 18th century and they were politically the dominant elements 
untill the mid 20th century. 
 
2.2.2 The Emergence of Dynasties and the Role of Tribal Systems: From 
Unification of Tribes to the Beginning of Their Rivalry  
The tribal system is mainly a traditional institution, which is believed to perform tasks of 
political interest, mediation, dispute resolution, and military organization (HAGER1983: 
83). In the tribal system the kinship is an important factor. Some believes that kinship 
was an essential means to mobilize political or economic resources for all the people in 
Afghanistan (RUBIN 2002:22), in fact among the Pashtun ruling family, the modern 
history proves that on a very large scale. The tribal ruling system was based on kinship, 
e.g., from father to son to grandson in the same clan. The big ruling families employed 
their sons as governors and, after the death of the fathers of the ruling families, these 
governor fought for the control of power. Later the sons of these governors challenged 
                                                 
16 For more discussions over the name of Farsi language see chapter 2.2. 
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each other in a form of cousin-rivalry or tarburwali (TAPPER1983: 49) and fought to 
gain the political power. This cousin-rivalry during the reign of both the Sadozai and 
Mohammadzai clans was the main factor fragmentizing the ruling system from the rise in 
1747 till its last fall in 1973 (figure 4). 
 
In 1747 just after the assassination of Nadir Shah Afshar, the elite guard of the Shah 
consisted of a body of horsemen from the Abdali (FLETCHER 1966:41) and the Ghilzai 
tribes who had got the opportunity to establish their own political entity.  Their leaders 
were Noor Mohammad Khan from the Ghilzai and Ahmad Khan of the Abdali, the two 
rival tribes. The first had 4,000 Ghilzais and the latter 12,000 Abdalis and Uzbeks under 
their commands (GHUBAR 1968:354). 
 
These tribal leaders serving Nadir Shah increased their power and influence in the 
dynasty as a result of loyalty to the King. They learned much about the ruling system of 
their time from the Persians.  During Nadir Shah’s invasion of India they learned about 
the wealth of India and the weaknesses of the Mogul Empire.  This invasion opened their 
eyes for a possible future invasion there. Furthermore, their own troops together with the 
scattered Pashtun tribes from Kandahar to India, were viable available instruments for 
achieving these goals.  
 
These factors were the basis on which Ahmad Khan Abdali (reigned from 1747-1973) 
established the Abdali dynasty in Afghanistan. However, there are different opinions on 
how he became king. Afghan authors often quote that the 25 year old Ahmad Khan 
invited different tribes and held a Jirga in Kandahar to discuss the election of a king. The 
Jirga could not come to a conclusion due to tribal competition. It was Mohammad Sabir 
Shah Kabuli, a Sufi, who ended the nine days of unsuccessful discussion by saying: “God 
has elected Ahmad as the king and all should accept his rule” (GHUBAR: 355). 
However, it is also believed that Ahmad Shah had brought a lot of treasures, which he 
had gained after the death of Nadir Shah, that helped him to bribe the tribal chiefs to elect 
him as king (ATAYEE 2002:39). Nevertheless, others reject the idea that Ahmad Shan 
set up a tribal Jirga, saying he proclaimed himself to be paramount chieftain or king soon 
after he got the news of Nadir Shah’s death and headed to Kandahar (DUPREE 2005: 
332, FARHANG 1993:117). At the same time Noor Mohammad Khan’s attempt from 
Ghilzai tribe, to kill Ahmad Shah failed which cost his life, also raises doubts about the 
event of the Jirga and supports the theory competition between two Ghilzai and Abdali 
tribal leaders to become king (FARHANG 1993: 129, 130).  
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Figure 4: The Abdali (Durrani) Dynasty (1747 – 1978) 
Source: TYTLER 1967: 346, GHUBAR (1967: 379, 391, 393, 401, 509, 517, 589, 608, 615), DUPREE 
(2005: 366-367) and EWANS (2002: 300) 
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gathering) as the only decision making institution for important decisions, including the 
election of the ruler in the country. However, from the death of Ahmad Khan Abdali to 
Amanullah, there is a huge gap of more than 147 years during which many serious 
problems occured. Particularly in the 19th century, the country was divided and there was 
an unending conflict between brothers, cousins, and tribes while there is little evidence of 
any Jirga held by the rulers.  Instead, Ahmad Khan’s decedents repeatedly used armed 
conflicts and foreign assistance as a tool to gain the power.   
 
Thus, the rise of Abdalis under Ahmad Khan, who was from the same tribe, is believed to 
be the emergence of Afghanistan as a political entity. Ahmad Khan Abdalli hereafter 
became Ahmad Shah. The title of Dur-e Durran (Pearl of Pearl) was given to him by 
Sabir Shah Kabuli. Therefore both his dynasty and his tribe from this period onward are 
called Durrani. He established Kandahar as his capital and immediately started 
expanding his territory. This success was mostly due to the fact that there was no major 
power in the territories he conquered. Moreover, his reputation as commander under 
Nadir Shah helped him to gain territories without any major resistance. In other words, he 
inherited Eastern part of the territories which once had been conquered by Nadir Shah 
while the Western part came under the control of independent rulers who mostly 
practiced Shii. These independent rulers that ended with the Qajar Dynasty (1785-1925) 
were a political obstacle for communication between Othman Empire (NEWELL 
1972:39) and other Sunni rulers in the East, Central and South Asia. The Othman Empire 
possessed the leadership of prayers and the Othman rulers were regarded as a caliphate. 
This was important for the legitimacy of all Sunni Muslims rulers to follow the Othman 
caliphate. Thus, unlike in Nadir Shah’s period, Afghanistan together with other Muslims’ 
lands in Central Asia and South Asia, had become religiously isolated from the Ottoman 
Empire and Middle East.  
 
With Ahmad Shah’s reign, the scattered tribes of Pashtuns from Kandahar to India for the 
first time came under the  single rule of a man from their own ethnic group. However, 
this lasted for only a short period and he was not successful in maintaining stability in 
these territories. Furthermore, in his 25 years of rule he did nothing for the development 
of culture, modernization and economic development.  Famous cities like Balkh, Herat 
and Ghazni declined and lost their importance to the growing city of Kandahar as the 
capital of the dynasty.  The economy of the dynasty was mostly dependent on revenue 
from the fertile districts of the Eastern frontier (GOPALAKRISHANAN 1982: 52), 
mainly in Punjab. The dynasty, from its from its beginnings on, was instable and 
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insecure. With its core in Kandahar, the Abdali dynasty was repeatedly challenged 
mainly in Panjab and Neshapur which made it difficult to sustain its control over all the 
large territories it conquered earlier (map 5). 
 
In 1761 Ahmad Shah invaded India and defeated Marathas in India, losing thousands of 
his troops. This was the biggest mistake he made, because after the defeat of the 
Marathas he returned without ruling their territories. With the removal of Marathas from 
power he made it easier for the British to become the paramount power in India. In other 
words Ahmad Shah inadvertently aided the penetration of the British toward the 
Northwest of India (DUPREE 2005: 338) or today’s border of Afghanistan. Finally, the 
power vacuum in India and the family and tribal fighting within the dynasty all paved the 
way for the British to succeed. 
 
 
Map 5: The Abadli dynasty 1747-1793 
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Ahmad Shah was a good warrior but not a good governor or administrator. He conquered 
a large territory over which it was difficult for him to maintain a sustainable rule. Until 
his death he was struggling to bring peace and calm down the revolts in different parts. 
He employed his seven sons as governors who competed over the political power after 
his death (FARHANG 1993:154, 159,180). Among them, Timor Shah (reigned from 
1773-1793) carried out efforts to overcome the challenges to his rule which were posed 
by tribal chiefs in Kandahar and by the growing power of Sikhs in Panjab.  
 
In order to protect his rule from tribal competition in 1773 he moved the capital from 
Kandahar to Kabul, a ‘Tajik centre’ (TAPPER 1983:14), which was free from tribal 
dominance. However, the challenges from the Pashtun tribes were not easy to overcome. 
In 1979 he survived a coup when he was in Bala Hisar, his winter palace in Peshawar.17 
In this coup many tribes, claiming to want to greet the king entered the palace and 
suddenly attacked the guards. To prevent any fresh reinforcement from Kabul, the tribes 
closed the Khybar Pass. Nevertheless, the rebellion forces failed with 6000 losses in their 
attempts, as the royal guard fought successfully (GHUBAR 1968: 374-375).  Further 
reasons for changing the capital from Kandahar to Kabul are due to the role of Kabul as 
culturally rich city and its magnificent cultural role as the the home of the Ghaznavids 
and Moguls, the interest of the dynasty in India and finally the strategic location of 
Kabul. 
 
Establishing the capital in Kabul, Timor Shah became busy in a luxurious life. He left 32 
sons after his death, a turbulent legacy for his successors. This led to continuous war 
between brothers over the succession of throne which caused dramatic problems for the 
country (KOHZAD 2004: 303-304, FARHANG 1993:170-173).  From 1793 to the 
downfall of the ruling Sadozai in 1818, the Durrani dynasty was shaken by wars over 
succession. During the reign of Zaman Shah (reigned from 1793-1801), Shah Mahmoud 
(reigned from 1801-1804 and 1809-1818) and Shah Shuja (reigned from 1804-1809), the 
outlying regions became independent of Kabul. Every prince proclaimed himself as king. 
This situation is often referred to as Muluk-ut-Tawayefi (tribal kingdoms) dominated the 
politics of the country untill the late 19th century. At the same time it provided 
opportunity for foreign invasions, interventions and divide et impera (map 6).  
 
                                                 
17 Not to be confused with Bala Hisar in Kabul. Beside these two there is also another in Ghazni, Bala Hisar Ghazni. 
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During Zaman Shah’s reign, a group of Napoleon’s delegates visited Kabul. The aim of 
this mission was to implement Napoleon’s plan already made with Alexander I, the 
Russian Emperor. According to this plan, 70,000 joint Russian and French troops would 
attack British India via Afghanistan. They already singed a treaty for the same purpose 
with Iran in Finkenstein in 1807. Zaman Shah, having 150,000 troops, rejected the 
proposal of Napoleon’s delegates and said that he was willing to free India from the 
British without receiving help from Christian powers (GHUBAR: 382). 18 However, he 
did use these troops in his family fighting and tribal fighting rather than in the unification 
of the country or in freeing India. 
 
 
Map 6: The disintegration of the Abadli dynasty 
 
                                                 
18 GHUBAR gives no further detail about the number or the name of French delegates. He also mentions no source for 
his claim. 
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From 1747 until 1903, the country had no famous modern schools or traditional 
Madrasa. The famous cities of Balkh, Herat, Ghazni and Kabul, which historically had 
reputation for cultur were in decline. The fighting brought chaos which further isolated 
the country from Madrasas in Central Asia. Bukhara had 366 colleges (Madrasas) each 
of which had 70-80 students many of whom came from neighbouring countries 
(OLESEN 1995:44). Thus, the reluctance of the ruling elites toward the importance of 
education made this the darkest era of the country. From 1860 onward, the Russian 
occupation cut off Afghanistan from central Asia completely. 
 
From 1801 onward, the fighting between the two clans of the Sadozai and Mohmmadzai 
continued. As a result the Abdali dynasty collapsed and its territory was divided like 
‘heired property’ among the Khans of both clans (HABIBI 1993:146, FARHANG 
1993:223). By 1830 the territory was no more a unified land but a group of independent 
Khanates of which the most important were Kabul, Kandahar, and Herat 
(HABBERTON1937: 11). This situation helped the British and the Sikh to gain more 
territory. The conflict mainly continued for the control of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and 
Peshawar. Dost Mohammad (reigned from 1834-1839, 1843-1863)19 from the 
Mohammadzai clan gained the control of Kabul. Peshawar came under the control of the 
Sikh, while Shah Shuja, with British aid, attacked Kandahar in an attempt to overthrow 
his rival Mohammadzai and claim the throne. At this time Iran found Afghanistan 
without any strong rulers and attacked Herat, besieged the city but failed to break through 
due to strong resistance from the population of the city.  
 
In order to consolidate and maintain order and peace in his territory, Dost Mohammad 
married daughters of the troublesome tribal or feudal chiefs who had influence in the 
community (MORGAN 1981:24). Due the lack of any other institution to legitimize 
power or gaining public support, this policy was successful and helped the Amir to move 
slowly for consolidation and unification of the country. At this time, Afghanistan was a 
zone where the territorial interests of Britain and Russia clashed with each other.  The 
‘Great Game’ for central Asia was about to burst into open warfare, with India the prize 
and Afghanistan the playing ground (TANNER 2002:136) (map 7).  The policy of  
                                                 
19 Authors have different opinions on the exact date of Dost Mohammad Khan’s reign. In English sources the following 
dates are mentioned: (TYTLER 1967: 347) 1834-1863, (GREGORIAN 1969: XX) 1826-1838, 1842-1863; (DUPREE 
2005: 366-367) 1826-1839, 1843-1863, (NOELLE KARIMI 1997:1) 1826-1863, EWAN (1819-1839, 1842-1863). 
While Afghan sources, on the other hand, mention: GHUBAR (1834-1839, 1843-1863), FARHANG (1836-1839, 
1843-1862). I prefer, GHUBAR which seems most accurate.  
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unification by the Amir raised fear among the British, because such a consolidation 
method could encourage others in their own territory. Thus, they preferred a policy of 
divide et impera toward the Afghan tribes as a counter policy. Later, the British were 
further provoked by the visit of a Russian mission from Kabul and decided to establish a 
puppet state in Afghanistan to act as a buffer and thus to create a balance of power 
(MORGAN 1981: 26-27). 
 
 
Map 7: The Great Game: Russian and British expansion in Central and South Asia. 
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According to the British policy, Shah Shoja (Sadozai) was a good replacement for Dost 
Mohammad (Mohammadzai), because Shah Shoja accepted being a puppet in the hand of 
the British and he was the rival enemy of Dost. However, it was unacceptable for the 
Afghans, as Muslims, to have a ruler who was enthroned by foreigners. Shah Shuja was 
the first Afghan ruler who was installed by the British. This caused the first Anglo-
Afghan War (1939-1942), which is considered to be the worst disaster in the history of 
the British army (MORGAN 1981:30). During the war, Dost Mohammad first escaped 
first with his family to Bukhara. Later when the people were fighting against the British, 
he suddenly had surrendered himself to the British who sent them to India, into exile. He 
was not sure that the people of Afghanistan would succeed. The people, without him, 
defeated the British and opened the possibility of establishing a government.  
 
However, despite their success in the war, the Afghan people failed to determine their 
own future through establishing a government.  Although there were many popular 
figures among them but they could not choose one as their leader. The main reason was 
that, as the traditional ruling elite used to be from the Durrani tribe, therefore they were 
looking for someone from the same ruling elite. That is why they asked the British for the 
immediate release and return of Dost Mohammad Khan from India. Although he escaped 
and left his people during the war by surrendering himself to the British authorities in 
Kabul, he was still he was regarded as leader or Amir. The people demanded the relaease 
of Dost Mohammad Khan in exchange for the lives of 300 detained British citizens 
(GHUBAR: 542). Thus, he found a second chance to rule from 1842-63. As the British 
also found it impossible to control the country directly, they instead supported the Amir’s 
return. 
Returning from India, the Amir agreed to establish a British protectorate kingdom and 
accepted British supervision of his foreign policy. To prove his loyalty to the British he 
eliminated those who had revolted against the British occupation. In his second term he 
created no permanent administrative institution upon which the unity of the country could 
be maintained (GOPALAKRISHANAN 1982: 53). He expanded his rule to what is the 
territory of today’s Afghanistan but this was not sustainable. Like his predecessors he 
also had a big royal family, e.g., 24 wives and 52 children out of whom 29 were his sons 
(RESHTIA 1999:215). He employed his sons as governors in his territory and  following 
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his death they fought for the control of power. Among them, Sher Ali Khan (reigned 
from 1863-1878) proclaimed himself Amir while his brothers opposed him (HABIBI 
1967: 286-287). As a result, this opposition once again led to family-fighting a term 
which is known as Khana Jangi.  
 
The British also fuelled these fights due to the fact that they wanted a ruler in Kabul who 
would maintain no relation with the outside world, particularly with Russia. What the 
British wanted from their interference was that Afghanistan should remain exclusively 
within its sphere of influence and whoever ruled in Kabul should be under their 
supervision. In addition to that they were concerned that any relation between 
Afghanistan and Russia would bring its influence into the country and could pave the 
way for further Russian advancement towards India.    
 
Sher Ali Khan defeated his rivals and brought the capital under his control. In terms of 
administration the country was divided into five provinces during his period:  Kabul, 
Kandahar, Turkistan, Herat, and Farah (RAHMATI 1986: 50). At this point in time, 
Russia sent its ambassador to Kabul and opened diplomatic relation with Afghanistan. 
This was considered a provokation and provided a reason for the British to invade again 
to Afghanistan again. The result was the second Anglo-Afghan War in 1878-1880. At the 
same time, after noticing the British invasion in Afghanistan, Amir Sher Ali Khan 
without using his 50,000 troops against foreign invasion, had escaped to Mazar-e-Sharif 
where he died (RESHTIA 1999:323). Some say he died days after he went there to ask 
the Russians at the border, to whom he had signed a treaty of defense, to help him against 
the British (DUPREE 1977: 408-9).  
 
The people of Afghanistan, more united than ever, fought against the British and defeated 
them. Although the British used their old policy of divide et impera  to disunite the 
people by causing ethnic conflicts between Pastuns, Tajik and Hazara in Ghazni,  this 
tactic was soon uncovered by the people as their enemy attempt (GHUBAR: 531).  
Unluckily, the people of Afghanistan who united to fight against a foreign enemy were 
unable to determine their own future. The lack of modern education, the dominance of 
tribal and religious elites, and the traditional and divine concept of the ruling system 
caused the people to follow the rule of kings or Amirs from a certain tribe for 
generations, despite the fact that rulers like Dost Mohammand Khan and Sher Ali Khan 
escaped or surrendered to foreign enemies of the country. The ruling elite loyal to foreign 
powers, be they Birtish, Russian or Persian, received financial and political backing. This 
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enabled them to buy the support of dominant tribal and religious elites on which their rule 
depended. The people not only were largely deprived of receiving basic services but also 
they were tortured, killed and expelled from the country.  
 
At this time, Sher Ali Khan’s rival, his nephew Abdurrahman Khan (reigned from 1880-
1901) who was in exile in Russia, suddenly received permission to go back to his 
country. According to his own account, when he arrived in the North of Afghanistan 
those loyal to Sher Ali Khan joined him to fight against the British occupation. When he 
entered the Shamali plain (Panjshir, Parwan and Kapisa) just north of Kabul, 300,000 
people declared their support and the mullahs called him Amir and gave him the title of 
the leadership of the prayer (ABDURRAHMAN 1995: 220). However, the letter he sent 
to the British commander in Kabul indicates that his return and his rule were determined 
and accepted by the two colonial powers. This is further supported by the fact that he 
declined to wage war against the British occupation something the people strongly 
demanded. Finally, according to his own account, he asked the British certain questions 
that were highly important for the future of Afghanistan as a state. He asked 
(ABDURRAHMAN1995: 220-221): 
 
 What is the limit of my territory? 
 Will Kandahar be included in it? 
 Will any English personnel (Nafar) remain in Kabul? 
 Does the English government expect me to eliminate any of its enemies? 
 What am I to do for the British? 
 
These questions reveal that he wanted to rule for the British who had also determined the 
limits of the territory he ruled, his expenditures (subsidies) and the policy he required 
(eliminating anti-British elements and sentiments). Thus, Abdurrahman provided all 
criteria the British desperately needed. They signed a treaty –accepting Abdurrahman as 
Amir at Kabul - promised him arms and a subsidy along with support against external 
aggression (MORGAN 1981:182). However, he was assigned as the ruler of Kabul and 
Turkistan in the North while his cousin Ayub Khan ruled in Kandahar and Herat.  Ayub 
Khan was a varitable enemy of the British. He fought against the British forces and 
defeated them in Maiwand near Kandahar. Abdurrahman Khan, instead of helping his 
cousin in the war against foreign invaders, escorted the British Army leaving Kabul to 
safety (ABDURRAHMAN 1995: 224). This raised the anger of the people as they 
noticed he was a British puppet. Hereafter, Amir Abdurrahman was frequently disturbed 
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by rebellions, which he put down ruthlessly. From 1881-96 the Amir commanded 17 
military campaigns (DUPREE 1977: 418-19) through which he expanded his rule in the 
country and put off all the rebellions (map 8).  
 
 
Map 8: The reign of Amir Abdurrahman Khan, the ‘Iron Amir’ 1880 – 1901. 
 
In 1891, Hazara revolted as a result of the Amir’s provocation, or, as often suggested, he 
had engineered the rebellion (FLETCHER 1966: 147). The Hazara ethnic minority, 
mainly Shii, inhabited Hazarajat in central Afghanistan. In this war which lasted from1 
891-93, beside the massacre around 9,000 men and women were sold as slaves only in 
Kabul while an unknown number of them were sold in other cities (FARHANG 
1993:392-396, GHUBAR: 665-669).   
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In order to expand his rule, Amir built up an army of 88,400 troops which was the 
greatest permanent army of Afghanistan up to date. Abdurrahman established a military 
factory in Kabul and purchased some artillery weapons from Germany and France 
(FARHANG 1993:422-3). Receiving 2,000,000 Indian Rupees from the British as regular 
subsidies and assistance provided the necessary financial means for achieving this goal. 
This army enabled him to defeat his rival cousin Ayub Khan and expand his control to 
Kandahar and Herat. Amir Abdurrahman used religion as a powerful tool to implement 
his rule. The motivation behind Amir’s strategy in this fight was to make people busy 
among themselves so that they would forget the fact that he is a British puppet. 
Furthermore he wanted the people to understand that he is loyal to Islam and especially to 
the Sunni school. He wanted to show that he is in favour of the Sunnis and has declared 
Jihad against the Hazara. He enjoyed the support of the Pashtun tribes who gained lands 
and properties of the Hazara as a result of the Amir’s permission. He demonstrated 
further this policy in 1896 when invading Kafiristan and forcing its non-Muslim 
inhabitant to convert to Islam. After the process of conversion to Islam the name 
Nooristan replaced the old name Kafiristan.  
 
Another major policy of Abdurrahman was moving Pashtun tribes from the infertile 
South to the rich and fertile region of the North. With this policy he achieved at least two 
main goals: First, he broke the power of the Ghilzai who were traditionally the rival 
enemy of the Durranis. Secondly by providing them with privileges, he won their loyalty 
to his rule. Moreover, with this policy he wanted to change the existing ethno-linguistic 
structure in the North to the benefit of the Pashtuns.  
 
While the Amir was busy with his internal affairs, foreign powers drew the boundaries of 
Afghanistan with or without his consent (DUPREE 1977: 421). These boundaries are the 
achievement of his time which remained unchanged until now (map 9).20 One of these 
boundaries, which is still very controversial, is known as the Durand Line. The Amir 
agreed on its demarcation with the British on 12th November 1893 (FLETCHER 
1966:166). In terms of internal administration the country was divided into six provinces: 
Turkistan, Badakhshan, Herat, Kandahar, Farah and Kabul. 
 
Unlike his forefathers he appointed his loyal followers as governors and kept his sons in 
the capital. These governors contributed greatly to the breakdown of the tribal system 
                                                 
20 Except the small border line of Sistan with Persia and a 92 km border with China that were determined later, in the 
middle of the 20th century. 
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(DUPREE 1977: 420). Unifying the currency was another step he took, because before 
1880 there were three different currencies common in Kabul, Kandahar and in Herat. The 
new currency was made of silver and by machine, marked with the title of the Amir Zia 
ul-Mellat-e wad-Deen (the light of the nation and religion), date and place it was minted. 
It was called Rupee with smaller units that were called as Qeran, and Tanga.  Further 
smaller units of metal coins were one Shahi and two Shahi (ABDURRAHMAN  1995: 
343-344). 
 
 
Map 9: The delimitation of the boundaries of Afghanistan 1873 – 1964. 
 
To minimize the rule of religious elites  and to unify their rules he issued a guidebook for 
judges and a booklet of rules with 69 items of guidance for the governors (Wali and 
Hakem) of the provinces (FARHANG 1993:423) enforcing his dictums (Farmans). At 
the same time, he instituted the Board of Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Bureau of 
Justice and the police (Kotwali), the Office of Records, the Office of Public Works, the 
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Office of Post and Communication (DUPREE 1977: 420), which were cruicial initial 
steps.   
 
At the same time, Abdurrahman Khan was against modernization such as railways 
(MORGAN 1981:191). Despite his claim to be in favour of religion even no Madrasa 
was established during his rule. However, to educate the members of royal family, there 
were a few English and Indian teachers. The rest of the population had to fulfil their 
educational needs in mosques, and were taught by mullahs. The curriculum consisted of 
religious subjects and Persian literature mainly from famous poets (Maulana or Rumi, 
Hafiz and Saadi) and stories (religious and fiction). For higher education the students 
(Talabas) had to go individually to India and attend theology in Dar-ul-Ulum Deoband 
the famous traditional Madrasa established in 1867 (OLESON 1996:45) without 
receiving any support from the Kingdom. 
 
Amir had an autocratic and centralized administration without any prime minister or 
minister. He claimed his rule was divine and he was sent by God to save the country from 
anarchy and foreign invasions. Whoever of the religious, tribal or feudal elites had 
opposed his divine power was brutally punished or executed (FARHANG 1993: 
417,420). After his death there were 12,000 men and 8000 women in his prisons only in 
Kabul. Being so brutal in killing, he is known as the ‘Iron Amir’ in English literature.  
While Queen Victoria officially granted him the highly regarded title of ‘Brave Indian 
Star’ (GHUBAR: 655-656, 685) his own people, up to now, remember him as one of the 
most brutal rulers in the history of Afghanistan.  
 
2.2.3 The Rise of Intelligentsia (Roshanfekran): First Steps in Building Institutions 
and Capacities  
During the reign of Abdurrahman (1890-1901), the country had only troops loyal to the 
king. Basic training institutions like schools, universities, as well as professionals like 
teachers, doctors and engineers did not exist.  However, Abdurrahman’s totalitarian rule 
provided the opportunity to introduce some modernization and modern education to his 
son Habibullah (reigned from1901-1919). In 1903, Habibullah opened the country to 
modern education by establishing the first modern school, the Habibia Lycee (derived 
from his name). This school was staffed with Indian and Turkish teachers and had around 
one thousand students from primary to upper secondary level (GHUBAR 1968: 702). 
Later this school became a political centre for the first trained group of intellectuals. 
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Habibullah was among the few rulers succeeding the throne peacefully. He followed his 
father’s policy of accepting the British direct control over the foreign affairs of the 
country. In the beginning, in order to show his loyalty to Islam, he carried out a very 
traditional and conservative policy. He ordered women to wear special veils (Burqa) and 
prohibited them to go out, with some exceptions in which case they were not allowed any 
ornament. At the same time he ordered the non-Muslim minority of Sikh to wear yellow 
clothes to be recognizable. He established 11 religious Madrasa in 11 cites of 
Afghanistan that had 14 teachers and 140 students (GHUBAR 1968: 700). Although he 
stopped the brutal methods of punishment (cutting hands, feet, ears and blinding) which 
his father used and sentenced whoever he regarded as guilty to prison (FARHANG 1993: 
439) this was far enough to convince the people to consider him as a legitimate ruler. 
 
Exiled by his father, a group of the Mohammadzai family (Musahiban from India and 
Tarzi from Turkey), were allowed to return to Afghanistan. The Musahiban and Tarzi 
families were politically divided into two groups; one led by Tarzi influenced by Turkey, 
Egypt and Germany; while the others were led by Nadir Khan, (born and educated in 
India), with his four brothers who were influenced by the British. When these two 
fractions returned from exile there was another anti-British conservative fraction led by 
Nasrullah Khan, Amirs brother. Thus family relationship qualified them to get royal titles 
and high posts. For example, the Tarzi established the first newspaper (Seraj-ul-Akhbar) 
and Nadir Khan (later Nadir Shah) from the Musahiban became a general (Sepah-salar) 
in the army. Once in they occupied official positions they strengthened their basis of 
power and established a network of people loyal to them.  As their final goal they were 
looking for an opportunity to overthrow the Amir and take over power. This was 
something they finally succeeded in and they ruled in the country from late 1929 to 1978. 
 
At this point in time Afghanistan, despite a political division between internal players, 
remained stable because it did not pose any challenge to the interests of the two powerful 
neighbours Russia and Britain. The subsidies received from the British helped the Amir 
to sustain his rule and to control the situation. However, the beginning of World War I 
and its consequences influenced Afghanistan. In September 1915, the first ‘German and 
Turkish military mission’ arrived in Kabul and was received with a warm welcome. The 
aim of this mission was to encourage people in Iran and Afghanistan to carry out 
uprisings against British India (SCHLAGINTWEIT 1995: 24). The Afghan royal court 
was divided about the aim of the mission. Habibullah did not want to risk his rule and 
turn against British, while Tarzi, Amanullah and his brother Enayatullah favored this 
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idea. Nadir Khan and his brothers were in favour of the Amirs policy, since they were 
loyal to the British. Nevertheless, the mission after some delay received permission to 
reform the army, train officers and to increase the capability of the military structure. 
This situation provoked both Russia and Britain, as a result they closed the 
communication route that linked Iran via central Afghanistan to Kabul, which was used 
by the Turkish-German Mission. In order to keep Habibullah on their side, the British 
increased the sum of subsidies.  
 
Although the Turkish-German mission failed in their mission and returned to their 
countries, it had major impacts on the future of Afghanistan. This opened the first contact 
with the outside world after many years of isolation. The strongest impact of the mission 
was that many persons within the royal family understood that as long as Habibullah is in 
power Afghanistan will remain under British influence. In other words he was the major 
obstacle for the independence and prosperity of Afghanistan. Therefore, in a planned and 
organized way Habibullah was assassinated on 20th February 1919 and his reign ended. It 
is significant to see that five months after this event in August 1919, Afghanistan became 
an independent and sovereign state. This was the first politically motivated assassination 
within the circle of the royal family.  
 
The assassination led the country to political turmoil, as a power struggle between 
members of the Amir’s family evolved, between his brother and his son. Nasrullah Khan, 
Amir’s brother, proclaimed himself to be Amir in Jalalabad and a friday sermon was read 
to spread and validate his name. At the same time Amanullah, the Amir’s son did the 
same thing process in Kabul. Finally Amanullah (reigned from1919-1929), based in 
Kabul managed to dominate and succeed to the throne. A few days later Nasrullah Khan 
was captured and sent to prison where he died. 
 
Immediately after gaining power Amnaullah declared the 3rd Anglo-Afghan war which 
led to the independence of the country. This paved the way for his political and 
administrative reform. He revised administrative divisions by dividing the country into 
216 small districts, five provinces (welayat); Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, Turkistan, and 
Qataghan-and-Badakhshan, four big districts (Hukumat-e Ala or grand government); 
Eastern District, Southern, Farah District and Maimana District. This administrative 
division remained unchanged until 1965 (RAHMATI 1986: 57-58) (map 10).  
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Map 10: The reign of Amir / King Amanullah Khan and major political developments 
 
In order to minimize the influence of traditional and tribal elites, he increased the number 
of modern institutions. Special attention was given to the development of a modern 
education system in the country. According to Mahmood Tarzi, “the goal of the new 
education system was to cultivate an enlightened intellectual class in Afghanistan, an 
essential ingredient for successful reform and modernization and to provide a group of 
able administrators for the monarchy” (GREGORIAN 1969: 240). To achieve this goal, 
more schools were established, e.g., Amani, Ghazi, Isteqlal in the capital, while other 
schools were established in major cities and provinces. Newspapers were introduced and 
their number increased both in the capital and in other major cities. As the training 
institutions increased, the demand for more teachers was raised as well. To fill the gap, in 
the beginning, Muslim teachers were hired from India, Turkey and Egypt. By the 
mid1920s a number of English, French, German, and Italian instructors were also 
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employed and their languages were taught (NEWELL 1982: 37). Until 1927, the number 
of students went up to 51,650 in elementary, and 3,000 in upper secondary and 
professional schools. Parallel to this, 322 elementary schools were established in the 
country and hundreds of students, including female students, were sent to Turkey, 
Germany, Italy, France, and Russia for further education (GHUBAR 1968: 792-793).  
 
Amanullah’s major concern was the dominant role of religious elites in society. 
Therefore the government set up certain regulations in an attempt to bring the religious 
elites under state control. The common religious course of studies for students in 
Deoband, India, was banned and those who studied faced different punishments. 
Furthermore, certain processes of evaluation which mullahs had to go through were 
established. Only if they passed they were given an official certificate, which 
acknowledged their status and paved the way for them to work.  
 
The main achievements of this era were the emergence of a modern educated class 
known as ‘intelligentsia’ who mainly represented the urban population. This social class 
emerged with a small number from Habibia School and grew bigger by 1928. However, 
their number was still small and they belonged to the younger generation, while in the 
traditional society of Afghanistan religious and tribal elites were dominant. It took some 
time for the intellectuals to grow in number and challenge the dominant traditional elites 
in the hierarchy of the society.    
 
As part of its international campaign in April 1919 Afghanistan established diplomatic 
relations with Russia. Both countries agreed on an exchange of ambassadors. Until 1928 
Amanullah established diplomatic relations with Iran, Turkey, Japan, Poland, Finland, 
Switzerland, France and Germany. In order to modernize the structure of state and 
government, Amanullah carried out some fundamental reforms. In April 1923, 
Amanullah issued the first constitution (Nizamnama-e Asasi) of the country during a 
Loya Jirga in Jalalabad with the approval of 800 tribal elites and official delegates 
(FARHANG 1993:532-3). The constitution was modelled on the Iranian constitution of 
1906 and the Turkish administrative codes of Ataturk. Turkish law experts also assisted 
the king in the formation of the constitution. Amanullah changed his title from Amir to 
king (DUPREE 1977: 450- 462) because the title Amir was more a religious form of 
leadership, so he wanted to distance himself from the religion. According to the 
constitution, the rule of the King was not based any more on the notion of divine will 
(OLESEN 1996: 121) which legitimised the power of his predecessors. Article 7 of the 
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constitution made it clear that the the name of the king was to be mentioned in the Friday 
sermon (Khutbahh-e Juma) as well as that the coins were to be minted to this name. 
Despite the monarchy remaining an absolutist institution (GREGORIAN 1969: 251) the 
constitution paved the way for the formation of an advisory Council of State (Shura-e 
Daulat) and Council of Ministers (Majlis-e Wozara). He established the first cabinet in 
the modern form with ten to eleven ministers and a prime minister. Almost for each 
ministry laws and regulations were provided. There were around fifty laws and 
regulations that included many aspects of the governmental administration (FARHANG 
1993: 532-533).  The first stage of reform was successful and enjoyed enormous support 
among the population. 
 
The second stage of the reform coincided in 1928 and came to its climax when 
Amanullah returned from his “Grand Tour” visiting many European and Islamic 
countries. Inspired by his visits, he immediately held another Loya Jirga and invited 
around one thousand delegates mainly tribal leaders and religious elites. He suggested 
substantial changes to be made in the constitution in order to make the government more 
representative. The reform he announced included the dissolution of the Council of State 
which was dominated by tribal chiefs, mainly the Durranis, the creation of an Upper 
House and a Lower House consisting of 150 legislators and the abolition of Loya Jirga, 
all in all in creation of a Western style cabinet and monarchy (GREGORIAN 1969: 259). 
To create a well-trained and ready national army he proposed the conscription to be made 
compulsory for two years. To accomplish these goals he also needed financial resources. 
Therefore, he proposed to increase the taxes. His further plans included the separation of 
mosques from the state, and compulsory education for males and females, the 
emancipation of women and the enforcement of monogamy (DUPREE 1977: 463).   
 
According to GREGORAIN the delegates agreed to some changes in the constitution, 
conscription and even the increase in tax. But they disagreed on three issues which 
caused a great public uproar: Amanullah attacked polygamy, declaring women free to 
discard their veil and making it compulsory for anyone living or visiting in Kabul to 
adopt to Western dress (GREGORIAN 1969: 261). However, there were more issues 
which raised public anger. Some of the issues at stake directly targeted tribalism in 
Afghanistan: emancipation and the education of women, the increase of tax, the 
conscription and the abolition of Loya Jirga. These issues are even today among the big 
challenges for the government in the Southern part of the country. Other issues that 
violated religious values in the country, like banning polygamy, and the veil, setting an 
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age limit for marriage (18 years) for women, together with changing the Islamic calendar, 
moving the holiday from Friday, the Islamic holiday, to Sunday, the official symbol of 
pulpit and niche (Mehrab wa Menbar) to wheat and sword . The increase of taxes on the 
poor people in rural areas, especially in the villages North of the capital, turned the 
people against the regime. While these people had no money to pay, the government 
occupied their land (SEDDIQH MUJDDIDI 2002:41). At the same time the enforcement 
of Western dress for the residents of the capital had nothing to do with modernization but 
instead it was against the dominant cultural values of the society. It widened the gap 
between rural and urban people. 
 
Through these proposed reforms it becomes clear that Amanullah considered 
modernization more problem of persuasion than a process of institution building 
(NEWELL 1972: 54). Introducing such a strange culture and even behavioural patterns, 
e.g., ways of greeting, for the people contradicted the traditional and religious way of life. 
In real terms these reforms meant the practical rejection of the Shariah law in the 
country. Therefore the religious elites were alarmed while the tribes especially in the 
South, were already voicing their opposition to modern reforms by the king. People from 
rural areas of Afghanistan, when entering Kabul, were forced to change their traditional 
clothes to Western ones and only then were they allowed to enter the city. 
 
Through these reforms Amanullah undertook the enormous task of rapidly transforming 
Afghan society without a definite plan, without the necessary financial resources, and 
without the requisite technological skills and manpower (GREGORIAN 1969: 269). 
Amanullah’s foreign friends, like Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, warned him that without a 
well-trained army and a loyal disciplined bureaucracy it would be impossible to 
implement any large-scale social and political reform. However, the modernization 
reforms in Turkey and other countries he visited impressed Amanullah and encouraged 
him to implement similar reforms in Afghanistan despite the warnings (DUPREE 1977: 
420).  
 
2.2.4 The Collapse of Modernism Effected by Religion Elites  
There are different opinions regarding to the collapse of Amanullah’s rule. Usually, the 
reforms he declared are indicated as the main cause for ending his rule. These reforms 
were never implemented, but the ideology of the king created enemies both inside and 
outside the country to overthrow him (DUPREE 1977: 463). One opinion is that 
Amanullah wanted to build a state in which tribalism had no place (TAPPER 1983:37). 
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Based on this idea, RUBIN believes that the end of Amanullah’s reign was as a result of 
revolts conformed in part to Ibn Khaldun’s model of dynastic decay (RUBIN 2002: 57). 
Another view suggests that the reforms frustrated religious elites more than any others. 
Amanullah was the first ruler to change his title from Amir to king since the first Anglo-
Afghan War. British invasions of Afghanistan made this religious title popular and 
legitimate to the public. That is why the religious elite called the reforms non-Islamic in a 
Fatwa and pronounced the king as an infidel who deserved death. Thus they declared 
Jihad against his rule (OLESON 1996: 152-157). In an attempt to minimize their role and 
effect in the society, Amanullah imprisoned Hazrat Sahib21 of Shor Bazar and his 
nephew, two of the most prominent religious leaders of Afghanistan (GREGORIAN 
1969: 263). The final blow that ended the reign of Amanullah came from the religious 
elite who turned against him and gave their support to Habibullah II.  
 
Furthermore, Amanullah’s foreign policy is also given as reason for the collapse of his 
rule. The British continuously ruled in Muslim populated border areas (including India) 
in the south. The Russian occupation of Central Asia neighbouring Afghanistan in the 
North altogether strengthened the position of the religious elites in the society. There 
were numerous refugees in Afghanistan especially in Kabul (including the Amir of 
Bukhara) who had left their homeland as a result of Russian occupation of Central Asia. 
This situation caused many people to join the Muslims in fighting against the Russians in 
Central Asia. One of them was Habibullah II (reigned from January 1929- October 1929) 
(KHALILI 1991: 107, RITTER 1990:555) who toppled Amanullah. His friendly ties with 
Russia became a historical point for the PDPA governments when Najibullah (1986-
1990) the leader of the party, and the President of DRA, said on a visit in Kremlin that: 
“The genius Linen and astuteness of Amanullah Khan provided a solid foundation for our 
friendship. The building constructed on that foundation has stood the test of time. There 
is a saying in my country: ‘A father’s friend is his son’s friend’” (NAJIBULLAH 1987: 
133). Therefore, Amanullah’s friendly relation with Russia also played a role in his 
downfall. 
 
At the same time, within the court, Amanullah faced opposition that weakened the 
foundation of his rule.  The first opponent was General (Sepahsalar) Nadir Khan who 
insisted that the government should solve the problem of rebellion caused by the tribes in 
                                                 
21 Hazrat Sahib is the title of a Mujadidi family also known as Hazratha (the Hazrats) who were the religious and 
clergies in Afghanistan. One member of this family, Sebghatullah Mujaddidi, is currently the Head of the Upper House 
in Afghanistan. Also he was one of the seven Mujahidin leaders based in Peshawar. 
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Junubi and Mashreqi through intra-tribal Jirga. It is believed that these rebellions were 
part of Nadir Khan’s attempt to gain power (GHUBAR 1999: 34, AKHGAR 2009). 
Nadir Khan and his brothers raised and educated in British India, wanted the Afghan 
monarchy to maintain a friendly relations with Britain. Amanullah’s friendly relations 
with Russia raised their anger. Furthermore, there were marked personality and policy 
conflicts between Nadir Khan and other ministers e.g., Mahmud Tarzi, and Mohammad 
Wali Khan (GREGORIAN 1969: 282). In order to decrease these tensions Nadir Khan 
was dismissed from his position and was sent to France on a diplomatic mission 
(TYTLER 1967: 224-225). Nevertheless, the conflict undermined the capability of the 
government to overcome the growing challenges.  
 
There were other major factors that played a fundamental role in ending Amanullah’s 
reign. The newly built state institutions had little success in wining the loyalty of the 
people. The institutions could not function effectively and efficiently. Corruption and 
nepotism were among the major problems. This was despite the repeated promise made 
by the government to control these problems. The justice system was among the most 
corrupt institutions in the capital and in the provinces. The government expenditure 
carried out from the collected taxes and revenues indicate clearly the heart of the problem 
(table 3). 
Institutions Expenditur % Tax Collected from Amount %
Ministry of War 40,000,000 22.22% Land 80,000,000 44.44%
Ministry of Darbar 20,000,000 11.11% Animals 25,000,000 13.89%
Ministry of Education 15,000,000 8.33% Customs 40,000,000 22.22%
Ministry of Interior 12,000,000 6.67% Mahsul-e Sokuk 10,000,000 5.56%
Expenditure on construction 
of buildings
10,000,000 5.56%
Miscellaneous
25,000,000 13.89%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7,000,000 3.89%
Ministry of Commerce 4,000,000 2.22%
Ministry of Finance 3,000,000 1.67%
Ministry of Justice 2,000,000 1.11%
Miscellaneous expenditures, 
purchase and some savings
67,000,000 37.22%
Total 180,000,000 100.00% 180,000,000 100.00%  
Table 3: Government expenditure and tax revenues in 1928                 
Source: Layeha-e Taraqqiyat (1928: 14) mentioned in (GHUBAR 1967: 791- 792). 
*GHANI mentions the budget for education as five million (GHANI 1983-1985: 560-561).                                             
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These figures show that the expenditure of the government is equal to the tax revenue 
collected. They illustrate that the state was relying on its own financial resources, an 
achievement hardly seen in later decades. However, apart from this positive development, 
the discrepancy of expenditures in different institutions is huge. Military expenditures are 
the highest, refuting the assumptions that Amanullah paid little or no attention to 
strengthening his army. Furthermore, the policy of reforms initiated by Amanullah did 
not match the expenditures. For example, the Durbar mainly consisted of aristocrats 
(Durrani chiefs), who received more budget than the education sector. This was despite 
the emphasis on the importance of education in the reforms. Most striking is the lowest 
amount of the budget being specified for the justice sector. This is a clear indication to 
the ineffectiveness of the justice system in the country which enabled corruption to grow 
in the institutions. At the same time, the amount of taxes collected by the government is 
mainly from land revenues. GREGORIAN names a figure as high as 30 percent 
(GREGORIAN 1969:270). However, official figures show the land revenues 80 million 
or more than 44 percent which together with revenues from livestock (25 millions or 14 
percent) makes it more than 58 percent. Therefore the high taxes on land and animals 
were the main financial source of the government budget while it was a huge burden on 
the poor people. 
 
Thus Amanullah’s reign came to an end due to many factors including repeated tribal 
rebellions in Junubi and Mashreqi, the declaration of reforms in 1928 which frustrated 
the religious establishment, and the increase of taxes. Besides the factors mentioned, the 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness of state institutions widened the gap between the state 
and people. The reforms needed well-trained people and Amanullah faced enormous 
administrative problems. Trained personnel were in short supply, and corruption and 
efficiency were major concerns (GREGORIAN 1969: 248). The main cause of rebellions 
in the country were bad administration (so-e edarat daulati) and inefficiency of  
government staffs (be kefayati-e mamurin-e daulat) who carried out their jobs with 
corruption and betrayal (GHUBAR 1968:790). This situation made the reforms even 
more unattractive to the people.  
 
As part of his last attempt to remain in power, Amanullah gave up all reforms. He went to 
the city centre and read his declaration in public. In this declaration he mentioned many 
items which guaranteed the power to religious and tribal elites. At the same time it 
removed some of the restrictions issued earlier. However, the declaration came too late to 
attract any public attention (SEDDIQ MUJADDIDI 2002: 74-77). Therefore Amanullah, 
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who left Kabul assigned his brother Enayatullah to the throne and left Kabul for 
Kandahar to reinforce new troops against Habibullah II forces. Enayatullah noticed that 
any resistance would be useless since there was no support for him except his 
surrounding guards. Thus, three days after Amanullah’s departure he threw in his support 
for the decision of the religious elite and tendered allegiance to the new Amir 
(STEWART 1973: 475).  
 
The religious elite, frustrated by Amanullah’s reforms, declared their support for 
Habibullah II (reigned from January 1929- October 1929), known as Bacha-e Saqao (son 
of the water carrier),22 who toppled Amanullah. He was entitled by the religious elite as 
Amir Habibullah ‘the servant of the religion of the Prophet’ (Khaadem-e Deen-e 
Rasoullallah) (SEDDIQ MUJADDIDI 2002: 65-66). The new Amirs’s name was 
mentioned in Friday sermon and the coin was minted to his name (KHALILI 1991: 149). 
                                                 
22 This title is quite often used pejoratively by Musahiban rulers who never wanted to use the real name of Habilbullah. 
Later it was used in many in Farsi, Pashtu and English publications. For example, authors like GREGORIAN use the 
name Bacha in short (GREGORIAN 1969: 277) without even noticing that it was not a name.  Habibullah is referred to 
mostly as the ‘bandit’ or the ‘highway man’ in the available sources. The primary source of these texts ends in the 
Musahiban family or Afghan writers that were either pro-Amanullah or supporting the cause of Musahiban rule. 
According to MAGNUS and NABY, 
In the period since his downfall, Habibullah was not simply ignored in Afghan history, like Amanullah, but 
he has been denigrated and maligned so that even his name is unrecognizable by most Afghans. He is known 
as Bacha-i Saqau, a reference to his mean birth into a poor family. Knowledge of his period is limited, and 
his person and motivation lie buried with him, his associates, and those who oversaw his overthrow and 
hanging. His short period of rule is credited with neither reform nor stability, although there may be evidence 
that his government gave reinvigorated support to the anti-Soviet resistance movement in Central Asia. This 
support turned to a summery hunt of anti-Soviet leaders by the Afghan military once Habibullah II was 
replaced. The extent of Russian and British machinations in the overthrow and replacement of both 
Amanullah and Habibullah II may remain unknownable (MAGNUS and NABY  2002: 43). 
 
The name Bacha-e Saqau (Bacha-I Saqau) means son of water carrier in Farsi.  The word Saqau alone means water 
carrier which in fact describe the carrier of a person. It is similar to schoe-maker, tin-smith in English and Schuhmacher 
and Eisenmann in German. Actually Habibullah’s father Ahmadullah took active apart in the second Anglo-Afghan 
War. Like a champion, he was bringing water for the Afghan fighters during the war. Thereafter he was called Saqau 
(the water-carrier) an esteemed title. His son Habibullah II took part actively in the third Anglo Afghan War. During 
Amanullah’s rule he served in one of the best known military establishments in Kabul (Qeta-e Namoona) and was 
trained by Turkish officers (SEDDIQ MUJADDIDI 2002: 29-33). Later, while in service and on his way home, he 
killed a few of government’s most wanted bandits. Since the government had declared a prize for the head of these 
bandits, he informed the local police and justice center about the issue. However, the local police centre imprisoned 
him and sent the news to Kabul that the police had inally captured the bandits. This soon led to the promotion of the 
police chiefs and his staff while the also received the ransom. Habibullah, while innocent, spent five years in prison and 
finally escaped and turned against the government. This was the untold story of Habibullah for many decades. It was 
for the first time in 1991 that a very famous Afghan poet and writer KHALILI dared to write a book about him. His 
writing is the first that is accredited because he was living and holding official posts during the rule of Amanullah, 
Habibullah II, Nadir Khan and Zahir Khan. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, he migrated and  lived in 
exile where he wrote this book.  
The next book published in 2002 by SEDDIQ MUJADDIDI is the second book after the one published by KHALILI. 
This book also agrees with the descriptions made by KHALILI. The interesting thing about this book is that its author 
is a member of the MUJADDIDI family who played an important role in the fall of Amanullah and gave to power to 
Habibullah.  
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He declared Shariah as the only ruling law and abolished the constitution and 
Amanullah’s reforms. 
 
The new Amir declared his policy by emphasizing that he was not against reforms that 
did not conflict with the tenet of Islam. His administration was composed of his brother 
and friends, some of whom were inexperienced; however, his Prime Minister, Foreign 
Minister, and few others were intellectuals who made the government more accountable. 
According to ADAMEC, the government was reasonably efficient, with a distinct 
‘republican flavour’, and law and order prevailed in Kabul (ADAMEC 1974: 163). In the 
beginning, the new Amir was happily welcomed by the people except pro-Amanullah 
intellectuals, and he was expected to maintain law and order. This optimism ended due to 
economical and political problems that followed (FARHANG 1993:564-5). There was no 
aid from outside during Abdurrahman’s and Habibullah’s rule, and since he gave up tax 
collection there was no income from tax revenues, either. 
 
At this point in time, Afghanistan’s strategic position was very important to its 
neighbours, especially Great Britain and Russia. During the celebrations of the Day of 
Independence Habibullah II declared his dedication to the safeguarding of his country’s 
independence and his willingness to re-establishing good relations with other countries 
(GREGORIAN 1969: 277) including Russia and Britain. However, both countries 
refused to recognize the new government in Kabul and continued their traditional 
competition by installing their loyal element in Kabul. The support of a religiously led 
movement from the bottom of society raised their special concern because they thought 
what happened in Afghanistan would affect other other oppressed Islamic movements in 
Central Asia and India and incline them to follow. As a result there would be many anti-
colonial uprisings. To avoid such an outcome, in 1929, the Russian army crossed the 
border, invaded Afghanistan and succeeded in occupying Balkh, including the cities of 
Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz. This was the first Russian invasion in Afghanistan in which 
more than 70,000 people were killed and hundreds were wounded (SEDDIQ 
MUJADDIDI 2002: 65-66). In this invasion, the Russian army used heavy artillery 
including air-bombings. On the ground, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi (a pro-Amanullah 
reformist and the Afghan ambassador to Moscow) was heading the army. His plan was to 
mobilize the people in the area and to transform Afghan Turkistan into a base of 
operation for Amanullah (GREGORIAN 1969: 278). However, noticing Russian troops 
in the conflict the public joined the limited numbers of the Afghan army and fought 
against the invading troops. Meanwhile Haibibullah II’s main foreign policy was to 
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nullify the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and the non-aggression pact signed with 
Amanullah in 1926 (RITTER 1990: 554-555) and support the exiled leaders as well as 
resistance forces from Central Asian against Russia. 
 
As an alternative option Amanullah ordered Nadir Khan to return from France 
immediately via Russia and support him in regaining the throne. Nadir Khan and his 
brothers returned, but neither via Russia and nor for the support of Amanullah. They 
returned and started their own campaign to gain the power in Kabul. Nadir Khan, visiting 
British authorities in India, assured them by saying “I am strongly pro-British…. I am not 
definitely pledged to support Amanullah or anyone else” (STEWART 1973: 517). In 
March 1929, Amanullah organized forces in Kandahar and headed towards the capital. 
However, this attempt failed and his forces were defeated by Habibullah II troops in 
Ghazni. As a result, Amanullah disappointedly left Afghanistan for Italy. His departure 
on the one hand and the public upraising on the other, made the Russian troops and 
Charkhi give up their unsuccessful efforts.   
 
For the British, Nadir Khan’s campaign and position was a “God-sent opportunity” 
(ARNEY 1990: 25). Therefore the British provided ground, money and people (TYTLER 
1953: 220-222, NEWELL1982: 37), so that Nadir could gain the control of the capital 
before the Russians succeeded in bringing back Amanullah. The British aid to Nadir 
Khan, which included 10,000 rifles, five million cartridges, and some 180,000 pounds, 
was an endorsement of Nadir’s rule in Afghanistan (GREGORIAN 1969: 321). Thus, 
with this aid Nadir Khan gained a better position in the war against Habibullah II.  
 
However, in fighting against the Amir who claimed his legitimacy to be based on the 
Shariah, Nadir Khan repeatedly failed to succeed. The reason behind the failure was the 
fact that Habibullah had a more legitimate position, endorsed by the religious 
establishment. Although Nadir Khan made many attacks, they were all defeated and later 
the loss of men made the war even more unattractive for the tribes.  Therefore he chose 
ethnicity and tribalism as an instrument to overthrow the Amir. He provoked the Pashtun 
tribes to fight against the ruling Habibullah II, a Tajik who took the power for the first 
time since 1747 from the dominant Durranis. As compensation, the tribes were allowed 
to take whatever they could from the enemy: land, property and women (FARHANG 
1993:594). The sentence Nadir Khan used is still popular in the Shamali plain in the 
North of Kabul: ‘their heads are mine and their rests are yours’ (Sar-e shan az man, mal 
wa namoos-e shan az shuma). This policy worked successfully since the tribes finally 
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found a reason for fighting that suited their nature.  After heavy fighting in October 1929, 
Habibullah II evacuated the capital and went to Charikar for reinforcement. The tribes 
looted Kabul and especially Kohdaman, the villages in the North of Kabul from where 
they also took whatever they could get including women (SEDDIQ MUJADDIDI 2002: 
156-159). These impressions are still alive in the memory of the people after many 
generations.  
 
While Habibullah was in the North waiting for his forces to return from Mazar, he posed 
a major threat to Nadir Khan’s rule in Kabul.  Therefore, to get rid of him, Nadir Khan 
asked the Hazaras to attack on Shamali promising them the same conditions as the 
Pashtun tribes. However the Hazara leaders refused Nadir Khan’s request and said that 
they prefer to suffer its outcome but they will not take part in the war against the people 
in Shamali. When this policy failed, Nadir Khan sent a group of religious and spiritual 
leaders in order to encourage Habibullah II to join the government. In order to assure 
Habibullah II and his friends safety and excuse, Nadir Khan signed in the margin of a 
Koran as a promise (KHALILI 1991: 182-187, FARHANG 1993:579). However, when 
Habibullah II came to the palace, following a brief meeting with Nadir Khan, he and his 
friends were arrested; a week later they were brutally executed. Even his two wives were 
forced to marry into the tribes, one of them did, and the other who refused was sentenced 
to 40 years in prison and torture (MUJADDIDI 2002: 163-171).  
 
2.2.5 The Re-establishing of Monarchy on the Basis of Tribal Authority and the 
Rise of Intellectual Elites: The End of the Great Game and the Beginning of 
the Cold War 
The victory of Nadir Khan reestablished the influence of the British in Afghanistan 
(BRADSHER 1983: 16). The interests of the British were centered on two objectives: to 
secure peace among the frontier tribes, and to stop the Russian advances and ideological 
infiltration. The British had considered Amanullah unreliable for securing these 
objectives (OLESON 1996:172-173). In contrast, the British regarded Nadir Khan as a 
reliable person because he secured the interests of the British. That is why Nadir enjoyed 
British financial and military support. Nadir recruited tribes from both sides of the border 
of Afghanistan and India (BRADSHER 1983: 16), something the British allowed him to 
do and which finally enabled him to take over power.  
 
Abdurrahman Khan’s policy of centralizing power and Amanullah’s failure to modernize 
Afghanistan, provided a good foundation for Nadir Khan to build the state. Amanullah 
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was reluctant to share power with religious and tribal elites, and very much relied on a 
small number of intellectual elite from urban areas. At the same time, Habibullah II 
mostly relied on the religious elites who considered him to be Amir. Nadir Khan, aware 
of the mistakes made in the past, relied strongly upon tribal elites. In order to sustain his 
rule he appointed some of the religious as well as a few of the intellectuals elites (mostly 
from urban areas) to his government. In terms of financial resources, the king relied on 
the merchant class rather than on the landowners, whose investments were in trade not in 
production (RUBIN 2002: 57). These merchants, who were few capitalists and dominated 
the the country’s economy since 1932 (FLETCHER 1966: 243), held the monopoly in 
external and internal trade while they were also politically present and active in the 
cabinet and government (GHUBAR 1999: 196). 
 
The ruling system was based on the family as well as on the support of the Pashtun tribes, 
particularly those in the South (Junoubi). In order  
to institute his program and consolidate the rule of his dynasty, Nadir relied heavily on his 
brothers as well as on the cooperation of the religious establishment and the Pashtun tribes. His 
government was virtually a family circle: Hashim Khan was premier, Shah Wali Khan was 
minister of war and commander-in-chief, and Shah Mahmud was minister of interior 
(GREGORIAN 1969: 294).  
 
Therefore, the king and his four brothers operated as the political hub of a patronage 
network that emphasized personal ties with the feudalist khans and other regional leaders 
in the traditional fashion. This policy required the relaxation of central control in some 
crucial areas of authority. Some of the Pashtun tribes that had brought the Musahibans to 
power were exempted from taxation and military conscription (NEWELL1982: 39 & 
RUBIN 2002: 62). 
 
At the same time, there were other major challenges for the government, consisting of 
five brothers, to overcome. These challenges were posed mostly from by the intellectuals 
and religious elites. In order 
to please the moderate Afghan modernists (and possibly to please Muslim modernists and 
nationalist abroad as well), Nadir retained two ministers from Amanullah’s government:  Faiz 
Mohammad Khan, the former minister of education,  became minister of foreign affairs and 
Ahmad Ali Khan, the former minister of commerce, became minister of education’ 
(GREGORIAN 1969: 294).  
 
Meanwhile, Nadir made efforts to gain the confidence of the religious establishments. In 
this context the religious elites who had played an important role in the collapse of 
Amanullah’s government, attracted his attention, especially the Hazarat Sahib Mujaddidi 
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and his brothers (Mujaddidis). His brothers Sher Agha Mujaddidi and Mohammad Said 
Mujaddidi became ministers of justice and state respectively, while Hazrat Sahib himself 
was assigned as Afghan minister to Egypt (GREGORIAN 1969: 294). Other religious 
elites were given jobs in state institutions reviewing the legislation (RUBIN 2002: 62). 
 
In order to show that the kingdom was loyal to the Islam faith, Nadir khan bade all the 
Afghan students sent abroad by Amanullah to return, closed down the first female school 
and ordered women to cover themselves with a veil (Purdah). He sent home all advanced 
students so that to train new brains to be loyal to the king and monarchy. Due to this 
pressure, the number of students decreased from 83,000 to 4,591 (GHUBAR 1999: 83). 
Nadir reaffirmed Habibullah’s II law when his Ministry of Justice and the department of 
Ihtesab (religious police) enforced the strict adherence of the people to the moral codes of 
Islam (GREGORIAN 1969: 294). Those executing these laws were students who studied 
in the Madrasas of Kabul and other provinces. To gain the direct control over the 
religious education more Madrasas were established between 1930 and 1940, and the 
cooperation with the Deoband Madrasa  in India was maintained (OLESON 1996:187-8). 
 
It is believed that Nadir, for administrative purposes, divided Afghanistan into five major 
provinces and four minor provinces (GREGORIAN 1969: 298). However, these changes 
were never put into effect and the administrative division Amanullah had undertaken 
remained unchanged (RAHMATI 1986: 58). To maintain the control over the country, 
Nadir Khan built up an army consisted of between 40,000 to 70,000 soldiers. To build up 
a modern officers corps, many of officer cadets were sent to France and Germany for 
their military training. In 1933, Nadir opened a preparatory military school for the sons of 
tribal chieftains in Kabul fulfilling the promises he had made to the tribes after his victory 
in overthrowing Habibullah II (GREGORIAN 1969: 297).  
 
While Nadir maintained an absolute rule in the country, his foreign policy was controlled 
by the British. There were many British agents, mostly from India in the court. They held 
official posts and titles of considerable importance (GHUBAR 1999:92-8). Relations 
with the Russians stagnated. Therefore, untill the death of Stalin in 1953, the Musahiban 
were not to resume friendly relations with the Soviet Union (NEWELL 1982: 39). Thus, 
the Soviets regarded the Afghan monarchy as a British puppet state and considered both 
India and Afghanistan as military bases for a British attack on the USSR (GREGORIAN 
1969: 331). 
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In 1931, the King held a Jirga and invited representatives of those who were loyal to the 
royal family: tribal, religious and a small group of urban elites. A new constitution 
(Usolnama-e Asasi) which consisted 110 articles that had been inspired by the 
constitution of Turkey and Iran was approved. It declared the monarchy in Afghanistan to 
be hereditary and legitimized the form of the state (FARHANG 1993: 592). According to 
this constitution the façade of a parliamentary government was created, while the actual 
control remained in the hands of the king. The complete autonomy of Shariah courts was 
guaranteed (OLESEN 1996:179). The institutions that were to be created on the basis of 
this document appeared to allocate authority to various government offices, but in reality, 
power was centred on the monarch and the royal family, creating a veritable oligarchy. 
Therefore, the constitution created but the illusion of popular participation without proper 
enforcement provisions (DUPREE 1977: 464). 
 
Despite all efforts, the new government was unstable and the people considered the ruling 
family tobe an illegitimate successor to the throne, as Amanullah, despite his erratic 
tendencies, had been popular especially among young urban people (FLETCHER 1966: 
231). Further the intellectuals favored strongly Amanullah and his modernization 
program. There was a strong feeling, especially among the intellectuals that Nadir Khan 
should transfer the power to Amanullah. This notion was particularly popular while the 
Amir was in exile and his supporters, together with his loyal friends, were active in the 
country and they were taking advantage of every opportunity to make his return possible. 
However, this subtle strategy was regarded as having failed once the intellectuals saw 
Nadir Khan strengthening his own position. Therefore they openly turned against Nadir 
Khan and challenged his rule.  
 
Nadir Khan repeatedly responded to the intellectual’s opposition with an iron hand and 
brutality. He enjoyed the support of tribal and religious elites who were unhappy about 
the role the intellectuals played in the society. The religious and tribal elites favored his 
conservative policies because the intellectual had only begun to take influence on society 
through their newly gained status under Amanullah’s rule. The tribes had played a key 
and instrumental role in Nadir Khan’s claiming of the throne. Nadir Khan’s policy of 
oppressing the intellectuals finally led them to carry out direct attacks against the 
government. As a result, Nadir Shah’s brother, who was the Afghan envoy in Berlin, was 
assassinated in July 1933 and Nadir Shah himself was assassinated in November of the 
same year in Kabul (GREGORIAN 1969: 338-9). In both cases the assassins were the 
anti-government students. In other words the intellectual elites grew in number during 
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Amanullah’s reign and emerged for the first time as a political element beside the 
traditional religious and tribal elites. Therefore they were simultaneously targeted and 
brutally tortured by Nadir and later his brothers. 
 
Like in the case of Abdurrahman, Nadir’s autocratic rule provided a secure and 
centralized Afghanistan for his 19 years old son, Zahir Shah (1933-1973). However, until 
1963 Nadir’s brothers Mohammad Hashim Khan, Shah Mahmud Khan and Shah Wali 
Khan were running the government. Among them, Hashim Khan, prime minister from 
1933-1946, took to a reactionary policy of torture and terror toward all opposing elements 
in the country while in his foreign policy he continued to rely on the British. In 1934 the 
administration of the country was re-structured into 7 provinces (Welayat) and 7 sub-
provinces (Hukumat-e Alaa) the administrative apparatus changed accordingly. (cf. map 
9 p. 61)  
 
Among other executive branches, Hashim Khan relied very much on the army. He 
increased the number of military forces from 70,000 in 1934 to 80,000 in 1941 and 
almost 50 per cent of the country’s revenue in this time was devoted to military 
expenditure (GREGORIAN 1969: 371). In order to gain the confidence of the tribes he 
continued Nadir Khan’s the discriminatory policy of allowing sons of tribal chiefs into  
the military academy, so that they considered themselves to hold their share of political 
power in the monarchy. In 1941, the office of police were given their own department as 
a sign of gratitude. In 1944, the police training school was established and 200 officers 
were sent to British India for training (GHUBAR 1999: 208).  
 
In 1946, Kabul University was established in order to take over the complete supervision 
of four faculties that had been established earlier. Kabul University facilitated the rise of 
intellectuals in the capital as well as in the country. The number of students increased 
with the expansion of the education system.   
 
2.2.6 The Influence of Intellectuals on the Introduction of Democracy  
The Great Game ended after the World War II, and Afghanistan survived the competition 
between the rival powers through a prudent policy of neutrality. In August 1947 the 
British rule in India ended, and the new state of Pakistan was established. The British 
officially remained in control of the old frontier (TYTLER 1953: 275-6) on the Southern 
border of Afghanistan. The USSR remained the Northern neighbor of Afghanistan. The 
influence of the new super power USA slowly appeared in the mid 1930s with the arrival 
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of a group of American teachers who were employed by the government in Habibia high 
school. Furthermore, an American company which invested in the exploration of oil, as 
well as American businessmen and diplomats, showed up (POULADA 1995: 25-26).  
 
The construction of the Kajaki dam on the Hilmand river between 1945 to 1953 by the 
American company Morrison-Knudsen Afghanistan Inc. (M.K.A.) was another step 
toward American involvement in the country. It brought less benefit to the country than 
expected, because the humanitarien problems in the region were ignored (DUPREE 1977: 
482-500) and as a result of miscalculations about the quality of the soil in the region. But 
the project helped to establish the influence of the Americans in Afghanistan.  
 
In 1946, King Zahir actively intervened in the government. He forced his conservative 
uncle to resign. Shah Mahmud Khan (1946-1953) replaced his brother’s military 
government with a semi-military one. The Monarchy came under international pressure, 
particularly from the United Nations, which expressed its concern over human rights 
abuse in the country. At the same time, the new educated class, especially those who 
studied in the West, encouraged Shah Mahmud to bring democracy to the country 
(DUPREE 1977: 486). Therefore, he began his rule with a gesture of amnesty to political 
prisoners including some anti-British elements (FLETCHER 1966: 231). By this time a 
group of intellectuals had already established parties to represent their interest. Two of 
these parties (Wikh Zalmian and Hezb-e-Watan) were under the leadership of the Afghan 
historians Habibi and Ghubar respectively (table 4). Elections were held for the post of 
mayor in Kabul and even for the National Council, where some candidatesof these parties 
were elected.  
 
Within the court, the royal princes Daoud, Naim, and Zabuli, the Minister of Economy, 
all known as conservatives, established the National Democratic Party. They encouraged 
the intellectuals to join their party. However, the party failed to attract the intellectuals 
because it was dominated by the royal princes and aristocrats. The failure of the party 
prompted the princes to put the government under pressure to give up democracy.  As a 
result, the political activities of the intellectuals grouped into the three parties of Watan, 
Khalq and Wikh Zalmian in 1950 and 1951, were banned and their members were 
sentenced to prison, where some of them stayed untill 1963. This policy of oppressing 
political opposition groups led to a political crisis in the institutions, like in the national 
assembly (FARHANG 1993:622-671), and among intellectuals and political groups 
including the growing number of students.   
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Table 4: Political parties 1947 - 1951                 
  
The intellectuals, especially those approximately 5,000 that received specialized 
education in universities abroad, were employed in governmental institutions. Positions 
held by these persons included government officials, teachers, editors, directors of the 
mass media as well as the cabinet and the highest administrative posts in the ministries 
(WILBER 1962: 147).  However, the key government ministries of defense, interior and 
foreign affairs remained under direct control of the Royal Family. The Royal Family not 
only played the decisive role in selecting which intellectuals to employ, but also had the 
authority to control these posts (WILBER 1962:147). Therefore, the intellectuals holding 
the positions had only a symbolic role, and their knowledge of and ability to carry out 
initiatives was undermined by the royal authorities. 
 
The Parliament (Shura-e Mili) that was elected in 1946 and continued to function until 
1952 became known, among the intellectuals as the “liberal parliament” (WILBER 1962: 
147). With 171 members, the Shura mainly consisted of three groups: those loyal to the 
government, the intellectuals, and one final group consisting of mullahs, khans and 
merchants (GHUBAR 1999:262). It is also argued that the members of this parliament 
merely fulfilled the minimum requirements of sanity, literacy and attainment of their 
twenty-fifth birthday (GRIFFITHS 1967:99). Nevertheless, at least there were some who 
raised their voices for democracy and equal rights for all citizens in the country. Around 
30 members of the Shura widely known as liberals, criticized the government on many 
issues that were against the constitution, specially the Bigar or slavery.  The criticism 
caused political conflicts between the intellectuals and the monarchy. As a result, in 1950 
and 1951 the freedom of press and the political activities of intellectuals were banned and 
Party Name Leaders Paper Members Position
Wikh Zalmian 
(Awakened youth)
Benawa, Gul Pacha Ulfat, 
Noor M. Taraki 
Angar then Wulus Intellectuals Independent
Democrat-e Mili 
(National Democrat)
Prince Daoud and Zabuli Loyalist to the 
Monarchy
Government
Watan (Homeland) Gh. M. Ghubar, S. Joya, 
S. Farhang
Watan Intellectuals Independent
Khalq (People) Dr.Mahmodi Neday-e Khalq Intellectuals Independent
Etehad (Unity) Sayed Ismael Balkhi Religious and 
intellectuals
Independent
Etehadia Muhaselin 
(Students Union)
Executive Committee Students of 
University and 
high schools
Independent
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their members were sent to prison. In 1953, the monarchy worried that political 
liberalizations would destabilize the country (EWANS 2002: 150) and after experiments 
proved to be unsatisfactory, Shah Mahmoud was replaced with Sardar Mohammad 
Daoud as prime minister in order to respond to some of the criticism, especially with 
regard to the poor economy and poverty in the country (SARIN and DVORETSKY 
1993:30). 
 
2.2.7 The Cold War and its Impact on Destabilizing the Geostrategic Balance of 
Afghanistan between the East and the West Blocks 
Daoud Khan as Prime Minister, 1953-1963, marked the beginning of the end of the 
monarchic  regime in Afghanistan. Daoud introduced a cabinet that consisted mostly of 
young Afghans educated in the West (RESHTIA 1992: 101). He gave up on building 
democracy, but promised to continue the process in the future, without naming a time 
limit or interm goals to be reached. A new period that is called “the dictator’s period” 
began. Daoud’s policy was mainly focused on two areas: solving the Pashtunistan issue 
and economic development.  
 
The economic development in the country needed financial resources. Nadir Khan and 
his brothers received aids from the British, especially in form of military equipments. But 
once the British rule ended, the monarchy in Afghanistan was worried and searched for 
new sources of support. In the beginning and under the precondition of a policy of 
neutrality and non-alignment, both Eastern and Western countries helped either 
financially or by promoting many development projects in the country. This strategy was 
a convenient mechanism used to transfer wealth from rich countries to strengthen the 
economy of Afghanistan, which was regarded as a backward country (TOYNBEE 
1961:33). When the Cold War rivalry between the USSR. and the West intensified, 
Afghanistan became the playground between the competing major powers. Each tried to 
prevent the influence of its opponent in the region. 
 
United State’s foreign policy under president General Eisenhower was based on blocking 
the Soviet expansion in the Middle East by developing a system of alliances with 
countries like Iraq, Iran and Pakistan (FLETCHER 1966: 257). Afghanistan refused to 
participate in the alliance (Baghdad Pact), and declared a non-alignment policy 
(RESHTIA 1992: 101-102).   On the other side, the Premier of the Soviet Union 
Khrushchev and his defense Minister Marshal Bulganin visited Kabul in 1955, officially 
signing a protocol of non-aggression valid for ten years and extending USD 100 million 
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in credits (WILBER 1962:185). In real terms, however, these generous aids were to be 
paid back through the permanent reliance of the government on the Soviet Union as their 
biggest donor. American high ranking diplomats warned Daoud that Afghanistan would 
“go down the communist drain in few years” (DUPREE 1973: 524). 
 
In order to organize the support of around twenty-one nations, the government 
established a Planning Ministry. In 1957, a first five-year plan was drafted, to be 
followed by a second in 1962-1967. However, these projects were miscalculated and the 
government had neither the trained personnel and the statistical information nor the 
devices to control major elements of development (NEWELL,1972, 126-7 and 
(FARHANG 1996:693).  
 
In general, the positive effects of the two five-year plans are still visible in the country. 
The backbone of the infrastructures in Afghanistan was built on the basis of these plans. 
Specific attention was given to the construction of transportation routes and the 
communication system, many power stations, airports, hospitals, schools and different 
factories (e.g. Fabrika Jangalak, Fabrika Khana Sazi, Fabrika Sement, Fabrika Qhirrizi, 
Fabrika Kod wa Barqh-e Mazar), including two silos. The education and health sectors 
can serve as indicators of the development. The number of schools and hospitals rose 
dramatically, and so did the number of students, teachers and doctors (table 5).  
 
Date
1927 51,000
1932/ 1311 22 1,350 105 600
1937/ 1315 92 9,275 309 650
1943/ 1320 331 64,000 2,190 38 730
1947/ 1325 359 93,544 2,677 88 770
1951/ 1330 378 98,743 3,128 50 137
1955/ 1335 804 126,092 4,007 52 149 1,380
1959/ 1340 1,436 235,301 5,983 59 250 1,759
1963/ 1345 2,298 443,459 9,824 63 527 2,197
1967/ 1351 3,972 760,469 21,920 67 827 3,504
13.9 17.2 14.3 4.5
Number of 
Medical 
Doctors
Number of 
Hospital Beds
Average Annual 
Percentage Increase
Number of 
Schools
Number of 
Pupils
Number of 
Teachers
Number of 
Hospitals
 
Table 5: The development of public service 1932 – 1967                 
Source: FRY (1974:14) 
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Although the increase of public service, especially of education and health services was 
impressive, it can hardly be considered sufficient in view of the est. population of 
15,400,000 in 1966-1967 (DUPREE 1977:146) dispersed widely in the country as it 
concentrated mainly on urban areas. In the urban areas – the capital and major cities like 
Kandahar, Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, the population was not very high. For example 
Kabul, the capital and the largest city of Afghanistan, had a population of only 250,000 to 
300,000 people (WATKINS, 1963: 244). The rural areas in the country received little or 
no public service at all. For example, Hazarajat in central Afghanistan was the most 
deprived region receiving no public service. Although the Salang tunnel facilitated the 
transport of goods and connected the northern region to the capital, it further isolated the 
Hazarajat. Its traditional connection to Kabul via the Shibar Pass that used to link 
northern region to the capital via Bamian, lost its importance when the Salang tunnel was 
opened.  
 
On the other side, Russian technology and engineering systems needed trained people to 
run them. In 1958, Russian experts were invited who carried out short term training 
courses for the military staff (AZIMI, 2000: 39). Besides, many Afghans were sent to the 
USSR for training. Around 3000 Afghans were sent to the USSR only for military 
training (FARHANG 1996:775). These trained persons staffed the governmental 
institutions and supported the semi-democratic government for the next ten years 
(KESHTMAND 2003: 90). However, these Soviet trained elites both in the civil and the 
military sector – inspired by the ideology of communism – also caused the forthcoming 
problems in the future of Afghanistan as well.   
 
The close relations with the USSR introduced the ideology of communism, which spread 
among some of the intellectuals, into Afghanistan. They considered communism not only 
as a better alternative to the monarchist regime, but also as a modern and appropriate 
political system for Afghanistan. Meanwhile the USSR, as a neighbor and a superpower 
in the global terms, provided the mental food for most of the intellectuals to support 
communist movements.  Many of those who visited the USSR or were educated there 
were impressed by the communist system. This holds true especially in regard to the 
obvious absence of poverty and in regard to a well established system of public services. 
Comparing the situation to their own country, most of these intellectuals became 
skeptical about the monarchist rule. They questioned why, despite extensive possibilities 
for creating a better situation in Afghanistan, the population was kept poor. 
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On the other side, the monarchy, and particularly Daoud’s government, accepted the 
Russian help and involvement in Afghanistan for a number of reasons: first because of 
the Pashtunistan issue. Its solution was one of the two main projects of Daoud’s 
government, and the issue reached its political climax and caused a diplomatic crisis. 
Between Afghanistan and Pakistan; a confrontation was immanent. Second, the USSR 
was willing to support Daoud’s government against Pakistan. It was the only country 
providing enormous economic help seemingly without any preconditions (SHARQ 1991: 
127-129). Third, unlike the support from the USSR, the donations and especially the 
military aid from the United States were not unconditional, which disappointed Daoud’s 
government (DUPREE 1973:522-523 and POULADA 1987:43). Fourth, the United 
States were economic and military supporters of Pakistan, and refused the request of the 
Afghan government for military aid (RUBIN 2002: 65). All this frustrated Afghanistan 
and forced Daoud to look for alternative supporters than the United States.  
 
The flow of millions of Dollars of aid from the USSR undermined the position of 
Afghanistan despite its official announcement of a non-alignment policy. It is also 
believed that Daoud had intended from the beginning, to establish a socialist government 
(RESHTIA 1997: 145) which matched with Soviet interests as well as with Daoud’s own 
policy. Thus, his too strong reliance to the USSR made him seem to the West a ‘Soviet 
lackey’ to the West (TANNER 2002: 227). Therefore, the influence of the U.S.S.R on all 
aspects of life in the country became considerable. As a result neither the King nor Daoud 
could make any serious decision without taking the U.S.S.R and its interests into 
consideration (MITROKHIN 2002:17).  
 
The close relationship of Afghanistan with the U.S.S.R fostered the emergence of pro-
communist elites among the intellectual groups. Many of them returned from the USSR 
after having been trained in different fields, mostly in military. Especially the training of 
Afghan officers in the USSR and the presence of a great number of Russian military 
advisors in Afghanistan worried the West because of the unclear political orientation of 
these officers (DUPREE 1973: 524). These new, educated elites, much larger in number 
than those who had received training in the West, were employed in the key institutions 
of the state, mainly the army and the police. Furthermore, the Soviet military assistance 
improved the quality of the Afghan army and modernized its institutions.  This strategy 
of state-building made Daoud’s government more independent from tribal and religious 
elites; something the monarchy used to rely on.   
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The strong army and police enabled Daoud’s government to expand its control beyond 
the capital and major cities, where religious and tribal leadership and obedience were 
traditionally dominant. In 1959, the government issued a decree that the Purdah23 (veil) 
was no longer required in the country.  The female members of the royal family were the 
first to appear in public without the purdah, which in turn encouraged other high ranking 
government officials to follow (RESHTIA 1997: 102). The religious elites who protested 
and voiced their oppositions, were severely punished.  
 
The government believed the religious and traditional elites to be obstacles to all plans of 
modernization. Therefore, their suppression and exclusion continued until their influence 
in the government was heavily deminished. However, the policy of suppression further 
damaged the image of the government and strengthened the position of the opposition. 
The religious elites turned into one major opposition group criticizing the government 
and its policy over many issues, e.g., the abolition of the Purdah and the training of 
Afghans in the USSR, as this not only brought professional skills in the country but also 
the ideology of communism, that was contradictory to the religion and tradition of 
Afghanistan.   
 
To summarize: there are some similarities between the two ten years periods of Daoud’s 
and Amanullah’s reigns. Both introduced a rapid modernization of the country by 
implementing many projects in close cooperation with Russia. Both strove for the 
abolishment of the Purdah and exerted opposition to the religious elites. And both of 
them supported the training of intellectual elites abroad. While Amanullah failed, Daoud 
could rely upon the capacity and capability of his army to eradicate any challenging 
oppositions. He confronted the religious elites and tribal fractions by relying on the army, 
the increasing younger officers who received training in Russia being loyal to him. Later, 
in 1973, this loyalty was proven when they committed a coup under Daoud’s command 
that ended monarchy in Afghanistan.  
 
Although the monarchy in general and Daoud’s government in particular did not collapse 
the way it did when Amanullah was dethroned by religious and tribal elites, the 
opposition by religious elites remained a challenge to Daoud’s government. On the other 
side the heavy reliance of the monarchy on the USSR between the 1950s and 1960s laid 
                                                 
23 The word Purdah literary means curtain in Farsi, used by women to hide their head and face from strangers. Later, 
the Mujahidin used the Arabic word Hejab instead, which is common now in the media. 
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down the basis for many political movements among intellectuals in Afghanistan, 
particularly the PDPA (People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) who supported Daoud 
in ending the monarchist regime and establishing a republic. Later, in 1978, the PDPA  
ended  the republic of Daoud as well.  Indeed, like Amanullah, Daoud miscalculated, 
when he relied only on a specific group of intellectual elites while he suppressed the 
religious elites. 
 
In terms of foreign policy, Daoud’s extreme reliance on the USSR and its involvement in 
the development projects isolated him from the West where he was labelled in as the 
“Red Prince” (FLETCHER, 1966: 285). At the same time the dispute with Pakistan over 
the Pashtunistan issue further isolated the country from its Southern neighbour, as 
Pakistan resorted to closing its border to Afghanistan. For the landlocked Afghanistan, 
Karachi port used to be the closest way to the sea. This situation forced Daoud’s 
government with its developing projects to become more dependent to the USSR in the 
North. At the same time the blockade by Pakistan affected the Afghan businessmen and 
traders who used to carry out their import-export via the Karachi harbor. These 
imbalances in both internal and external affair faced the country with political crisis. Due 
to this situation the King unhappy with Daoud, asked him to resign.  
 
 
2.2.8 The Creation of Pashtunistan Issue and its Continuous Impact in 
Destabilizing the Regional Geostrategic Balance 
The delimitation of Afghanistan’s boundaries in the late 19th and early 20th century by 
the neighboring powers (mainly Russia in the North and the British in the South and 
East) was based more on political and strategic interests rather than on ethnic and 
economic values (GREGORIAN 1969: 11). One of these boundaries was drawn in 1893 
by Sir Mortimer Durand and the British Boundary Commission along the mountainous 
tribal area, for the purpose of dividing India from Afghanistan (SPAIN 1963: 21). The 
Pashtuns, who remained under British rule until 1932, were divided into the Settled 
District and Tribal Agencies. The Settled District roughly comprised the land from the 
base of the hills to the Indus, while the Tribal Agencies (Malakand, Khyber, Kurran, 
North Wazirestan, South Wazirestan and Mohmand) comprised the land between the 
beginning of the hills and the Durand Line (FLETCHER, 1966: 248). The border known 
as the Durand Line lies today between Afghanistan and Pakistan while mainly the 
Pashtun, Baluch and Brahwi tribes live on both sides of it. More important, however, is 
the fact that it cuts across four river valleys, many lines of communication and many 
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tribal regions (TAYYEB 1966: 74).  According to TYTLER the position of Afghanistan 
as a state is undermined by the artificial boundary of the Durand Line, and Afghanistan is 
“ethnographically, economically and geographically an incomplete state” (TYTLER 
1953: 300). The Durand Line is a most inefficient boundary, particularly from the 
geographical point of view, since it does not consider any natural features or any 
astronomical line (TAYYEB 1966: 74). 
 
The delimitation was accepted during the reign of Amir Abdurrahman Khan when he 
received a mission under Sir Mortimer Durand, the Indian Foreign Secretary, who 
delineated the border. Amir Abdurrahman Khan gave up his claim to the territory and 
received Rs600,000  as well as annual payments of Rs12,000,000 and weapons and 
military equipment from the British Indian government in exchange (ABDURRAHMAN 
1995:452-3).24 Despite knowing that the Durand Line cuts the nation in two and even 
divides the tribes, Abdurrahman surprisingly signed the agreement (TYTLER 1953: 188). 
 
After Abdurrahman, his son Habibullah reaffirmed and signed the treaty with the British 
without misgivings and free from outside threats (DUPREE 2005: 485). There are three 
treaties signed in 1905, 1919 and 1921, all containing wording through which the Afghan 
authorities appear to ratify or at least accept the 1893 Durand Line Agreement 
(POULADA 1968: 24). In 1919, when Amanullah Khan declared war against the British, 
he received widespread support especially in among the tribal areas where the uprising 
began. This was the third Anglo-Afghan War in which people from both sides of the 
border fought with great enthusiasm against British rule (GREGORIAN 1969: 229-230). 
The situation shocked British India, as there were widespread uprisings especially in the 
tribal areas, that ended the British control almost overnight, something the British had 
taken more than twenty years to build up (SPAIN 1963: 151).   
 
 It is believed that the Afghans were unable to carry out a prolonged war against the 
British, who had an upper hand at least technically. They initially requested an armistice 
on May 28, 1919 GREGORIAN 1969: 231). In fact, history is a witness of prolonged 
Afghan guerrilla fighting against foreign invaders. The British troops consisted of 
340,000 soldiers plus 185,000 animals (horses, mules, elephants) as well as a railroad, 
                                                 
24 It is also mentioned that: “Abdurrahman in his autobiography states that he never considered any Pashtun areas as 
permanent ceded to the British” (DUPREE 2005:425). However, such a consideration can hardly be found in that 
autobiography. 
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military vehicles and well-developed communication facilities (GHUBAR 1968: 757). 
Nevertheless they were regarded as foreign occupiers and it was hard for them to fight 
against the entire population of the region.  
 
Meanwhile, the British were very concerned about this situation and desperately needed 
to bring the situation under control. That is why they took hostage the Afghan 
ambassador (Sardar Abdurrahman Khan together with his family) in Delhi and requested 
an armistice. Moreover, recognizing Afghanistan as an independent state, the British 
confiscated all the documents and properties of the embassy in Delhi and all the 
consulates while Afghans avoided such a reaction against the British embassy in Kabul. 
The British compensated their military defeat with diplomatic success. As a result of 
negotiations they succeeded in persuading the Afghan army to set back 20 miles from the 
border (GHUBAR 1968: 769-770).   
 
Two months later, on August 8, 1919 the Rawalpindi Treaty was signed. According to 
this treaty, the British recognized Afghanistan as a fully sovereign state and Amanullah 
recognized the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and British India. At the 
same time the British revoked their subsidies to Amanullah, and the import of arms 
through India was put to a stop. After the armistice and signing of the Rawalpinidi 
Treaty, Afghan soldiers halted their attacks on all fronts according to the order they 
received from the government. However, the tribes continued their attacks and even 
intensified them, which forced the British to increase their troops. Despite the treaty there 
was no peace in the tribal areas, making it difficult for the British to maintain law and 
order (SPAIN 1963: 186).  The revolt continued from until the end of the British rule in 
the tribal areas, as to be seen in the (table 6). 
 
Year No. of Attacks Year No. of Attacks Year No. of Attacks
1920 - 1921 392 1926 - 1927 19 1932 - 1933 17
1921 - 1922 194 1927 - 1928 18 1933 - 1934 8
1922 - 1923 131 1928 - 1929 10 1934 - 1935 21
1923 - 1924 69 1929 - 1930 4 1935 - 1936 38
1924 - 1925 39 1930 - 1931 17 1936 - 1937 37
1925 - 1926 30 1931 - 1932 21 1937 - 1938 74
  
Table 6: Raids by trans-frontier elements on British India 1920 – 1938                 
Source: SPAIN 1963: 187. 
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As illustrated in table 6 the highest number of raids occurred close to the time of the third 
Anglo-Afghan War. The decrease in the number of raids in later years represents the lack 
of support from the Afghan government for the tribal revolts. Especially from 1929 
onwards the number decreases significantly. Striving to organize resistance more 
efficiently and to gain independence Abdul Ghafar Khan, the Pashtun tribal leader, 
founded the Khudai Khitmatgars (the Servants of God) movement in 1929, which 
became a powerful political force. In 1930, the British arrested Abdul Ghafar Khan and 
his associates, causing a riot in which thousands of people who put on red shirts took part 
(SPAIN 1963: 165). Later Ghafar Khan and his brother Dr. Khan Sahib became members 
of Indian National Congress (TAYYEB 1966: 195).  
 
At this stage the development in the border regions attracted little attention by the 
government in Afghanistan. In 1940 the Germans offered their support to Afghanistan by 
offering to restore the Durrani Empire and to link the country with the port of Karachi, 
which was rejected by the monarch (TYTLER 1953: 308).  When World War II made it 
obvious that the Indian subcontinent would become independent, a widespread nationalist 
revolt arose among the population of the Indian subcontinent, especially within the 
Pashtun tribal areas. At this time the monarchy was unwilling to get involved in, the 
political changes along the border of Afghanistan. It was difficult for the monarch, who 
had gained the throne with British support, to raise any territorial claims as long as the 
British were there. Even the word Pashtunistan did not exist, it was created afterwards by 
the Indian media, who referred to it as Pathanistan. However, the Afghan authorities 
changed it to Pashtunistan (RESHTIA 1997: 58). It was in 1945 that Ghafar Khan and his 
brother initiated Pashtunistan movement (TAYYEB 1966: 195). 
 
The monarchist regime started to react only when some of the ethno-nationalist 
intellectual elites protested and voiced Afghanistan’s right on the other side of the 
Durand Line. GHAUS considers the claim, made by radical influential quarters in 
Afghanistan or “Protagonists of Greater Afghanistan” who advocated the unification of 
all Pashtuns under the Afghan flag (GHAUS 1988: 71), to be one of the most important 
initiatives.  As a result, in 1944, the monarch reminded the British of their interest in the 
fate of the Pashtuns. In September 1947, the monarchist voted against Pakistan’s 
membership in the United Nations. This caused the relationship between the two 
countries to be built on mistrusts and pessimism from the early beginning of Pakistan’s 
independence. Later the monarchist regime redrew its negative vote and indicated its 
willingness to discuss the issue with Pakistan on a diplomatic level.    
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Altogether, the monarch did not take a clear position on the Pashtunistan issue from the 
beginning. After the independence of Pakistan, the monarch – believing that the “the start 
of all ends is at the hands of the British”25, – sought the key for a solution in London. The 
monarch expected the British to solve the problem with Pakistan according to the 
demands of Afghanistan (FARHANG 1996:664, 669). During meetings and discussions 
with the British, the monarch did not clearly reflect the will of Afghan people. According 
to GHAUS, the Afghans regarded the territories of the NWFP, the Tribal Agencies and 
some parts of north-western Baluchistan as an independent Pashtun state, or Pashtunistan 
(GHAUS 1988: 70). In other words: the monarch did not raise any territorial claims 
beyond the Durand Line. Instead the government repeatedly asked the British authorities 
to give the Pashtun tribes an opportunity to determine their own future. This was the 
official policy of the monarch towards the Pashtunistan issue.  
 
In July 1947, the British sponsored a referendum and offered to the population of the 
tribal areas the choice to join Pakistan or India. Being Muslim, the tribes chose Pakistan 
rather than India. The British rejected the suggestion of two additional choices for the 
tribes, i.e. a union with Afghanistan or the establishment of a separate Pashtun state 
(FLETCHER, 1966: 249). The monarchist regime under the premiership of Shah 
Mahmoud Khan rejected the outcom of the referendum and took this opportunity to 
bluntly challenge the validity of the Durand Line as an international border something 
was backed by India, too (DUPREE 1977: 489). In 1949, the Afghan Shura-e Milli 
(Parliament) and a Jirga that was held in Jalalabad unanimously challenged the validity 
of the Durand Line (GHUBAR 1999: 234).   
 
To convince the pro-Pashtunistan nationalist Afghans, the monarchist regime celebrated 
an annual Pashtunistan Day; a famous crossroad in the middle of Kabul city was 
designated as Char-Rah-e Pashtunistan (Pashtunistan Square), a flag for Pashtunistan 
was established and raised, and, more important established the Department of Tribal 
Affairs (Riyasat-e Umoor- e Qhabayel), with its branches in other provinces, was 
established in Kabul. Furthermore, the Afghan media waged fierce pro-Pashtunistan 
propaganda, as did the Indian media (RESHTIA 1997: 58).  To counter this propaganda, 
Pakistan opened Radio Free Afghanistan at Quetta in 1949. Mohammad Amin, 
                                                 
25 FARHANG used this term in Farsi: “Sar Reshta-ye Tamam-e Kar haye Jahan dar Dast-e Englis ast” (the start of all 
ends are at the hands of the British).  
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Amanullah’s half brother who was on the Pakistani side of the border- tried to calm down 
the tribes (DUPREE 1977: 491). 
 
It was not before long that the issue turned to a larger problem in the region when the 
United States and the USSR got involved. The United States started backing Pakistan as 
it joined the SEATO and CENTO and became a strategic ally of the West (POULADA 
1987:43). This Pakistani position affected its relations with Afghanistan as well as 
Afghanistan’s own subsequent direction (HAQQANI 2005:162). The USSR initially 
called the Durand Line a part of a wicked imperialist plot (GRIFFITHS 1967:63) and 
backed Afghanistan’s demands, which were that the population of neighboring 
Pashtunistan should be given the opportunity to freely express their will (WILBER 
1962:185). However, after the clashes of 1960-61 between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the 
USSR changed its attitude and persuaded both sides to consider their mutual interests and 
ease the tensions (GRIFFITHS 1967:63). 
 
The monarchist regime, particularly under Daoud premiership (from1953-1963), did not 
follow a strategy that could guarantee the future stability and security of Afghanistan. 
The violation of relations with Pakistan did not benefit the country but instead revived the 
mistrust between Afghanistan and Pakistan and encouraged Pakistan to take an active 
role in the politics of Afghanistan. The Pashtunistan issue failed to get international 
support as well. Especially the United Nations and the West considered this issue as an 
irredentist move of the Afghan monarchy.  
 
Unlike that of Afghanistan, the position of Pakistan became stronger throughout time. 
Pakistani authorities managed to convince the West to consider Pakistan as a belt against 
the aggression of the communists and received support (GHUBAR 1999: 228), although 
a military threat from the USSR seemed to be unlikely because Pakistan had no border 
with the Soviet Union. However, Pakistan’s interest was to strengthen its own position 
militarily and diplomatically against Indian threats (EWANS 2002: 153-4) and irredentist 
ambitions of Afghanistan’s ruling elites. The government of Pakistan and its propaganda 
pointed to the active role of the USSR in development projects in Afghanistan. This 
provided reasons for Pakistan to convince the West that Afghanistan is a state under the 
U.S.S.R’s. sphere of influence. 
Pakistan’s pursuit of alliance with the United States during the 1950s also affected its relations 
with Afghanistan as well as Afghanistan’s own subsequent direction. The lure of Pakistan as a 
security partner in its Cold War containment strategy led to the neglect of Afghanistan in U.S. 
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diplomacy and foreign assistance. The Pakistanis developed an interest in painting a menacing 
picture of Soviet influence in Afghanistan to bolster their own position as the first line of defence 
against Soviet expansion into South Asia (HAQQANI 2005: 162). 
 
The Pashtunisan issue somehow eased after Daud’s resignation. In 1963, both countries 
restarted their diplomatic contacts. The port of Karachi was reopened for Afghan goods. 
However, the position of Afghanistan with regard to the Durand Line remained 
unchanged. In 1973, when Daoud regained power, the issue once again began to stress 
the relations between the two countries. Daoud’s suppression of religious elites in the 
country forced them to migrate to Pakistan. This gave the chance for Pakistan to provide 
its support for these groups while they were instigating them to carry out rebellions 
against Daoud’s government. In 1973 and 1974, the religious groups carried out many 
attacks against the government in Panjshir, Laghman and Badakhshan. Pakistan also had 
the support of the United States and Iran, who wanted to loosen Afghanistan from the 
USSR and instead supported a regional alliance with Iran and Pakistan. The pressure 
worked, and in 1975 the two countries started negotiations. In 1976, the heads of the two 
countries met in Kabul and in Islamabad where Daoud gave up his claim. According to 
Abdul Wali Khan (son of Abdul Ghafar Khan and leader of Pashtun tribes in Pakistan), 
Daoud assured Pakistan’s President Zia ul-Haq that Afghanistan had no specific claims 
about Pashtunistan in 1977 (TANIN 2006: 187-188).  
 
From 1978 until now, every regime has refused the recognition of the Durand Line as a 
borderline between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On the other hand, this long border has 
never been controlled by anyone. It is one of the longest borders in the world that is 
uncontrolled and seemingly uncontrollable. Today it serves as a major pathway for the 
smuggling of people, weapons and opium. In the current situation, the border is among 
the most insecure areas of Afghanistan, and the fighting between international coalitions 
and NATO against Al Qaeda and Taliban militants are concentrated there.  
 
 
2.2.9 The Experimental Democracy in 1963-1973  
According to OLESEN, an incongruence developed between the socio-economic and the 
political structure of the state under the Monarchy’s rule, i.e. an increasing lack of 
representation of the fast growing urban middle class in the political structures of the 
state. This resulted in a growing challenge to the legitimacy paradigm on which the state 
was founded (OLESEN 1996: 224). However, it was not only the urban class but also the 
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religious and tribal elites who criticized the monarchist regime and particularly the policy 
of Daoud’s government.  
 
In 1963, there was a high demand for a political change among the intellectual, religious, 
traditional and above all, among the members of the royal family itself. The intellectual 
group whose number was increasing wanted a broader system of political participation 
(NEWELL 1972: 69). This group, after studying in the USSR and the Western countries, 
returned to the country with different ideas and perspectives. They were inspired by the 
socio-economic development abroad and found the situation of their own country neither 
comparable nor acceptable. The religious elites, on the other hand wanted to put the 
country back on its religious track. The traditional elite, particularly a group of around 
200,000 nomads, wanted a solution to the border dispute that caused them to stop their 
normal communication and migration through the border (DUPREE 1977: 560). Finally 
for the first time in 30 years, the king took an active role in the politics of the country. 
Zahir’s major attempt was to depose Daoud whose increasing influence in governmental 
institutions especially in the army raised his concern. 
 
King Zahir Shah was very well aware of the dynamics of the three political elites in the 
country and wanted to convince them by replacing Daoud with Dr. Yousuf, a figure who 
did not belong to the royal family. However, it was not easy to depose Daoud, a 
“powerful man”, from power. The king tried to encourage Daoud to step down during a 
discussion in the family (DUPREE 1977: 558). However, the only way to convince the 
Prime Minister to resign was to introduce a new constitution which would differentiate 
between state and government authority (AHMADZAI 2006:142). Daoud expected the 
king to foster a social change and to strengthen peoples’ role in political and socio-
economic affairs in order to avoid a social explosion.  In a personal letter to the king he 
mentions that: 
The people, especially the intellectuals, wish a change in their society and are looking for that. In 
secret there are different thoughts, beliefs and ideologies. Foreign hands are active for their 
political purposes. This sort of government is no more favorable for the people, especially the 
intellectuals, and they are tired of it. If this sort of [government] is still bearable for H.E. the King 
and others, but not for me despite I belong to the royal family. [This is] because I see the end of 
[this government] harmful to the country and [will cause] the kingdom to fail. Honestly I should 
say it [this government] cannot last long (SHARQ, 1991: 87, TANIN, 2006: 109).26 
 
                                                 
26 The text in the source is in Farsi, here it is translated from Farsi into English by the author. 
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Daoud hoped that by minimizing the role of the king, the power will shift to his side. 
However, the ratification of the new constitution disappointed Daoud, because the King 
remained the highest authority of decision making in the affairs of the state. Finally, in 
1963, Prime Minister Daoud resigned. The USSR and China, Daoud’s international 
supporters, were unhappy about his resignation (DUPREE 1977: 554, 561) because they 
were losing a cooperative politician who had intensified relations with them.  
 
The king appointed Dr. Yousuf, a man educated in West Germany as the Prime Minister. 
Dr.Yousuf was the first high ranking official who was not a direct member of the royal 
family or Mohammazai. There was no member of the royal family in the new cabinet, 
although several had marrital connections and were loyal to the royal family. On the 
other side this was the first cabinet in Afghanistan in which merit, education and 
professionalism were considered and not the social background (prestige and wealth): 
half of the members had a doctorate’s degree (FLETCHER 1965: 279-280, FARHANG 
1996: 710, 733-734). 
 
Under Dr. Yousuf’s government, a seven people strong committee was formed to draft a 
new constitution. The committee members consisted of intellectuals and Afghan 
historians, who evaluated the constitutions of more than one hundred countries with 
different form of governments (TANIN 2005: 143). However the main source of 
inspiration was the constitution of France and other Western models (MOLTMANN, 
1982: 18). In early 1964, the cabinet reviewed the draft of the constitution. Then a 
consulting commission, with twenty-five members as representatives of different strata of 
society, reviewed it. The commission very soon was divided into five groups. The first 
supported the idea of a constitutional monarchy. The second group, small in number, was 
in favor of the royal family. The third group consisted of Pashtun conservatives who were 
against the official status of the Farsi language as well as against equal rights for all 
individuals. The forth group was against the monopoly of government over educational 
and economic sectors and emphasized the need for the privatization of both. Finally the 
fifth group emphasized on the role of religion in the justice system (FARHANG 1996: 
716-18). Nevertheless, in September 1964, a Loya Jirga was held that lasted for ten days. 
During these days language, the role of religion and the role of the royal family were the 
most controversial issues that stagnated the session. Finally the new constitution was 
ratified on the first of October 1964.  
 
The new constitution was considered to be a “cultural document” for Afghan society 
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(DUPREE 1977: 663), a meaningful document in the history of Afghanistan that paved 
the way for the Afghan society to move from a traditional-feudal to a modern democratic 
form (BUESCHER, 1972: 133). It was also the first major achievement for the 
intellectuals who had started their struggle half a century ago (FARHANG 1996: 724). 
Unlike the intellectuals, the religious and tribal elites were not very happy about the new 
constitution. The religious elite wanted the Shariah law and condemned the Mosahiban 
Dynasty for violating Islam by introducing hereditary monarchy in the country (OLESEN 
1988: 125). The tribal elite was concerned that the new constitution would eventually 
undermine tribalism and restrict their authority. 
 
However, the new constitution was not a completely democratic one, especially because 
the establishment of political parties and political activities that could undermine the 
monarchy was forbidden. The king had an incontestible authority. For example, articles 6 
to 24 gave unlimited authority to the king and he was the chief commander of the armed 
forces, appointing the Prime Minister and his cabinet, appointing judges and high-ranking 
civil and military officials, authorized to dissolve the parliament, and many other 
decisions in the state while he himself remained unaccountable (RAHIMI 1967). 
 
Beside the constitution, another development in the process of state-building happened in 
1964 when the administrative units were reorganized from 14 provinces (7major, 7 
minor) to 29 provinces (Welayat), with 309 districts (Wuluswali) with many sub-districts 
(Alaqadari) (DUPREE 1973: 155-160) (map 11).  
 
Each district had its judiciary courts and primary courts, department of tax and other 
administrative offices. New governors (Wali) district governors (Wuluswal / Hakem) and 
sub-district governors (Alaqadar) were employed. For the first time these high-ranking  
positions were given to educated young people with master degrees from foreign 
universities. The aim of establishing these new provinces was to bring closer the rural 
society to the staff of the governmental authorities and to facilitate the processes of 
development in the rural communities. In the old administrative system some provinces 
had been large, with many natural obstacles like wide deserts or high mountains that 
made the communication difficult between the provincial authorities and the capital. 
Usually it took a lot of time for the people to come to the provincial centers and to 
discuss their problems with governmental authorities.27  
                                                 
27 In 1965 the number of provinces decreased from 29 to 28 when Katawaz -Urgon was dissolved and was separated in 
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Map 11: Administrative divisions 1964 -1973 
 
 
2.2.10 The Establishment of Political Parties in Secret and Their Activities among 
the Intellectuals  
Despite the proclamation of democracy, the formation of political parties was not 
allowed. The national assembly (Shura-e Milli) and its both houses passed the Political 
Parties Bill but the king as the highest authority of the state postponed signing it. This 
delay ensured, from the government’s perspective, a disorganized opposition consisting 
of many political activists (GRIFFITHS 1967: 98-99). 
 
Lacking of such a law, the political elites developed their activities undercover and in 
secret. They were initially allowed to publish their papers but this was temporary and was 
fully dependent on the policy of the government. Between 1966 and 1972, out of 30 
                                                                                                                                                 
two (Katawaz and Urgon) each of which merged to provinces of Ghazni and Paktia respectively (RAHMATI 1985:60).   
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newspapers, the government banned 12 out of 30 newspapers and four others stopped 
publishing because of financial difficulties (DUPREE 1977: 602-607). While the parties 
remained inofficial they became known according to the name of the newspapers they 
published their views in e.g., Khalq, Parcham, and Shula-ye Jawid.  
 
Nevertheless, the government as a central institution lost its direct control and the ability 
to monitor the parties and their activities or the ideologies they followed. More important 
were the economic resources from which the parties carried out their activities. The only 
visible source of income most of them had was the newspapers they published and sold in 
the bazaar. However, this income could hardly support their financial requirements 
because of many reasons. First, they had very few readers due to the large number of 
illiterates in the population. Second, their readers were mainly concentrated in Kabul. 
Third, each party published articles in its paper in line with one certain ideology which 
made it hard for them to get more readers. Finally the different parties used their papers 
as a tool to disgrace each other like Khalq (masses) against Parcham (banner), though 
both followed a Marxist-Leninist stance. Another paper, Mardum (people), started to 
publish just to confront the Khalq ideology, and once Khalq was banned by the 
government, Mardum voluntarily folded (DUPREE 1977: 602-603).   
 
Among the parties established, some were leftist and pro-communist. The leading figures 
were men like Noor Mohammad Taraki, Babrak Karmal and Mir Akbar Khaibar who 
followed the ideology of Marxism and Leninism from Moscow (FARHANG 1996: 728). 
In order to organize their political activities, a group of 27 including their leaders 
established the party known as the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan or PDPA 
(Hezb-e Demokratik-e Khalq-e Afghanistan), under cover in Taraki’s house at Kabul city 
in early January 1965 (KISHTMAND 2003: 140-141). Noor Mohammad Taraki, 
Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal were the three communist presidents who ruled 
under the Soviets from 1978 to 1986. The USSR’s authorities recognized the PDPA party 
as their legal counterpart (RESHTIA 1999: 334). Soon after its establishment, there was 
conflict among the leading figures over the leadership within the party (Taraki and 
Karmal) that resulted in its division into two fractions, the Khalq and the Parcham, 
headed by Taraki and Karmal respectively. 
 
Another pro-communist movement was established that followed Chinese Marxist line 
(FARHANG 1996: 721). Its name was Hezb-e Demokratik-e Nawin (new democratic 
party) that became known as the Shula-ye Jawid (eternal flame) according to the 
 101 
 
newspaper they had. The party was a Maoist revolutionary one, with its orientation to the 
extreme left (DUPREE 1977: 611-612). In 1968, it organized a mass demonstration of 
students and workers in Kabul, which ended in violent clashes with the police. 
Subsequently, 14 leaders of this fraction were arrested, and five of them sentenced to 13 
years of prison. In spite of harsh reprisal, Shula-ye Jawid remained the largest and most 
influential leftist group in Kabul (SAIKAL 2006: 165).  
 
The emergence of the pro-communist PDPA and Shula-ye Jawid, with their anti-religious 
ideology, frustrated the religious elites in the county. They established the Islamic 
Society (Jamiat-e Islami) as a strong Islamic movement in 1964 (FARHANG 1996: 755) 
in order to confront the spread of communist ideology in the country. The leaders of this 
movement were theology professors and lecturers at Kabul University .e.g.,  Prof. 
Ghulam Mohammad Niazi, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Prof. Mohammad Mosa Tawana, 
and Lecturer Abul Rasoul Sayaf. The last three studied at Al-Azhar University in Cairo 
and were influenced by the ideology of the Ikhwan-ul Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood). 
This movement was further strengthened when the students union of higher education 
institutions joined it. Some of these students were from Polytechnic Institute like Ahmad 
Shah Masoud, and from the faculty of Engineering at Kabul University, like Gulbudin 
Hekmatyar. In order to confront the pro-communists elites, the movement started their 
political activities especially among the students at the university and later throughout the 
country (FARHANG 1996: 755). This can be called the first organized Islamic 
movement in the history of Afghanistan that developed among the intellectuals in the 
institutions of higher education. 
 
At the same time, under the leadership of Ghulam Mohammad Farhad, an irredentist and 
ethno-nationalist movement emerged (FARHANG 1996: 732). The party became known 
as the Afghan Melat (Afghan nation) according to its publication’s name, while its 
members called it Hezb-e Afghan Sosial Demokrat (Afghan Social Democratic Party).  
The party followed an anti-neoimperialist, anti-foreign influence and pro-Pashtunistan 
strategy for a “greater Afghanistan” (DUPREE 1977: 611-612). However, what made the 
party more popular was its ethno-nationalistic strategy. Its members were mainly ultra-
conservative Pashtuns who were against the rights of any other ethnic groups.  
Particularly the party wanted the Pashtu language to be the only official language. An 
example of this was the hard debate on the constitution during the Loya Jirga of 1964, in 
which Farhad, the ASDP’s its leader, raised his opposition against Farsi to be stipulated 
as the official language (FARHANG 1996: 721). Following the collapse of the Taliban, 
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the party restarted its activity in Afghanistan under the leadership of Anwarulhaq Ahadi, 
who was made Minister of Finance in Karzai’s cabinet.  
 
2.2.11 Instable Changing Governments and the Break up of Social Control 
In 1965, parliamentary elections were held and members of both houses of the national 
assembly (Shura-e Milli) were elected. The participation of people was smaller than had 
been anticipated. The king again appointed Dr. Yousuf as Prime Minister, who with his 
cabinet, was approved with a majority of votes on 25th of October. On the same day, 
known as Seh Aqhrab (3rd of Scorpion the 8th month of Islamic calendar), the students of 
Kabul University, led by PDPA members, demonstrated outside of the Shura-e Milli. The 
police, under the command of Sardar Wali, the king’s son-in-law, opened fire against the 
demonstrators and killed some of the students. The killing of the students by the police 
deepened the political tension and unrest in the country. The people wanted the king to 
bring Sardar Wali his son in law to justice, something the king did not want to do. 
Instead, the king blamed the Prime Minister for not controlling the students and replaced 
Dr. Yousuf  with Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal a new figure (FARHANG 1996: 724-
740). Thus, Dr. Yousuf, the first liberal Prime Minister, became the victim of a policy 
carried out by the royal family.  
 
There were some positive achievements during Dr. Yousuf premiership: the diplomatic 
relations with Pakistan were resumed, a new constitution in which for the first time the 
will of people, particularly that of the intellectuals, was to some extent considered, was 
ratified; the national assembly (Shura-e Milli) was established and members of its two 
houses were elected. Nevertheless, the king replaced him with Hashim Maiwandwal in 
order to calm down the frustrated students and intellectuals.  
 
Hashim Maiwandwal Prime Minister from 1965 to 1967, was supposed to implement the 
new constitution, officially allow activities of political parties and their newspapers, 
eradicate corruption and lawlessness in state institutions and finally to end the repeated 
violence by students (KESHTMAND 2003: 218). The right to freedom of speech opened 
the way for many newspapers issued by different political parties who started criticizing 
the government.  For example Afghan Mellat published the translation of an article from 
Ramparts, an American magazine, which accused the Prime Minister of being a CIA spy 
(DUPREE 1977: 612-614). This resulted in the discontinuation of the newspaper Afghan 
Melat, and the intellectuals used this issue to exert political pressure on Maiwandwal who 
had failed to accomplish what he had promised. 
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The king, in order to end the political crisis in the country, replaced Maiwandwal with 
Noor Ahmad Etemadi. The exchanges of prime ministers became the standard solution to 
all problems by the monarchy faced. Under Noor Ahmad Etemadi’s premiership (1967-
71), the PDPA members achieved more freedom for their political activities. Once they 
published an article in Parcham newspaper, in which Lenin was appreciated in a manner 
that the Muslims reserve exclusively for the Prophet of Islam (TANIN 2005: 163). Such 
anti-religious articles by the communists were published despite the draft of the Press 
Law that safeguarded the “fundamentals of Islam” (DUPREE 1977: 600). The 
government and its judiciary system ignored the anti-Islamic propaganda published by 
the media (FARHANG 1996: 758). This situation further amplified the tension between 
the monarchy and the religious elites. Although the religious leaders discussed the issue 
with the king directly, the king rejected all of their suggestions and added that “I will not 
leave Afghanistan like Amanullah” (TANIN 2005: 164). Later the national assembly 
(Shura-e Milli) also criticized the Prime Minister. As a result of this pressures the king 
replaced Etemadi with  Dr. Abdul Zahir as Prime Minister in 1971.   
 
Once he started his job, Dr. Zahir faced many problems. The discussion about the civil 
law resulted in complications over the language issue in the national assembly (Shura-e 
Milli). Some conservative Pashtu-speaking members wanted to put an item in this law 
which would make learning Pashtu as a condition for the employment of staff in different 
institutions of the state (FARHANG 1996: 761). At this time a famine occurred in the 
northern and western parts of the country. This famine was a result of droughts in 1970 
and 1971. Despite the belief that “Afghans had never known famine” (FLETCHER 1966: 
282-283), many people died of hunger, others migrated and some even sold their children 
(FARHANG 1996: 762). Famines and other natural disasters were not uncommon in 
Afghanistan. However, this fact was not widely known due to the lack of communication 
between the provinces and the center at that time. For the first time this issue now passed 
through media on a grand scale and attracted the attention of the public. The government 
proved to be incapable of handling the problem which raised a lot of criticism from the 
public. Due to this strong criticism and the problems within the parliament, Dr. Abdul 
Zahir offered his resignation to the king (KISHTMAND 2003: 223).  
 
In 1972, the King selected Mohammad Musa Shafiq as new Prime Minister (1972-1973). 
Shafiq had a background of religious education in the country and higher education in 
Egypt and the United States.  The policy of Shafiq was focused on the creation of law and 
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order internally, and on balancing Afghanistan’s external affairs, as these were clearly 
imbalanced between the East and the West. He managed to solve the problem of  the 
distribution of water in Hilmand River between Iran and Afghanistan. The solution of this 
one-hundred-years old problem was a great success for him since it maintained the 
interests of Afghanistan (TANIN 2005: 165-156). This success encouraged him to begin 
discussing the Pashtunistan issue with Pakistan, but the coup of 1973 happened and 
Afghanistan foreign policy took another direction. 
 
The period from 1963 to 1973 is known as the Daha-ye Demokrasi (decade of 
democracy). It was a very unstable period because many governments came one after the 
other. Five prime ministers e.g., Dr. Yousuf, Hashim Maiwandwal, Noor Ahmad 
Etemadi, Abdul Zahir and Musa Shafiq, each were in charge for short periods, without 
being able to complete the projects they were dedicated to, or even conclude the terms 
they were designated to be in charge for, because the king ordered their resignation (table 
7). These governments made many promises to maintain political stability and economic 
development that were not kept. The prime ministers were highly educated in the West 
but the authoritative rule of the king and other members of the royal family exercized the 
real power, and undermined their skills and talents. This situation gave them little chance 
and hopes to perform well. Being unmotivated, frequently they had asked the king how to 
do their jobs.  
Amir / King Prime Minister From To
Amir Abdurrahman Khan 1880 1901
Amir Habibullah Khan 1901 1919
Amir Amanullah Khan Wali Mohammad Khan 1919 1929
Amir Habibullah Kalakani Sayid Hussain Jan. 1929 Oct. 1929
Nadir Khan (Oct. 1929-33) Oct. 1929 1933
Mohammad Hashim 1933 1946
Shah  Mahmoud 1946 1953
Mohammad Daoud 1953 1963
Mohammad Zahir Shah Dr. Mohammad Yousuf 1963 1965
(1933-73) Hashim Maiwandwal 1965 1967
Noor Ahmad Etemadi 1967 May-71
Dr. Abdul Zahir 1971 1972
Musa Shafiq 1972 1973
 
Table 7: Amirs / kings and prime ministers 1880 – 1973        
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
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Although in 1963 it was planned to hold the balance in the external politics of the country 
between the West and the USSR, the governments failed to maintain such a ballance due 
to the involvement of many actors in the decision making processes. During this decade 
the monarchy continued to follow its non-alignment policy and officially kept this 
position. However, in terms of foreign assistance, which was the main factor of foreign 
influence in the country, the policy of the monarchy remained unbalanced. From 1966 to 
1970 the USSR was the largest donor to Afghanistan, constantly increasing its support. 
At the same time, the United States assistance to the country was smaller than that of the 
USSR and decreased in 1970 (table 8).    
 
Total aid Aid Aid Aid Cumulative
Donor Before 1966 1967-67 1968-69 1969-70 Total
U.S.S.R 568,100,000 44,720,000 30,520,000 28,400,000 661,740,000
   Grants 94,400,000 6,300,000 5,800,000 106,500,000
   Loans 473,700,000 44,720,000 24,220,000 22,600,000 565,240,000
U.S.A 387,900,000 12,730,000 4,790,000 1,440,000 406,860,000
   Grants 310,300,000 6,670,000 2,810,000 860,000 320,640,000
   Loans 77,600,000 6,060,000 1,980,000 580,000 86,220,000
West Germany 73,400,000 7,640,000 6,470,000 2,300,000 89,810,000
   Grants 2,300,000 1,700,000 1,900,000 890,000 6,790,000
   Loans 70,100,000 5,940,000 4,570,000 1,410,000 82,020,000
United Nations 21,640,000 980,000 2,110,000 6,240,000 30,970,000
   Grants 21,640,000 980,000 700,000 2,080,000 25,400,000
   Loans 1,410,000 4,160,000 5,570,000
P. Rep. China (all loans) 15,300,000 2,980,000 5,530,000 5,560,000 29,370,000
All Sources 1,095,400,000 69,050,000 50,200,000 44,210,000 1,258,000
   Grants 428,400,000 9,350,000 12,250,000 9,720,000 459,720,000
   Loans 667,000,000 59,700,000 37,950,000 34,490,000 799,140,000  
Table 8: Sources of foreign assistance to Afghanistan (in US Dollars) (commodity assistance not 
computed)             
Source: NEWELL (1972: 144) 
 
Considering these foreign assistance and Afghanistan’s export of gas to the USSR,  
RUBIN believes that Afghanistan, at this stage, became a “rentier state” since 40 percent 
of its revenue accrued directly from abroad (RUBIN 2002: 65). More interesting is that 
these investments in development projects in Afghanistan were not only financial, but 
also involved hundreds of foreign experts who carried out the implementation processes 
of these projects. This was due to the fact that the local manpower capacity was not very 
satisfactory, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Therefore foreign experts from 
different countries were officially invited to Afghanistan. The number of these experts is 
mentioned in to be around 1929 the year 1971 mainly from the donor countries 
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(FARHANG 1996: 774). The USSR, being the biggest donor, also provided the highest 
number of experts, around 1050 people. The second largest number, 210 persons, was 
from China, and the rest belonged to the other Western and Eastern countries and the 
United Nations (table 9).  
 
To ensure their countries influence, experts from the Eastern and Western Blocks were 
competed each other in Afghanistan. The governmental institutions were the setting 
where these competitions took place, since each institution had signed agreements of 
cooperation with either block. Usually, in these institutions, members of each block or 
foreign advisors tried to build loyalty among the staff while at the same time they were 
trying to criticize their opponent donors in other institutions (DUPREE 1973: 522).  The 
advisors from the USSR were concerned about the presence of Western advisors while 
the Western diplomats and advisors were worried about the political orientation of 
Afghanistan in the long term. 
 
Country Number of Experts Country Number of Experts
U.S.S.R. 1050 United States 105
Bulgaria 31 W. Germany 152
Czechoslovakia 32 France 85
China 210 Japan 15
India 59
United Nations  200
1929Total number of Foreign Experts
Table 9: Number of foreign experts in Afghanistan in 1971                
Source: Figures from FARHANG 1995: 774.  
 
The Defense Ministry was one of the key institutions that the Monarchy relied on and 
Khan Mohammad, who held this post of Minister of Defence from 1963 to 1973, was the 
most loyal to the king and. Throughout five cabinets in a decade, Khan Mohammad 
remained. Meanwhile, the staff of the army was divided into two groups; the elder 
generation, who were in the higher positions in the hierarchy, remained loyal to the king; 
the younger generation in the lower ranks remained loyal to Daoud since they received 
their training in the USSR during his premiership.  
 
In other words: The monarchist regime as the central authority of the state faced 
opposition from different political elites in the country. The frustrated intellectuals and 
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religious elites carried out their activities undercover and in different parties they 
established in secret. The differences among the parties caused them to confront each 
other in many ways: in the media, in the governmental institutions, and in the sessions of 
the parliament and at universities. To measure the unrest, only between April and June 
1968 around 32 demonstrations were held by university students, workers and others, 
who demanded reforms, public service and better working conditions (DUPREE 
1977:619-620). Still in the same year the number of demonstrations increased to 78 
(KESHTMAND 2003: 209). The political crisis in the country was hard for the 
government to control. Each time the King tried to bring political stability by changing 
the prime minister and dissolving the cabinets, which proved to be unsatisfactory, since 
the regime lost its credibility and legitimacy among the population of the country. 
According to HASAN SHARQ, who was among the main organizers of the coup in 1973, 
the 40 years of continuous rule of Zahir Shah became boring, and the monarchist regime 
was like still water that spoiled from time to time (SHARQ 1991: 87). Even, democracy 
proclaimed by the regime, could not gain support since it was induced from the top and 
its aim was to legitimize the monarchist regime and extend its life.  
 
Another reason for this instability was the competition between King Zahir Shah and his 
deposed cousin Daoud within the royal family. Despite Daoud being removed from 
power, his influence remained among the Soviet-trained staff of the governmental 
institutions. Daoud played an important role in destabilizing the situation, because he was 
deposed while his goals had not yet been achieved. At the same time many developing 
plans started during his premiership period, and these same plans were implemented 
again by his successors as prime ministers who had different views of the situation, .e.g., 
the agreement of Afghanistan with Iran over the water distribution of water from 
Hilmand River, furthermore frustrated him. He later called his peaceful resignation a 
mistake toward his people which should be compensated (MUHTAT 2005: 68). That is 
why he finally carried out the coup of 1973, overthrew the monarchist regime and 
proclaimed a republic.  
 
To sum it up, since 1919, Afghan rulers have made many attempts to build a functioning, 
effective and stable state but they failed to do so. Prior to the state’s independence, the 
sustainability of the rulers and the ruling system was dependent mainly on support by 
external powers and subsidies it received. After the independence, Afghanistan initially 
made some major achievements and in the training of human resources. The 
establishment of foreign relations paved the way for the country to come out of its 
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traditional isolation. As a result of these contacts, Amanullah and Tarzi, being inspired by 
modernization in the West, introduced reforms and replaced the traditional structures 
with modern ones.  However, building modern institutions needed massive financial and 
capable human resources. Moreover, the reforms introduced were perceived as being 
contradictory to the traditional and religious values of the society. The top-down 
implementation of reforms imported from Europe first turned the tribes against the 
monarchist regime, and then the religious elites. Amanullah wanted to eliminate the 
dominant power of tribes and religious elites. Finally, the newly built institutions turned 
ineffective due to corruption and nepotism which made the penetration of the institutions 
from the centre to the periphery difficult.  
 
On the whole the king was highly influenced by the foreign visits. He sought a revolution 
from above through his reforms while the country was poor both in terms of institutions 
and their capacity, and the professionals to staff them. Moreover, it was impossible for 
him to modernize the country without transforming the socioeconomic structure, and it 
was equally impossible to do so without sharply curtailing religious and tribal authorities 
(GREGORIAN 1969: 269). Institutional incapacity was among the main challenges 
Amanullah’s government faced. He introduced planes, a railway line in Kabul, the 
telephone, telegrams, X-ray machines, modern artillery, construction machines and many 
other modern technologies that were unfamiliar to his people, but the mechanics, 
engineers, doctors, pilots, trainers and teachers were foreigners. For instance Turkish 
trainers assisted in the military, health, and law sector; Germans experts assisted the 
military, technical and education sector; and French experts assisted in education, 
archeology and health sector. One available source shows that in 1920 to 1926 there were 
200 German professionals and experts in service in Afghanistan (GHUBAR 1968: 789).  
 
Amanullah’s main achievement was the emergence of an intellectual elite which 
remained loyal to him. At the same time, this loyalty created a target for the next rulers, 
especially Nadir Khan and his brothers. The pressure intensified when Nadir Khan in 
Kabul, and his brother Mohammad Aziz in Berlin, were killed by members of the pro-
Amanullah intellectual elites. As a result, the monarchist regime under Hashim Khan, 
Nadir’s brother, continued to eliminate the remaining small number of intellectual elites. 
With this policy, the monarchist regime started training a new generation of intellectuals 
who would remain loyal to the regime. The new generation that slowly emerged was 
small in number compared to the dominant tribal and religious elites. Being part of  the 
urban population, time they maintained their influence in the institutions from time to 
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time.  In other words the religious and tribal elites were dominant in rural areas while in 
urban areas the intellectual elite slowly emerged as a political element.   
 
Furthermore, Nadir Khan and his brothers learned from Amanullah’s failure and followed 
a policy based on which Afghanistan remained an “autocratic monarchy or an absolute 
oligarchy” (FRANK 1960: 1). Moreover, Afghanistan continued to be a “buffer state” 
until the British withdrawal from India in 1947.28 Later, Afghanistan established relation 
with other countries, especially the USSR and the West, the two rival blocks in the Cold 
War. The competition of the two blocks in Afghanistan was well demonstrated in 
economic investment. It was for the first time that Afghanistan received such huge 
investments from the outside world. Nevertheless, these investments and the economic 
competition between the two blocks helped the spread of different ideologies. This in 
particular affected the intellectual elite visiting Western and Eastern countries. The 
development of higher education with the establishment of Kabul University and later the 
Institute of Polytechnic, is of fundamental importance. These educational institutions 
trained capable staff for government institutions. At the same time they were the main 
centres where different ideologies confronted each other. Different faculties established 
academic affiliations with Eastern and Western countries based on which there were 
exchange programs. Large numbers of students who later would shape the political scene 
of the country were sent abroad. The existence of many foreign professors in these 
institutions and foreign advisors in government institutions also helped the spread of 
different ideologies and eventually the formation many underground parties.  
 
Altogether, the situation helped the intellectuals grow in number and maintain their 
influence in the institutions of the state. In contrast the influence of traditional and 
religious elites declined. Nevertheless their influence remained as strong as ever in the 
rural areas. More important was the fact that the monarchy supported the intellectual 
elites and suppressed the tribal and religious elites in the country. The intellectual elites 
belonged to two groups; those who studied in the West and had benn supported by the 
king, were in favor of a constitutional monarchy. The other group was the communist 
group opposed the monarchist regime. Meanwhile the tension within the royal family 
(cousin rivalry) also brought further unrest. As a result, fractionalism undermined the 
effectiveness of the institutions and thus created instability in the country. 
 
                                                 
28 SHAHRANI argues that Afghanistan was as a ‘buffer state’ from 1880 to 1955 (SHAHRANI 1988: 25).  
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2.3 Ethno-linguistic and Socio-religious Diversity 
Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic country with a very complex social 
structure. It is claimed that there are around fifty-seven different ethnic groups, and forty 
to fifty-seven different languages and dialects belonging to several distinct language 
families (RASULY-PALECZEK 1998: 205).  This diversity makes Afghanistan 
attractive enough to be called an “anthropologist’s nightmare” (ARNEY 1990: 4). 
 
The ethno-linguistic and socio-religious structure of Afghanistan transcends its current 
borders. The distribution of these ethnic groups throughout Afghanistan is closely linked 
to its neighbouring countries where members of the same ethnic groups live e.g., 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan with their respective Uzbek, Tajik and Turkmen 
population. However, there is no Pashtunistan as a territorial entity despite the earlier 
attempts made by governments in Kabul to create one after the British withdrawal from 
the Indian sub-continent. Pakistan is the second land where large numbers of Pashtuns 
live, more precisely in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the Baluchistan province. These people 
are known as Pakhtun or Pathan both in Pakistan and India.  Pakistan also shares the 
Baluch ethnic group with Afghanistan and Iran.  At the same time, contradicting the 
claims raised by many scholars that the Hazaras are the only ethnic group who live 
completely within Afghanistan, recent studies show that large communities of Hazaras 
live in Baluchistan, a province of Pakistan and in Meshhad city Iran (HARPVIKEN 
1998: 179, MOUSAVI 2000: 188-205). 
 
2.3.1 Ethno-linguistic Diversity  
There are no official statistics which indicate the number of population and ethno-
linguistic groups in Afghanistan. The one and only ever taken survey of population, in 
which more than 13,000 people took part, was sponsored by the UN and took place in 
1979 under the control of the Central Statistics Office (CSO). However, with the 
outbreak of war, the survey was abandoned (RAHMATI 1986:100, HYMAN 1982: 9). 
Some figures that came out from the preliminary result of the survey founded the basis 
for an estimation of the population by different governments. Even today the CSO in 
Kabul provides the population figures which are based on 1979 estimations. The number 
of ethnic groups has been a sensitive political issue, and due to this problem the 
population survey was not used to put forth any figure in this regard. Furthermore, the 
three decades of war affected the population and as a result millions migrated to the 
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neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Iran. Today a large number of them are living in 
these countries still.  
 
Therefore, within literature, all statistics are based on personal assumptions and 
estimates. Many scholars carried out these estimations in the1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In 
comparison to the situation of today, in particular the better security in these three 
decades provided the opportunity to study the country for many researchers. These 
studies, carried out mostly by western scholars in Afghanistan (and in tribal areas of 
Pakistan), are still used as primary sources. Some of this work carried out by CAROE 
1958, WILBER 1962, KLIMBURG 1966, FLETCHER 1966, TYTLER 1967, 
GREGORIAN 1969, NEWELL 1972, DUPREE 1973, SNOY 1974, JANATA 1975, 
WIEBE 1984 and GROETZBACH 1990. Among them DUPREE is probably the only 
one who spent more time (1949-1968) inside the country. He concludes the result of his 
studies by saying that “most writing on Afghan people and culture is simply a footnote to 
ELPHINSTONE’s classic work (1815). Writers on Afghanistan have either copied 
ELPHINSTONE or copied those who have copied ELPHINSTONE” (DUPREE 2005: 
55, 64). 
 
There is little doubt, however, that the classic work of ELPHINSTONE causes confusion, 
especially the figures he had provides, as they include larger areas beyond the territory of 
Afghanistan, e.g., parts of Pakistan as well. At the same time as DUPREE distanced 
himself from these figures, he introduces official estimates of population for each 
province that were published in the Kabul Times daily newspaper in1967, issues number 
94-152. His assumptions are still used largely as a reference, especially the ethnic map he 
drew. However, the data provided by the government was exaggerated and needed 
careful attention. Particularly because the government carried out the policy of 
‘Pashtunization’ in which it needed support for its claim to show the Pashtuns as the 
majority (sixty percent). 
 
Therefore, the estimate made by the government was confusing and far from reality. To 
support this claim it suffices to take a look at official figures published in 1934 which 
estimated the total population to be 12,000,000. Out of this number 60 percent were 
claimed to be Pashtun and the rest was made up of Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkomens, 
Nuristanis, etc. (AHMAD and AZIZ 1934:37). Later, in 1938, an Afghan official 
diplomat mentioned that “the population is estimated to be 12,000,000 out of which 
number the majority are Pushtuns or Pukhtuns. The rests are Tajiks, Hazarahs, Uzbeks 
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Turkomans, Nuristanis, etc.” (ALI SHAH 1939: 256). It is interesting to see that after 
four years the population figures remained unchanged. Furthermore the figures did not 
explicitly include the percentage for ethnic groups this time, instead the author used the 
word ‘majority’ for the Pashtuns, designating the rest as minority.  
 
Nevertheless these estimates founded the bases for the analysis of the population for 
many years. In recent years different sources show different figures. According to many 
estimates Pashtuns are 38, Tajiks 25,  Hazara with 19, Uzbek 6 and Turkmen 3 percent of 
the population (EMADI 2002:1-2, DIERCKE 2008: 157). The remaining 9 percent include 
other ethnic groups like Aimaq, Baluche, Pashai, Nuristani, Kyrgyz, Qizilbash, Brahui, 
Arab, Gujar, Sikhs and Hindus. (map 12) The first four major ethnic groups play an 
important role in the political structure of the country since they constitute the majority of 
the population. 
 
 
Map 12: Distribution of ethnic groups in Afghanistan 
Source: DIERCKE (2008: 157)  
 
In terms of social structure all groups, except Tajiks, are divided into many tribes and 
sub-tribes. Among them the Pashtuns seem to be one of the biggest tribal societies in the 
world with a very complex structure. Their genealogical structure starts from a legendary 
figure named Qais who descended from Saul (ALI 1969: 6, MIAKHEL 2004: 188-189).  
 113 
 
Qais had four sons: Sarbanri, Bitan, Gharghasht and Karlanri. These four sons are the 
ancestors of the four main Pashtun tribes, which are again complexly subdivided. The 
eldest son, Sarbani had two sons, Sharkhbun and Kharshbun, whom CAROE based on 
geographical, historical, cultural and linguistic factors, names as fathers of the broad 
categories Western and Eastern Afghans (CAROE 1958: XV).29 Sharkhbun (the Western 
Afghan) is the ancestor of the Durranis with their sub-tribes Sadozai and Mohammadzai 
who roughly ruled the country from 1747 to 1973 in the country. (figure 5) At the same 
time Kharshbun (the Eastern Afghan) is the ancestor of the Yusufzais and other tribes in 
Peshawar and its valleys in the North. Pashtu the language of the Pashtuns has many 
different dialects usually grouped as Eastern and Western dialects. Certain words like 
Pakhtu and Pashtu or Pashtun and Pakhtun, which sometimes cause confusion have the 
same meaning but they represent two different dialects.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The genealogy of Pashtuns 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI modified after CAROE 1958, MIAKHEL 2004: 185-197. For the rest of 
pedigree (Baitan, Gharghasht and Karlanri) see CAROE (1958: 12-13, 15, 19, 21).  * According to CAROE 
Urmor was an adopted son, and they are not Pashtun 
                                                 
29 CAROE only considers the Karlanri as Pathan (Pakhtun or Pashtun) and adds that they are the tribes who never fell 
under the effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and now form the backbone of the so-called tribal belt 
(CAROE 1958: XV).  The rest (Western and the Eastern), who were subject to Persian and Mogul empires, he 
considers as Afghan.  
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Although modern studies consider all these different tribes as Pashtuns, this identity has 
not prevailed over other identities which exist in the tribal and its subdivisions. They call 
themselves first as Sadozai, Mohammadzai, Barakzai, Hotak, Kakar and Zadran; then 
Ghilzai, Durrani, Yusufzai, and finally as Pashtun or Afghan. There is also sometimes 
confusion between the word ‘Pashtun’ and the ‘Afghan’. The word ‘Afghan’ and 
‘Pathan’ is usually used by others to refer to Pashtun. From Persians to Moguls and even 
untill today non-Pashtun people (e.g., Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks and etc.,) call them 
Afghan, while the Indians and Pakistanis refer to them as ‘Pathan’. The Pashtun refer to 
themselves as Pakhtun, Pakhtana, Pashtun, and Afghan. According to their own legend 
and genealogy the word ‘Afghan’ stems from the name of Afghana, son of Saul (figure 
5). Moreover, the word ‘Pashtun’ is a Kandahari dialect which replaced the traditional 
‘Pakhtana’, (plural of Pakhtun), used by Khoshhal Khan Khatak the famous Pashtun poet 
(17th century). He and many others after him used the word Pakhtana in order to address 
and name all different Pashtun tribes in one word. At the same time he used the word 
Afghan, Pakhtun and Pakhtana interchangeably. 
The very name Pukhtun spells honour and glory 
Lacking that honour, what is the Afghan story? 
(CAROE 1958: 238) 
 
Prior to the reign of Ahamd Shah Durrani, Pashtun tribes were subject to Persian and 
Mogul empires. It was the Ghilzais who ended the rule of Safivids in Persia, 1722, and 
occupied Esfahan. At the same time other Pashtun tribes in the east repeatedly fought 
against the Mogul empire. Khoshhal Khan Khatak was one of the pioneers of the anti-
Mogul struggles. However, while Pashuns fought against dominant foreign powers in the 
East and in the West, they have never had peace among themselves. Khushhal Khan 
Khatak’s poems clearly describe his anti-Mogul feelings and at the same time they 
highlight the disunity and fragmented structure of Pastun society: 
Hara char da Pakhatana ter Mogul kha da           Etefaq war sakha neshta  dir Arman 
Every deed of the Pathans is better than that of the Moghals: 
Concord is what they lack, the pity of it!  
(KHOSHHAL 1890: 44, BIDDULPH 1890: 90) 
 
Usually three factors women, gold and land (zan, zar, zamin) determine the main cause of 
conflicts. Each tribe has its own lebensraum where tribal order is the dominant law. One 
of the main characteristics of Pashtun tribe is Pashtunwali, which is a set of tribal codes 
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of conduct that determines the traditional way of life and is used to solve disputes. Any 
attempt from outside to change this law is resisted strongly.  
 
Tajiks are the second largest ethnic group, and they are most probably the aboriginal 
inhabitants of the country (GREGORIAN 1969: 32-33). It is also believed that they 
represent the development of one of the early layers of Central Asian civilization, 
predating the advent of Turks (AKINER 1986: 302). They speak Farsi (also known as 
Dari and Persian) with different dialects, mainly Kabuli, Herati, Badakhshi, Shamali, 
Ghaznichi, Laghmani and Logari. Among them the Kabuli dialect is the most widely 
spoken, especially among the urban people. Tajiks are also called Dehgan, (Dehqan 
meaning peasant) and Farsiwan (Parsiwan, Farsi zaban, meaning Farsi speakers), 
mainly by Pashtuns. However, many consider the Farsiwan to be a different distinct 
ethnic group.30 In general, Tajiks are classified into four groups: The first group is the 
Heratis, who are also known as Farsiwans, and live in Herat and its surrounding areas. 
The second group is the Farsiwans, which includes the large number of inhabitants in 
Northern cities the like Mazar-e Sharif, Kunduz, and Baghlan. The third group is that of 
the Kohistani Tajiks, who are dispersed between the Parapamisus ranges in Ghor 
province to Sinkiang province in China and from Northern Hind Kush to Pamir. The 
fourth group is semi-nomads who closely resemble the Hazaras, but they are Sunni. They 
live in the valleys of Dara-e Shikari (RAHMATI 1986:260-262) now part of Bamian 
province. 
 
Tajiks are mainly farmers in rural areas and merchants (craftsmen, artisans and 
shopkeepers) in urban areas. In 1979, fifty percent of the merchants in Kabul belonged to 
the Tajiks while in Herat and Ghazni the figures seemed to be even higher (SAWEZ 
1986: 286). At the same time they are the most dispersed ethnic group in Afghanistan.  
An earlier study describes this disparity: 
Mit Ausnahme des Südostens trifft man Tadschiken in ganz Afghanistan an, vor allem in den 
Städten. Eine höhen tadschikischen Bevölkerungsanteil gibt es in Kabul und  den Gebieten 
nördlich davon über den Hindukusch hinweg bis nach Badakhschan, in der Provinz Ghazni und in 
der Oase von Herat (SNOY 1972: 183) 
 
Furthermore they serve as administrators in Central Asia and in Afghanistan. Unlike 
other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, where the loyalty patterns evolve around tribal bonds, 
                                                 
30 See DUPREE (2005: 59), TANNER (2002:15). ORYWAL mentiones:  ‘Farsi, Farsiwan auch schiitisch Tajik 1986: 
19, 49).’ Others see Tajik as synonym of Farsiwan (SNOY 1972: 183). 
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the Tajik loyalty patterns evolve around village and family (MAGNUS and NABY 2002: 
16). They have always been present in bureaucratic jobs in institutions, something which 
is true even today. They are the usually seen as their rival ethnic group in the political 
structure of the country by Pashtuns (SAWEZ 1986: 284-285).  
 
Hazaras are the third largest ethnic group who are easily distinguishable from others in 
Afghanistan. The ideas on their descent are usually based on the Mongol-like facial 
features they have and also some Mongol words they still use. They speak Farsi with a 
Hazaragi dialect, mostly in the rural areas and among themselves.  However, this dialect 
is slowly disappearing because of the Hazaras contacts with urban areas in Afghanistan 
and Iran. They live mainly in the central region of the country known as Hazarajat which 
constitutes Afghanistan’s central plateau. This natural factor has helped the Hazaras to 
enjoy a rather independent position. It was difficult for different rulers to maintain their 
control in an area which was hard to reach and to inhibit due to long winters.  
 
In the 1880s, when the Hazaras resisted the rule of Amir Abdurraman Khan, they were 
oppressed, killed, exiled or sold as slaves. From here on they were subject to 
discrimination by rulers in Kabul. In his autobiography Abdurrahman mentions that “if 
the Hazarars, who carry loads like donkeys, had not existed we would have done our 
work [carried our loads] like donkeys” (ABDURRAHMAN 2005: 288). Although 
Amanullah later banned slavery, the position of the Hazaras remained almost unchanged 
and they were treated as lower class citizens. Until 1978 they represented one of the most 
deprived ethnic groups in Afghanistan. However, following the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, large number of Hazaras migrated abroad, particularly to Iran where they 
had close cultural and religious relations. Receiving support from Iran, they established 
the eight Shii Mujahidin parties (cf. chapter 4.). These contacts also paved the way for the 
emergence of a new generation of Hazaras who represent an intellectual as well as 
religious elite. Migration has tremendously improved their standard of living, education, 
and way of life.  
 
The Uzbeks are the fourth major ethnic groups in Afghanistan, mainly living in the 
Northern regions bordering Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. They used to be the second 
most deprived ethnic groups in the country following the Hazaras. They became 
politically active during the communist regime, especially following the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops from Afghanistan. In order to fill the gap left by the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops, the government recruited many of Uzbeks and Pashtuns not in the army but into 
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separate militia groups. They were paid well and received other amenities they desired. 
This special attention made them perform better than the army. General Dostum was the 
commander of these militias who played a key role in the fall of the communist regime in 
Kabul.  
 
Beside these four groups there are many other different ethnic groups like the Aimaq, 
Turkman, Baluch, Brahui, Nuristani, Gujar, Kyrgyz, Arab, Hindu, Sikh and other smaller 
groups. These different ethnic groups are also further divided linguistically and make 
their distinction from one another even more complicated. There are more than 30 
distinct languages in Afghanistan which belong to the Indo-Iranian language family. This 
family is split mainly into two subdivisions, Iranian and Indian (Indo-Aryan). Among 
them Farsi (Persian or Dari) and Pashtu are the official languages, of which around 85 
percent of population are native speakers. The rest of the languages are spoken locally in 
different parts of the country (table 10). 
 
 
Table 10: The linguistic situation of Afghanistan   
Source: KIEFER (1983: 502) 
 
It should be noted that scholars have different opinions concerning the ethno-linguistic 
division of Afghanistan. An example of such differing opinions would be the case of 
Farsiwan and Tajik which was related to earlier. ORYWAL conceives ethnic groups as a 
“continuum within which the members of a group identify their particular position in 
space and time by including or excluding other groups.” Taking this concept into 
consideration he names more than fifty different ethnic groups in Afghanistan 
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(ORYWAL 1986: 7, 18-19). However, with such a classification one may find different 
ethnic groups even in homogenous societies. A rather better way would be to see how 
these different groups are described within the society and among themselves. Major 
sources for such analysis would include constitutions and official documents which 
mentioned the name of different ethnic and social groups according to inner perspectives 
with local terminologies. 
 
The ethno-linguistic diversity of the country has been one of the main controversial 
topics of the changing constitutions since Amanullah (cf. chapter 5.1.2). In contrast to the 
previous constitutions, the new one ratified in 2004 explicitly mentions the name of 
different major ethnic groups.31 Article 4 in chapter 1 mentions that “the nation of 
Afghanistan is comprised of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkmen, Baluch,  Pashai, 
Nuristani, Aimaq, Arab, Kyrgyz, Qezilbash, Gujar, Brahwi, and other ethnic groups 
(Aqwam).”32 This article highlights many important facts. Firstly, it acknowledges the 
diversity of social structure in the country. At the same time it puts the name of ethnic 
groups in a hierarchical order starting with major ethnic groups while it continues with 
minor ones without ending in the name of a particular minor group. There are still few 
other minor groups like the Sikhs and Hindus which seems to have been ignored. 
Nevertheless, the word “other ethnic groups” (Sayer Aqwam) at the end of the sentence 
leaves a space open for the other communities that are not explicitly mentioned.  
 
One of the most significant points in this article is the word Aqwam which is a plural 
form of Qawm. The word mentioned here as an equivalent to the term ‘ethnic groups’ 
which is repeatedly used in the literature. However, scholars using the word Qawm are 
often confused. The confusions usually seems to stem from the colloquial as well as 
formal and official usage of the word in different parts of Islamic world. WENSINCK 
believes that the term does not primarily suggest the meaning of nation. He concentrates 
in the usage of the word by Arabs and concludes that if it is used without article (Arabic 
‘al’) it has the same meaning as English ‘people’, French gens, and German Leute 
(WENSINCK 1978: 780). However, even in non-Arab Muslim countries in formal and 
official usage sometimes the word Qawm is used to refer to ‘nation’ and Qawmi is 
                                                 
31 SCHETTER studying Pashtuns says that “there is no explicit Pashtun reference” in the constitution (SCHETTER 
2008:2). 
32 Translated by author from Farsi version, since there is no official version in English. Afghanistan’s Embassy in 
Washington has translated one and adds that it is not the official translation. SHAFI RAHEL has also translated one in 
English but as he describe it was for Secretariat of Constitutional Commission.  Furthermore he translated the word 
‘Aqwam’ as ‘tribes’ which does not seem correct. 
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interpreted as meaning ‘national’ (e.g., in Pakistan’s national anthem (Qawmi Tarana) 
and in its text the word Qawm is used as an equivalent to ‘nation’). Furthermore, in 
Afghanistan it is used of course without the article and it does not refer to ‘people,’ which 
has a general meaning, but to a certain group of people.  According to VATIKIOTIS the 
word “Kawm is a tribal provenance used to denote a group of people having or claiming a 
common ancestor, or a tribe descended from a single ancestor. One’s Kawm is simply 
one’ people, either genealogically determined or mythologically and folklorishly 
depicted.” However, when it comes to Qawmiyya (another form of the word Qawm) he 
defines it as nationalism (VATIKIOTIS 1978: 781).  
 
In colloquial language, unlike in official useage the word Qawm sometimes refers to 
‘tribe,’ ‘sub-tribe’ and even ‘relatives.’ While there are more proper words such as 
Tayefa, Qabila, and Ashira, that are used in officially to describe tribes, sub-tribes and 
other smaller groups e.g., to be seen in the name of a ministry (Ministry of Ethnic and 
Tribes or Wezarat-e Aqwam wa Qabayel), or in the word Aqwam wa Qabayel   
mentioned in chapter 1, article 6, of the new constitution of 2004. KOHZAD mentions 
the period in which Mirwais Khan rebellion against Safavids occurred as Daura –e 
Nahzat-e Qawmi (period of Qawmi movement) (KOHZAD 1940: 235) (figure 6).  
 
Qawm (ethnic group, nation)
Tayefa (tribe)
Qabila (sub-tribe)
Ashira
Khanadan / Famil (family) 
Ummah (Moslem community)
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009)  
Figure 6: The Qawm structure 
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The question of why the tribes and sub-tribes prefer to use the word Qawm colloquially 
instead of Tayefa, Qabila, and Ashira may be posed. This is because the word Qawm 
signifies rather a larger number of people than the latter terms. Therefore, as other tribal 
societies where the numbers of people indicates the power of the tribe, in Afghanistan 
tribes and even sub-tribes prefer to use the word Qawm in order to create a bigger image 
for themselves. Especially among the Pashtun tribe due to the persistent rivalry and 
conflicts, Qawm is frequently used.  For example, the Ghilzai and Durrani rarely use the 
word Tayefa, and the same is true for sub-tribes like the Sadozai and Mohammadzai who 
are referred to as Aqwam instead of Qabayel (plural of Qabila), which means tribe. 
Nonetheless, in the official language, the word Tayefa is usually used for Durranis 
(KATEB 1952: 10, KOHZAD 2004: 296-299). What also adds to the confusion is that 
many non-Pashtun colloquially use the term Qawm to refer to their relatives as in 
(Khwish wa Qawm), which covers those associated as relatives.  However, among the 
Hazaras the words Qawm, Tayefa, Tol or Tolwara and Khanawar show the social units 
and the structure from the unit with the highest number of members to the family 
respectively (MOUSAVI 2000: 77).    
 
Nevertheless, the new constitution explicitly describes Afghanistan as a multi-Qawmi 
(multi-ethnic) nation. This can also be interpreted to mean that what is known as the 
‘Afghan nation’ has not been created yet.  
 
2.3.2 How to Create Unity in Diversity: The Challenges of Ethno-linguistic 
Diversity in Building Nation and National Institutions 
The Afghan rulers have repeatedly found the ethno-linguistic diversity as a major 
problem in creating a stable state and a unified nation.  In order to overcome this 
problem, the policy of Afghan monarchs from Abdurrhaman onward was to create a 
modern nation through the assimilation of the diverse population. This policy of 
assimilation, which is usually referred to as ‘Pashtunization,’33 was continued until the 
end of the monarchy in 1973. Abdurrahman moved many Pashtun tribes from the arid 
regions of the South to the fertile regions in the North. This policy was later followed by 
his successors, especially by Amanullah, who legalized it by issuing a certain law: 
(Nezamnama-e Naqelin ba Samt-e Qataghan or law of migration toward Qataghan). In 
this law special privileges were guaranteed for the tribes moving from the province of 
                                                 
33 The terms used are as ‘Pashto-ize’ DUPREE 2005: 66, ‘Pashtunize’ RUBIN 2002: 66, KENT 2007: 14 and 
‘Paschtunisierung’ FROEHLICH 1970:  219, SCHETTER 2003: 261.  Also cf. MOUSAVI 2000: 188-189, GHUBAR 
1999: 44.  
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Kabul and its sub-provinces Mashrqi and Junubi. 34 For every member of migrant 
families (above seven years old male or female) eight jerib or 15,344sq. meters (1 Jerib = 
1,918sq meter) of fertile lands was distributed, the benefits also included exemption from 
tax and free use of transportation facilities (NEZAMNAMA1923a: article 1-7). 
 
The cultural assimilation of the population started with the arrival of Mahmud Tarzi from 
exile in Turkey. Tarzi also a Mohammadzai, was the editor of Seraj-ul Akhbar published 
in Farsi from 1911-1918, which propagated modernity and nationalism. As SMITH stated 
that “nationalism is born among intelligentsia” (SMITH 1971: 255), in Afghanistan Tarzi 
was one of the founding members of the intellectual elite. He is considered to be ‘the 
Father of Journalism in Afghanistan’ and was also the pioneer of the nation-building 
project in the country. He inspired the younger generation of the royal court as well as the 
emerging intellectual elites with the European idea of modernity he brought from Turkey. 
He introduced the European concept of the term nation (Millat also from Turkish) for the 
first time, which was different in concept from the common traditional notion held in the 
country. Prior to this, Islam was the main factor that held all different ethno-linguistic 
groups together. For Tarzi and others who followed him later, the ethno-linguistic 
diversity of Afghanistan was seen as an impediment to integration. In order to overcome 
this challenge Tarzi used the Pashtu language as a main tool in his nation-building 
project. He explains his idea as follows: 
One of the main national characteristic of every nation is to preserve, reform, and develop its own 
language. The official language of our sacred Matboaa state is ‘Farsi’ and our national language is 
‘Afghani’. Farsi became the official language of our state because before the formation and 
establishment of Daulat-e Moqadassa-e Afghania [Sacred State of Afghania] and the 
independence of our sovereignty, our neat and sacred soil [land] was part of Iran….. when HE  
(Ahmad Shah Baba-e Ghazi)  succeeded in the independence and establishment of Saltanat-e 
Afghaniya [Afghaniya Dynasty], all affairs of administration, offices and institutions based on 
which the state is founded were in Farsi and in the hand of Farsi speakers who were originally 
Iranians…. Therefore, from the beginning, the foundation of Daulat-e Moqadassa-e Afghaniya 
was laid in Farsi (TARZI 1915:1-2). 
 
There are many important points to notice: TARZI used the word ‘Afghani’ which used 
to be the common word until it was replaced by Pashtu. He called Ahmad Shah Baba 
(father). This is inspired by Turkey (Atta Turk, or father of the Turks). The most 
important thing in his words is that he signifies the role of Farsi in the institutions of the 
state. Although he mentioned as ‘Farsi language of the Iranians’, but this never means 
that he ignored or rejected the entire Farsi speaking population of Afghanistan. He 
wanted Farsi to remain the official language of the institutions. He says: 
                                                 
34 For the name of Qataghan, Junubi and Mashreqi (cf. Map 9). 
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However, in the sacred soil of our beloved country there are not only the Afghani Aqwam who 
speak Afghani but also other Aqwam who speak Farsi and are the main part of Afghan nation. The 
people of the capital and other main big cities and provinces are mostly Farsi speakers. From the 
beginning …..to now, Farsi has been in the entire administration, the judiciary branch and the 
institutions of the state which makes changing or abolishing it difficult. Therefore, no one can 
order that our official language [Farsi] should be changed into Afghani [Pashtu]. There is also 
another important reason. Farsi is more important and more common than Afghani…. For 
example, the Afghani language [Pashtu] is limited strictly to Afghanistan and the several million 
[strong] Afghan nation. In contrast, Farsi besides being the language of our neighbour Iran, is also 
common in the entire region beyond the Oxus (Mawara-un-Nahr) [Central Asia] and Hindustan 
and even in the countries of Othman.  It should be understood that every Qawm and every Millat 
(nation) is alive with their own Qawmi and Millati (national) language. If the language of a Millat 
is diminished their entire existence would be diminished. They [others] call us Millat-e Afghan 
(Afghan nation) and our beloved soil [land] as Afghanistan. We should preserve this language 
[Afghani or Pashtu] at the cost of our lives. We should try seriously to develop and reform it. It is 
crucial not only for the Afghan people [Pashtun] but also for other Aqwam [ethnic groups] to learn 
the language of our land and nation. Teaching Afghani must be the most important part of the 
teaching in our schools and have priority to other languages like English, Urdu, Turkish or Farsi 
(TARZI 1915:1-2). 
 
Obviously TARZI’s idea of nation-building was concentrated in promoting and 
preserving the Pashtun culture as an accepted model and generalizing it to the entire 
population. The main elements of this culture which gained tremendous attention were 
Jirga as an institution35 and Pashtu as ‘the language of nation’ (Zaban-e Millat). To 
achieve this goal Pashtu-Maraka a centre for the development of Pashtu, was established 
in Kabul. Initially it was a difficult task to promote Pashtu because of the problems of 
how to write it and which dialect would be adopted as an accepted model. Since the 
Durranis came from Kandahar, the Kandahari dialect of Pashtu was suggested to be used 
in writing, reading and teaching for the first time. The first Pashtu teacher employed in 
the modern Habibiya high school was Saleh Mohammad Kandahari. He was also the first 
to write a textbook in Pashtu especially for Habibiya School. He described his opinion as 
follows: 
In 1915, Afghani, as a subject, was added to the curriculum of the school of Habibiya, and its 
instruction was ordered. [I should say this in a poem:]  
     Paskhtu Mra wa Juandai kra                               Khudai da dai Juandai Krina 
     Pashtu was dead, you (the king) gave it life      May god extend your life (in return) 
 
I [KANDAHARI] was employed by [the Amir] to teach the writing of the Afghani language. In 
our beloved country, up to now, there was no Afghani textbook or grammar book. Even its 
teaching was entirely dead. Poor Pashtu was forgotten like other dead languages. There were no 
instruction books and no writing regulations. After being employed I published the 1,2,3 textbooks 
and a book on grammar… There were different common words and expressions. Each tribe had its 
own expressions and vocabulary. … Because the generation of our king (khamirmaya nasle shah-
e maarefpanah) belongs to the neat soil of Kandahar and his Qawm is Durrani,…. and all Afghans 
agree that the Afghani [language] from Kandahar is the sweetest and the easiest, thus after lots of 
                                                 
35 Later Amanullah abolished Jirga as part of his modernization reforms (cf. Chapter 3) 
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discussions in the Association of Education we agreed that writing should be done in the Afghani 
from Kandahar, in order to form a unity (KANDAHARI 1915: 1-9).  
 
Thus, the Pashtu language found its way in the school and in the government beside the 
dominant Farsi. Yet Pashtu was taught as a language with the help of Farsi not and not 
used as a communicative tool for learning other subjects. Furthermore, the name Afghani 
for the language remained till the reign of Zahir Khan, 1933-1973. Moreover. this policy 
at this stage created no major problem in the institutions since Pashtu did not have the 
status to replace Farsi. At the same time Farsi still remained the only official language in 
the institutions and Durbar. It was in 1937 that Pashtu became official through a decree 
forwarded by Mohammad Hashim Khan, the Prime Minister (TICHY 1940: 197, 
FARHANG 1995: 632-634).36 However, it was not the official status of Pashtu that 
created problems but the part of the decree which made learning Pashtu in three years 
compulsory for all institutional staff in order to replace Farsi in the institutions. 
Nevertheless, in practice it proved to be difficult and even impossible to replace Farsi 
with Pashtu. The failure was mainly due to the fact that Pashtu did not have the status that 
could replace Farsi. The small number of available words was regarded as one of major 
problems in Pashtu being used in the administration and institutions. Therefore the first 
attempt at a Pashtu Tolana (Pashtu Academy) was made by “systematically purging 
foreign words and replacing them with new invented Pashtu words” (DUPREE 
2005:93).” To do so Farsi words were analysed and then translated into Pashtu. Later the 
word formation process included other languages (e.g., Arabic, English) for which new 
words were created, e.g., a simple term ‘rocket’ became ‘Torghundai’ (a black mound 
which flies up in the sky) (DUPREE 2005: 93). The newly created words were even 
difficult for many Pashtuns to understand. Therefore, the new words and difficult 
grammar were among the main problems mastering Pashtu. At the same time, the staff of 
the institutions who were predominantly non-Pashtuns demonstrated their reluctance to 
learn Pashtu and this played an important role. Thus after the government failed to 
achieve its aim in the given time, the program was extended to another three year period. 
Later, even the government even paid some extra money to the participants of the Pashtu 
courses. Nevertheless, despite the government repeated extention of the period of courses 
the policy repeatedly failed.  
 
                                                 
36 Although at this stage Zahir Khan was the King but he was too young and the actual power was practiced by his 
uncle Mohammad Hashim Khan who was the Prime Minister. (cf. Chapter 2.2.5 - 2.2.9) 
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The policy of Pashtunization reached its climax during the premiership of Mohammad 
Daoud (1953-1963). According to DUPREE this time the attempt to Pashtunize the 
institutions came “to disaster” because neither the officials nor the recipients could 
understand Pashtu. To overcome this challenge non-Pashtun high-ranking officials found 
it necessary to have a clerk translate their Farsi (DUPREE 2005: 66, 70). However, 
recipients were often non-Pashtun, therefore everything had to be written twice: first in 
Farsi and then translated into Pashtu. Moreover, the negative impact of this policy was 
massive for the institutions, especially for the education system, both economically and 
culturally since the quality of education declined (FARHANG 1995: 633-634). Thus the 
process of communication between officials became slow and ineffective.  
 
It is important to notice that the first two constitutions did not indicate anything about the 
multitude of languages spoken in Afghanistan, and Pashtu became official or ‘national’ 
by a royal decree. Nevertheless, from time to time, the Pashtu language became an 
exclusive criterion and a tool for nationalism and nation-building idea. At the same time 
the idea of nationalism became equal to Pashtun nationalism. As a result this notion 
developed that “in Afghanistan the concept of nation and nationality has always been 
Pashtun and it had no other meaning (SHAHRANI 2009).” Therefore, this government 
backed policy of nationalism widened the gap between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun 
ethnic groups, because the non-Pashtun population became a victim of this nationalism, 
especially their languages came under severe pressure. 
 
The British withdrawal from Indian provided another momentum for this Pashtun 
nationalism, which led to the creation of Pashtunistan and the formation of many Pashtun 
parties who claimed for ‘a greater Afghanistan’ and ethnic hegemony. Hereafter Pashtuns 
who lived in Pakistan were also regarded as part of Afghanistan. In order to strengthen 
this idea and attract the attention of tribes beyond the border, in 1958, the government 
established Khushhal Khan Khatak high school in Kabul exclusively for the 
Pashtunistanis (GHARGHASHT 1966: 194) a term the government used to refer to all 
Pashtun tribes in that period.  
 
This nationalism was further strengthened by the idea of the Aryan race which provided 
an instrument for the implemention of the policy of assimilation. The idea of Aryan race 
was imported from Europe and as a result of contacts with European. In particular, even 
before the Nazis took over power in Gemany, the German teaching staff in Kabul, formed 
a Nazi club in Nejat High School and spread the ideology of Nazis (ADAMEC 1974: 
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219, FARHANG 1995: 637). Furthermore, members of royal family visited Berlin on 
different occasions, were inspired by the devepoment in Gemany. In 1936, Faiz 
Mohammad Khan, Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs met Hitler in Berlin and 
mentioned to him that “Afghanistan hopes to receive help from Germany, whom it 
considered an elder and more advanced Aryan brother” (ADAMEC 1974: 223). 
 
These contacts influenced members of the royal family and their policy of nation-
building in Afghanistan. Hereafter, in order to create a sense of harmony among the 
diverse population, the history of the country was rewritten and invoked as proof that the 
majority of population were descended from Aryans (GREGORIAN 1969: 345). 
Pashtuns who used to claim being one of the lost Jewish tribe were redefined as of pure 
Aryan race. An Afghan professor from Kabul University described the Pashtuns and 
other ethnic groups in his book: 
The principle races and tribes that make up the 15,000,000 population of the country are: the 
Afghans or Pashtoons, the bulk of which are derived from Indo-European stock and constitute the 
great majority. Next in number are the Tajiks who, too are of Aryan origin. The rest are the 
Mongoloid Hazaras, the Uzbeks, the Turkmans and the Kirghiz. Other small minorities include the 
fair-skinned Nurristanis (old Kafirs), of pure Aryan stock), the Arabs, the Hindus, the Sikhs and 
the Jews. ……  Indeed, the time [in which the Afghans are described as of Semitic origin] is past 
for ever to call the Afghans of Semitic origin, for Pashto, their language, does not bear any 
resemblance to Hebrew or any other Aramaic language. At present all agree that Pashtu belongs to 
the indo-Germanic family of languages (ALI 1969: 6, 9). 
 
New names and terms replaced the old and common words. The word Aryan and Aryana 
(or Ariana) was used by historians, teachers, and officials. Hotel Ariana, Chahr Rahi 
Ariana (Ariana crossroad), Ariana Afghan Airlines are some of the examples still largely 
used by the Afghans. It is believed that the aim of this policy was:  
to level out ethnic heterogeneity of Afghanistan’s territory and to thwart any attempts at secessions 
[…] toponyms that carried any ethnic or particularistic perceptions, such as Kafiristan/ Nuristan, 
Khorassan, Turkistan, Qataghan or Hazarajat were replaced by administrative terms which often 
referred to provincial towns (e.g. Herat, Bamyan) or rivers (e.g. Kunar) and did not imply any 
ethnic connotations (SCHETTER 2006: 23).  
 
However, this may be true in cases of other ethnic groups (Turkistan and Qataghan) but 
not in the case of Pashtuns, for whom two new provinces (Paktia and Paktika) were 
created to suit to their identity.37 Furthermore, provinces like Khorassan did not exist in 
                                                 
37 These are just few examples. However, it never denies the facts regarding the archeological discoveries made in 
Afghanistan, based on which many new provinces were created like Balkh, Bamian, Takhar, Nangarhar, Kunar, 
Laghman, Kapisa. Though the name ‘Kandahar’ remained unchanged and was not replaced with its historical name 
‘Arachosia’ (in Greek) or Zameendawar in Farsi used following the Islamic period. The name Kandahar seems to be 
originated from Gandahara a historical area that lies between Sindh and Peshawar which is far away from modern 
Kandahar city. This still remains a question how this name was applied to Kandahar. 
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the Afghan administration. Parts of Khorassan were under the control of the Durranis for 
a short period but were lost to the Persians in 1801.  
 
In 1964 when Loya Jirga was convened to ratify a new ‘liberal’ constitution, language 
and identity were among the most controversial topics. Pashtu became both the official 
and national language and replaced the name Afghani. At the same time during the 
constitutional debate, many conservatives Pashtuns wanted to oust Farsi from its status as 
the official language of the country, an idea which was resisted by the non-Pashtun 
delegates. The Farsi language survived this attempt at degradation, but its name was 
changed to Dari. The word Dari was traditionally used to refer to Farsi but not solely as a 
name (noun) but as an adjective to describe Farsi or to show its status in Durbar. This is 
more or less like using Fus’ha for Arabic and Hochdeutsch for the German language. 
According to a linguistic expert, referring to Farsi as Dari alone is neither scientific nor 
correct and logical.  The language’s original name is Farsi, and if Dari is used then it 
should be mentioned as Farsi-ye Dari (YAMEEN 2009). The main idea in coining Farsi 
into Dari was to differ from Iran because the ruling elite thought (and still think) that Iran 
is a major source which strengthens the influence of Farsi. In other words, with this attept 
at re-naming the language, they wanted to (and still want to) to weaken Farsi by isolating 
it from literature published in Iran. In order to do so articles and books were written 
specially by Pashtun writers. HABIBI was one of the most famous among those who 
strongly backed this idea.   
 
Thus, introducing and implementing the European concept of nation proved to be 
unsuccessful because the situation in Afghanistan was entirely different from Europe, as 
it presented a very complex and diverse ethno-linguistic and socio-religious structure. 
Thus, the challenge of creating a nation out of different ethno-linguistic groups proved to 
be more difficult than it was expected by many regimes in Afghanistan. The main factor 
that contributed to the failure of these policies was tribal and ethnic hegemony 
propagated by the ruling elites. In general, the two sub-tribes (Tayefa) Sadozai and 
Mohammadzai of the Durrani tribe were the dominant ruling elites for a long period in 
the history of Afghanistan. Therefore, in Farsi literature, the ruling elites were seen 
predominantly as Sadozai and Mohammdzais first and then as Durrani and finally 
Afaghana, the plural of Afghan.  Although the word Pashtun was used earlier by Pashtuns 
(e.g., Khushhal Khan Khatak), it was a self-preference and not used by others. The idea 
of being Pashtun is a creation of modernity which replaced the notion of being Afghan. 
The same goes for the language which was referred to as Afghani first and later changed 
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to Pashtu. However, the rule of the Durranis never means the rule of all Pashtuns tribes 
because the Pashtun Ghilzais, consisting of a larger number of sub-tribes than Durranis 
were sidelined from power and were seen as the rival enemy. 
Die Ghilzais, durch ihre Wahl Ahmad Schahs im Jahre 1747 Mitbegründer des afghanisschen 
Reiches, wurden in der Folgezeit von den Durranis politisch immer mehr in den Hintergrund 
gedrängt, wodurch sich zwischen  den beiden Stämmen schwerwiegende und intensive 
Antipathien entwickelten (FROEHLICH 1970: 173-174). 
 
The Mohammadzais made all possible attempts to break the Ghilzais’s power so that they 
would not be able to challenge the Mohammadzai rule. In the late 19th century the 
Ghilzais revolted against Amir Abdurrahman (1880-1901). In this rebellion the Ghilzais 
preferred the Hazaras (who are seen as the traditional enemy of the Pashtuns) to the Amir 
in Kabul: they sent their families (women and children) to Hazarajat and to Waziristan 
for safety (ABDURRAHMAN 2005: 272). The Amir, after putting off the rebellion, 
moved many of these tribes from their place of origin in the South and settled them in the 
North. With this policy he aimed at mainly two things: first to break the strength of the 
Ghilzai tribe and to minimize the threat they presented, and second to spread out the 
Pashtuns to the North. This policy was further followed by Amanullah and Nadir Khan. 
Especially the latter used many of these tribes and tribes from the border areas to gain 
access to the throne.  As reward for their support Nadir Khan gave special privileges to 
these tribes which included exemptions from tax payments and conscription, receiving 
development projects in their areas, and high-ranking military positions in the army.  
 
Apart from the Durrani and Ghilzai tribes in Afghanistan, a large number of other 
Pashtun tribes and sub-tribes (e.g. Yousufzai, Tarklanri, Waziri, Afridi, Orakzai, Khatak, 
Bangash, Kakar, Turi, Mohmand and Tarin) lived outside the control of the rulers in 
Kandahar or Kabul. They kept their region semi-independent by accepting the indirect 
rule of the Moghuls, Sikhs and the British. Finally, Pakistan emerged and they became an 
autonomous part of a newly-born state. Following the Pashtunistan issue, Afghan 
authorities repeatedly mentioned that Pashtuns are divided equally on the two sides of the 
Durand border line or between Afghanistan and Pashtunistan. The territorial distribution 
of Pashtuns was published in official maps by Afghan authorities included not only tribal 
regions in Pakistan but also in Baluchistan. In order to support this claim official 
estimates used to declare the number of Pashtuns as higher than that of other groups. The 
assumptions that half of the Pashuns live in Afghanistan and the other half lives in 
Pakistan dominated the scientific literature.  However, recent figures from Pakistan 
estimate the total number of Pashtuns to be 21,000,000, out of which 13,000,000 live in 
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Pakistan and the remaining 8,000,000 live in Afghanistan (GANKOVSKY 2006: 209). 
Another source claims that 8,000,000 Pashtuns live in Afghanistan and 22,000,000 live in 
Pakistan (KRECH 2004: 18). 
 
Therefore, the Pashtun’s fragmented tribal structure is the main internal factor that led to 
the fall of the Abdali dynasty because these different tribes were seldom in peace with 
one another. This factor in particular prevented the transformation of the traditional tribal 
ruling system into a stable and functioning modern state. From 1747 to 1973 there were 
repeated conflicts between brothers, relatives, sub-tribes (Sadozai vs. Mohammadzai) and 
tribes (Durrani vs. Ghilzai).  In 1973 the Durranis lost their leading position to the 
Ghilzai and other ethnic groups. Although AHADI, the current leader of Afghan Mellat 
Party, ignores the role of the Ghilzai tribes and considers the fall of monarchy as the  
beginning of the decline or the end of Pashtun dominance in the politics of Afghanistan 
(AHADI 1995: 621). The fall of monarchy, as a highly centralized form of government, 
paved the way for the emergence of the Ghilzais (e.g. Khalq, Afghan Mellat), and other 
ethnic groups in (e.g., Parcham, Shola-Jawid, Setam-e Melli). At the same time the 
fragmentation of the PDPA, the ruling communist, into Khalq, Parcham and other minor 
groups was mostly based on ethnic groups. The same was true for the Mujahidin parties 
in Pakistan and in Iran, who, despite their common aim, were divided into 15 different 
tribal, ethnic and religious sections. Those Taliban coming from Afghanistan mainly 
represent the Ghilzai tribes, the Durranis lost their dominant role with the fall of 
monarchy (cf. Ch. 2.2). One can hardly find a popular figure who is a member of 
Durranis, more specifically of the Mohammadzais. They were almost disappeared from 
the political scene of the country. King Zahir Khan, while in exile in Italy, made attempts 
on several occasions to show he was active in politics. He usually demonstrated his 
presence through the media and by backing of the Mahaz-e Milli the Gailani led 
Mujahidin party in Peshawar.  
 
During the post-Taliban state-building processes it was difficult to create institutions 
which would represent the will of the diverse peoples. The main difficulty was to decide 
who was to have the leading position, or be the head of Afghanistan’s Interim 
Administration AIA, and Afghanistan’s Transitional Administration ATA, who should 
hold the postion of the Minister of Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs. Many 
different political parties, Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns, were at the Pertersberg Conference 
where they could not reach an agreement on these issues. For a non-Pashtun to be the 
head was unacceptable for the Pashtun delegates. However, it was also hard to find a 
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Pashtun figure who would be acceptable for all Pashtuns. Within the Pashtuns, the tribal 
competitions between the Ghilzai and Durrani made this process difficult, especially 
when the former king was rejected almost by all. Nevertheless, the Durranis succeeded in 
instating Hamid Karzai (a very unpopular figure) as an alternative to the king. Karzai also 
enjoyed support from the United States. Even before being nominated by the delegates of 
the conference as the head of the AIA, Hamid Karzai supported by the US special 
commandos, started his political campaign to gain power around Kandahar. Karzai’s 
political campaign is an indication to the fact he knew that he would become the head of 
the AIA. Furthermore, when the US reopened its embassy in Kabul, Zalmai Khalilzad 
(originally a Pashtun from Afghanistan) was assigned as the US ambassador to 
Afghanistan, having very close relations to Karzai. In fact, Khalilzad was the main 
architect of the whole Bonn process. As the US ambassador in Kabul, he was actively 
involved in every key decisions of the government while Karzai had only a symbolic 
role. The media called Khalilzad ‘the new Viceroy,’ reminding of the British viceroys 
who enthroned or supported many Afghan amirs. Thus, the Pertersberg Conference was 
merely a meeting of different political elements while the key decision had already been 
made outside. 
 
Despite the help of the international community, the process of building up new 
demonstrates that overcoming the challenges of tribalism38 and ethno-linguistic 
relationships are far from being overcom. The AIA, ATG, the elected government and the 
parliament continuously demonstrate the existence of such tensions among the elites. 
Especially the replacement of ministers was mainly based on ethnic rivalries. For 
example the Ministries of Defence, Education,39 Information and recently Ministry of the 
Interior, were subject to repeated replacements. All previously non-Pashtuns led are now 
run by Pashtuns. Zalmai Khalilzad and his close associates played (and still play) key 
role in this ethnic cleansing within institutions. According to KENT “on the policy front, 
members of Khalilzad’s coterie, notably Marin Strmecki and Martin Hoffman, a former 
college roommate of Donald Rumsfeld, stepped up their efforts to Pashtunize the Karzai 
                                                 
38 The term tribalism is defined as:  
any group of persons, families, or clans, primitive or contemporary, descended from a common ancestor, possessing a 
common leadership, and forming a community. Members of the tribe speak a common language, observe uniform rules 
of social organization, and worked together for such purposes as agriculture, trade, or warfare. They ordinarily have 
their own name and occupy a continguous territory. Tribalism does not ordinarily apply to formation of large territorial 
units, or states, but denotes, instead, units composed of extended kinship group (SNYDER 1990: 401). 
 
39 The Ministry of Education was given, for a short period, to Nur M. Qharqhin, an Uzbek. Later he was replaced by 
Hanif Atmar a Pashtun who was then instated as Minister of the Interior. Since then Farooq Wardak another Pashtun 
has been in charge. 
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regime” (KENT 2007: 14). The idea of this policy was to convince the US that a 
dominant Pashtun dominated government would weaken the position of the Taliban and 
eventually lead to their surrender. However, the policy proved to result in the opposite of 
this desired effect as it failed to deter the Taliban. At the same time the deteriorating 
security situation further undermined the strength and legitimacy of the government in 
Kabul and created pessimism converning the efforts of the international community in the 
nation-building process. AKHGAR states: 
I do not believe that foreign powers can build a nation out of us. If they do so, then we will be a 
material nation. Of course nation is not Murch wa Masala (pepper and other tasty spices and 
herbsl used for cooking) in that one can take some parsley, pepper, some garlic [mix them and 
then say] this is Masala. It [nation] is not construction material either. It is a human being 
phenomenon. I do not believe that without independence we can succeed in building a nation. We 
should create the motivations and we should choose our way on our own without being imposed 
by others. Not like one day they [foreigners] say we give you socialism. One day an Islamic 
Republic. One day they bring an Emirate of Taliban. Finally they say no! Enough with of all this! 
Let’s have democracy! In my view nation is a group of people who have common feelings. Such 
feeling can not be imported from outside. If different Aqwam (ethnic groups), Tawayef (tribes), 
and religions consider that they have common feelings, then they are a nation, at every stage of 
history. If these groups are from the same parent but have opposing, contrasting and different 
feelings they can not be regarded as a nation” (AKHGAR 2009). 
 
The elected parliament hardly fosters national unity and solidarity. It is dominated by the 
rival tribal, religious and intellectual elites, and is referred to as “a divided house” 
(WILDER 2005: 44). When it comes to key decisions the members are highly divided 
along Qawm (ethnic group), tribal and linguistic lines rather than effective political 
parties. For example, in April 2008, Alam Gul Kuchi a Pashtun member of parliament 
(also a former member of the Taliban movement), called the non-Pashtun people in the 
country migrants. The non-Pashtuns members of parliament regarded this as an insult. In 
response around one hundred of them refused to take part in the parliamentary sessions 
for several days   and demanded that Alam Gul apologize for what he said.40 Such 
situations repeatedly occur in the parliament undermining its effectiveness as a ‘national’ 
institution. 
 
Usually there are two opposing sides within each institutions: the Pashtuns and the non-
Paschtuns. In this rivalry, each side tries to discredit the oppositions by naming the 
political affiliations the enemy used to have, which are not popular now and lack images 
in the society. For example, Pashtuns labels non-Pashtuns as Warlords and as affiliated 
with ‘Northern Alliance’, Parchamis, Shulais, etc. In the same way non-Pashtun call 
Pashtuns as Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Khalqi, Afghan Millati, and Qabila-gara (tribalists). 
                                                 
40 See THE DAILY AFGHANISTAN, April 17, 2008, no. 477, third year. 
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Though there are members of the Taliban, Mujahidin, Khalq, Parcham and other leftist 
groups on either side, there are also others who had/ have no political affiliations and are 
still villainized so. Thus, for each side the Qawm (ethnic) affiliations are more important 
than the true political affiliations. This means Pashtuns support the Taliban, Khalqis 
(directly or indirectly) and other Pashtun groups regardless of their role in the conflicts of 
Afghanistan. For example, Noor-ul-Haq Hlumi and Shanawaz Tanai, two prominent 
former members of the PDPA (Khalq fraction), won in the parliamentary election in 
Kandahar and Khost respectively, which surprised the other candidates. In the same way 
the non-Pashtuns, in order to counter-balance their oppositions prefer Qawm affiliations 
over other issues.  
 
Nonetheless, the process of nation-building and creating unity in diversity has been one 
of the main challenges in Afghanistan for the ruling elites, especially in the post-Taliban 
era, in which international community played a major role and invested lots of efforts. 
Yet all has proved to be unsuccessful so far.  
 
 
2.3.3 Religious Diversity 
In terms of religion more than 99 percent of the population of the country is Muslim. The 
majority of the Muslims (around 80 percent of the population) is Sunni, or Hanafi, this 
comprised various ethnic groups, including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbek, Aimaq, Baluch, 
Nuristani, and other small groups. There are also around 19 percent Shii Muslims in 
Afghanistan the majority of whom are Ithna Ashari (twelvers) and there is a smaller 
number of of Ismaelite (seveners) as well. Hazara and Qizilbash are predominantly Itna 
Asharis while Ismailites are Tajiks. There is also a small numbers of Shii Pashtun tribes 
(e.g., the Orakzai and Turi) as well as Hazara Sunni communities in Afghanistan. 
 
Religiously, Afghanistan is not a very diverse country but what makes the religion 
complex is the way it is interpreted. Due to these different interpretations there used to be 
a hierarchical structure of religious groups. These include Sayids, Sufis, Pirs, and 
Murshid (Murrids). Sayids claims to be the descendents of the Prophet Mohammad and 
Ali, the fourth caliphate of Islam. However, some of these Sayids also claim that they 
originate from the Arabs who came to this region in the past centuries. That they are 
usually seen as Pashtuns, Tajiks or Hazara is due to the fact that they adopted the 
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traditions and customs of the environment.41 Whatever their origin was they used to be 
the most respectable religious group.The Sayids still have a very important social 
positions among the Hazaras. They inter-marry with other ethnic groups but their 
daughters are rarely allowed to marry into other religious groups..  
 
The Sufis follow Sufism which is Islamic mysticism and emerged in the eighth century 
A.D. in the Islamic world. In the Sufist structure the Khanaqa (usually a Ziyarat or 
shrine, or a residence house) is an institution where the members or followers (Mursheds 
and Murrids) come to meet their master or leader (Pir). There are mainly two orders of 
Sufism in Afghanistan, the Qaderiya and the Naqshbandiya. The Qaderiya is order is 
headed by Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani whose ancestor, Abdul al-Qadir al-Jailani (Gailani) 
founded the order in the 1166. Pashtuns in the Southern and Eastern part of the country 
are among the primary devotees to Gailani Tariqa. They have their own interpretation of 
Islam. The Naqshbandiya originated in Bukhara in the 14th century and is found in parts 
of Northern and Southern Afghanistan. The Mujaddidi family is associated with devotees 
of the Naqhsbandi order in Southern Afghanistan (ADAMEC 1993: 224-225). 
 
Mujaddis played a crucial role in the downfall of Amanullah and rise Habibullah II’s 
ensuing rise to power. The Mujaddidis called Amanullah’s reform un-Islamic and issued 
fatwa against him. At the same time they proclaimed Habibullah II ‘Amir’ and asked 
people to support him. Later they gave their support to Nadir Khan, who overthrewn 
Habibullah II. As a result of their support they received positions in the judiciary branch 
and the parliament, where they remained for a longer period.  
 
In the 1950s, Afghanistan’s close relations with the USSR led to the spread of 
communism among the intellectual elites who also enjoyed the support of the 
government. Daoud Khan, who was receiving aids from the USSR, declared a series of 
reforms which also included the removal of the ‘Purdah’. Sebghatullah Mujadidi, in 
Kabul, turned against the government by calling the reforms un-Islamic. He continued 
this opposition until the 1970s, which caused him to be sent to prison. Once released 
from the prison he went to Peshawar where he founded one of the seven Mujahidin 
parties. Sebghatullah Mujaddid was the first president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan 
                                                 
41 While in field research one of the Sayids coming from Nangarhar and a Pashtun told me that: “We [the Sayids in 
Jalalabad] are not Pashtuns, we are Arabs. That I speak Pashtu and I come from Jalalabad does not mean that I am a 
Pashtun. The fact that we look like Pashtun is because we lived among the Pashtuns. What will happen if you add a few 
drops of milk in tea? It is no more tea and no more milk. It is milk-tea (Sheer-Chai) (BANOORI 2008).” 
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in the Mujahidin Interim Government for two months. Since the establishment of the 
parliament in 2005, he heads the Upper House.  
 
There were political activist from the Qadiriya as well. Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani, who 
heads the Qadiriya, had established one of the seven Mujahidin parties in Peshawar. 
During the Mujahidin government the Gailanis represented the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and some of the diplomatic missions abroad. In Karzai’s cabinet Mohammad 
Amin Fatemi, also from Gailani family, is the Minister of Public Health, while Fatana 
Gailani headed, for some time, the Afghan Red Crescent.  
 
Following the three decades of war the Sufi orders in Afghanistan now do not posses the 
same status they enjoyed for centuries in the traditional society. This does not mean that 
the Sufism is rejected today in the country but in comparison to the other political elites, 
they posses less influence in the society. Their activities are more concentrated in the 
Khanaqa where they meet together on special occasions. In contrast to the Sufis other 
political parties and movements with religious ideologies (e.g., the Mujahidin and 
Taliban) have dominated the population especially in the rural areas. In the urban areas 
other political parties dominated by intellectuals, left little space for the activities of Sufi 
orders. Probably it was due to this reason that the leading elites of the Sufi orders turned 
to political parties and joined the Mujahiddin in Pashawar in order to preserve their 
traditional role in society.  
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2.3.4 Population Distribution 
Afghanistan has an area of (652,225km2) and the Central Statistic Office (CSO) has given 
an estimate of its population to figure around 24.5 million in 2008. According to this 
estimate the density of population would be 37.5 persons per square kilometer in the 
country (CSO 2008) (map 13). However, the density of population remains high in a 
small proportion of the land (less than one sixth of the total land) while in the rest of the 
territory there is little sign of human activities. In other words, the distribution of the 
population in Afghanistan is not even and is greatly affected by geographical factors 
(e.g., topography, climate, arable land) as well as cultural, political and economical 
factors (map 14). 
 
The figures are estimated on the basis of 1979 estimates which, according to CSO, were 
provided to meet the urgent needs of the users (CSO 2008). It is important to note that the 
three decades of war tremendously affected the population figures and distribution 
because more than a million people were killed while millions of others migrated mainly 
to Pakistan and Iran. Therefore the figures, either by the CSO or other international 
sources, can not give a clear image.  
 
Taking the geographical factors into consideration, Afghanistan is a mountainous country 
as around 75 percent of the land is covered with mountain ranges and deserts, and only 
13 per cent are cultivated land. Earlier estimates shows that out of this 13 percent 
cultivated land, 10 per cent was pasture land, and a mere 3 percent was forest. With some 
20 million sheep and goats, there was intense pressure on pastures (HYMAN 1984: 9). 
However, these estimates are from three decades ago. The contiuous war together with 
the draught (that occurred in the late 1990s), affected badly the cultivated lands and the 
forests. As a result large deforestation and desertification occurred in Afghanistan in the 
late 1990s which in turn affected the distribution of population in the country.  
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Map 13: Distribution of population in Afghanistan in 2008 
 
Map 14: Density of population in Afghanistan in 1984                                        Source: AGCHO (1984) 
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The Hindu Kush range, which stretches from the Northeast to the Southwest through the 
whole length of the country, characterises the main physical feature of Afghanistan. 
Without the Hindu Kush Afghanistan would be a dessert just like other desserts which are 
located on the same latitude. It is the watershed of four river systems of Amu Darya, 
Sindh and Kabul, Harirod, and Sistan and Hilmand.42   
 
The earliest human settlement areas, some of which developed later to major cities (e.g., 
Balkh, Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and Jalalabad), were built along these river systems. The 
shores of the main rivers like Kabul, Hilmand, Harriod, Balkhaab, Kunduz and Kokcha 
are among the densely populated areas. Along or in the vicinity of some of these rivers 
famous cities like ancient Balkh, Kunduz, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa and Nangarhar were 
founded, especially the latter three are now among the densely populated provinces. 
(figure 7) In contrast to the river banks, the distribution of population in mountainous and 
desert areas decreases to null.  In order to understand the distribution of population better, 
figure 4 illustrates the population in 34 provinces. According to figure 7, small provinces 
like Kabul, Kapisa and Nangarhar are among the provinces where the density of 
population is very high. Kabul which is a unique case in Afghanistan with more than 700 
people per square kilometre, is at the top. Kapisa, with more than 200, and Nanagarhar, 
with more than 150 people per square kilometre, are in the second and third respectively. 
On the other hand, in large provinces like Nimroz, Farah, Hilmand, Kandahar, Urozgan, 
and Zabul, the density of population declines below 20 people per square kilometer. This 
is to say Nimroz with 3, Farah with 9, Hilmand with 13, Zabul with 15 and Kandahar 
with 19 people per square kilometer are the provinces where the population is most 
widely dispersed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 AREZ mentions this division but he does not consider the Hindu Kush as the watershed for all four river system 
(AREZ 1981: 31-34, 44). This is due to his classification of the Hindu Kush into Eastern and Western parts which does 
not include other ranges like the Koh-e Baba, the watershed of theHilmand river and the Parapamisus the watershed of 
the Harirod river. However, the Koh-e Baba is the continuation of the Hindu-Kush range (ENCYCLOPAEDIA 
BRITANICA 2007, vol. 5th p. 935) including other ranges in the Western part of the country. Furthermore, the Hindu 
Kush is not located exclusively in Afghanistan but its highest part, including its highest peak, is located in Pakistan.  
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Figure 7: Density of population in different provinces 
 
2.3.5 Diversities of Settlement Structures and Social Groups 
Settlement structures in Afghanistan usually describe the division between different 
social groups. These structures can generally be divided into urban and rural structures. 
Before more details are presented, it is important to notice first that within the small 
proportion of land (less than one-sixth of the total territory) that provides an environment 
that maked human activities possible, the distribution of population differs highly in 
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terms of rural and urban population. The rural population is estimated at 17.9 million or 
77.8 per cent and the urban population is 5.1 million or 22.2 per cent. These figures also 
include 1.5 million nomads who were settled during the three decades of war. However, 
this figure does not include nomads and migrants who are abroad (CSO 2008).43 Earlier, 
the rural population was around 85 per cent (RAHMATI 1986: 88). However, this 
percentage has declined, particularly in rural areas, due to the repeated wars. The millions 
of people, who migrated to Pakistan and Iran during the Soviet invasion, were mainly 
from rural areas. 
 
In the rural areas of Afghanistan there are two types of completely sedentary settlement 
patterns: a linear and a nuclear one. The linear settlement patterns includes villages along 
the rivers while the nuclear settlement patterns villages clustering about a town and 
several village-town clusters surrounding a city, is more common in Afghanistan 
(DUPREE 2005: 132). Kabul city surrounded by small village clusters, presents a good 
example of this.  
 
The main activities of the rural population are farming and related activities. Yet this 
sector, which has contributed a high share of the GDP in the country, received little 
attention from the government authorities in different periods. The major challenges in 
rural areas are water scarcity and old traditional irrigation and farming systems. The 
problem of water scarcity is prominant in all rural areas. This problem has lead to an 
unending conflict among the rural population. Most of the time water is available but it is 
the lack of irrigation systems that cuts off the farmers from water resources. Furthermore, 
farmers still use largely old methods of farming, e.g., cows shovels, yokes to till the land 
and using animals, water and wind as a source of energy in farming (e.g., ploughing, 
harvesting, reaping, scything, winnowing, and milling) which affects the quality and 
quantity of agricultural products. The persistence of these challenges undermines the 
efficiency and productivity of the available arable land in the rural areas.  
 
Beside the technical problems, there is another factor that badly affects the faming. This 
factor is more a social problem with regard to land ownership that exists traditionally. 
Each family possesses a small parcel of land which is the only source of income and 
making a living. As the number of family members grows, one day the small parental 
land is divided between sons who develop their own family. Later these sons develop 
                                                 
43 According to CSO ‘the number of nomads who settled is not known clearly but the settlement of nomads in 
Afghanistan in the last thirty years is recognized by national and international sources (CSO 2008).’ 
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their own family and the land again will be divided between brothers. Thus this process 
continues while the cultivated lands constantly grows smaller in size. Usually this 
division is not peaceful, especially in the later stages when the grandsons inherit the land. 
The conflict that occurs between grandsons, mainly over the land, is referred to as cousin 
rivalry (Audarzadagi in Farsi and Torborwali in Pashtu) (figure 8). The piece of inherited 
land is not always a cultivated land but it can be a forest, a pasture or an orchard. The 
same process of division that happens concerning the land also happens with regard to the 
parental Qala44 the family house. This usually creates an unfriendly environment in the  
neighbourhood.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Land distribution as major cause of cousin rivalry 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
Another significant fact is that the rural areas have always been isolated from the urban 
areas. The control of governments in Afghanistan seldom reached the rural population. 
Traditionally there used to be Khans (feudal) who dominated the rural population 
including the religious elites. Each Khan owned large proportion of better land with water 
resources, livestock, mills, caravanserais and a big Qala where he and his family lived.  
                                                 
44 Qala is referred to a traditional big house in rural areas which is usually surrounded by mud walls. These mud walls 
are made up of several Muhra (staple) and its size differs from place to place usually around 50-80cm. Thus in a Qala 
the walls are usually made of several Muhras (4 to 8). The more the rate of animosity (cousin rivalry) between rural 
people the higher would be the size of the walls to protect them.  In the four corners of the Qala there are four Burj 
(watching towers) with small hole for shooting and defending the Qala.  
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In every province, district and villages there were many Khans as the dominant rulers. 
The monarchs in order to maintain their influence in the rural areas, had established 
networks with these Khans. Even the governors employed by the monarchs had to be a 
Khan, his relative or others who maintained the interests of the Khan. The Khan was the 
central authority in the rural areas for rural people to refer to. The Khan had the last word 
in important decisions, he gave loans to the people (usually with a high interest that the 
people could not afford to pay back), and he captured, and imprisoned anti-government 
political elements or criminals. The Khan also collected tax revenues (mainly from the 
land and livestock), while there was usually a difference in the official sum he collected 
and the sum he sent to Kabul.  
 
The last three decades of war also changed the social hierarchy that existed in the rural 
areas. Today it is mainly the past memories of Khans that have remained in the rural 
areas the Qalas they owned are used as names for certain locations. During the three 
decades of war new groups emerged who play the same role as the Khans did in the past. 
These new groups are composed of Mujahidin commanders who play a dominant role in 
the rural areas. Just like the Khans they have occupied or bought large parts of the 
cultivated land, where they built their Qalas. They have armed groups (Cheriks) who 
work under their commands. What is significant today is that the government in Kabul 
and even the international community, have to deal with these commanders who have a 
dominant role in rural areas. The government has no influence beyond the capital and for 
the time being it seems to be the only alternative strategy to cope with these commanders 
known as ‘warlords’. These warlords not only include the former Mujahidin commanders 
but also those of the Taliban that switched sides. 
 
Therefore the continuous war in the country further enhanced the tensions between rural 
people. The Soviet invasion in particular widened the gap between the rural and urban 
population. The Mujahidin represented mostly the rural population where they enjoyed 
strong support. In contrast the governments mostly represented the urban population, 
though there were some exceptions on both sides. 
 
As the population grows the area of cultivated land, water resources and pastures cannot 
provide enough food for the rural people. Due to this fact in particular thousands of 
people each year migrate to Iran, Pakistan, or the Arab States in the Persian Gulf. The 
rural people choose Iran and Pakistan because they are mostly illiterate and these 
countries speak languages that are common in Afghanistan, e.g., Farsi in Iran, and Pashtu 
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(Peshawar and Quetta). However, the situation of Afghan labour migrants in these 
countries has never been satisfactory for the workers because of the pressure from official 
authorities. Recently the situation has become severely bad. Especially in Iran these 
workers are usually kept from becoming being employed and they are captured and sent 
to prison or sent back to Afghanistan. In Pakistan the deterioration of the security 
situation has raised concern among Afghan migrant workers. However, when they return 
home, they do not find any job either.  
 
The urban settlement presents different categories of the social groups. The urban 
population is one-fifth (5.1 million or 22.2 per cent) of the total population who are 
settled in major cities, including the capital. Within the major cities, which also include 
the capital, there are planned and unplanned settlements. The settlements with 
geometrical form and road systems represent the planned settlements in which housing 
was officially distributed to the people, especially to the staffs of the government in 
different periods. Different governments maintained their control in urban areas, 
especially the capital. The central authority, the ministries, main official buildings, 
embassies, and NGO offices, all traditionally existed in the capital. At the same time 
urban people play an important role in the political, economical, social, and cultural 
sector of the country. They play a dominant role in the institutions of the state and they 
provide the major share of staff for the education sector.  
 
The public settlements range from very rich to extremely poor areas. The richest areas 
usually include the planned areas which are dominated by high-ranking government 
officials, commanders and merchants, while the poorest settlements include squatters and 
temporary shelters e.g., tents where the returnees, internally displaced people, and the 
extremely poor people live. What is significant in the last few years is that the gap 
between rich and poor can be obviously seen in the settlement areas. In the 1960s to the 
1980s there used to be a middle class in the cities, but their number is declining 
constantly. There is little doubt, however, that the number of middle class people was at 
its highest during the period of communist regime. Prior to the communists there were 
Mohammadzai aristocrats or other high ranking government officialswho lived in the 
richest quarters like Wazir Akbar Khan, in Kabul city or in big villas which were clearly 
distinguishable from other houses, in other parts of urban areas. Today the former 
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aristocrats have been replaced mainly by commanders belonging to different Mujahidin 
parties. 45 
 
Meanwhile there has been a huge disparity in terms of distribution of public services 
between rural and urban areas. For a long time major public services like electricity, road 
systems, communication, electricity, drinking water networks, schools, universities, 
kindergartens, hospitals and health clinics, libraries and similar facilities like that were 
exclusively built in the capital and few other major cities. The main roads that was built 
linked these cities with the capital while the rural areas were deprived. The negative 
impact of this policy was not only noticeable for the rural people but also for the 
governments. It was due to this fact that government authorities never reached the rural 
areas. The communist governments noticed this problem and wanted to tackle it, 
however, because of their ideology, the rural people turned against them. 
 
Since the fall of the Taliban, the international community and the elected government are 
taking this issue into consideration and have provided strategies to bridge the gap 
between rural and urban areas. These strategies are important particularly because for the 
first time in history, rural areas have attracted the attention of the authorities. In 2002, the 
US launched the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) as part of its Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF). The aim of the PRT was to help central government extend its control to 
the provinces and to strengthen local the governments’ ability to deliver public services. 
There are many PRTs in different provinces which are led both by the US military and 
ISAF. The government has introduced a special programme, the National Solidarity 
Program (NSD), under the leadership of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation which is 
embedded in the new governmental structure. Nevertheless, the demand is so high in 
rural areas that small scale programmes such as PRTs and the NSD can not accomplish 
the feats they are confronted with. This needs a broader strategy, precise survey and 
planning based on which requested projects should be implemented in rural areas. At the 
same time human and financial resources are required to carry out such projects. At 
present the international community and the Afghan authorities do not have a unified 
strategy to tackle the problem of rural areas in the country. 
 
                                                 
45 Many of the former aristocrats who returned from exile sold their property to the high-ranking officials and 
Mujahidin commanders who could afford to buy such houses. Some also rented their houses to NGOs and international 
organizations. Thus very few owners of large houses live in there today. 
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3 Persistence and Sustainability of Traditional Organizations and Ruling Systems 
Afghanistan’s diversity has greatly influenced its ruling system. There are three main 
different sources of legal systems common in the country: the official system and the 
customary system which consists of the religious and the tribal system, though they often 
overlap. Furthermore, each of these three has also its own specific coding system as well 
as separate institutional body. The formal legal system is carried out through the 
institutions of the state. The religious legal system is carried out through Shura 
(originally religious council) or Majlis (gathering) which usually takes place in mosques. 
In the religious system of rule the religious elites (Ulama, Rohaniyun46, Mullahs, often 
Mujahidin and Taliban commanders)47 are the key actors in solving problems at a local 
level which is usually beyond the capability and reach of the state authorities. The tribal 
system is carried out mainly through a Jirga. This usually held either to remedy the 
absence of other sources of legal systems, as those mentioned in the above, or as the 
easiest, quickest and cheapest way of solving disputes. Unlike Shura where the religious 
elite have the leading positions, the Jirga is mainly dominated by the tribal elders (Khan, 
Malik, often Mujahidin and Taliban commanders if they are Pashtuns and if the Shura 
can not meet their demands).  
 
3.1 Governmental Institutions (Constitution) 
Prior to the independence of the country religious and customary laws were practiced by 
the population. This practice was challenged after the promulgation of the first 
constitution in 1924 when the government introduced more than 220 official laws for the 
legal system. These laws were known as Nezamnamas (regulations or orders), they 
covered cultural, social, religious parts of life as well as political, economical, 
administrative and managerial parts of the institutions of the state. By introducing these 
laws the government wanted to replace the two predominant and commonly practiced 
religious and customary systems of law by a new, official legal system. However, the 
government failed to implement these laws. There were many factors which contributed 
to this failure namely the inability of the state authorities to reach beyond the capital, lack 
of public support, ignorance of traditional values and public interests, and finally lack of 
public representation in the law making process. The tiny number of newly emerged 
intelligentsia settled in the urban areas might have supported these laws, but not the 
predominantly rural population who had remained isolated for centuries having little or 
                                                 
46 Ruhaniyun means spiritual leaders. 
47 In theory the Taliban usually claim to represent religious groups. However, in practice their influence remains mainly 
within their own tribes and Qawm and hardly extends beyond their own social bonds. 
 144 
 
no contact with their outside world. Moreover, the government centred in the capital had 
ignored the countryside where around ninety percent of the population had a traditional 
way of life. Therefore, the people regarded these laws as being contradictory to their 
religious (divine law of Shariah) and other customary laws.  
 
Thus this top-down approach to building a legal system without involving the people and 
considering the requirements of the society failed. What is more significant is that the 
new legal system undermined the legitimacy of the ruler and the ruling system too. 
Therefore, the people led by religious and tribal elites in the rural areas turned against 
their own government. This confrontation between state authorities and the traditional 
population continued up to the fall of the communist regime. 
 
In the meantime, the term ‘constitution’ failed to create legitimacy and credibility in the 
traditionally conservative society. It remained more a rudimentary document, the idea of 
which was to bring at least a minimum of legitimacy to the changing ruling elite and 
ruling system and to fill the gap of law (especially in terms of foreign relations). 
Therefore, as the regimes changed through the course of time so did the constitutions. 
These changing constitutions through the course of time weakened the idea of a 
constitution in general and undermined its sustainability as a document for organizing 
modern society. So far there have been seven constitutions. The latest was promulgated 
in 2004 (Table 11).   
 
As illustrated in table 11 most of the constitutions were ratified in Loya Jirga. The first 
exception (ignoring the term Majles-e Moazam as the first case), in the case of 1980, is 
due to the fact that the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan 
introduced what they called ‘fundamental principles’ to be replaced by a constitution 
later. Therefore, these ‘principles’ were considered to be temporary and were later 
replaced with the constitution of 1987, ratified in Loya Jirga.     
 
None of these constitutions survived the political changes that happened in different 
periods of time. According to SHAHRANI, in Afghanistan the constitutions were issued 
by certain individuals (rulers) to maintain their own interests, not for the population. 
They never considered the requirements and interests of society. Due to this factor such 
constitutions lasted as long as these individuals (elites) were in power. The end of their 
rule was the end of their constitutions, and then the new elite introduced a new one. From 
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Abdurrahman 1880-1901 to Karzai 2001- all introduced constitutions supporting their 
own interests (SHAHRANI 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Ratification of constitutions by Loya Jirga 1923 – 2004                 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
The current constitution has also passed the same traditional process of being ratified by 
Loya Jirga. As illustrated in the table 11, the number of the delegates in 2004 seems 
smaller in comparison to the past Loya Jirgas. It should be added that in the earlier 
emergency Loya Jirga, when the delegates arrived for the first time they numbered more 
than 1500 people. There was intense rivalry in the nomination process since each political 
group wanted to gain the upper hand in the Loya Jirga, by nominating their own 
candidate.  Therefore the number was higher than anticipated, which raised the concern 
of the AIA, UN, and EU, the organizers of the Loya Jirga (cf. 4.5.2). They thought that 
the high number of delegates on the one hand and the heterogeneous composition of the 
delegates on the other would make the debate and reaching an agreement difficult. 
However, the main idea behind this policy was to purify this Loya Jirga from anti-Karzai 
opposition groups. Thus the Loya Jirga commission, requested the delegates to elect their 
13 / 149 NajibullahKabulLoya JirgaConstitution of DRA
Qhanoon-e Asasi-Jumhuri-e-Afghanistan (revised)
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Rabbani1335KabulShura-e-Ahl-e-al-
Hal wa Aqd
Election of President1992
Rabbani1200 MullahsKandaharShura-e-Ahl-e-al-
Hal wa Aqd
Election of Taliban Leader as ‘Amir-ul-Moaminin’1996
502
1580
452
528 **
872
No. 
Delegates in 
Loya Jirga
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* Majles-e Moazam (grand assembly) is an Arabic word used in Farsi. The same term is mentioned in the Farsi version of Nezamnama while in its 
Pashtu version the term  Majles-e Loy Jirga is used not Loya Jirga.
** GHUBAR mentions that 209 of the delegates were government officials and 18 others as participants without voting rights (GHUBAR 1999: 100)
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best candidates. As a result the number shrank from more than 1500 to 502 people who 
then participated in the constitutional Loya Jirga later. 
 
Moreover, the delegates came from rural and urban areas of the country (Mujahidin, 
Taliban, communists), as well as some delegates from abroad, e.g., Afghan migrants from 
Pakistan and Iran and those from exile in the West. This heterogeneous composition was 
further fractionized into religious, tribal and ‘technocrats’48 groups or along ethnic 
groups.  Each fraction tried to impose articles in the constitution which would undermine 
or minimize the role of the opposition group.  The successful completion of this Loya 
Jirga was thanked to the presence, monitoring and support of the international 
community (e.g., EU, UN, ISAF and pressure from the US), without which such a 
gathering of dispersed and fragmented political elements would have been impossible. In 
this process Zalmay Khalilzad, the US ambassador (American-Afghan and ethnically 
Pashtun), played a key role and strenghtened Karzai’s position. Thus the Loya Jirga 
ratified a new constitution in which the fractional rivalry left its impacts and undermined 
creating a document that would safeguard more national interests and a democratic 
system in the country rather than upholding the fractional interests.   
 
Another major problem within the constitution concerns the linguistic issues in the 
country. Although article 16 of the constitution not only declares both Farsi and Pashtu as 
official languages but also promotes other locally spoken languages to official status, this 
is only granted in those areas where they are spoken by the majority of population. It 
further allows the usage of these languages in public, in the media and in all types of 
publications. The most controversial part in this article is the last sentence which says 
“the existed academic and national administrative terminologies shall be preserved.” The 
article does not give further detail regarding what these terminologies are. In other words 
this sentence creates more difficult questions for which there are no answers. This last 
sentence of the article caused major problems when the Minister of Culture, Information 
and Tourism fired and punished three of his journalists in early January 2008 who used in 
his report the Farsi words of Danishgah (university) and Danishkadah (faculty) instead of 
equivalent Pashtu words in his report. The Afghan Journalist Union condemned this 
action of the Ministry and called on Karzai and international organization to stop 
punishing the journalists (8AM 2008: 1). Later the Ministry changed the emblem of 
                                                 
48 Following the Bonn Process the term technocrats were used quite often used by the media referring to the intellectual 
elites many of who lived in exile in the West. This is actually a new term replacing the former intelligentsia though in 
Farsi both terms are used (Roshanfekran wa Teknokratan). 
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National Gallery from Farsi to Pashtu, which further deepened the tension and caused 
public outrage. In November 2008, university students demonstrated in Kabul and later in 
Balkh and demanded equal linguistic rights (JAMEAH WEEKLY 2008a: 1-2). In Balkh 
the governor placed new signs at the entrance gate of the university in three languages 
(Farsi, Pashtu and English) and calmed down the tensions. In Kabul, nothing has 
happened, although following the demonstration the Minister of Higher Education 
promised the students that he will allow the usage of both languages (JAMEAH 
WEEKLY 2008b: 1-2). 
 
In these linguistic questions the Pastuns are usually on one side and the non-Pashtun on 
the other. Pashtuns, by relying in the last sentence of the article 16 of the constitution, 
believe that only the Pashtu words are ‘national terminologies’. However, the article does 
not support such a claim. The non-Pashtuns, on the other hand, claim that the last 
sentence was fabricated after the approval of the constitution and was added to that article 
during the editing process. This claim may be supported by the fact that the constitution 
was first ratified in Farsi and was later translated into Pashtu. Moreover the wording of 
the last sentence is not correct and this shows clearly that a Farsi speaker would never 
phrase it this way. This last sentence is enough to create more tension and to undermine 
the credibility of the constitution in the future, even among the tiny number of its 
supporters in urban areas, if it is not revised and clarified.  
 
Nonetheless the constitution still remains more of an official document for the current 
government, just like the previous constitutions. It will support the legitimacy of the 
government in its relations with the international community. The challenge, however, 
regarding gaining the confidence and loyalty of the population across the country, 
remain. In particular transmitting this document and other official laws from the capital to 
the rural population will be one of the major long term challenges.  
 
3.2 Religious Institutions (Shariah) 
In comparison to tribal law, which created tensions in society, Islam has usually played a 
central role in integrating the diverse population. In particular the mosques used to be the 
central institutions where people regardless of their ethnic or linguistic background, meet. 
What is significant is that the legitimacy of the any ruler in Kabul and the ruling system 
in Kabul was based on Shariah law. The ruler was called as Amir (commander) a 
religious title, and he at least in theory, retained Shariah law as the official law. Earlier 
ruling elites were tribal but the governments have always functioned more through 
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religious systems and Shariah law. In addition to that the name of each ruler was 
mentioned in the sermon of the Friday prayer (Khutbahh), and the coin was minted in the 
name of the ruler. This process of legitimacy continued to exist up to the fall of monarchy 
in 1973.  Amanullah was the first ruler who wanted to reform this process, but he failed. 
According to the constitution he introduced he remained loyal to Islam, and his name was 
mentioned in Khutabs. However, after his modernization reform everything changed.  
 
This religion based source of legitimacy had strong public support. Whenever people 
turned against their rulers the first thing they did was to remove the name of the ruler 
from the Khutbahh which meant the end of his rule. In the same way the name of any 
ruler that came to power was declared to the public through Khutbahh in Friday prayer. 
Especially during political crisis and foreign invasions, religion gained great importance 
and united the diverse people against foreigners. In 1839, when the British invaded 
Afghanistan and enthroned Shah Shuja, the people turned against him and mullahs 
removed his name from the Khutbahhs. During the British invasion in the 1879 when 
there was no leader, people in Charikar, north of Kabul minted the coin without a name 
on them and hoped to find a leader by saying: 
Mekonam dewanagi ta bar saram ghawgha shawad  
Seka bar zar mezanam ta Sahebash paida Shawad. 
I will act insanely until people notice me 
I mint coin until he (the next king) is discovered (GHUBAR 1967: 631, translated in EMADI 
2005: 65). 
 
Later rulers noticed the importance of mosques as religious institutions and tried to 
influence them and the religious elite majority who dominated the mosques. Hereafter the 
rulers, beside the title of Amir mentioned before their names, were given a religious title 
such as Seraj-ul Millat-e wad-Deen, (the light of the nation and the religion), Khadem-e 
Deene- Rassullallah (the Servant of the religion of the Prophet), Al-Mutawakal-e Alallah 
(the one who trusted in God). Religious elites were employed in the institutions 
especially in the judiciary sector, and their presence endorsed the legitimacy of the ruler 
and the dominance of the Shariah law in the system. In consequence the absence or 
ignorance of these elites undermined the legitimacy of the ruler and the ruling system.  
 
The establishment of Shura (council), a traditionally religious institution for the 
consultation of scholars (Ulama), has been another step taken toward strengthening the 
legitimacy of the political system on the basis of religious means. For example, Shura-e 
Dawlat (State’s Council) in the constitution of 1924, Majles-e Shura (Consultative 
Council) or later Shura-e Milli (National Assembly), Majles-e Moazam (Grand 
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Assembly) (cf. table 11), Shura-e Wuzara (Council of Ministers) have been part of such 
attempts in which succeeding governments wanted to integrate religious institutions into 
the political system.49 Unlike GLATZER, who believes that Shura came to use as a “new 
political term” after Soviet invasion (GLATZER 2001: 176), Shura is a common 
religious institution from the early days of Islam. There is one Sura (chapter) in Koran 
with the name ‘Shura’ which emphasizes on the importance of consultation and gathering 
on key decisions (Koran 42:38). Following the independence of the country different 
governments used the term Shura for political gatherings in order to demonstrate their 
loyalty to the tenets of Islam. Today the National Assembly is referred to as the Shura-e 
Milli and according to the constitution it is the highest legislative organ [which] shall 
manifest the will of its people as well as represent the entire nation.50 Another example is 
the establishment of Shuras at provincial and district levels. At the same time two-thirds 
of the members of the House of Elders are elected from these provincial and district 
Shuras. In addition to that they have a consulting role between the government or the 
international community (UN, NATO, ISAF, EU, NGOs) on one side and the local 
population on the other, especially in the reconstruction programs. 
 
The changing ruling systems in Afghanistan had also influenced the traditional role of 
Islam in some periods. This happened in particular when the monarchy was overthrown 
and was replaced by a republic in 1973. Hereafter, the traditional legitimacy of Khutbahh 
and the minting of coin in the name of the rulers became part of history. Meanwhile it 
was in this period that a new elite, who was influenced by the ideology of communism, 
took over power Thus, the ruling elite and the system failed to gain legitimacy in the eyes 
of the population. Moreover, Islam has entered a new era and gained a new role in 
politics. The growth and spread of ideologies (coming from different countries, e.g., 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt), has tremendously influenced its role. Although 
Afghanistan is predominantly a Muslim country, these different imported ideologies have 
nevertheless provided multiple interpretations of Islam. Usually there are many political 
players who use Islam as a tool to achieve their political ambitions. These groups can be 
divided religiously into Sunni and Shii groups and politically into Mujahidin (cf. Chapter 
2.2) and Taliban groups. All of them are influenced by different ideologies based on 
which they interpret Islam. Their ethno-linguistic and social structure highlights some of 
the main factors which shape these ideologies and interpretations of Islam. When the 
                                                 
49 For Shura-Dawlat cf. NEZAMNAMA 1923: articles 39-49, for Shura-e Mili cf. OSULNAMA 1952: articles 7, 27-
36, 38-41, 44, and for Shura see the constitution of 1964, articles 41-42. 
50 Chapter 5, article 81, translated version by Sayed Shafi Rahel. 
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Taliban emerged many Pashtun Mujahidin groups (most of them commanders) and 
parties (e.g., those led by Khales, Mohammadi and many Hekmatyar’s commander) 
joined them. They surrendered the southern part of the country peacefully to the Taliban 
while their names and parties melted into this new movement. Thus, hereafter, the 
Mujahidin or more accurately, the new Mujahidin groups represented mostly non-
Pashtun ethnic groups who were further divided into Sunni and Shii Mujahidin parties.51 
From here on the name Taliban signified Pashtuns and Mujahidin was used to refer to all 
the non-Pashuns. More significant is that they both represented rural populations and 
their core power bases remained in the rural areas from where they originated.  
 
Usually there is a correlation between the different interpretations of Islam and the social 
structure of the population. According to the Mujahidins’ interpretation of Islam 
education upto the highest level is allowed for boys and girls, the mass media especially 
TV, radio, internet, and music are permitted and women are allowed to go to work. In 
contrast the Taliban interpretation of Islam does not allow any of these possibilities and 
whoever crosses the drawn red line will be severely punished. Nevertheless, in terms of 
their stronghold, both ideologies are to be found in rural areas and have little or no 
influence in the urban areas. While the Taliban ideology is overwhelmingly rejected by 
the urban population, the Mujahidin have also failed to create loyalty among the urban 
population. Especially the civil war the Mujahidin carried out in the early 1990s directly 
affected the urban population and created a negative image of Mujahidin groups in their 
minds.  
 
Regardless of their interpretations of Islam, both Mujahidin and the Taliban used rejected 
the Loya Jirga as an institution. Instead they established multiple Shuras to organize their 
political affairs. This is particularly significant in the case of the Taliban who are mainly 
Pashtun. Contradicting popular opinion in the literature that the Jirga is a Pashtun 
tradition, the Taliban established Shuras (e.g. Shura-e-Ulama, Shura-e Kandahar, Shura-
e Kabul and recently Shura-e Quetta). Among these Shuras, which both the Mujahidin 
and the Taliban established and used as a high institution to make important decision 
(e.g., election of a president or a leader), was the one with name of Shura-e Ahl-e Al-Hal 
wa Aqd (lit. those who loose and binds). In both case this Shura was held to elect the 
leader (e.g.s Rabbani as the president of the Mujahidin government and Mullah Omar as 
the religious commander of the Taliban religious leader). (cf. table 11) In fact the term 
                                                 
51 The new Mujahidin groups consisted mainly of non-Pashtun parties who resisted the advance of the Taliban in their 
plan of taking over all the country. 
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Shura-e Ahl-e Al-Hal wa Aqd is used in Saudi Arabia and has influenced both political 
elements in Afghanistan. 
 
Nowadays the Mujahidin leaders, in order to influence in the urban areas and on 
intellectual elites, invest in training institutions, especially higher education institutions. 
In 2005, Ayatullah Mohseni, the leader of a Shii party (Harakat), established a religious 
university in Kabul called Hawza-e Elmiya-e Khatam-un-Nabieen.52 This university 
looks like a little Qom53 within Kabul, it was built in close range to residential quarter of 
the Shii residents in the western part of the capital, and not far from Kabul University. It 
is important to notice that such a religious center (Hawza-e Elmiya) is rather a new idea 
in Afghanistan. In general, there are two main Shii Hawza-e Emiyas; one in Qom, Iran 
(Hawza-e Elmiya-e Qom) and the other is the old one in Najaf, Iraq (Hawza-e Elmiya-e 
Najaf).  
 
Recently, a controversial Shii law, that is believed to contain articles according to which 
women cannot leave the house without their husbands' permission, and which supposedly 
states that they can only seek work, education or visit the doctor with their husbands' 
permission, as well as stating that they cannot refuse their husband sex, was passed by the 
parliament and signed by the president. This issue caused a lot of international concern. 
Human rights organizations, the UN, EU, and other international organizations expressed 
their concern and warned Karzai about signing it. The government, who had not not 
anticipated this, suddenly agreed to revise the law as a result of pressure from 
international community. In opposition to the government decision, the students of this 
university demonstrated against the government and demanded the law to remain 
unchanged. Oppositional demonstrators, who were also in front of the university, wanted 
the law to be changed. This issue in particular shows the growing political role of this 
religious university in maintaining religion’s influence in the society. Meanwhile 
Mohseni has also established a TV channel called ‘Tamadun’ (civilization) which 
propagates his ideas and is more or less similar to Iranian TV channels. 
 
On the other side, more recently, Sayaf another Mujahidin leader (Sunni and from Etehad 
party), has received permission from the governmtn to establish his own university in 
Kabul. This is the second time he establishes a university. The first time it was during 
Mujahidin government in 1990s, when he established a university exclusively for women 
                                                 
52 Literally means ‘scientific centre of The Last Prophet,’ it represents a grouping of Shii seminaries.  
53 A city (mainly a religious centre) in Iran located not very far from the capital. 
 152 
 
called ‘Ummahatul Moamenin’ in Kabul. Later it was dissolved and its students were 
integrated to the Institute of Pedagogy which became University of Education in the same 
location in Kabul. It is important to note that Sayaf is influenced by the Saudis while 
Mohseni is influenced by Iran. Thus the possibility of ideological confrontation (Wahabi 
and Shii) seems very likely in the future. Beside these two religious institutions initiated 
by Mujahidin leaders, in late 2007 Saudi Arabia signed an agreement with the Ministry of 
Urban Planning to build an ‘Islamic Center’ in Kabul. The plan and the design of the 
complex has already been made; the Ministry provided the land “in a wonderful place in 
Kabul” and finally the Saudis are financing the project (ENKESHAF-E-SHAHR 2007: 
12). 
  
Another important issue is the role of Islam in the constitution which is mentioned in the 
three initial articles. The first article defines Afghanistan as an Islamic Republic and the 
second Article further emphasises this role by mentioning “the sacred religion of Islam is 
the religion of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.” More important, however, is the third 
article which explicitly says that “no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the 
holy religion of Islam in Afghanistan.”54 This last article indirectly highlights the role and 
importance of Shariah law in the country. It can also be simply interpreted in a way that 
it allows the practice of other customary laws that are not “against the tenet of Islam”. 
Furthermore, the legal system has always been (even during the communist regimes) 
based on in Shariah law (e.g., matrimonial law, inheritance law).  
 
However, the question of who interprets and which institution is in charge of such 
interpretation may arise. Article 116 in chapter 7 mentions the judiciary as an 
“independent organ of the IRA which is composed of Supreme Court (as the highest 
judicial organ), Courts of Appeal, and Primary Courts.” Thus, according to this article the 
judiciary branch is the institution officially authorized to interpret all laws in the country.  
 
The professional personnel of the judiciary institutions are mainly trained at Kabul 
University. However, there is a problem to provide qualified lecturers as there are two 
faculties dealing with law. The Faulty of Theology is in charge of providing judges and 
experts in theology who staff most of the courts. These judges are more professional 
because they study mainly Shariah law (law and jurisprudence or Fiqh and Qanoon) 
which is important in judiciary institutions. At the same time the Faculty of Law and 
                                                 
54 Cf. Constitution of 2004 chapter 1, article 1-3. 
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Political Science also train staff and experts in laws which is more about international and 
secular laws, including the official laws of the country. Furthermore, the Faculty of 
Theology traditionally had academic affiliations with Egypt (mainly Al-Azhar 
University) while the Faculty of Law and Political Science had academic affiliations with 
European countries (mainly France) (DITTMANN 2004:66-67). These academic 
relationships also affected the education system with two different ideologies a secular 
and a religious one. Many of the founding Mujahidin leaders were the former teaching 
staff of the Faculty of Theology (e.g., Rabbani, Sayaf, Niazi, and Tawana). At the same 
time many of secular political figures were former students in the Faculty of Law and 
Political Science (e.g. Karmal, Keshtmand).  
 
With the development of higher education many other universities have been established 
in Afghanistan. However they have the same system like in Kabul and they have a faculty 
of theology and a faculty of law and political science. Moreover, recently among the 
returnees there have been professionals who studied in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other 
Islamic countries as well as in the Western countries. These returnees are employed in the 
judiciary branch and also in the training institutions. This situation is further influenced 
by a more recent development in these two faculties (now existing at all universities): the 
US involvement in the faculties of theology and Italy’s involvment in the faculties of law 
and political science. So far many of the training staff of these faculties has been on short 
term visits to the USA and Italy. There is little doubt that both the returnees and the new 
contacts with Western countries will further influence the legal system.  
 
Thus like the multiple sources of law common in the country there are at least two 
different types of training staff which have run through different systems of education. 
Although some of the graduated students in the field of law and political science are 
employed as prosecutors and advocates, or as officials in other ministries (Foreign 
Affairs), the courts remain outside of their influence. Particularly the Supreme Court is 
dominated by members who have studied in the Faculty of Theology. Article 118 of the 
constitution also mentions that “members of the Supreme Court shall have higher 
education in legal studies or Islamic jurisprudence as well as expertise and adequate 
experience in the judicial system of Afghanistan.” This Article also places more emphasis 
on Islamic education and supports the case of those with an educational background in 
theology. Especially gathering experience in Afghanistan’s legal system is impossible 
without knowledge of customary laws.  
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Thus even in the official law there is a strong dualism of religious and secular influences. 
The different training institutions with varied education system and sources of knowledge 
add more challenges the existing problems. Therefore while the long term challenge will 
be to extend the influence and practice of these systems from the center to the periphery 
of the country, the more visible challenge in the short term is how to integrate the two 
different systems. 
 
Beside the fact that the Shariah law has influence on the official legal system, it also 
plays an important role in customary law, especially among the non-Pashtuns. The impact 
of this can usually be seen in the daily life of the population, especially in the rural areas 
where there is no official body. In such cases the mullah and elder people try to solve 
problems through Shura and Shariah law, in the mosque or in the village. Thus the 
solution of disputes of an economic of financial nature is usually based on Shariah law as 
well as on customary laws, while issues like inheritance and matrimonial law are 
exclusively based on Shariah law. The latter is also carried out by the Pashtun tribes. 
 
3.3 Tribal Institutions (Tribalism) 
In Afghanistan all ethnic groups, except Tajiks, have tribal social structures. Among them 
Pashtuns constitute the largest tribally organized group (cf. Chapter 2.3.). Through the 
course of history these tribes were cut off from outside influence in their secure mountain 
bastion centered on the Suleiman range and the Safed Koh mountains (POULLADA 
1973: 28). This isolation helped many of them to preserve their customs and traditions, a 
fact which is true even in the present. It is important to notice is that life in a tribal 
environment gives the individual a sense of identity which is based on belonging to a 
well-defined social group, having a territorial base and a set of customary rule of conduct 
(KAMALI 1985: 3-4). One of the main characteristics of the tribal system among the 
Pashtun tribes is Pashtunwali or the Pashtun’s code of conduct. In Pashtunwali the role 
of the Jirga (tribal council) as an institution in which tribal elders gather, discuss and 
settle important intertribal issues is very important. Unlike the Shura which often takes 
place in the mosques, the Jirga has no specific place. It is usually held in open air, under 
the shadow of a tree, in a public building, or in Qalas owned by Khans, Maliks (tribal 
chiefs) and commanders. 
 
The tribal system has also influenced the political structure of Afghanistan since the 
ruling elites – the Pashtuns – used to be only one out of the many tribes in the country. It 
played an important role in the nationalistic ideologies of the ruling elite. More 
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important, however, is the fact that different governments used the tribal system to 
legitimize their rule so that they would be able to extend their control from the center to 
the periphery of their territoy. One of the main instruments for achieving these goals was 
the Jirga which has taken place many times since the independence of the country. In 
order to legitimize (and also Pashtunize) Jirga as a national institution for gatherings, the 
word ‘Loya’ (big, great in Pashtu) was added to it. The term Jirga is a Mongol word, it is 
also used in Farsi, and its practice was also common among Hazaras. 
 
Much has been mentioned in the literature about Loya Jirga, however many of the 
publication discuss the issues that are discussed in the Loya Jirga rather than defining it. 
Thus two questions still remain in this regard: first what is Loya Jirga and second why 
the decisions on constitutions were made in a Loya Jirga. One of the main sources that 
comprehensively define the Loya Jirga is the constitutions which are its products.  
According to some of these constitutions Loya Jirga is defined as “the highest 
manifestation of the will of the people of Afghanistan.” The constitution of 1976 
mentioned this definition for the first time; it was adopted into and added to the later 
constitutions as well, including the current one.55 Thus despite the fact that all previous 
constitutions (Nezamnama 1923 and Osulnama 1931) were ratified in a Loya Jirg, none 
of them mentioned the Loya Jirga as an institution. Instead Nezamnama, in its Farsi 
version mentioned that this constitution was ratified by the Ulama in a Majles-e-Moazam 
(grand assembly) and in brackets put Loy Jirga as its translated equivalent in Pashtu.56 
The same example exists in the current constitution, too, where the Farsi version 
mentions the Shura and the same word is translated into Jirga in the Pashtu version 
(article 138 chapter 8). In the constitution of 1964 one chapter specified the concept of 
the Loya Jirga, however, it mentioned more about its authorities and composition rather 
than giving any definition. The Loya Jirga was an initiative of Tarzi and Amanullah who 
created it as an institutional body within the framework of state, especially as part of their 
modernization programme. This stands in contrast to the popular belief represented in 
literature which claims that the Loya Jirga dates back to 1747 or earlier.57  
 
                                                 
55 Cf. Article sixty-five in chapter 6 of 1975 and article 110 in chapter 6 of the new constitution ratified in 2004. 
56 The religious status of the Majles-e-Moazam is further supported by the terms Ulama, Sadat, Mashayekh (all terms 
referring to different classes of religious elites) and representatives of the country (cf. NEZAMNAMA 1923b: article 4 
and NEZAMNAMA 1923c: article 4), Farsi and Pashtu versions. 
57 NOELLE-KARIMI is among the few who carefully looked through this history, and she rejects the earlier existence 
of a Loya Jirga prior to twentieth century. She mentions the date of the first Loya Jirga as 1916 NOELLE-KARIMI 
(2002:42-43) which she adopts from ADAMEC (1974:36). TARZI is one of the main sources who mentioned the 
whole session in detail in his Seraj-ul-Akhbar, however, he did not mention the term Loya Jirga here. Instead he 
mentioned a “Durbar was held” TARZI (1916: 1-3). Cf. HANIFI (2004: 301). 
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One of the main problems of the Loya Jirga has been its lack of representativeness. As 
illustrated in table 11, the number of delegates varies. The government directly or 
indirectly selects its members in order to endorse whatever policy made. Due to this fact 
the Loya Jirga is mentioned as an instrument for the legitimization of royal policies 
which intend to introduce new institutions or functions into the political system. Its 
members are dominated by Pashtun chiefs, although other groups, religious leaders, and 
even influential urban personalities have been prominent (NEWELL 1972: 76). In the 
Loya Jirga of 1964, 209 out of 528 delegates were government officials who were loyal 
to the system, while 18 others were visitors (GHUBAR 1999: 100). There were a small 
number of intellectual elites independent from the government. The rest were influnced 
by tribal and religious elites. The same process of nomination was followed later by 
successor regimes. Especially during the communist regime the number is the highest of 
all other cases. In that particular case 893 out of 1580 delegates were government staff, 
including 168 members of Revolutionary Council (Shura-e Enqelabi) and the Council of 
Ministers (Shura-e Waziran), 32 members of the National Party of Fatherland (Jabha-e 
Mili-e Padarwatan), 223 members of the Reconciliation Commission (Komision-e 
Musaleha-e Milli) and other committees (e.g., farmers, workers, youth) that were 
conform to the policy of the regime.58 
 
Taking this fact into consideration the Emergency and the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 
the post-Taliban state-building process has not been an exception, although the process of 
selecting the delegates was different this time. The AIA had no control beyond the capital 
to select the members and there were many other players outside Kabul which included 
the Mujahidin parties, commanders and the Taliban or their loyal elements. Thus lack of 
representation and manipulation of the process of selection unquestionably has 
undermined the viability of the Loya Jirga as an institution for making important 
decisions. 
 
In addition to the Jirga as a tribal institution, the idea of creating and supporting Arbaki 
(tribal militia) another element from the tribal system is nowadays seen as attractive. This 
idea has been given a large amount of attention, especially following the failure of 
international community and the government to bring security and establish the rule of 
law in the country. According to this idea the government provides weapon and money 
for the tribes to recruit fighters and form Arbaki in the tribal areas of Afghanistan, which 
                                                 
58 Cf. for the detailed list of the members (AFGHANISTAN YEARBOOK 1987: 340-410). 
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constitutes the most insecure part of the country. This policy takes place is set in a time in 
which there has been a successful disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), 
program the framework of the post-Taliban peace process. The program has been carried 
out and funded by Japanese authorities to demobilize and disarm the armed groups in the 
country. Furthermore, the program is similar to what the Sovieta did in the 1980s to pave 
the way for their withdrawal from Afghanistan. In order to fill the gap the Soviet troops 
left behind, and to sustain its rule in the country, the communist regime created militia 
who worked alongside the military and police forces and fought the opposing Mujahidin 
groups (cf. Chapter 4).    
 
In conclusion, it can be said that the official legal system has always failed to reach out to 
remote areas in the country especially in the tribal areas (southeast and southern) due to a 
very weak presence of state authorities and officials. Furthermore, the multiple sources 
for laws brought forth many political actors who were usually autonomous from the 
capital, which undermined the legitimacy and capability of the state and its institutions. 
Thus the changing government in Kabul considered the existence of customary laws and 
the political actors on behalf of these laws (religious and tribal elites) as major problems 
and challenges to their own rule.  In order to cope with these challenges each 
government, in different periods, carried out different methods and strategies, yet none of 
them were successful. Usually the inability of the central government to reach the 
periphery has been considered as the main reason for the continuation of customary laws. 
However, in addition to that there have been other important factors which even created 
confrontation between the tribes and state authorities. Some of these factors have been 
the lack of credibility and legitimacy of the official law, the lack of understanding the 
role of customary laws and their importance by the officials in policy making, ineffective 
administration and management of the official legal system, or the complete lack of 
official legal institutions in the rural areas.  
 
Most important, however, among all factors is the high level of corruption in the 
institutions which undermined their credibility and efficiency (cf. Chapter 5.2.). 
Corruption has made the official legal system unattractive in the eyes of the rural 
population in general and in tribes in particular. Furthermore the top-down and bottom-up 
bureaucracy adds to the complexity and difficulty of the official legal system because it 
takes more time and costs more money. Altogether these factors contribute to the 
persistence of the traditional institutions in Afghanistan and help both tribal and religious 
elites in preserving and being proud of traditional systems.   
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4 War and Civil War as Major Determinants of State-Building in Afghanistan 
Today there are many political groups in Afghanistan that consist of pro-monarchy 
elements, intellectual elites, Mujahidin parties and Taliban (cf. Chapter 5.2). These 
groups are not the product of the last few years but are the bi-products of the last four 
decades of war and political instability in Afghanistan which started with the 
competitions between the East and West, both trying to maintain their influence during 
the Cold War. One impact of this competition was the first ever increase in the number of 
intelligentsia in the country. They were trained in the Eastern and Western countries, 
inspired by different ideologies and from time to time were able to take influence on 
different institutions. Thus their return challenged the dominance of the traditional tribal 
and religious elites in the institutions as well as in society. Another significant thing is 
that the intellectual elites mostly came from urban areas, the population of which 
constituted less than 20 percent of the overall population. Therefore, the governments in 
Kabul (1973-1992), dominated by a small number of intellectual elites, could not expand 
their rule to the rural areas. In the rural areas (with over 80 percent of population) the 
tribal and religious elites remained dominant; they often mobilized the rural population 
against any illegitimate or unpopular central government based in Kabul.  
 
In order to overcome this challenge Kabul based regimes needed financial resources and 
human resources to sustain themselves and penetrate into the countryside. On the other 
side outside help affected the ruling system through the spread of foreign ideology 
(communism) and finally undermined the legitimacy of the state. This situation is 
especially seen in 1978, when the legitimacy of the state declined to its lowest level and 
the government lost its credibility even in the urban areas. Thus the only chance for the 
government to survive was to search for out-side help (financial and human resources), in 
this case from Soviet Union.  
 
At the same time opposition groups (tribal and religious elites) also fought for their 
survival and sustainment of their own systems and influence in society. The strong 
military violence used by the central governments endangered their survival. Thus they 
also searched for help from outside world, in this case from the Western and pro-Western 
Islamic countries. This outside help for the opposition groups also inffected them with 
foreign ideologies (e.g., religion based ideologies like wahabism, deobandi, and those 
that belonged to the Shii).  
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4.1 The Fall of the Monarchy and the Proclamation of the Republic by Daoud 
On July 17, 1973, when King Mohammad Zahir was in Italy, Daoud his cousin and the 
former Prime Minister, carried out a military coup and proclaimed a republic. In an 
interview with the media Daoud mentioned corruption and the ineffectiveness of the 
institutions as the main reasons which motivated him to carry out the coup: “whenever a 
nation verges on disaster and corruption in governmental institutions reach its highest, 
and hope for reform is totally lost, then it befalls every patriot to come to rescue the 
country (DANISHYAR 1974: 14).” This was the first coup in the recent history of 
Afghanistan.59 At the same time it paved the way for illegitimate methods of changing 
the political regime in Afghanistan in the next two decades. More important was that with 
this coup Daoud ended the era of family-based and tribe-based rule (Musahiban and 
Mohammdzai) in Afghanistan and started his reliance on institutions (mainly military) of 
the state and its elites. The intellectual elite became dominant significantly after the 
military coup in 1973 which led to the fall of the monarchy. 
 
There were many political organizations behind the anti-monarchy coup (SARIN and 
DVORETSKY 1993: 35). The direct involvement of the USSR in this coup is still a 
debated. FARHANG mentions the involvement of 120 Russian tank drivers (FARHANG 
1996: 795). However, Russian resources deny any direct involvement, and say that 
Daoud played the main role and we had an indirect role since those young Afghan 
military officers had been trained in the USSR (TANIN 2006: 172). Daoud’s close 
colleagues also deny any Soviet initiatives in carrying out this coup and say that it was an 
Afghan venture in pursuit of purely Afghan aims (GHAUS 1988: 107).  
 
Nevertheless Daoud and his loyal PDPA60 officers noticed that the Monarchy had very 
limited or no public support while its continuation of rule was based on the strength of 
the army and police. Therefore they carried out their best effort to influence in these two 
institutions more and more. In particular this situation highly politicized the army and this 
institution became an instrument for gaining the political power in the country. In his 
message to the people Daoud focused about the role of army: 
True patriots, wherever they were, watched with deep sorrow and anguish this horrible state of 
                                                 
59 Another coup is mentioned in 1956, carried out and headed by the Finance Minister Abdul Malik Abdurrahimzai that 
failed (HAROON 1997: 27) 
60 Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan 
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their nation. But they were constantly aware of the situation specially the Afghan armed forces 
who felt this agony more than anyone else, exercising extreme patience hoping that today or 
tomorrow the vile and rotten system in Afghanistan would become aware of the misery of the 
nation and endeavor to reform itself. But the result proved that these hopes are impertinent, and 
the regime and system became so corrupt that no hope or expectation for its reform existed. 
Consequently all patriots, especially in the patriotic armed forces of Afghanistan decided to put an 
end to this rotten system and deliver the nation from their plight (DANISHYAR 1974: 3). 
 
On the same day that the coup happened, Daoud and other key leading figures of the 
coup, mostly leftists, had formed a committee known as the Komeeta-e Markazi (Central 
Committee) to carry out the everyday tasks of the government (GHAUS 1988: 106-107). 
The key leading figures of the coup were introduced to the public as the members of the 
Central Committee through the official media, and their group photo was published 
(MUHTAT 2005: 368- 369). After its first session, the Central Committee appointed 
Daoud as the President and Prime Minister of the republic (KESHTMAND 2003: 249).  
The establishment of the Central Committee, inspired by the communist USSR and 
China, was a new and strange institution in the political framework of Afghanistan. It 
remained a highly political institution (politburo) within the framework of the state 
structure till the fall of the communist regime in 1992.  
 
Although the new regime was proclaimed to be a republic it was just a change in name, 
not in the policy of the government. Daoud, besides being the President and the Prime 
Minister at the same time, occupied other posts such as foreign minister and defense 
minister (SHARQ 1991: 116). During the monarchy there were some symbolic figures 
holding these posts hiding the fact that the full authority and power concentrated in the 
hands of the King. But in the republic, it was now Daoud who held four extremely 
important key posts. The people considered the regime to be the continuation of the same 
monarchy headed by another member of the Royal Family. This political change was 
regarded as a power rivalry common in the history of Afghanistan since Ahmad Shah 
Durrani. Furthermore, Daoud was more like a king than a president because Daoud was 
the head of all affairs and leading councils; therefore he was known as Daoud Shah 
(MOLTMANN 1993: 17-18). At the same time there were 3000 Soviet advisors who 
were working in the ministries (HYMAN 1982: 105). 
 
There are some who believe that the majority of the population in the country welcomed 
the resumption of power by Daoud. Different classes of Afghan society cheered to and 
celebrated the new regime all over the country, while the right extremists groups and pro-
king elements were disappointed (GHAUS 1988: 107, KESHTMAND 2003: 244). There 
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is no doubt that the people in the urban areas, especially the capital, welcomed the 
situation as a political change after more than forty years of monarchy. Many of the 
supporters were either involved in the government bureaucratic system or they were 
educated and wanted to get broader opportunities of employment. The initial support of 
the people also attracted the attention of Zahir Shah, the ousted King, in Italy and caused 
him to send his resignation to Daoud as new President of the republic. In his message 
Zahir Shah showed respect to what he realized as the will of the people of Afghanistan 
who welcomed the regime of the republic with absolute majority (DANISHYAR 1974: 
53). 
 
In the rural areas, which held more than 80 percent of the population of the country, 
Daoud’s return to power raised huge concern. This was especially the case for the 
dominant tribal and religious elites who were suppressed severely during his premiership. 
Even in the urban areas some of the intellectuals were strongly opposed to Daoud’s 
government, in particular those with religious backgrounds and from institutions of 
higher education. The opposition grew especially when it became clear that the religious 
and traditional elites were not adequately represented in the new regime cabinet. Out of 
thirteen ministers seven were either PDPA members or they were loyal to this party 
(TANIN: 2006: 174-175). Thus the communist PDPA members controlled key positions 
in the army and in the civil administration. This upper hand position helped them to 
further expand and strengthen their influence and presence in these institutions. As a 
result of their role in overthrowing the monarchy and supporting Daoud to gain the 
power, they openly referred to themselves as “king makers”. For Daoud who had seized 
the power with the help of the communist PDPA members, it was difficult to take any 
action against them (GHAUS 1988: 187). The PDPA Parcham fraction officially declared 
its policy of supporting the new regime and recommended to its members to defend this 
regime against any internal conspiracies or conspiracies of imperialism (KESHTMAND 
2003: 251).  
 
The Central Committee of the regime of republic issued many decrees as part of its 
reform program. According to these decrees the constitution of 1964 was abolished. At 
the same the parliament was dissolved and the authorities of the king were transferred to 
the President of the Republic (SHARQ 1991: 118). The legislative power was transferred 
to the Central Committee (FARHANG: 1996: 808). The reforms mostly focused on 
economic development, social reforms and social justice (OLESEN 1996: 220) and on 
extending the governments power to the rural area. The regime of the republic declared a 
 162 
 
land reform, and two new laws were approved for this purpose: the Land Reform Law 
and the Developing Tax Law. The latter increased tax on those people who owned more 
land than the limit of 20 hectars of irrigated land or 100 hectars of rain land. This forced 
many to sell their lands since they were unable to pay the high amount of tax that was 
required (FARHANG 1996: 808-809). Furthermore, Daoud nationalized banks and 
insurance companies. This decision caused many merchants to invest their money abroad. 
 
Few months after its establishment the new regime arrested pro-king figures like 
Maiwandwal, the former premier minister, many military leaders and members of the 
former parliament who were all accused of committing a coup against the regime. The 
Islamic movements, whose key leaders and figures were among the teaching staff and 
students of higher education institutions, carried out another rebellion that failed. 
However, the political figures behind the coup succeeded in escaping to Pakistan where 
they were warmly welcomed. The government of Pakistan found a ‘golden opportunity’ 
to fight Daoud’s government who was regarded as the old enemy (TANIN 2006: 177-
180) and as the creator of the Pashtunistan issue.   
 
Afghanistan’s internal conflict was as a result of a wider regional competition between 
the USSR and the West. In the late nineteenth century, the Great Game was replaced by 
the Cold War. Afghanistan’s position between the USSR and the Western allies Pakistan 
and Iran made its political balance very unstable. Especially the reliance of Daoud’s 
government on the USSR and other Eastern Block states undermined Afghanistan’s 
previous nonalignment policy. The West and its allies were concerned about the growing 
influence of the USSR in the region. Particularly the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan 
worried oil-rich Iran, which was still a monarchy. Their main concern was that such a 
situation could happen in Iran. Therefore Iran, under Reza Shah, and Pakistan, the 
Persian Golf states and the West put Daoud’s government under pressure to join the 
West. Islamic movements who had fled from the government’s oppression to Pakistan 
benefited most from this Western pressure. They were supported covertly, both 
financially and militarily, to fight against Daoud’s regime. As a result the Islamic 
movements challenged the sustainability of the government.  
 
In general Daoud became the victim of his own internal and external policy. The 
opposition started from the beginning of his rule in 1973 and increased upto 1975. In 
particular the Islamic movements supported by Pakistan carried out several military 
attempts to topple the Daoud’s government. Although the coup of 1973-1974 the 
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rebellions of 1975 in the Badakhshan, Panjshir, and Laghman provinces failed, but these 
unrests brought the government under pressure and made it unstable. It was as a result of 
this pressure that Daoud negotiated with Pakistan and gave up his claim on Pashtunistan. 
The Pashtun leaders of Pakistan also supported the result of these negotiations (TANIN 
2006: 185-188). This solution of the Pashtunistan problem was the first step that brought 
Daoud’s government closer to the West and its allies. The next step by the West and its 
allies in the region was to reduce Afghanistan’s dependencies on the USSR To do so Iran 
declared its huge economic support for Afghanistan in many developing projects. In 1975 
Daoud visited Tehran and Reza Shah agreed to extend a credit of USD2 billion to 
Afghanistan, USD1.7 for the construction of a railway from the Iranian border to Herat, 
Kanadahar and Kabul, and the rest USD300 million for development projects in 
Afghanistan (GHAUS 1988: 149). However, this was not the only aid promise, Daoud 
also received promises of aid from many oil-rich Arab countries during his tour of the 
Persian Golf states. 
 
Once Daoud was sure about finding support from alternative resources rather than of the 
USSR, he started to consolidate his grip on power by distancing himself from the 
communist elites. He started replacing many of them with the moderate or non-partisan 
officials from the previous liberal cabinet, political retainers who were close to him 
(NEWELL 1982: 47). Furthermore, he openly criticized the influence of foreign 
ideologies in the country for the first time and said that the Afghan nation would not 
tolerate any “imported ideologies” (GHAUS 1988: 190). Daoud who took power through 
coup was concerned about the legitimacy of his rule. He abolished the “undemocratic 
constitution of 1964” and promised to introduce a new one which was to adhere to the 
principles of “real democracy”. With this attempt he wanted to legitimize and sustain “his 
authoritarian rule” (OLESEN 1996: 224), and the Loya Jirga provided him with an 
instrument for achieving such a goal. 
 
In 1976, the president ordered a commission that consisted of his close friends and loyal 
elements to draft a new constitution. The members of the Loya Jirga who later ratified 
the new constitution were elected. This election was symbolic, as the process was openly 
voting system watched by the police and government officials. The elected 219 members 
came to the capital. In January 1977, the draft of the new constitution was published in 
the newspapers. At the same time the President selected 130 members as the 
representatives of farmers, workers intellectuals and women (FARHANG 1996: 829-
830). The Loya Jirga held from 31 January to 13 February ratified the new constitution in 
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136 articles and also elected Daoud as President. This was the fourth constitution in the 
modern history of Afghanistan (cf. table 11). 
 
In the new constitution Daoud was the first guaranteed the absolute power over all 
institutions.  Although one part of it (one dealt with personal security and rights, which 
had been copied from the constitution of 1964) theoretically accepted the principles of 
democracy, the establishment of authorized judiciary and legislative institutions was, in 
practice, prevented. This was due to Daoud’s attempts to gain the total political power 
through a strong presidency and a weak legislature. Furthermore, the new constitution 
gave Islam a restricted passive role (NEWELL 1982: 47) and instead the key concepts of 
socialism were added to the values of Islam (OLESEN 1996: 220). This was due to the of 
influence of leftist movements in the state institutions. In particular with the republic the 
traditional legitimation of the ruler based in mentioning the name of the ruler in 
Khutbahh and minting his name in coin, ended. Thus the constitution of 1964 was the last 
to mention, this in its article 17, that the “coin is minted in the name of the King”, and 
that “the name of the King is mentioned in Khutbahhs.” 
 
According to article of 78, most of the power was concentrated on the president and he 
had more power than the king had in the constitution of 1964 (RAHIMI 1967: 131- 132, 
136, 138, FARHANG 1996: 830). Article 40 declared a one-party system in the country, 
the party being the Hezb-e Inqelab-e Mili (National Revolution Party), which was 
supported to prevaile as the only party untill the political education of the people of 
Afghanistan attained its maturity. Article 2 described the aim of the constitution as the 
exercise of power by the majority of the people, who consists of farmers, workers, and 
enlightened people and the youth.61 According to article 65 Loya Jirga was the supreme 
manifestation of power and will of the people; and article 48 defined the National 
Assembly (Shura-e Milli or Milli Jirga) as an institution where the will of the people is 
manifested, it is designed to represents the whole of the nation. Nevertheless, legislative 
and judiciary institutions had limited power. The government was not obliged to receive 
votes from the Shura-e Milli, which could also not vote against it. Only the president was 
authorized to employ or dismiss the ministers. At the same time all members of judiciary 
institutions were employed by the president and remained accountable to him. 
                                                 
61 Such social stratification was mostly used by the PDPA and other communist parties to describe the social classes 
among the population. This is an indication of their influence in the institutions. However, the one party system 
challenged their influence and domination in the process of writing the constitution. 
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The one-party-system alarmed the PDPA members because they had no possibility of 
continuing as a political party according to the new system. Therefore they started 
opposing the Daoud’s government on every issue. Daoud, noticing the fact, purified his 
government from the communist elements. Communist ministers were either deposed or 
were sent as ambassadors. By late 1977, there was no known communist minister in the 
cabinet (GHAUS 1988: 191). This situation turned even his loyal Parchami members to 
enemies of the regime since there was no place left for them in the government. 
However, in consolidating his power Daoud lost both time and political capital.  
 
The USSR, who was the first to recognize the regime of the republic (DANISHYAR 
1974: 8), was very much concerned about the political development and particularly the 
direction Afghanistan was heading. In April 1977, when the USSR invited Daoud to 
make his second official trip to Moscow, this was a surprise for him, since he had already 
planned to discuss the U.S.S.R’s involvement in the activities of communists in 
Afghanistan. According to an insider account Leonid Brezhnev complained about the 
activities of experts from NATO countries working in Afghanistan who were stationed in 
the northern part of the country. He asked Daoud, as the head of the state, “to expel these 
imperialist spies” (GHAUS 1988: 179). Daoud rejected the Russian demand as an 
intervention into Afghanistan’s internal affairs and left the meeting.  
 
This historical meeting did not only solve any of the problems with the USSR, on the 
contrary, it further intensified the existed tensions between both governments. Especially 
when the communist elites were expelled from the government, Afghanistan started 
friendly relations and cooperations with the West and its allies like Pakistan, Iran or the 
Persian Gulf states. To counterattack Daoud’s U-turn policy, the USSR used its utmost 
influence to reunite the fragmented communist Parcham and Khalq fractions of the PDPA 
so that they would be able to topple Daoud’s government and replace it in Afghanistan.  
 
In 1976, the two rival fractions united with the active support and mediation of the 
USSR. The unification of the two fractions was based on fifty-fifty power sharing with an 
extra privilege for the Khalq to head the Central Committee (TANIN 2006: 204). Since 
the two fractions constituted the main cadre of the institutions, their unification turned 
them into a powerful anti-government opposition. This situation worried Daoud while his 
brother Mohammad Aziz predicted the collapse of the regime (GHAUS 1988: 194). In 
order to give a preemptive response to the growing threat Daoud further intensified his 
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pressure on the communist elements. He tried to keep the army under his control by 
removing some of the key high-ranking figures who he considered to be his enemies. 
While Daoud was not fully aware of the true number, the PDPA members claim that 
there were around 400 communist officers in the army mainly in Kabul garrisons. Beside 
the communist PDPA members there were more than 300 hundred Soviet military 
advisors in the army (KESHTMAND 2003: 317, 348). According to one account the 
famous Russian secret organizations KGB (Committee for State Security) and GRU 
(Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces) were behind the political 
rivalry between the PDPA fractions. The KGB was mostly involved with the activities of 
non-military elements of the party while the GRU was behind the activities of the 
military elements (TANIN 2006: 206-208). This very complicated network infiltrated the 
military and civil institutions of the state and government.  
 
Daoud’s determination to gain the total power cost him the support of almost all political 
groups. The intellectuals, religious and tribal elites were all against Daoud. As the 
number of intellectual elites increased with the expansion of education system, especially 
the higher education raised the demand for employment and job distribution in the 
country. But the state failed to provide them with this huge number of acceptable career 
paths or survival strategies. They joined the political parties like the PDPA and other 
small leftist parties who promised them a better situation: social equality, justice, 
education, and providing the basic needs like food, clothing and shelter (Nan, Lebas wa 
Khana). The latter constituted one of the most known slogans of communist parties. 
Many of the leading figures of this group were influenced by communist ideology during 
their training in the USSR  
 
The religious elites who fled from Daoud’s suppressions set up Islamic organizations in 
Peshawar. Although traditionally the religious elites consisted of groups led by mullahs 
and Pirs62, at this stage for the first time the intellectual elite not only joined the religious 
elite but also led and developed Islamic political movements and organizations. However, 
some mullahs and Pirs also existed among the leading figures of the Islamic movements. 
This group, who also had the support of some tribal elites, was formed to prevent the 
expansion of communist ideology in Afghanistan. In other words they were both against 
the government and the communists. 
 
                                                 
62 Spiritual leaders usually are the so called Sayid and are believed, among some communities, to be the descendents of 
the Prophet.  
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The political tension continued with a series of assassinations in the capital. Parcham 
leaders seemed to be the first target of these planned assassinations. In 1978, a pilot was 
falsely killed because he bore resemblance like to Karmal (GHAUS 1988: 194). 
However, Mir Akbar Khyber, one of the key Parcham leaders, did not survive and his 
assassination further pushed the tension to a very high level. Later it became clear that 
Hafizullah Amin, one of the Khalqi key Khalqi figures, was behind these assassinations: 
he was clearing out potential rivals in anticipation of a seizing the power (GHAUS 1988: 
194-195). But initially the murderer’s identity remained unclear among the communist 
who were shocked. They charged the government with the assassination since its interior 
ministry had an anticommunist reputation that was influenced by SAVAK63. The event 
intensified the tension between the government and the PDPA members and set in motion 
the events that led to the coup. The PDPA members carried out a massive demonstration 
in Kabul against both Daoud and the CIA (RUBIN 2002: 105). The government 
responded to it by arresting all the leaders of the PDPA with the exception of Hafizullah 
Amin, who was under house arrest and could launch communication with the PDPA 
members in the military. While the PDPA members in the military were keenly looking 
for receiving an order to commit a coup against the Daoud’s government, Taraki, the 
leader of the Khalq fraction, ordered them to carry out the coup on the day when he is 
arrested (HAROON 1997: 146).  
 
4.2 Soviet Invasion: The PDPA Takes over Power 
The associates of the united fractions of the PDPA (Khalq and Parcham), forces that were 
in the military garrisons of Kabul, launched a coup on the evening of the 26 and the 
morning hours of the 27 April, 1978, while their leaders were unaware. Since the date of 
the coup was chosen according to the Afghan lunar month of Saur (Taurus), it became 
known as the Saur Revolution. This happened, exactly the way they had been ordered, 
one day after the PDPA leaders were arrested. Russian-made Mig21 bombarded the 
presidential palace. It is often disputed who flew these jets. According to one account 
Russian pilots flew these jets since the Afghans pilots were in training on these new jets 
and none of them had carried out any flights (FARHANG 1996: 864). At the same time it 
is believed that the pilots were Afghan (HAROON 1997: 151) and had already absolved 
some flights hours with the Russian trainers. Nevertheless, the PDPA officers killed 
Daoud together with 18 members of his family and freed their leaders from prison.  
 
                                                 
63 SAVAK = Iranian secret service during Reza Shah reign. 
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After the coup a military council known as Shura-e Nezami, consisting of officers who 
commanded the coup, controlled the power for a few days. Later the military council 
handed over the power to the Shura-e Inqilabi (Revolutionary Council), consisting of 35 
leading PDPA members from the Central Committee. According to the communist 
regimes the Revolutionary Council was “the highest Organization of the State Authority 
and the true manifestation of the people of Afghanistan” (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 
1980: 2-3).” When the Revolutionary Council took over the power of executive, judiciary 
and legislative institutions, it abolished the constitution of 1977 and issued its decrees. 
 
The two rival PDPA fractions had different opinions on what to call their regime. The 
Khalq fraction wanted to call it Peoples Democratic Republic of Afghanistan while the 
Parcham preferred Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). Finally, the two fractions 
approved the latter (PANJSHIRI 1999: 102).  However, when they wanted to establish 
their government once again the struggle over the distribution of power occurred among 
them. According to the decisions made in the Revolutionary Council of the Central 
Committee, Taraki was named as the Head of the Revolutionary Council, the President 
and Prime Minister of the DRA, and Karmal was made his deputy in all three positions. 
Amin became Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Abdul Qader, a colonel, and 
Noor Ahmad Noor, both members of the Parcham fraction who carried out the coup, 
became Defense Minister and Interior Minister respectively (table 12). 
 
Despite the pre-coup agreement of fifty-fifty power distribution between the two 
fractions, the Khalq became the dominant power in the first cabinet. It took many key 
positions in the PDPA government, while the Parcham was unhappy about its political 
status. Although the Parcham had the ministries of defense and of interior, they were not 
satisfied with power sharing. Their main concern was about the subordinate position of 
their leader Babrak Karmal who became deputy in three posts and was not appointed as 
prime minister. At the same time, the political system in the PDPA government was 
highly centralized where the Khalq was positioned at the core of the power. Under 
pressure, the Parcham initially accepted the results but continuous rivalry between the 
two fractions led to the further expulsion of the Parcham in 1979 when Karmal and five 
of its key leaders were sent abroad as ambassadors. The process continued and the 
cabinet was further purified of the Parcham while the Khalq ministers filled the cabinet 
(table 13). Later the Khalq government branded their rival Parcham leaders as traitors to 
the Saur Revolution and ordered their return for trial (NEWELL 1982: 74). While Karmal 
and his other colleagues refused to return, the remaining Parcham members were arrested 
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and tortured (HAROON 1997: 170). Despite the Khalq dominating the core institutions 
of the state, there were still a considerable number of lower-ranking Parchams both in the 
army and in civil institutions. This group, without a high-ranking key leader, remained in 
opposition and showed little apparent reactions. They were keenly waiting for the orders 
from their leaders.  
 
Position Assigned Member Fraction
Head of the Revolutionery Council
President Noor Mohammad Taraki Khalq
Prime Minister
Deputy Head of the Revolutionery Council
Vice President Babrak Karmal Parcham
Deputy Prime Minister I
Deputy Prime Minister II
Foreign Affairs Khalq
Deputy Prime Minister III
Ministry of Communications
Ministry of Defence Abdul Qader Parcham
Ministry of Interior Noor Ahmad Noor Parchm
Ministry of Finance Abdul Karim Misaq Khalq
Ministry of Information and Culture Mohammad Hasan Bareq Shafi Parcham
Ministry of Justice Abdul Hakim Sharaee Jawzjani Khalq
Ministry of Education Ghulam Dastgir Panjshiri Khalq
Ministry of Higher Education Alam Gul Soma Khalq
Ministry of Public Health Shah Wali Khalq
Ministry of Planning Sultan Ali Keshtmand Parchami
Ministry of Mines and Industries Mohammad Esmael Danish Khalq
Ministry of Border and Tribal Affairs Nezamuddin Tahzib Parcham
Ministry of Agriculture Saleh Mohammad Ziray Khalq
Ministry of Transport Mohammad Rafi Parcham
Ministry of Water and Electricity Mohammad Mansour Hashemi Khalq
Ministry of Commerce Abdul Qudoos Ghoubandi Khalq
Ministry of Social Affairs and Tourism Anahita Ratebzad Parcham
Department of Radio and Televesion Suliman Layeq Parcham
Hafizullah Amin
Aslam Watanjar Khalq
 
Table 12: Cabinet members in the Peoples’ Democratic Party of Afghanistan PDPA in 1978               
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) modified after FARHANG (1993: 870-880), and TANIN (2006: 232-
233) 
 
 170 
 
Period Position Khalq Parcham Non-PDPA Total
May 1978 All 9 13 0 22
Corea 3 4 0 7
July 1978-Dec. 1979 All 1b 23 0 24
Core 0 10 0 10
Jan. 1980 -Nov. 1985 All 29 7 3 39
Core 7 2 0 9
Dec. 1986-Dec. 1989 All 25 9 30 c 64
Core 4 4 2 10
c. Includes SZA and SAZA
b. Mohammad Hasan Bareq-Shafi
a. Core includes the president, prime minister, and the minister of defense, internal affairs and foreign     
affairs, and state security (director general of KhAD before January 1986). 
 
Table 13: The political composition of the PDPA government May 1978 – December 1989               
Source: RUBIN (2002: 114) 
 
Taraki claimed that the PDPA had enough human resources to rule the country and that 
there was no need for any other elements (FARHANG 1996: 873). When it seized power, 
the Khalq claimed the total number of its members to be 50,000. However, other sources 
estimate their numbers to be around 6,000 to 15,000 (FARHANG 1996: 862, HYMAN 
1982: 83, NEWELL 1982: 73). Therefore the Khalq dominated government further 
continued its policy of purging the remaining apolitical professionals in the 
administration, many of whom had been trained in the USA and Europe, from senior 
posts replacing them with its own members.  
 
At the same time around 8,000 people were imprisoned, being accused of affiliation with 
opponent parties (WIEBE 1984: 181). Many of these prisoners were killed especially the 
high-ranking officials. Among them were known figures like Musa Sahfaiq the former 
Prime Minister 1972-1973 who was killed (ADAMEC 1991: 213). By September 1979, 
the number of political prisoners increased to its highest level: only in Pul-e Charkhi, the 
central Prison in Kabul,  it was at least 12,000 (HYMAN 1989: 109). The aim of this 
oppression was to get rid of any challenging opposition and provide a secure base for the 
implementation of the reform and ideology. Thus the government continued mass arrests, 
imprisonment and killing in the country. A large number of those who had no affiliations 
with either of the two fractions also lost their jobs and positions. This situation affected 
the state institutions both qualitatively and quantitatively when large number of 
experienced officials (WIEBE 1984: 181) under pressure and terror left their jobs. 
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4.2.1 Implementing Fundamental Marxist Reform in a Traditional Society 
In Afghanistan, governments used to maintain their focus and attention in the urban areas 
while the rural communities used to live according to the dominant cultural and 
traditional values. In rural areas, Khans and Maliks (feudal land owners) were the 
decision makers while the farmers constituted the labor force. With the PDPA 
government in 1978, for the first time in history the rural area of Afghanistan not only 
came under the consideration of the government but also a lot of revolutionary changes 
were to be enforced. The Khalq government tried to expand its control to the traditional 
rural areas. To do so the regime used its knowledge about the social injustice that existed 
for generations between the feudal landowners and the farmers. Poor landless farmers, 
estimated at 630,000 (HYMAN 1982: 91), despite working hard, earned only very little, 
hardly enough to survive. The farmers were really among the most deprived social 
classes in the rural society, because the governments used to concentrate their attention 
on the capital and major cities. The Khalqis were mostly people from the rural areas with 
rural backgrounds who had received an education and finally turned to the political elites. 
Their leader Taraki came from a Kuchi (nomad) family, Ghalzai tribe. Due to his love of 
the communist way of life, he even changed the name of his village to Soor Klay (Red 
Village) (ATTAYEE 1999: 415). The Khalq government used Marxist and Leninist 
ideology as a base for the solution of all problems in particular the so called the Islahat-e 
Ardi (Land Reforms). They ignored the fact that such imported ideologies will never 
work, especially when they intervene with the religious beliefs and traditional values of 
the traditional society.   
 
The Revolutionary Council of PDPA, according to its communist ideology, considered 
the social structure and traditional system as unjust. Therefore, in order to change this 
situation, the Revolutionary Council projected certain radical plans to transform the 
society. As part of these plans the Revolutionary Council issued eight decrees which 
founded the basis of the new regime. These decrees declared the leaderships of the 
regime, abolished the constitution of 1977, and included certain reforms to be 
implemented in the society by the Khalq-led government (table 14). 
 
The Khalqis thought the reforms would lead to the consolidation of the government’s 
power in the rural areas where more than 80 per cent of the population lived. However, 
the declaration of decrees was a warning for the population: especially the 
implementation of the reforms including the land reforms raised public criticism. The 
redistribution of the land to the people could likely benefit some but it destroyed the 
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existent traditional old network of the society. In other words while in the old system the 
farmer could survive with little profit, in the new system the farmer could gain a piece of 
land when he was desperately looking for a loan, and the government ignored this basic 
part of the reform since there was no bank or other necessary institution to help the 
farmers. Moreover, this radical policy created a winner and a loser situation in the society 
where a Khan could lose his land to many farmers who used to work for him on the same 
land. This in fact created animosity between Khans and Maliks on one side and the 
farmers on the other.  
 
Decree 
Number Date Main Subject
1 29.04.1978 declared Taraki as the Head of the Revolutionary Council,
2 30.04.1978 declared Karmal position as the deputy of Trarki, and also the new PDPA cabinet
3 14.05.1978 abolition of 1977 constitution and establishing new civil and military courts
4 12.06.1978 issued the new red flag with Khalq special symbol,
5 12.06.1978 abolished the citizenship right of the 23 members of the former monarch
6 06.07.1978 abolished all the loans the land owners had on farmers
7 17.10.1978
called the dominated social system as unjust patriarchy and feudal system, and declared certain social reform 
e.g. equal right of man and women,  abolished bride-price and arranged marriage, and fixed the age of 
marriage (18 for man and 16 for woman),
8 28.11.1978 Land reform  
Table 14: Decrees number 1-8 issued by the PDPA’s Revolutionary Council in 197864               
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009)  
 
Therefore, the policy of the PDPA government raised criticism especially among the 
religious and tribal elites. The Mullahs, the dominant religious elites in the rural areas, 
declared that the received pieces of land were illegal land. They told the people to give up 
farming on such lands (FARHANG 1996: 882). At the same time the Mujahidin 
movements based in Pakistan intensified their military activities against the Khalqi 
regime. Unlike the resistance against Daoud’s regime that had received little significant 
support from the people, this time the Mujahidin resistance was supported both in rural 
and urban areas. Although in July 1979 the forceful land reform ended with 600,000-
hectars of land distributed to 248,000 farmers, the opposition arose against the reform. 
Many were arrested, among them were even those who had just received land, documents 
from the government (FARHANG 1996: 882 from ARNOLD).  
 
Meanwhile, the opposition was not just to the land reform but also to all the decrees that 
wanted to intervene in the traditional society and change it entirely according to the 
                                                 
64 Cf. the details of the decrees 1-8 in (MINISTRY OF JUSTICE 1978) 
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Soviet’s socialist model. Decree no. 7, considered the traditional family system as an 
obstacle to consolidation of sincere family ties between husband and wife. It abolished 
bride-price, arranged marriages, and decalere the minimum age for marriage 18 years for 
men and 16 years for women. These decrees were in other words similar to the failed 
modernization reforms carried out by Amanullah in the 1920s. The significant point is 
that both Amanullah and PDPA members were inspired by foreign ideologies and 
modernization programs. They wanted to implement reforms that were in contradiction to 
the traditions and customs of the people and in a top-down manner, ignoring the role of 
the people. 
 
In general the decrees aimed to change the social and traditional life of the people and 
replace it with a communist way of life. The population opposed the PDPA government 
and soon serious unrest spread in the country, challenging the government’s control. The 
religious groups oppressed by the regime also took part and accompanied the people in 
some of the provinces. Since the Anglo-Afghan wars this was the strongest uprising of 
the people against the government and this worried the regime. It is believed that the 
“main reason the revolt spread so widely was that the army disintegrated in a series of 
insurrections from unrecorded defections of small posts to mutinies in nearly all major 
garrisons” (RUBIN 2002: 120). However, the policy of brutal oppression of the 
population was the main reason that turned the society against the regime. The army 
disintegrated in some parts because its members noticed that they were ordered to kill 
their own people (systematically) by a tiny number of the intellectual elite influenced by 
the ideology of communism.  
 
The PDPA government was trying to prevent the total disintegration of the army. Taraki 
turned to the USSR and asked for an immediate assistance through sending their troops 
into Afghanistan. The recorded conversation between Taraki and Aleksey Kosygin, the 
Soviet’s Prime Minister, shows how the Khalqi leader was desperately asking the USSR 
to send their troops to Afghanistan and save the PDPA government. Even when the 
Russian rejected the suggestion of sending troops (being aware of the international 
consequences of the situation), Taraki repeated his suggestions and recommended the 
Russian to send troops from Soviet Socialist Republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan. He added that the same ethnic groups live also in Afghanistan and if they were 
to put on Afghan traditional uniforms they would not be recognized. In order to assure 
Kosygin, Taraki claimed that Pakistan had made the same policy and sent many 
 174 
 
Pakistanis to Afghanistan; why could not the U.S.S.R do the same?65  
 
The Khalq regime responded to the uprisings around the country with an iron hand, 
killing thousands of people. Major anti-government uprisings took place in Herat, Kabul, 
Samangan, Kunar, and Laghman, Panjshir, Logar, Jawzjan and Ghor provinces and 
districts. The number of people killed varied in these regions. The bloodiest uprising 
were in Heart, where 25,000 people were killed by the regime, followed by Kabul with 
10,000, Samangan 1,500 and Nooristan 1,170 respectively (map 15).66 It is significant to 
see that the southern region was relatively stable. This is because the Khaqis were 
predominately from the South. In these battles the government used strong artillery and 
heavy air bombardment. Even fighting jets from Russian territories were participated 
(FARHANG 1996: 992 and AZIMI 1999: 190).  
 
 
 
Map 15: Anti-government uprising in 1978 and Soviet invasion 1979-1989 
 
                                                 
65 The conversation is mentioned in many publications, including KAKAR 1997: 321-326. 
66 There are different figures about the number of people killed. They range from 5,000 ARNEY 19 90 to 25,000 
AZIMI 1999: 190 (cf. Map 1). 
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Nevertheless, despite continuous efforts the government could not eliminate all 
opposition groups. There were many pro-Chinese leftists parties who were independent 
from Moscow and opposed the PDPA government. The most famous one was Shula-e 
Jawid, which was split into many subgroups (figure 9). One of its largest and most 
influential bodies was the SAMA (Sazman-i Azadibakhsh-i Mardom-i Afghanistan, or 
Afghan People’s Liberation Organization) founded by Abdul Majid Kalakani in 1978.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Communist parties and their external supporters 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
These parties played an important role in destabilizing the regime. For example on 14th 
February 1979, an armed group of the SAMA kidnapped the US ambassador and 
demanded the release of one of their key members. During the rescue efforts by the 
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police the US ambassador was killed in the shootouts, while some Soviet advisors were 
also present on the scene (FARHANG 1996: 887-888). In response to the oppositions, the 
PDPA government suppressed pro-Chinese groups. In 1980 the regime arrested Kalakani 
and executed him (KAKAR 1997: 109). In the same year the American embassy in 
Tehran was besieged, and the one in Islamabad was attacked, which shows the extent of 
violence in the region during the Cold War. 
 
The conflict between state authorities, political groups and the public enforced anarchy 
throughout the country, particularly when the political situation within the dominant 
Khalqi dominated government became increasingly fragmentary and unstable. Although 
Taraki was the President but he gave Hafizullah Amin most of the power calling him 
“loyal student”. This situation gradually reduced Taraki to a symbolic position while 
Amin further increased his power. Therefore the Khalq government, dominated by 
Hafizullah Amin’s role, became determined to carry out a revolutionary transformation of 
the Afghan society by decree and terror (RUBIN 2002: 111). As a result, the Khalq 
fraction split into two groups: Aminists (groups loyal to Amin) and the Tarakists (groups 
loyal to Taraki) groups (ATTAYI 2005: xx). The division within the Khalq fraction and 
the increasing importaqnce of Amin in the government, as well as rising violence 
throughout the country (including the killing of the US ambassador), demanded of the 
government to bring to the situation under control, whatever the price.  On this occasion a 
possible Soviet military intervention as a solution to the problem was discussed both in 
Kabul and in Moscow.  
 
In September 1979, Taraki visited Moscow the Soviet’s capital. The Soviets discussed 
the reunification of Khalq - Parcham coalition and removing of Amin with Taraki. On the 
same visit Taraki held a speech in front of six to seven hundred members of the party 
gathered from different cities, and called Amin a “Cancer of the Party” which needed an 
immediate operation. Amin’s loyal officer Sayed Daoud Tarun, who was among the 
listeners, soon informed Amin about the plan prepared against him (TANIN 2006: 266-
268). The weekend of 16 September, just few days after the return of Taraki from 
Moscow, saw the climax of the infighting between the two murderous rivals. Taraki’s 
attempt against Amin not only failed but also provided Amin with a total victory. Amin’s 
upper hand in the power position helped him to besiege Taraki in the presidential Palace. 
Later on October 8/9 he was killed, as had been ordered by Amin (HYMAN 1982: 154, 
FARHANG 1996: 931). 
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Amin’s fear of possible reactions by groups loyal to Taraki drew his attention to the army 
where he purged all of those who were considered as opponent elements (AZIMI 1999: 
206). In order to demonstrate to the public positive changes in the administration the 
AGSA (da Afghanistan Gato Satalo Edara or administration for preserving the interests 
of Afghanistan), the secret service that imprisoned and killed thousands of people, was 
renamed to KAM (Kargari Estekhbarati Moassesa or workers secret organization)67. 
Nevertheless, it was a change in name while its activities were still horrifying to the 
people.  
 
Amin (ruled from October 1979 to December 1979) declared a new policy of maintaining 
security, rule of law and justice while blaming Taraki for all the past events (FARHANG 
1996: 937) including the killing of tens of thousands of people. As a proof of the past 
crimes he published a list of 12,000 prisoners who died from April 1978 to July 1979 
only in Pul-e Charkhi (HYMAN 1982: 156-158). The people knew that Amin himself 
had held the power and Taraki had only played a symbolic role. Therefore, upon the 
publication of list, his government was faced with a strong public reaction. For the first 
time guerrilla war entered the capital. Since the government was incapable of pacifying 
the unrest, the Soviets installed small groups of its military forces in strategic areas like 
the Salang Pass, Bagram Airport, and also increased the number of its military advisors in 
the army (FARHANG 1996: 937-939).  
 
The Soviets believed that with a military intervention they would accomplish their 
objectives to unseat Amin, install a Khalq-Parcham coalition and frighten or deter the 
rebels so that Karmal would be able to rebuild the army and reestablish control over the 
country (COLLIN 1987: 77). Therefore, on December 27, 1979, a few hundred Soviet 
troops stormed Darulaman Palace and killed Amin. Soon the number of Soviet troops that 
invaded Afghanistan increased to 85,000 men while there were 3,000 soldiers from the 
adjacent border in the north (BRADSHER 1983: 206). 
 
Simultanously with the military invasion, the Soviets military installed a new coalition 
group of Khalq and Parcham as government. It consisted of eight key figures like Babrak 
Karmal, Anahita Ratebzad, Genral Gul Aqa, Abdul Wakil and Noor Ahmad Noor from 
the Parcham fraction and Asadullah Sarwari, Aslam Watanjar, Sayid Mohammad 
Gulabzoy from the Khalq fraction, Babrak Karmal lead the coalition (TANIN 2006: 282-
                                                 
67 These two words, AGSA and KAM, are Pashtu acronyms translated literally to English in the above. 
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283). These coalition groups formed a government headed by Babrak Karmal for over six 
years. In 1986 he was replaced with Najibullah who remained in power until 1992 or the 
fall of communist regime. Both ruled under the shadow of the Soviet troops military 
support. 
 
4.2.2 The Impact of the Soviet Military Invasion on the State and its Institutions 
The Soviet military invaded on 27 December, 1979, in order to keep Afghanistan on its 
side and to prevent it from falling into the hands of the West or Islamic movements. 
According to Russian sources, the state in Afghanistan was collapsing (FARHANG 1996: 
941). Therefore, the internal disintegration of the state and PDPA party prompted Soviet 
military intervention (RUBIN 2002: 121). At the same time, Soviet officials indicated 
that Soviet security was at risk in Afghanistan (COLLINS 1986: 124) and that their 
intervention was a defensive move (HYMAN 1982: 166). Their concern was that the 
intervention of Pakistan, China, and in particular the US, which had lost its influence in 
Iran and wanted to change Afghanistan into its new military base in the neighborhood of 
Central Asia.  
 
Within the ruling elite it is believed that Amin played the major role in the events that led 
to Soviet military intervention in December 1979, particularly when he took over power 
(KAKAR 1997:32). The Soviets named the following three basic reasonss for their 
invasion of the country: 
 
1. A request for military assistance from the Afghan government 
2. The Soviet Union’s commitment to give that assistance, by the 1978 treaty. 
3. Self-defense against foreign armed aggression, in accordance with the UN Charter 
(article 51) (HYMAN 1982: 166-167). 
 
The first reason refers to the agreement signed between the Khalqi leaders Taraki, Amin, 
and Brezhnev on December 5th, 1978 (FARHANG 1996: 956). The second reason is an 
interpretation of this agreement as well as of Taraki’s conversation with Kosygin, the 
Soviet Prime Minister during the uprising in Herat and the government’s loss of the 
control of the city. However, it was the Soviet’s intention to respond militarily to the 
deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan, where they had invested since the 1960s and 
which was now “a state with a socialist orientation” (COLLIN 1986:47, 166), on the 
verge of collapse. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to save what it had invested in the 
last decades in Afghanistan and to minimize any possible threat to its interests in the 
region during the Cold War. 
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In the new coalition government of PDPA, Karmal was the Head of Revolutionary 
Council, General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Central Committee, Prime 
Minister and Chief Commander of the armed forces. There was a cabinet consisting of 20 
members (KISHTMAND 2003: 635) of both fractions with a shift of power to the 
Parcham side. Karmal made lots of efforts to keep the unity between the two fractions, 
including signing an agreement of unity in which every members of the party promised to 
be honest. However, the two fractions were against the unity and they demonstrated this 
many times in practice (AZIMI 1999: 277 and TANIN 2006: 302-303). The Mujahidin 
benefited most from the animosity between the two fractions, Khalq and Parcham. In 
particular this helped the Mujahidin to penetrate into the government and get information 
on military operations carried out by the government, and to avoid great casualties or to 
win the war. Therefore the coalition government was fragile from the beginning and only 
the presence of Soviet troops prevented it from collapsing. 
 
There were major challenges ahead for the PDPA coalition government. They inherited a 
state and an army that was weakened during the Khalq purges; the state had lost its 
legitimacy from within. The regime led by Karmal declared a moderate policy and tried 
to undo some of the political damage with its new leadership; stopped calling the DRA a 
socialist country, changed the red Khalqi flag back to the traditional red, green and black 
tricolor, revoked land redistribution, and released some of the political prisoners 
(ARNOLD and KLASS 1987: 149). 
 
The moderate policy of the regime had little impact on the people of Afghanistan as well 
as on the world. The major challenge to the regime was being legitimate in the name of 
Islam (RASNAYAGAM 2003: 94) and the presence of the foreign troops in the country, 
which continued to question the credibility of the state and its institutions. Therefore, 
major projects were concentrated on building the necessary institutions and providing 
reasons for the legitimacy of foreign troops in Afghanistan.  
 
While the government lacked legitimacy and public support, the Soviet invasion 
strengthened and legitimized the Mujahidin resistance based in Pakistan. A huge number 
of people migrated to Pakistan; many of them joined different Mujahidin groups.  From 
April 1978 to November 1982 around 2,800,000 Afghans migrated to Pakistan (COLLIN 
1986: 143). Many people also migrated to Iran, some of them joined the Mujahidin 
groups supported by Iran. In opposition to the Soviet invasion and the government, the 
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urban residents of Afghanistan defied the curfews to send up a nightlong chant of “Allah-
u-Akbar!” (God is the Great) from the flat-topped roofs of Kabul, Herat and Kandahar 
and other towns. These protests were severely suppressed, and the curfew from evening 
till early morning remained unchanged till the fall of the PDPA regime. 
 
4.2.3 The Formation of Mujahidin Resistance Forces in Pakistan and Iran 
The Soviet invasion had to face with massive international condemnation, it particularly 
raised concern in the region and in countries like China and the Muslim states, headed by 
Pakistan, which considered it as a threat of Soviet expansionism (SAIKAL 2006: 198). 
The Islamic revolution in Iran also affected Mujahidin resistance in particular on Shii 
Mujahidin movements. Particularly Khomeini strongly condemned the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan on many occasions and took a hard line against the Soviets in international 
meetings such as the Islamic Conference, the nonaligned meetings, and the U.N. General 
Assembly; they even boycotted the Moscow Olympics (BENARD and KHALILZAD 
1984: 176). This situation isolated the DRA from its neighbors in the East, South and 
West, while it made Afghanistan totally dependent on the USSR as its northern neighbor.  
 
The Islamic movements were created as a result of an unbalanced internal policy of the 
state toward communists and religious elites. Especially its policy of supporting 
communists and sharing the power with them, while at the same time ignoring the role of 
religious elites in the state and instead continuing to suppress them. In addition to that, in 
the 1970s, Daouds’ Republic regime carried out mass arrests of religious figures and 
continued their repressions throughout the country. From this period on the leading 
figures of the religious groups were in exile, in Pakistan, where they received political 
support. But untill the fall of Daoud these movement lacked strong support among the 
people, as well as attention from the world. Initially, Pakistan used them as a counter-
policy against Daoud’s claim on Pashtunistan.  
 
The Soviet invasion strengthened the position of Islamic movements in Pakistan when 
they attracted the attention of the West and anti-Soviet forces.  The Islamic movements 
were called ‘freedom fighters’ and ‘Afghan resistance’ while they were known as 
Mujahidin forces in Afghanistan as well as in other Islamic countries. The US declared 
its support for the Afghan Mujahidin through a massive economic program and military 
aid to Pakistan, as the frontline state, and gave similar assistance and logistic support to 
the Afghan Mujahidin (SAIKAL 2006: 198). The U.S. motivation to support the Afghan 
resistance and Pakistan was its strategic interests in preventing the Soviet Union from 
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expanding its military influence in the region (RAIS 2002: 238). The US under Carter 
and Reagan assigned the CIA to spend what become USD3 billion to support the Afghan 
resistance. The Agency quickly delegated important decision-making to Pakistan, often 
neglecting the fact that Pakistan might have interests that did not necessarily with those 
of either Washington or the people of Afghanistan (MACKENZIE 2002: 94). Other 
Islamic countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt also declared their support. Egypt 
declaring its support for Afghan Mujahidin, freed many members of fundamentalist 
groups from prison and let them join the in the fight against the Soviet invasion (TANIN 
2006: 316-317).  
 
These resistance forces had control and influence in 90 per cent of the rural areas of the 
country (BRADSHER 1983: 207), while the government with the support of Soviet 
troops tried to maintain its control of the main communication routs and major cities (cf. 
map 15). However, the resistance forces of Mujahidin were also split into many political 
parties (figure 10).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Islamic parties based in Pakistan and Iran and their external supporters 1978 - 1992 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
Pakistan
Based
Sunni
Parties
Supported by: The West, USA, & Israel + Western allies Islamic countries  e.g. Pakistan, Saudis, Egypt, Golf States 
Iran 
Based
Shiia
Parties
Supported by: Islamic Republic of Iran
Mullahs
Islamic Parties
Ideologists:
Ikhwanis (Ikhwanul Muslemin or 
Moselm Brotherhood)
Pirs, Sayeds (Sofis), Royalists
Traditionalists:
Radical
Radical
Jami’at
(Rabbani)
Hezb I
(Hekmatyar)
Etehad
(Sayaf)
Hezb IIt
(Khales)
Harakat
(Nabi)
Nejat
(Mujadidi)
Mahaz
(Gailani)
Sazman-e Nasser
Sepah-e Pasdaran
Harakat-e Islami
Hezbullah
Sazman-e Mujahidin
-e Mustadafin
Shura-e Itefaq
?
?
Wahdat
Wahdat-I
Harakat
Wahdat-II
1979 - 1991
1992 -
 182 
 
 
This division was as a result of long existent rivalries and ideological differences mostly 
in the leadership. At the same time the distribution of foreign assistance to the seven 
parties through ISI further fueled the conflict among the rival parties (figure 11).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11:  Financial sources and arms suppliers of Islamic parties based in Pakistan 1978 - 1992 
Source: YOUSUF and ADKIN (2001: 82) 
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and Shii Parties based in Iran, according to religious schools. The Sunni parties received 
support from the Islamic countries as well as from Soviet’s rival Western countries, led 
by the US. In contrast the Shii parties were supported by Iran alone. 
 
This strong military and economic support from the West, China, Saudi Arabia and other 
Islamic countries was all carried out through Pakistan and its secret military service ISI 
(Inter Service Investigation) to the Mujahidin seven parties  
 
Pakistan’s security commitment, and the military assistance it received from the U.S., 
was the most important factor for upgrading the capacity of the Afghan resistance (RAIS 
2002: 238). This special role gave Pakistan the chance to build trust and loyalties among 
the leaders of the seven parties. Those parties that thought according to the policy of 
Pakistan received more funds and attention from the ISI. This means the more 
fundamental the party was the more funds it would have received. 
 
Among the seven parties three were fundamentalists: Harakat, Etehad and Hezb. Harakat 
was a traditional fundamentalist, Etehad was a Wahabbi fundamentlist who receive extra 
attention from the Saudis and other Arab countries, Hezb, led by Hekmatyar, was an 
ideological fundamentalist party that attracted the attention of the Islamic fundamental 
parties in Pakistan as well as elsewhere in Arab countries. Particularly the ISI had 
invested tremendously in Hekmatyar over the years and regarded him as the key figure 
guaranteeing Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan (RUBIN 2002: 252). Even the Shii 
regime in Iran provided its support for the radical Sunni Hekmatyar. Although RAIS 
claims that Iranian support for Hekamtyar was for a short time and untill Khomaini’s 
death, and that it was mainly due to his radical credential and open praise of and support 
for the Islamic revolution in Iran (RAIS 2002:183). But, in fact, Hekmatyar’s coalition 
with Abdul Ali Mazari in1993 and his exile in Iran from 1996 to 2001 in Tehran, show 
that the Islamic regime in Iran maintained their support for him. In 2001, it was under 
U.S., pressure that the Iranian authorities ordered Hekmatyar to leave Iran. 
   
The other four Mujahidin parties were known as moderate. But the problem with the 
moderate groups was that they lacked a united leadership, and they remained dependent 
on Pakistan and under its influence. Pakistan was not only the distributing body of the 
funds for the Mujahidin parties but also provided the space for the parties to carry out 
their activities. They were based in Peshawar and they received funds, arms, training and 
all necessary requirements on Pakistan’s territory. 
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These dependencies of the Mujahidin leaders on Pakistan undermined the coordination of 
a united leadership for military operations in Afghanistan. Later in the 1990s, major 
commanders of different parties organized a National Commanders Shura (NCS) which 
was an alternative to the ineffectual leadership of the exiled party leaders and the alliance 
between ISI and Hekmatyar. This alternative leadership of NCS worked when Ahmad 
Shah Masoud68,  as its spokesman, visited Pakistan in October 1990, and attracted more 
U.S. aid directly to him and other big commanders (RUBIN 2002: 182). This gave him 
the privilege of remaining out of ISI influence and being able to carry out his military 
activities independently.    
 
4.2.4 The War 1979-1992  
Despite the presence of Soviet troops Afghanistan, the challenge of resistance proved 
hard to overcome at least in the short term, both for the Soviets and their supported the 
government they supported. Therefore certain efforts were carried out to increase the 
capacities of the state for coercions and surveillance of the two national institutions, the 
armed forces and the secret police KhAD 69 (RUBIN 2002: 130). KhAD was a separate 
institution from the police and the armed forces, its authority had grown in time. 
Najibullah, who was trained by KGB and brought back to Kabul after the invasion, 
headed the KhAd. Later, when he became president, KhAd was promoted to ministry 
level and its authority was above that of both the ministry of defense and that of the 
interior (figure 12). 
 
Furthermore to reduce the power of resistance through diverting the attention of the 
people from the Mujahidin, the DRA worked to establish institutions that would 
showcase government support for Islam. New mosques were built; 34 in Kabul alone and 
523 others were renovated throughout the country (RASANAYAGAM 2003: 94). In the 
beginning the Department of Religious Affairs was established and later, in 1985, it was 
upgraded, becoming the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Endowment (Wizarat-I Shu’un-i 
Islami wa Awqaf). 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 One of the main commanders of the Rabbani led Jamiat Party who led Shura-e Nezar (Supervisory Council) 
69 KhAD Khedamat-e Amniyat-e Daulati (state security service) and WAD Wezarat-e Amniyat-e Daulati (ministry of 
state security) 
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Figure 12:  Hierarchy of state institutions under the PDPA 1996 - 1992 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
The DRA efforts to attract any public support vanished mainly due to the presence of 
foreign troops in Afghanistan on the one hand and the puppet government on the other. 
The struggle against foreign invasion was gaining momentum. Therefore “in mid-1980 
Moscow and Kabul began to devise a counterinsurgency and state-building strategy 
based on long term Soviet commitment to the regime. The state relied primarily on 
military techniques of coercion in the countryside and police techniques of coercion in 
the cities (RUBIN 2002: 123).” The strengthening of the armed forces was the major 
policy of the regime. Its size in 1983 is mentioned to be between 40,000 to 70,000.70  
However, along with fractional conflict in the command structure, maintaining the size of 
                                                 
70 AZIMI, who was within the armed forces, claims that it was 70,000 in the same year (AZIMI 1999: 289), while 
RUBIN mentions it was reduced to 40,000 (RUBIN 2002: 131). 
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the army was a persisting problem, because of high number of mutinies and desertions.71  
 
Due to a high demand for armed forces the age of conscription was reduced from 22 
years of age to 20, then 19 and even 17 years. In some cases even teenagers of 15 and 16 
were forced to conscribe (AZIMI 1999: 289). The compulsory conscription was one of 
the most negative phenomena that had an unpleasant impact on society. At the same time 
the conscription program was enforced largely on non-Pashtun people, while the 
Pashtuns enjoyed being in the high ranks of the armed forces since the 1929, when the 
tribes from the South had helped Nadir Khan to take the throne.72 In an attempt to invoke 
this tradition in October 1982 Abdul Qadir, Minister of Defense, revoked the exemption 
from conscription of the Pashtun tribes, e.g., Shinwari, Mohamand, and Jaji. The tribes 
responded to this policy of the government, by blocking the transportation of goods on 
the routes they largely controlled (RUBIN 2002: 132). Nevertheless, the major problem 
for the government in gaining the support of the population was the presence of the 
Soviet troops in the country and its lack of legitimacy. These two factors in particular 
made it difficult for the government to carry out compulsory conscription. Most of the 
male population between the ages of 16-40, who were the target of this program, had to 
migrate abroad or join the Mujahidin groups. 
 
It is believed that the Soviet strategy from June 1980 to December 1984 was to take 
control of the major centers of communication (cf. map 15), limit infiltration, and destroy 
local strongholds at minimum risks to its own forces (COLLIN 1986: 139). The decisive 
turning point against the Soviet invasion came in April 1984, when the Soviet assault 
failed for the seventh time to bring Panjshir, a strategic valley close to the Salang pass, 
under their control (ARNOLD 1993: 131). Panjshir valley became a concentration point 
of best-trained Mujahidin forces under the command of Shura-e Nezar (supervisory 
council) led by Ahmad Shah Masoud, who repeatedly ambushed Soviet military convoys. 
There is no doubt that Panshir remained the only permanent stronghold under the control 
of Mujahidin forces. Even the regime admitted this when Saleh Mohammad Ziray, a 
Khalqi member of the politburo, called Panjshir as “the strongest front in the world after 
the USA and the USSR” (KAKAR 1997: 243).  
 
Furthermore, the Mujahidin groups removed all communists or government loyalist from 
                                                 
71 AZIMI mentions the number in 1983 to be 34,143 (AZIMI 1999: 289), while RUBIN, for the same years estimates it 
between 20,000 to 40,000 (RUBIN 2002: 131)  
72 This is particularly true in the case of tribes in Paktia, Khost, Paktika and Nangarhar. 
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the rural areas so that they could communicate easier, and later destroyed the roots and 
bridges joining the city and villages together, while their last strategy was attacking 
governmental institutions in the rural areas. To counterattack, Soviet forces accompanied 
by governmental forces, heavily bombarded rural areas and intensified their pressure on 
on the population. As a result of these battles within the country around 3 million people 
migrated to Pakistan and 2 million to Iran (TANIN 2006: 318-323)73, thousands of others 
migrated to Europe or the US. Although the number of casualties was high due to the 
extensive war, there are few exact figures in the literature. For example, according to 
AZIMI, Soviet sources mentioned the number of casualties until January 1986 as being 
1.5 million Mujahidin forces killed and 1 million disabled. At the same time, Soviet 
military casualties were 12 thousand, and Afghan forces 38 thousand, which seems to be 
exaggerated (AZIMI 1999: 291). This sensitivity was due to the fact that the government, 
and especially the Soviets, wanted to hide the true number of casualties they had taken, as 
not to face too much criticism from the world. 
 
In March1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the USSR, he determined his 
policy of pulling out Soviet troops, but the military sources opposed this decision as a 
humiliating act (TANIN 2006: 331). Being aware of the military failure in Afghanistan, 
Gorbachev imposed a one-year deadline for making the old strategy work. After the 
situation proved to be the bloodiest year, the Soviet congress under domestic pressure and 
continuing resistance in Afghanistan, allowed Gorbachev to promote a political 
compromise – “national reconciliation” – and to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops (RUBIN 2002: 146).  
 
The political changes in the USSR left their direct impact on Afghanistan. In March 1986 
Karmal resigned and Najibullah replaced him. This power transfer is considered as a 
blood less coup against Karmal. Despite there being around 160,000 military and 115,000 
police forces with 20,000 secret services available, nothing happened (PANJSHIRI 1999: 
124). However, this decision was not carried out without Soviet involvement and its 
personnel were the final decision makers for the Afghan state. At the same time the 
PDPA government and the armed forces were aware of the fact of the political change in 
leadership and considered it to be an approved decision; except some protest by pro-
Karmal elements that changed nothing (AZIMI 1999: 313).  
 
                                                 
73 At the eve of the Soviet troops withdrawal the peak of Afghan migrants to Pakistan was 3,722,000 and 2,940,000 in 
Iran (RASANAYAGAM 2003: 194). 
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With Najibullah (ruled from 1986 to1992) the last PDPA president in Afghanistan and 
the head of the party, the PDPA became even more divided. Although Karmal and 
Najibullah represented the same Parcham fraction, this time political rivalry grew within 
the Parcham party and led to the emergence of two groups, one pro-Karmal and the other 
pro-Najibullah. According to KISHTMAND, the Prime Minister of this period, this 
problem was due to the policy of double standard in the leadership (KESHTMAND 
2003: 981). This means that although Najibullah and Karmal both belonged to the 
Parcham fraction, for Najibullah regional and tribal affiliation had more priority. He 
preferred the people from Paktia to all others (ATAYEE 2001: 443). Despite Najibullah 
was from Parcham, he installed many Khalqi figures from Pakita in the key institutions of 
his government. For example, Shahnawaz Tanai, Aslam Watanjar, and Raz Mohammad 
Paktin three Khalqi figures who each became Defense Minister, Interior Minister and 
Minister of Water and Power respectively. However, even tribal affiliations failed to 
build the trust among the rival PDPA fractions when in 1991 Tanai committed a coup 
against Najibullah’s regime. Furthermore, as part of Najibullah’s regional interests, Khost 
- a district in Paktia province- was promoted first to Loy Woloswali (major district) and 
later to Khost province, a title which has remained unchanged until now. 
  
At this point Afghanistan according to Gorbachev, became a “bleeding wound” 
(SAIKAL 2004: 200) for the Soviets, which he tried to heal with a strategy that would 
inflict as little damage as possible to Russia’s image in the world. The policy of “national 
reconciliation” proposed in Moscow for the honorable withdrawal of its troops from 
Afghanistan, also became the main policy of the PDPA regime (TANIN 2006: 334-335) 
for its own survival. However, in practice, the regime still lacked legitimacy and had an 
image problem, since it was known as anti-Islamic or regarded as offensive to Islam. 
Therefore, the regime carried out its efforts to show itself as non-offensive and tried to 
gain credibility as a defender of Islam (OLESEN 1996: 257) and religious elites in 
Afghanistan, a policy which mounted, in effect, in the dissolution of the monolithic 
communist state (RASANAYAGAM 2003:120). To repair its image among the people 
the regime stressed the common Islamic heritage and established a links with mullahs 
(RAIS 2002:151) by enrolling them into the government payroll system and paying them 
regular salaries and coupons like normal government officials. In 1987, the regime 
claimed the number of mullahs that were receiving salaries and coupons was 16,000 a 
figure that increased to 20,000 in the following year (RUBIN 2002: 165, 166). Moreover, 
religious programs were created in the media, discussing religious issues, declaring 
prayer time, calling Mujahidin fighters were called as “angry brothers”. The public media 
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continuously broadcast these programs. In addition to this some 4,000 political prisoners 
were released, a six-month ceasefire was announced (RASANAYAGAM 2003: 119) and 
extended it by another six-month. 
 
In 1987, parallel to the policy of reconciliation, in order to reconstruct state structure, the 
regime convened a Loya Jirga, and ratified a new constitution, which had been drafted by 
the Soviet advisors (RUBIN 2002: 147). According to the new constitution Afghanistan 
reverted to its former name Republic of Afghanistan. It also ostensibly provided for a 
multiparty system, a popularly elected parliament that would choose the prime minister, 
while Najibullah was elected as president by the Loya Jirga.  At the same time 
Najibullah, besides holding the office of the president that concentrated all executive 
power, was also the chief commander of armed forces (AZIMI 1999: 335). 
 
The Mujahidin parties unanimously rejected the Najibullah’s proffered initiatives, which 
they roundly denounced as a fraud designed to perpetuate PDPA rule (ARNOLD and 
KLASS 1987: 156). The Mujahidin parties’ main reasons for the rejection were the 
presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the PDPA in power.  
 
4.2.5 The Withdrawal of Soviet Troops and Pakistan’s Geostrategic Ambitions in 
Afghanistan  
In April 1988, under UN mediation, and with the USA and the USSR present an 
agreement that became known as Geneva Accord was signed between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The accord consisted of four elements  
 
1. A bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the principles of 
mutual relations, in particular on non-interference and non-intervention 
2. Soviet commitment to withdraw its troops within ten months, by 15 February 
1989 
3. A bilateral agreement between Afghanitan and Pakistan on the voluntary return of  
the Afghan refugees from Pakistan, but not necessarily those from Iran 
4. The guarantees of the accord by the USA and the USSR (SAIKAL (2006: 201). 
 
In line with this agreement the Soviet troops’s withdrawal started in May 1988 and ended 
in February 1989. The interesting thing about the Geneva Accord was that none of the 
Afghan Mujahidin delegates were invited to the meeting, neither those Mujahidin parties 
based in Pakistan nor those in Iran. More importantly the the agreement was between 
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Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Iran was not included. Therefore, the agreement 
demonstrated that Pakistan is the main player in the conflict and that the Afghan 
Mujahidin parties were just instrument for its policies. This situation helped the Pakistani 
governments to develop strategies to fill the gap of political influence after the Soviet 
troops’ withdrawal was completed. It had been expected that the regime would collapse 
with the withdrawal, and that it would not be able to stand on its own without Soviet 
support. 
 
Thus, in February 1989 in Peshawar, parallel to withdrawal of the Soviet troops, a Shura 
made up of 439 members from seven Mujahidin parties was formed (KAKAR 1997: 
268). The Shura elected an ‘Interim Government’ (IG) headed by Mujaddidi, and Sayaf 
as prime minister. The problem with this election was that Pakistan’s secret service (Inter 
Service Investigation or ISI) blatantly manipulated the whole process of the election 
while the Saudis spent USD26 million and lavishly bribed the delegates of the Shura 
(EWANS 2002: 241).74 Some members of Shii parties based in Iran ostensibly came but 
they refused to pfurther participate in the Shura, when the Sunni parties rejected their 
demand (RAIS 2002: 200). However, it was difficult for the Shii parties supported by 
Iran to find any possibility of participating in the political process that was funded by the 
Saudis. The aim of the Saudis was to provide their support for Sayaf, who was known as 
a pro-Saudi Wahabi leader among the Mujahidin parties. Nevertheless, due to the strong 
involvement of Pakistan and the Saudis in forming the Interim Government (IG) from 
one side, and the continuous rivalries among the Mujahidin parties on the other, the 
election process gained little credibility and attracted little attention.  
 
Despite all their efforts, even Pakistan and Saudis did not recognize the Interim 
Government established in exile. The US said it would only recognize the IG if it showed 
its capability to bring significant amount of territory in Afghanistan under its control and 
if it enjoys broad popular support (EWAN 2002: 41). Therefore, to get recognition from 
the world, especially from the USA, meant to gain more territory in Afghanistan. In order 
to achieve this aim the ISI organized a Mujahidin military offensive in order to occupy 
Nangarhar, where it intended to install the IG, in March 1989 (RUBIN 2002: 250). This 
offensive went on for four months and the Mujahidin forces were defeated. As a result of 
this defeat Hamid Gul, the head of ISI was deposed from his position (AZIMI 1999: 
400).  
                                                 
74 According to EWAN for each delegate USD25,000 was paid (EWANS 2002: 241). 
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In another attempt Masoud tried to claim Kunduz and thus to provide a territory for the 
IG to settle inside the country. However, this plan was failed when Hekmatyar’s 
commander captured ten of Masoud’s senior commanders and killed them. This action 
frustrated Mujaddidi, the President of the IG, who called Hekmatyar “a criminal and a 
terrorist”, while Hekmatyar suspended his participation in the IG (RUBIN 2002: 251-
252). The defeat of the Mujahidin in Nangarhar and the fractional fighting among them in 
Kunduz, supported the position of the regime in Kabul. 
 
The resistance of the PDPA regime in the Nangarhar offensive surprised the Mujahidin 
forces and their supporters. Basically there were three major factors, which prevented a 
possible collapse of the PDPA regime: the Soviet’s continuous military support for the 
regime, the political differences and rivalries among the Mujahidin parties, which was 
often accompanied by military conflicts and prevented them form forming a united front 
against the regime, and finally the use of militia forces by the government in the military 
conflict. These three factors provided a better military position for the PDPA regime to 
survive a possible collapse.  
 
The use of militants as armed forces by the regime was the most destructive policy, 
which had its side effects on the regime and, more importantly, it militarized a high 
number of the population both in urban and rural areas. In order to consolidate its 
position against the Mujahidin, the regime gave a lot of incentive for tribal elites to join 
them and recruited militias in Kandak haye Qawmi (ethnic battalions), to take part in 
military operations as well as in securing government supply routes. Some of these 
militia figures were Esmat Muslim, Jabbar-e Qhahraman, Sayed Mansur Naderi, Juma 
Khan Andarabi and Abdurrashid Dostum. Esmat Muslim was responsible for keeping the 
road from Kandahar to Spinboldak open (KAKAR 1997: 262). Jabbar, a ‘fanatic ethno-
nationalist’ who led a large militia in Hilmand, initially had a Qheta (battalion) and later 
it was promoted to Luwa (brigade) (AZIMI 1999: 343). Naderi was the governor of 
Baghlan, with 13,000 men under the command of his son Jaffar; he was also playing the 
role of mediator between the Mujahidin groups and the government. Andarabi led a 
militia that was in charge of blocking the supply lines to Mujahidin forces in Panjshir. 
Dostum, who started his career in a self-defense unit for the state’a natural gas 
company’s installations, was soon promoted to military general and led the largest and 
most effective pro-government militia, which numbered 40,000 men by 1991 
(RASANAYAGAM 2002: 130). He had a military strong contingent composed of two 
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Lowa (brigade) led by his loyal militia commanders Rasul Pahlawan and Ghafar 
Pahlawan. In 1989, Najibullah claimed the number of armed forces, police, KhAd,  
PDPA party members, border militia, regional and ethnic militia self-defense forces and 
militia to be 500,000 (AZIMI 1999: 341-344). 
 
Beside all of this, the PDPA regime concentrated its efforts to strengthen the army, police 
and KhAD, the only institutions of the state that the regime primarily relied on. The 
regime declared the state of emergency in the country, and military training became part 
of the curriculum in the upper secondary school system as well as at university. There 
were part-time students and administrative staff who were responsible for the security of 
schools, universities or ministries and departments. They were known as Sepah-e 
Enqhilab (revolutionary guards) and Defa-e Khodi (self defense) groups (figure 13). In 
other words, it can be said that the regime wanted to militarize the whole society on the 
country, while it received large assistance from the Soviets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13:  The composition of security institutions under the PDPA 1986 - 1992 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
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In 1989, three new provinces were created which raised the number from 29 to 32. These 
new provinces were Nooristan, Sar-e Pul and Khost. The latter was important because 
many key figures of the PDPA were from there and also the Mujahidin forces made many 
attempts to gain its control over this area (map 16).  
 
While the regime was consolidating its position against the Mujahidin forces, it was 
weakened again from within the state’s institutions due to the rivalries of the two Khalq 
and Parcham fractions. In an attempt, which RUBIN calls a “Pashtun Plot,” Hekmatyar 
formed an alliance with non-Durrani Pashtuns members of the Khalq and tried to benefit 
from the PDPA fractional rivalries (RUBIN 2002: 151,253). In March 1990, Shahnawaz 
Tanai, the Khalqi minister of defense, in a joined coalition with Hekmatyar, carried out a 
coup, in coalition with Hekmatyar and ISI which failed. Tanai, with many other Khalqi 
generals, fled to Pakistan where he was appointed by Hekamatyar as the commander of 
his group ‘Army of Sacrifice’ (RASANAYAGAM 2002: 138). Although the coup failed 
and Najibulah’s regime survived but the army was weakened because of the political split 
among the military forces who joined Hekmatyar.   
 
 
Map 16: Administrative division of Afghanistan 1989 - 2004 
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Therefore, to strengthen its weak position, the regime committed to even more reforms. 
In May 1990, another Loya Jirga was held: the PDPA was reformed and renamed the 
Hezb-e Watan (Homeland Party), a multi party system was endorsed, the state of 
emergency was lifted, and private enterprise and foreign investment was welcomed 
(EWAN 2002: 243). The economy of the country was deteriorating because of the war 
and repeated attacks on highways slowed the transportation of food and other necessary 
material, especially to the capital where the regime still controlled the central power. 
   
On the other side the pressure from the Mujahidin and their international supporters was 
increasing. In January 1991, when the Soviet troops were sent to Lithuania and other 
Baltic states, the CIA and ISI insisted on putting the Soviets under military pressure in 
Afghanistan. By March of the same year they increased their resources for Mujahidin, 
which also included sending many Pakistani advisers on the ground, which enabled the 
Mujahidin forces to get the control of Khost (RUBIN 2002: 255). The Mujahidin forces 
captured the city, but instead of making it a resistance capital for the IG inside 
Afghanistan they looted it (EWAN 2002: 246) and moved all its military equipments to 
Pakistan (AZIMI 1999: 462). Meanwhile “Hekmatyar, General Durrani of the ISI, and 
Qazi Hussain Ahmad, leader of the Pakistani Jama’at-e Islami75, paid a well publicized 
visit to Khost, broadcasting the Pakistani role to an increasingly nationalist Afghan 
public” (RUBIN 2002: 255). The fall of Khost into Mujahidin hands further highlighted 
the increasing role of Pakistan and its enormous influence on seven Mujahidin parties in 
Pakistan, in particular on Hekmatyar’s party.  
 
Meanwhile, the collapse of the Soviet Union in August 1991 and the decline of the 
communist there weakened the position of Najibullah’s regime. One month later, in 
September 1991, the Soviet and the U.S. agreed to stop sending arms to the Afghans from 
January 1992 onwards. Moscow further announced that it would decrease or halt the flow 
of oil and wheat to Afghanistan, and withdraw all of its military advisors from 
Afghanistan (EWAN 2002: 246, TANIN 2006: 355-356). At the same time, in these 
negotiations, the Russians abandoned their insistence that Najibullah should be a member 
of an interim government (EWANS 2002: 246). Lack of support from the Russians, who 
were the only aid resources and their pressure on Najibullah to step down worried the 
                                                 
75 A radical Islamic party in Pakistan 
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regime. Najibullah called the Soviet as “the enemy of Afghanistan” and, as a last attempt 
to remain in power, sent a delegate to Geneva to persuade the former king to return to the 
country and become the head of State again (SAIKAL 2006: 206).  
 
In addition to the international pressure, the relationship of the regime with General 
Dostum in the North became deteriorated. As a result, Dostum switched sides and formed 
an alliance with Masoud and other Mujahidin forces. This alliance helped him to take 
control of Mazar-e Sharif city in March 1992, followed by the surrounding provinces. 
After getting control of northern Afghanistan, Dostum, Mazari and Masoud formed a 
coalition headed by Masoud. At this time Kabul, the capital and its surroundings were 
still under the control of the regime. 
 
4.2.6 The Disintegration of the PDPA’s Political System and its Institutions 
In April 1992, Najibullah entered the UN compound in Kabul as a refugee after his 
attempt to leave the country failed (AZIMI 1999: 550, 555). Meanwhile the Mujahidin 
forces attempts were concentrated on influencing and occupying governmental 
institutions, especially the military and police institutions in the capital. Through these 
plans, the human resources in the army and police mainly were divided into three 
categories:   
 
1. PDPA rival fractions composed of mainly highranking officers realized the fact that 
there is little chance for them to play any important role in the new Islamic system. 
In order to gain the confidence of Mujahidin parties, each fraction started to deliver 
the control of certain areas and institutions to a particular Mujahidin group.  
 
2. Lower ranking officers of the army left the job due to the prevailing anarchy and 
searched for a new civilian life, some left the country due to the conflict, while the 
rest were officially in the army without a certain task or regular payment.  
 
3. More importantly, the soldiers who were recruited through forceful conscriptions left 
the army unhindered since the PDPA regime was no more in power and the 
Mujahidin had their own militia forces.  
 
The role of Qawm in transferring power was significant since each fraction wanted its 
own Qawm to be dominant in the future. In other words, the Pashtun dominated Khalq 
wanted to transfer the power to Hekmatyar, also a Pashtun. At the same time, the non-
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Pashtun dominated Parcham wanted to transfer power to rather moderate forces of 
Mujahidin, especially from their own Qawm. In terms of establishing a relationship with 
the Mujahidin, the Khalq fraction was more advanced since it had traditional contacts 
with Hekmatyar, with whom the had once carried out a joint military coup against 
Najibullah’s government. At this stage their members formed a coalition with Hekmatyar 
and gave up the control of many areas in the South and institutions in the capital.  
 
Therefore, in Kabul, the Khalqis headed by Paktin and Watanjar ministers of defense and 
interior respectively (both Pashtuns) allowed Hekmatyar’s forces to penetrate into the 
city, and they abandoned the control of key governmental institutions, e.g., the 
presidential palace, defense ministry and ministry of interior (AZIMI 1999: 571-576) to 
his forces. 
 
On the other side, members of Parcham fraction established contacts with Masoud, 
Hekmatyar’s rival, as an alternative option.  Masoud initially avoided entering the capital 
as ‘head of state’ and asked the Mujahidin leaders to intensify their efforts for forming an 
interim government. However, Hekmatyar’s brief control over important parts of Kabul 
city was considered as ‘an imminent coup’ (RUBIN 2002: 270-271) and prompted his 
rival forces to react. Thus, forces led by Masoud, the Shura-e Nezar (SN) (supervisory 
council), entered the city as well.  
 
Beside the two rival groups there were other forces of former government militia led by 
General Dostum. In order to conform with the Mujahidin forces he reshaped his militias 
and declared their name to be Junbesh-e Milli-e Islami-e Afghanistan (JMIA) (national 
Islamic movement of Afghanistan). Dostum’s forces had important parts of the capital 
under their control e.g., the airport, the central part, Microryans, and Balahistar military 
base. At this time Mazari’s Hezb-e Wahdat-e Islami-e Afghanistan (HWIA-M) (party of 
Islamic unity of Afghanistan) took control of large parts of South-Western Kabul, and 
Sayaf’s Etehad-e Islami-e Afghanistan (EIA) (Islamic union of Afghanistan) took control 
of the Western part of Kabul. The former was supported by Iran and the latter by Saudi 
Arabia, they constituted the two vital opposite military fronts in the city; each was busy 
with consolidating its own positions.  
 
This competition over influence in state institutions resulted in severe conflicts among the 
rival Mujahidin fractions. Different rival groups occupied different institutions, according 
to the training they received during the many years of war; whatever they captured was 
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considered as Ghanimah (booty), and therefore became their own property. Thus, 
government offices, including military, police and other institutions that provided public 
security and services were occupied by different fractions, the facilities they had were 
looted, and the rivalry wars badly damaged the infrastructure.76 
 
4.3 The Mujahidin Government 1992-200177 
On 24 April 1992, the Mujahidin Shura consisting of 51 members was formed in 
Peshawar. The Shura formulated an interim government to whom the power would later 
transfer in Kabul. As planned for the first two months Mujaddidi was the head of Islamic 
State of Afghanistan, followed by Rabbani for the next four months (KAKAR 1997: 
276). Then the Shura elected a transitional government during which instituting a 
constitution and an election were planned. The agreement of this Shura was signed by all 
Islamic parties and became known as the Peshawar Accord. At the same time members 
of all rival parties were included in the new cabinet; the premiership was given to 
Hekmatyar and the defense ministry to Masoud while members of other parties filled the 
rest of the ministries. Even strong critics of the Mujahidin government admit that this was 
the most representative cabinet in the history of Afghanistan (ATAYEE 2001: 468-469). 
 
On the other hand, government institutions were controlled by various armed groups. 
According to the new cabinet all forces should have come under the command of the new 
government. Therefore, in order to secure the capital for the new government, Masoud, 
now Minister of Defense, ordered his forces to disarm all armed groups and bring them 
under the control of the government. Masoud also enjoyed support from the remnant 
armed forces of the PDPA government and Dostum’s militias in the disarmament 
process. However, Hekmatyar’s forces, despite their leader being appointed as prime 
minister, declined to give up their arms. Therefore, from 25 to 27 April, Masoud’s led 
forces organized a military campaign in the course of which Hekmatyar’s forces 
evacuated the occupied government buildings and were expelled from the city (AZIMI 
1999: 581). At this stage the western part of the city, which was under control of Mazari, 
was not initially considered to be as important as the center of the city where the main 
government offices were located. Mazari and other Shii parties were based in those areas 
                                                 
76 I was the eyewitness of such happenings carried out by different forces. None of the Mujahidin forces was 
uninvolved in these lootings regardless of their Qawm and place of origin. Those who formed the government and 
those who formed the opposition forces equally participated in the lootings. 
77 This date is not considered on territorial bases of control. It is considered according to the recognition of the 
government by the UN and other countries. In contrast Taliban despite brought major parts of the country failed to get 
such recognition and only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE recognized it for certain time. 
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where most of the Shii population lived and they enjoyed strong local support. This 
provided a chance for Mazari to consolidate his power and to use this territorial control 
for his political ambitions.  
 
During a formal ceremony on 28th April 1992, members of the government of the 
Republic of Afghanistan, namely the deputy president, the prime minister and the heads 
of the two houses, some of PDPA members and military officers, officially handed over 
the power to the Mujaddidi the president of the Interim Government of Afghanistan 
(IGA). However, it was merely a symbolic ceremony, as the PDPA government was 
already dissolved and in practical terms none of its institutions survived the political 
change in the country that had occurred with the arrival of Mujahidin. A high number 
(500,000) of military, police, KhAD/WAD, and militia forces either joined different 
Mujahidin fractions or they emerged as separate forces e.g., Dustum’s JMIA. 
 
The new government proclaimed the establishment of the Islamic State of Afghanistan 
(ISA). However, this is hardly to be considered as state, and certainly did not rule 
Afghanistan (RUBIN 2002: 272). The reasons that the ISA government could not rule the 
country lie in certain facts, the first and main reason being that it inherited a military state 
that had been fragmented and was already divided into many fractions; secondly the huge 
number of Mujahidin forces were not itself a unified force but composed of the seven 
Sunni parties of Peshawar and eight Shi’a parties in Iran.  Even each party was further 
divided into fractions. For example, the Shura-e Qumandanha (Council of Commanders) 
in the country emerged as separate organ from the Mujahidin parties based in Peshawar 
and Iran. This enabled the commanders to decide more independently in the Shura in 
Afghanistan, which was away from the influence of Pakistan and Iran. At the same time, 
the Iranian attempts to unify the eight Shii parties into a union (Wahdat) proved little 
successful because this union was again divided into two fractions under the same name 
but with different leaderships (Anwari and Mazari) and directions.  
 
4.3.1 The Regional Division of the Country among Rival Groups 
While the capital was burning in the conflict between government and opposition groups, 
regional commanders and Shuras, many of them loyal to the government, ruled the entire 
country. Dostum, based in Mazar-e Sharif, controlled the area from Maimana to Kunduz 
and to Pul-e Khumri; Rabbani and Masoud controlled the area from Kundz to 
Badakhshan and Kabul. Ismael Khan, one of the main commanders of JIA, controlled 
Herat and the western part of the country. The Shii parties controlled Hazarajat the 
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central part of the country. In the East, Southeast and Southern provinces there were three 
Shuras all loyal to government in Kabul. Haji Qadir was the governor of Jalalabad and 
the leader of Mujahidin Shura known as Shura-e Mashreqi (eastern council) which 
controlled the eastern part of the country. In the South, Mullah Naqibullah led the  Shura-
e Kandahar (Kandahar’s council) which also governed its neighboring provinces. Finally 
in the Southeast, Mawlawi Jalaluddin Haqani led Shura-e Paktia. (Paktia’s council).  
Except for Dostum and Mazari, who switched sides, the rest were loyal to the 
government in Kabul. On the other side, Hematyar the main opposition group to the 
government, controlled some of the eastern parts in the Logar and Paktia provinces. 
Many Arab terrorists were in territories controlled by Hekmatyar where they organized 
their military activities (COLL 2005: 292).   
 
Meanwhile, the Mujahidin parties all had many commanders who ruled in certain part of 
the country, depending on where each commander came from. The territories each 
commander ruled were not uniform in size, nor equal in the number of fighters and also 
on financial resources received. Especially the size of the territory each Mujahidin 
commander ruled varied from a small village to a sub-province or a province. Sometimes 
there were major commanders in a province who had many other commanders under 
their command in different parts of the same province. In other words there were 
networks of major commanders and commanders in the field, who were led by a 
particular leader of the parties in Peshawar or Iran. For example, Masoud was one of the 
major commanders of the Jamiat party led by Rabbani, who had his own organization 
Shura-e Nezar (SN) with many other commanders under his command. 
 
How to unite this high number of different armed militias was among the biggest 
challenges the Mujahidin government to cope with from the beginning. Even more 
challenging was that this high number of Mujahidin included more professional warriors 
than qualified personnel for the administration of institutions. These warriors represented 
the mostly rural population of Afghanistan, who used to receive little attention from the 
central government in terms of public service and, more importantly, education. They 
suffered most under the central governments during the last decades of war. For them 
state authorities used to be the biggest enemy. Therefore they turned against the injustice 
imposed by the PDPA government. 
 
In order to ease the tension among the different social groups Mujaddidi, the president of 
the Interim Government of Afghanistan (IGA), declared general amnesty to all members 
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of the former governments, hoping this would make the integration of heterogeneous 
political elites and groups easier in the country. However, the ISA first had to face its 
own major challenges within the new Mujahidin government. The traditional competition 
that existed among different parties, especially among the major parties based in 
Peshawar since the beginning of the resistance against the Soviet occupation, now 
manifested themselves in severe military confrontations over the control of the capital. 
These confrontations were carried out between the government forces, who controlled the 
capital, and the opposition, whose repeated attempts to maintain its control over Kabul 
failed. The government side consisted members of all parties while Hekamtyar led the 
opposition group.  
 
Nevertheless, the IGA laid the foundation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and 
especially Rabbani tried to broaden and solidify it by persuading Hekmatyar to join it 
(KAKAR 1997: 282). The ISA was internationally recognized, but it lacked economic 
resources as well as professional human resources to run an effective government. The 
PDPA regime, especially Najibullah’s government, lasted on the basis of a life system 
provided by Soviet support (SAIKAL 2006: 205). In contrast the Mujahidin government 
lacked such an international support and lacked control over the whole country and even 
had its problems in the capital. The US and Saudi Arabia, who tremendously funded the 
Mujahidin government to fight against the Russian troops, now drastically ended their 
financial support for the Mujahidin to build their Islamic state. The government needed 
human resources and economic resources to maintain its control over the country. With 
the end of the PDPA there were no more regular armed forces, security and police forces; 
no effective judiciary system. The government’s attempts to integrate the undisciplined 
militias into the small proportion of surviving armed forces officers, who received no 
salary for months, failed.  
 
Despite efforts were made to build a national army composed of different ethnic groups, 
but the meager financial resources and the ongoing conflict undermined these efforts 
(KAKAR 1997: 282). At the same time external intervention continued to destabilize the 
process of state-building by the Mujahidin in the country. Particularly Pakistan was the 
major supporter of Hekmatyar, who opposed the government in Kabul and declared a war 
against it. In other words the conflict was a result of Pakistan’s constant attack through 
‘its agent’ Hekmatyar aided by Arab radicals and Khalqis (RUBIN 2002: xviii). 
Hekmatyar wanted to get control over Kabul through military force. After his attempts 
failed he formed a coalition with Mazari, who had the control of the Southwestern part of 
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Kabul city. At this time Rabbani, who was to head the IGA for four months, replaced 
Mujaddidi, who had led the country for two months. As part of his efforts to broaden the 
government, Rabbani negotiated with Hekmatyar and persuaded him to end the conflict 
and join the government. Initially, Hekmatyar nominated one of his aides, Abdul Sabour 
Farid, who assumed the premiership in July 1992 for a short period but quit after the 
rivalry once again arose. Hekmatyar started a war against the IGA that represented all the 
Mujahidin parties including his own Hizb-e Islami party, if not the people of Afghanistan. 
From May through August, Hekmatyar periodically bombarded Kabul with rockets. According to 
the United Nations, by August over 1,800 civilians had been killed. Several thousands more, 
injured in the shelling, sought treatment in the hospitals where damage to the electrical grid and 
the water system had curtailed services. Food supplies in Kabul were becoming scarce, shops were 
closed, and over 500,000 people were fleeing the city in all directions. The United Nations and 
most diplomatic missions withdrew all non-Afghan personnel. By end of the year over 5,000 
people had been killed and perhaps a million had fled the devastated city (RUBIN 2002: 273). 
 
After Rabbani’s four-month term finished on October 28, the leadership of the Mujahidin 
Shura extended his mandate for forty-five days, because the ongoing fighting and 
destruction in Kabul had prevented Rabbani to summon the grand Shura (Ahl-e Alhal wa 
Aqhd) for the election of the president Finally, with some delay, the Shura78 was 
convened at the end of December with 1,335 men representing most areas of the country 
and most ethnic groups, but it was predominated by Jamiat the ruling party (RUBIN 
2002: 273). The Shura elected Rabbani as president for two years with 737 votes in favor 
and 380 abstentions while 60 others boycotted the election (KAKAR 1997: 284). Sayaf, 
the closest ally of Rabbani, said that this election was fair, based on Islamic justice and 
all parties had their representatives (ATAYEE 1999: 2004).  
 
Hekmatyar opposed Rabbani’s reelection and continued his bombardment of Kabul by 
rockets. At the same time Mazari also opposed the government and demanded the official 
recognition of the Shii school of Islam in Afghanistan (DAULATABADI 2002: 430) as 
well as 25 per cent power share in the government. Mazari led forces in the West of the 
capital were busy fighting with Sayaf. It is significant to see that other Shii parties e.g., 
Harakat led by Mohseni and Wahdat led by Anwari were under the umbrella of 
Rabbani’s government.  
 
Ostensibly there were national and international attempts to end the conflict and find a 
political solution for the conflict between Rabbani and Hekmatyar. Despite there being 
                                                 
78 This Shura called Ahl-e al-Hal wa al-Aqd (literally, those who loose and bind) was based on a common gathering of 
ullama (religious leaders) in Saudi Arabia.  
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many agreements of peace reached on different occasions between the government and 
the opposition group led by Hekmatyar, all attempts to end the war failed. Hekmatyar 
especially was at the heart of the problem: first he criticized the presence of Dostum in 
Kabul, later he disagreed with Rabbani over the presence of Parchamis in the 
government, and finally he accepted Rabbani’s government but rejected Masoud as the 
minister of defense. Even though he met the demands upone him as a result of 
agreements made in different Shuras that were held inside and out side the country, he 
continued his attacks on Kabul. 
 
On the other side analysts believe that ethnicity together with foreign intervention played 
an important role in these conflicts. The conflict is considered to have been a struggle of 
power dominated by four ethnically identified armed forces: the Uzbeks under Dostum 
supported by Uzbekistan, the Shii Hizb-e Wahdat (HWIA-M) supported by Iran, the 
Pashtuns under Hekmatyar supported by Islamic movements and intelligence officers in 
Pakistan and the Tajik under Masoud who alone lacked a powerful patron (RUBIN 2002: 
273). However, it is significant to see Shii is mentioned as an ethnic group in place of the 
Hazara. SCHETTER, in a model, also describes the crux of the conflict as the ethnic 
factor paired with foreign intervention (figure 14).   
 
 
Figure 14:  The parties involved in the conflict, their ethnic base and external sources of support 
Source: SCHETTER (2003: ) 
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The model tries to show the internal actors with regard to their ethnicity and the external 
support they receive. The model describes the relationship between internal and external 
actors in a stable and clear cut manner. Here again the Hazaras are represented by Mazari 
HWIA-M alone while it gives no information about the other Hazara and Shii parties 
HWIA-A and HIA-M. Furthermore, it does not mention when exactly such relationships 
between the internal and external existed. This is particularly important because some of 
the parties used to switch sides between the government and its opposition. The main 
figure missing in this model is Hekmatyar, who played a central role in the conflict and 
used ethnicity as an instrument for his political ambitions by arguing that “Pashtun 
interests must be defended” (DORRONSORO 2005: 256). Despite a long period of being 
in the opposition, he finally joined the government after he was left alone and his forces 
joined the Taliban. According to the model, however, the Taliban only represents the 
Pashtuns; the model does not give information about the existence of thousands of 
foreign fighters in the movement. 
 
Another important fact is that in many sources such as in the above, the existence of the 
government is ignored. The government led by Rabbani was recognized by the UN and 
international community it as a legitimate government, despite the fact that it had little 
control in the country. At the same time government forces are considered as Tajiks 
under Masoud, ignoring the participation and support of Islamic parties led by Sayaf, 
Khales, Gailani and Nabi together with regional Shuras (Shura-e Kandahar led by 
Mullah Naqib, Shura-e Mashreqi led by Haji Qhadir, and Shura-e Paktia led by Haqani) 
- all of them Pashtun – and other Hazara and Shii parties like Wahdat (HWIA-A) and 
Harakat (table 15). 
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Mujahidin 
Leader Abbr. Full name
Religious 
School Qawm
Rabbani Jamiyat Jamiat Islami-ye Afghanistan (JIA)                            (Islamic Society of Afghanistan) Sunni Tajik
Masoud Shura-e Nezar (Supervisory Council) (SN) Tajik
Sayaf Etehad Etehad Islami-ye Afghanistan  (EIA)                         (Islamic Union of Afghanistan) Sunni Pashtun
Mujaddidi Nejat Jabha-e-Nejat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (JNIA)      (National Front for Liberation of Afghanistan) Sunni ?
Gailani Mahaz Mahaz Islami-ye Afghanistan (MIA)                       (National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) Sunni ?
Nabi- Mohammadi Harakat-e Enqilab Harkat-e Enqelab-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HEIA)   (Islamic Revolution Movement of Afghanistan) Sunni Pashtun
Khales Hezb-e Khalis Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (I)   (HIA-K)              (Islamic Party of Afghanistan) Sunni Pashtun
Hekmatyar Hezb-e Hekmatyar Hezb-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (II)  (HIA-H)              (Islamic Party of Afghanistan) Sunni Pashtun
Dostum Junbesh Junbish-e Milli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan (JMIA)    (National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) Sunni Uzbek
Mazari Wahdat-e Mazari Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HWIA-M)      (Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan) Shia Hazara
Anwari Wahdat-e Anwari Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HWIA-A)      (Party of Islamic Unity of Afghanistan) Shia Hazara
Mohseni Harkat-e Mohseni Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (HIA-M)                (Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) Shia ?  
Table 15: Mujahidin parties according to their leadership, religious and Qawm structure                  
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
Nevertheless, the changing positions of the rival groups in this conflict prove little 
indication of ethnic conflict alone. More importantly, the Mujahidin parties did not 
represent a particular ethnic group. In fact there were fighters within each party from 
different ethnic groups. For example the regional Shuras in Kandahar, Nangarhar and 
Paktia all dominated by Pashtuns supported Rabani. Similarly Hekmatyar had many Tajik 
commanders (table 16).  
 
Government Party Oppositions Party Government Party Oppositions Party
Rabbani JIA Hekmatyar HIA-H Rabbani JIA Hekmatyar HIA-H
Masoud SN Masoud SN
Sayaf EIA Sayaf EIA
Mujaddidi JNIA Mujaddidi JNIA
Gailani MIA Gailani MIA
Maulavi Nabi HEIA Maulavi Nabi HEIA
Khales HIA-K Khales HIA-K
Dostum JMIA Dostum JMIA
Anwari HWIA-A Mazari HWIA-M Anwari HWIA-A Mazari HWIA-M
Mohseni HIA-M Mohseni HIA-M
April 1992 - December 1993 December 1993 - April 1994
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Table 16: Mujahidin parties: Government and its oppositions 1992 - 1994         
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
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Furthermore, the conflict had a rural-urban dimension, too.  The people who lived in 
urban areas suffered more under the power struggle of the Mujahidin groups than those 
who lived in rural areas, as the Mujahidin wanted to dominate the cities. In other words, 
if during the Soviet invasion the wars were mainly focused in the rural areas and where 
most of the rural people and the Mujahidin suffered, now the suffering has shifted its 
direction into the cities. The brutal military operations of the Soviet army together with 
PDPA government forces in the rural areas of Afghanistan (especially heavy air 
bombardments) had developed a kind of hatred among the Mujahidin groups against the 
cities and their dwellers. This hatred was intensified by the training they received in 
Pakistan and Iran in which destruction and burning of the cities was openly discussed.  
The phrase ‘Kabul must burn’ – mentioned by high-ranking Pakistani officers from the 
ISI (YOUSAF and ADKIN 2001: 142) was put in practice systematically, especially by 
the most radical groups like Hekmatyar. In addition to that the radical groups of the 
Mujahidin did not consider the dwellers of the cities to be true Muslims. They were 
thought to be in favor of communist regimes because they lived in Kabul during the 
Soviet invasion. In order to avoid conflict Mujaddidi declared general amnesty to all 
members of the former governments, while Hekmatyar continued to attack Kabul 
pretending the presence of communists and Dostum in the city. Though these attacks, and 
through the resulting counterattacks by the Mujahidin government, Kabul was badly 
destroyed and its residents severely suffered. 
 
To understand the reasons motivating Hekmatyar and later of the Taliban for opposing 
the ISA, it is necessary to evaluate the different factors of the conflict. In general two 
main factors for the cause and continuation of the war can be identified: an internal factor 
and an external one. 
 
4.3.2 Internal Factors of the Conflict 
The main actors in the conflict were the government led by Rabbani (a Tajik) on one side 
and its opposition HIA-H, led by Hekmatyar (a Pashtun) on the other. There were also 
three other groups: Mazari led the HWIA-M Shii party, Sayaf led the EIA and Dostum 
led the JMIA party. Sayaf, a Pashtun, and his party remained beside Rabbani from the 
beginning of the IG till 2001 and had a constant position. Mazari had an instable position 
and he switched sides in the war many times. First he was with Masoud, later he joined 
Hekmatyar, and then, finally, he joined again Rabbani’s government again when he lost 
his territories to the Taliban. Dostum, like Mazari, switched sides on many different 
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occasions. In the beginning he played a major role in the collapse of the Najibullah’s 
regime, later he took control of Kabul and removed Hekmatyar’s forces from the capital. 
Then, in 1994, he joined a coalition with Hekmatyar and Mazari and committed a coup 
against Rabbani’s government. Finally, after loosing his territories to the Taliban, he 
again joined Rabbani’s government. The leaders of remaining parties, Gailani, Khales 
and Mohammadi, were mostly loyal to the government, as were the other Shii parties e.g. 
Wahdat, led by Anwari and Harakat, led by Mohseni. They possessed political positions 
in the government and were less involved in the armed conflict in Kabul (Map 17-18).  
 
The most externally influenced actor was Hekmatyar who at the focal point of the 
conflicts had three objectives: First he wanted to make sure that Rabbani and Masoud 
were not allowed to consolidate power, build a considerable administration, or expand 
their territorial control so that the country would remain divided into small fiefdoms, run 
by various Mujahidin leaders or local commanders or a council of such elements, with 
only some of them allied to Kabul. His second objective was to ensure that Rabbani’s 
government acquired no capacity to dispense patronage, and to dissuade the Kabul 
population from giving more than limited support to the government. Thirdly, he aimed 
to make Kabul an unsafe city for representatives of international community, and to 
prevent the Rabbani government from attracting the international support needed to begin 
the post-war reconstruction of Afghanistan and generate a level of economic activity 
which would enhance its credibility and popularity. His tactics proved highly successful 
in all these respects (SAIKAL 2006: 33, AHMAD 2004: 34-35).  
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Map 17: The conflict in Kabul between governmental allies and opposition groups 
 
 
Map 18: The anti-government coup carried out by Shura-e Hamahangi (coordinated council) 
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4.3.3 External Factors of the Conflict: The ‘New Great Game’ 
Following the collapse of the PDPA regime in Afghanistan, the Mujahidin established the 
Islamic State of Afghanistan but this government lacked control over its territory and also 
had its problems in the capital. Since there was no army and police, outside the capital 
was dominated by Mujahidin commanders from different groups. These commanders 
blocked the communications system through the highways. They had checkpoints where 
they looted the civilians passing through. Although some of these commanders were from 
the ruling party or loyal to the government there was anarchy in the country. This 
situation helped many external actors to maintain their interests through supporting a 
particular fraction of specific political, religious, ethnic or linguistic groups, rather than 
strengthening the central government in the country. 
 
External actors played the major role in the conflict since they paid the huge cost of the 
war and without this the rival fractions, especially those opposing the government, could 
hardly continue the destructive wars. These actors consisted of Afghanistan’s powerful 
neighboring countries like, Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan together with the other actors 
in the world like the U.S., Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Russia, India and Turkey. 
This rivalry of foreign countries played out in Afghanistan was a result of their 
geopolitical interests in the region, that is referred to as ‘the New Great Game’ 
(DITTMANN 2004: 66) in the Central Asia. The potential behind this game was the 
emergence of oil-rich Central Asia paired with the independence of many states in this 
region. These states, all landlocked countries, needed an alternative transit route to the 
South that would make them more independent of the Russian territories. On the other 
side the Central Asian states used to be the center of Islamic culture and tradition prior to 
the Soviet occupation. These new Islamic states attracted the attention of the rest of the 
Islamic world, mainly Saudi Arabia, Golf States, Pakistan and Iran. 
 
Furthermore, the fall of the British rule on the Indian sub-continent was accompanied by 
the end of the British influence in Afghanistan. This situation shifted the balance of 
power to the USSR, which resulted in the involvement of the USSR in Afghanistan in 50s 
and 60s, and later their military invasion in 1979. Later, in 1989, after the withdrawal of 
the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the fall of the USSR provided a power vacuum 
which many countries in the region wanted to fill. In this period the communist regime in 
Afghanistan collapsed and the Mujahidin parties took over power. As the seven Sunni 
parties of the Mujahidin were based in Pakistan and the next eight Shii parties were based 
in Iran, these two countries in particular enjoyed enormous possibilities of intervention 
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and saw more opportunities in this competition than did others in the region. Especially 
Pakistan, following the withdrawal of the Soviets troops from Afghanistan, started to 
implement its own strategy in Afghanistan and made a long term plan for the post Soviet 
state-building process in Afghanistan. According to a secret document received and 
published by the communist regime in Kabul in 1989, Pakistan’s plan concludes that in 
the process of state-building and: 
establishing a new government in Afghanistan which can be recognized by many countries 
(especially the Muslim countries), we should provide the least chance for pro-Iranian 
elements”…….. Maintaining peace and starting reconstruction in Afghanistan would be a long 
and hard process. We have the necessary requirements not only to control this process but also in 
the future we can gradually merge our political and economical structures in a way which will 
result the unification of Pakistan and Afghanistan. This unification of course will result the 
confederation of Afghanistan and Pakistan. ….”79 
 
Meanwhile Saudi Arabia, the second major donor to the Sunni Mujahidin groups in the 
1980s, shared with Pakistan a common strategy of maintaining their own interests both in 
Afghanistan and in the region. The two countries were trying to prevent Iran and India 
from keeping their influence in Afghanistan and in the region. In addition to this they had 
tremendous economic and cultural interests and wanted to maintain their influence on the 
new Islamic states in Central Asia by introducing the fundamental ideologies (Wahabi 
and Deobandi)80 common in their own countries.  
 
In order to implement its strategic plans in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s policy continued to be 
governed by its longstanding relationship with Hekmatyar until 1994 (MAGNUS AND 
NABY2002: 180). This support was given to him to get the government control in Kabul 
(AHMED 2004: 35). This strategy was also backed by Saudi Arabia who from 1991-
1993 spent USD 2 billion on Afghanistan with Hekmatyar being the major beneficiary 
(AHADI 2002: 123). Pakistan’s secret service  
ISI had even deeper interest in Hekmatyar’s fate. By 1994, Pakistani intelligence relied on the 
Islamic training camps in Hekmatyar’s controlled Afghan territory to support its new covert jihad 
in Indian-held Kashmir. The political-religious networks around Hekmatyar trained and shipped 
foreign volunteers to Kashmir. Bhutto recalled that during this period, Pakistani intelligence 
officers repeatedly told her they could not fight the clandestine Kashmir war with Kashmiris 
alone; there just weren’t enough effective native guerrillas to bleed Indian troops. They needed 
Afghan and Arab volunteers, and they needed the sanctuary of guerrilla training camps in Afghan 
territory (COLL 2005: 292). 
 
Iran was also following its interests in Central Asia but this did not depend heavily on 
Afghanistan since it neighbored Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In fact, major Iranian 
                                                 
79 Abridged from MUJDA (2002:3-5) 
80 Religious ideology dominated in Pakistan and in Saudi Arabia. 
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efforts were concentrated on supporting the Shii parties and communities in Afghanistan. 
At the same time Iran wanted to prevent its rivals in the region (Saudi Arabia, the Gulf 
States and Pakistan) from turning Afghanistan into their own base. Such a policy could 
have led to a further isolation of Iran. In the mean time, Iran played a double role 
between the Afghan government and its opposition. During the whole conflict Iran 
supported Mazari against Rabbani’s government. At the same it maintained another 
channel open to other Shii parties on the side of the government. Later, when the Taliban 
killed Mazari and eleven Iranian diplomats, Iran shifted its major support to the Rabbani 
government who did not have the capital under its control anymore. 
 
Meanwhile, Pakistan regarded the opening of trade routes into Central Asia as a priority 
of its national interests. At the same time its efforts to establish a client government in 
Kabul were not successful. Hekmatyar’s inability to topple the government led by 
Rabbani made Pakistani authorities gather more support for him. The option was to 
broaden the base for anti-government opposition groups in Afghanistan. In particular 
Dostum, who was fighting alongside the government, attracted their attention. However, 
in turning Dostum against the government and bringing him to the side of Hekmatyar, 
Pakistan needed to talk to Uzbekistan, which like many other Central Asian states, 
regarded the Taliban as a threat to the stability of the region. Therefore Pakistan made 
efforts to coordinate its geopolitical ambitions with Uzbekistan. On 19 October 1996, 
Farooq Leghari, Pakistan’s President, visited Uzbekistan and assured Uzbek authorities 
that the Taliban have no ambition beyond Afghanistan’s border. They also discussed the 
energy resources in Central Asia and their transportation through Afghanistan to 
Pakistani ports (MARSDEN 2002: 138). The common interests between the two 
countries made them use their utmost influence to bring the two enemies Hekmatyar and 
Dostum together. The unity of the two was believed to play a key role in ousting Rabbani 
from power.  Thus, Islam Karimov used his influence with Dostum to shift his alliance to 
Hekmatyar (MAGNUS and NABY2002: 180).  
 
Finally, in January 1994, Hekmatyar, Dostum and Mazari formed a coalition known as 
Shura-e Hamahangi (coordinated council) that organized a coup against Rabbani’s 
government. The coup, like the other fighting, was concentrated in the capital, unleashing 
one of the deadliest rocket and artillery attacks on Kabul killing 25,000 people (SAIKAL 
2001:33. RASANAYAGAM 2003: 142) and injuring around 100,000. A large number of 
people was displaced and migrated inside and outside the country. At this stage Kabul 
city witnessed the most massive destruction since the British burnt and destroyed it in 
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1845.  
 
The HWIA-M party, led by Mazari, also joined this anti-government coup. They did this 
because Mazari had a common view with Hekmatyar. He opposed Rabbani’s government 
and his party carried out the deadliest compaigns against the government and its loyal 
forces in Kabul city. Meanwhile Dostum participation in the coup with his air power was 
seen as an undefeatable victory against Rabbani government. However, the coup and the 
three participating forces failed and were ousted from the capital, and the government 
remained in full control of Kabul. 
 
4.3.4 The Government Consolidates its Power in Kabul 
The total control of the city provided the chance for the government to start implementing 
services for the citizens in Kabul. However, to repair the large amount of destruction was 
beyond the capability of the government with minimum resources available. The city was 
without power and water, and its infrastructure was badly damaged especially in the areas 
where the frontline was located. Public offices, hospitals, clinics and schools were 
reopened and started their normal activities. The Ministry of Higher Education and Kabul 
University Kabul were severely damaged both were reconstructed and reactivated. 
Students, male and female, returned to their classes after a few years. At the same time 
Sayaf opened his own university, Ummahatul Mominin (mothers of believers), that was 
only for female students. Another change was that the government added Saqafat-e 
Islami (Islamic culture) as a new Islamic subject to the curriculum.  
 
The most important thing, however, was the provision of food, water, electricity, oil and 
other necessary materials for the desperately poor population. In the past Afghanistan 
used to be dependant on the Soviets and its economic requirements used to be supllied 
from the North, either from the USSR or from elsewhere via USSR territory. After the 
withdrawal of its troops, the Soviets announced that they would stop sending aid. 
However, financial transfers still continued to be made through the USSR up to the fall of 
the PDPA regime in 1992. With the fall of the USSR and the new political developments 
in the region, the trading of goods (mainly food and oil) was stopped or strongly 
decreased. With the rise of the Mujahidin to power and their strong political relations 
with Islamabad, Pakistan, with Karachi port, became an important neighbor for the land-
locked Afghanistan. Hereafter Pakistani products replaced all Russian products in in 
Afghan markets, which brought economic benefits to Pakistan.  
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The imported food and oil used to come from or through Pakistan and via highways in 
the East and in the South which were still under control of Hekmatyar. He used to keep it 
them closed to put pressure on the government. He increased his pressure further on the 
government by depriving the capital of electricity, as he had seized control of the Sorobi 
and Naghlo power stations in the East of Kabul province. 
 
4.3.5 Taliban: Pakistan’s “Creeping Invasion”81 
For the Pakistanis, the post-PDPA Afghanistan provided a unique opportunity to maintain 
their strategic goals. There were certain factors that paved the way for Pakistan in 
achieving its goals. Following the fall of the PDPA government, the seven major 
Mujahidin parties which enjoyed popular support from the West were all based in 
Pakistan. Even the Mujahidin Interim Government was established in Peshawar under the 
eyes of Pakistani authorities. The collapse of USSR further increased Afghanistan’s 
geopolitical importance for regional players, in particular for Pakistan. Pakistani 
authorities regarded the opening of trade routes into Central Asia as a priority of their 
national interests. Afghanistan became the key to Central Asia and only a pro-Pakistani 
government in Kabul could have helped Pakistan in maintaining its interests. Pakistan 
long border with Afghanistan and its close cultural ties to the tribal areas further 
facilitated achieving these goals. 
 
However, the independence of the Rabbani led government in Kabul from Pakistan 
created a major obstacle for Pakistani authorities. At the same time, their support for anti-
government opposition groups had failed many times. Therefore, the repeated failure of 
Hekmatyar to overthrow Rabbani’s government prompted Pakistan’s attempts to seek 
another alternative client who would be capable of bringing Afghanistan under control 
(MALEY 2002: 219) and provide safe trade routes for Pakistan to Central Asia. With 
these objectives in mind, Pakistan’s interior minister Naseerullah Babar, ethnically 
Pashtun, took the initiatives in form of a campaign that resulted in the creation of the 
Taliban, 82 a new pro-Pakistan movement planted in Afghanistan. Babar was not the only 
Pashtun within Pakistan’s government busy in the project of the Taliban. There were also 
other high-ranking Pashtuns like Colonel Imam, an ISI officer and Pakistan’s General 
                                                 
81 According to MALEY “Creeping invasion occurs when a middle power uses force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of another state, but covertly and through surrogates, denying all the while that it is doing any 
such thing; and this use of force is on a sufficient scale to imperil the exercise of the state power, by the state under 
threat, on a significant part of its territory, and is designed and intended to do so” (MALEY 2002: 221). 
82 The word Taliban in Farsi literary means religious student. It has an Arabic root and also used in Pashtu and Urdu 
languages. 
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Consul in Herat. He had extensive experience in cross-border liaisons and played an 
important role in the rise of the Taliban (DAVIS 2001: 45). In September 1994, ISI 
officers surveyed the highway from Herat to Chaman on the Pakistani border, and in 
October, Babar, together with six Western ambassadors, visited the Kandahar-Herat 
highway without even informing the government in Kabul (RASHID 2002: 27). Babar, 
who is considered to be the ‘godfather’ and ‘architect’ of the Taliban, recruited, trained 
and armed a number of students from madrasas (religious schools) in Pakistan to provide 
protection for a Pakistani convoy en route to Central Asia through Afghanistan (SAIKAL 
2006: 221).  
 
Therefore this covert policy of intervention in Afghanistan is regarded as “Pakistan’s 
creeping invasion” (MALEY 2002: 221 and SAIKAL 2006: 219). While Pakistan 
engineered the Taliban, it also enjoyed major support from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia 
who were interested in the region and particularly in Central Asia after the fall of the 
Soviet Union. In 1992 James Baker, the US Secretary of State who repeatedly visited 
Central Asian capitals, mentioned openly that Washington would do everything in its 
power to block Iranian influence in this region (RASANAYAGAM 2003: 169). The US 
was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as they were in line with Washington’s anti-Iran 
policy. The importance of the US policy in the region was focused on the success of any 
southern pipeline from Central Asia that would avoid Iran (RASHID 2002: 46) and pass 
through Afghanistan to Pakistan and Arabian Sea.  
 
Just like the period of Soviet invasion, Pakistan once again became the key player of the 
US, Saudis and its own interest in Afghanistan and via Afghanistan in the region. The ISI 
was the main organizer and supporter of the Taliban movement. According to Benazir 
Bhutto Pakistan’s prime minister “the request from ISI covert aid to their new clients 
grew gradually, it started with a little fuel, then became machinery, then it became 
money…I don’t know how much money they were ultimately given … I know it was a 
lot. It was just carte blanche” (COLL 2005: 292).  
 
The US wanted the Taliban to establish a government in Afghanistan, based on the Saudi 
Arabian model which could maintain interests of the West. 
The US government, well aware of the Taliban's reactionary programme, chose to support its rise 
to power by actively encouraging Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to back it. Senator Hank Brown, 
chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-committee on the Near East and South Asia, had this to 
say of the Taliban: 'The good part of what has happened is that one of the fractions at last seems 
capable of developing a new government in Afghanistan'. The USA expected the Taliban to be 
like the Saudis-a local elite propped up by American aid and influence-while Western corporate 
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powers would be allowed to develop their long coveted oil pipeline running from the oil-rich 
Central Asian Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean, permitting American freighters to access this 
newly tapped bonanza.'31 This analysis helps explain why the Bush administration gifted USD44 
million dollars to the Taliban-a government not formally recognised by the USA-in 2001, couched 
in the lingo of the so-called 'war on drugs  (HARTMAN 2002:484). 
 
In order to implement the plan of creating a Saudi-like ruling elite in Afghanistan, it was 
crucial for the Saudis to take part in this initiative. Therefore, the director of the Saudi 
intelligence, Prince Turki-al-Faisal and his chief of staff Ahmed Badeeb, accompanied 
the ISI in supporting the Taliban. Mullah Omar, the Taliban’s leader, was impressed by 
this massive support and said:  “Whatever the Saudi Arabia wants me to do, I will do” 
(COLL 2005: 295). Furthermore Mullah Rabbani, a senior member of the founding 
Taliban Shura and a close associate of Mullah Omar’s, confessed to the Saudi authorities 
that the Taliban considered King Fahd as their Imam, or spiritual leader (COLL 2005: 
296). Thus, the political ties turned to strong ideological ties according to which the 
Taliban were obliged to follow religious orders from the Saudis.  
 
4.3.6 The Multinational Composition of the Taliban 
The Taliban movement was recruited out of students from madrasas in Pakistan. They 
were ideologically under the influence of these madrasas. The Pakistani Jamiat ul-
Ulema-i-Islam JUI (society of Muslim theologians) ran the network of madrasas, 
including two major ones in Baluchistan and in Karachi which some of the Taliban 
leaders had attended (RASANAYAGAM 2003: 142). Ethnically the Taliban movement 
consisted mainly of Pashtuns from both side of the Durand border. Those from the 
Afghan side were mainly from Kandahar and its close surroundings. In terms of tribal 
affiliations, the Taliban were predominantly Ghilzai and their ruling elite, including their 
leader, was mostly Hotak, a sub-tribe. However, there were also large numbers of 
Pakistanis and many Arabs from different Arabic countries. There were also Uzbek, 
Chechens and other foreigners from the Central Asia and the Caucasus who joined the 
Taliban movement (figure 15). The madrasas were the only religious institutions that 
unified the heterogeneous Taliban belonging to many different nationalities under a 
common ideology.  
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Figure 15: Internal and external composition of the Taliban with their major supporters 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
The first military operation of the Taliban occurred on 12 October 2004 when their 200 
force assaulted the border district of Spin Boldak (DAVIS 2001: 45). This rather small 
group attacked the Afghan border post from Pakistani soil and captured it from militias 
loyal to the government in Kabul. Their initial success prompted their further advance 
toward Kandahar, the major city in southern Afghanistan, which they captured in 
November 1994. After capturing Kandahar, thousands of Pakistani volunteers from JUI 
madrasa, inspired by the new Islamic movement, joined the Taliban.  By December, 
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some 12,000 Afghans and Pakistanis had joined the Taliban in Kandahar. Soon they 
headed forward and occupied Kandahar. This immediate success of the Taliban was 
celebrated by the Pakistani government and JUI, while Babar, who had taken the 
initiative in establishing this movement, proudly admitted that the “Taliban are our boys” 
(RASHID 2002: 29) and that “they are actually a phoenix who have returned to be the 
real master of the Afghan chessboard” (DIXIT 1998: 104). The ISI also mobilized the 
former Khalqi members to assist the Taliban in filling their technical and professional 
gaps. 
 
4.3.7 Strategy of the Taliban  
After capturing Kandahar, the Taliban made it their central base, and organized their 
further expansion toward two different directions – to Herat and to Kabul, the capital. By 
February 1995, they advanced to Kabul’s doors in Maidan Shahr in the Southwest and 
captured Hekmatyar’s base in Char Asiab in the South of the city.  
 
There were many factors behind the rapid success of the Taliban in the southern part of 
the country. Beside the strong external supports from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the US 
they benefited from, a number of internal factors helped the Taliban to gain territory 
rapidly. The internal factors consisted of lack government control and insecurity 
especially in the southern part of the country. Different armed groups mostly belonging to 
anti-government opposition groups blocked the highways and looted passengers. This 
policy of blocking the highway was similar to that during the period of Soviet invasion, 
which aimed at weakening the government in Kabul by bringing it under severe 
economic pressure. Kabul, the capital, was very much dependent on the imports of 
necessary goods (food, oil, gas, burning wood and coals) through the South and from 
Pakistan. The blockade of highways created economic crisis and the growing insecurity 
endangered the life of the ordinary people. The Taliban profited most from this public 
anger. They repeatedly claimed that their aim was to bring security, remove all 
checkpoints from highways, and bring order and the rule of the Shariah to the country.  
 
Beside other factors, there was also another important fact that that helped the Taliban 
advance in the southern part of the country. The Taliban’s external supporters, mainly 
Pakistan, invited Sardar Abdulwali, the principle advisor and nephew of Zahir Shah the 
former king, to Pakistan and held discussion with frontier tribes and Afghan 
representatives. It is significant to see that Abdulwali tried to visit Pakistan during the 
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan but the Pakistani government never allowed him. This 
 217 
 
visit, during which Abdulwali was received with high official honors and much popular 
enthusiasm, revived speculations about the return of the monarch to an active role in 
establishing a national government of reconciliation in Afghanistan (MAGNUS and 
NABY2004: 184-186). In September, when Kabul was almost besieged from three 
directions, the King while in Italy, announced that he would soon return to Afghanistan 
(ELMI 2000: 75). These events supported the rumors in Afghanistan that the Taiban 
would bring Zahir Shah. These rumors helped the Taliban to advance rapidly in the 
South. Especially the majority of the Afghan Taliban were mainly from Kandahar where 
the Mahamadzais clan or Afghanistan’s former ruling family came from.  
 
As a result the Taliban faced little challenges from the warlords and former Mujahidin 
commanders in the southern part of the country, and they were soon integrated with the 
new movement. This was due to the fact that the Taliban proved to be an unchallenged 
force with enormous external support. Beside that many of the warlords joined the 
Taliban because they were opposed to the Rabbani government. On the other side most of 
these warlords shared both ethnic and tribal relationships with the Taliban. AWhen ethnic 
and tribal relations failed to gain support of the warlords, Taliban used bribing the 
warlords. For example in Jalalabad and the Eastern part of the country, the Taliban paid 
USD 10 million to Haji Abdul Qadeer, the head of the Shura-e Mashreqi (RASHID 
2002: 48), to surrender the eastern provinces. In fact these factors helped the Taliban to 
maintain their control almost in the entire southern part of the country. 
 
In March 1995, when the Taliban attempted to advance toward Shindand airbase, they 
were defeated by government forces and faced 3000 casualties. To enable the Taliban to 
advance toward Shindand and Heart, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia intensified their support 
of the Taliban and provided them more arms, ammunition and vehicles as well as with a 
new command structure which had been created with the help of ISI advisors.  
Meanwhile the ISI initiated a military cooperation agreement between the Taliban forces 
in the South and Dostum’s forces in the North. According to this agreement, Dostum 
professional staff was to repair the jet-fighters and helicopters which the Taliban had 
captured in Kandahar. This helped them to build an air force and strengthened their 
military capability. These military initiatives from one hand, and the joining of 25,000 
new volunteers from Pakistan on the other, helped the Taliban to capture Herat in 
September 1995 (RASHID 2002: 36-40). At the same time Dostum’s own planes took 
part in bombarding Herat. 
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Opposing the occupation of Herat, many people demonstrated in Kabul in front of 
Pakistan’s embassy in Kabul, in which a guard of the embassy opened fired at the people. 
As a result of the huge anger that followed, the people stormed the embassy, beat its staff 
and burnt down the building (ELMI 2000: 73). While the Taliban brought Rabbani’s 
government under pressure through their military successes, the government in Kabul 
gained political success by wooing other opposition leaders like Hekmatyar. At this point 
Hekmatyar, who had lost many of his men and his territory to the Taliban, joined the 
government - after many years of fighting against the same government - and held the 
premiership and announced his cabinet. Once in power, Hekmatyar called for the 
dismissal of all communists from government institutions, banned music broadcast on TV 
and radio, advised women to follow Hejab, and ordered the government staff to hold the 
midday prayers in their work places (MAGNUS and NABY2004: 186). These measures, 
which in particular restricted the freedom of the inhabitants of the capital, further 
damaged his reputation. Meanwhile the growing threat of the Taliban undermined the 
implementation of such policies. 
 
Nevertheless, Hekmatyar’s joining the government was a major political success for 
Rabbani especially when Pakistan’s attempts to persuade Hekmatyar to join the Taliban 
failed. Hence major efforts were carried out to bring legitimacy to the movement of the 
Taliban which would in turn undermine the legitimacy of the Rabbani government. In 
March 1996, Mullah Omar summoned 1,200 Pashtun mullahs and held a Shura (Ahl-e 
Alhal wa Aqhd) in Kandahar to legitimize the Taliban leader as the all-powerful leader of 
the country. Despite the Shura being held in extreme secrecy the external influence was 
apparent. Particularly Pakistani officials and ISI officers monitored the Shura. After more 
than two weeks of Shura, the core group of Kandaharis around mullah Omar finally 
nominated him to become the ‘Amir-ul Momineen’ (commander of the faithful). Mullah 
Omar, now in a leading position within the Taliban, wrapped himself in a cloak believed 
to have belonged to the Prophet Mohammad PBUH, which was taken out of its shrine for 
the first time after 60 years, appeared on the roof of a building in the center of the city in 
order to dignify his title and leadership. The meeting ended with the declaration of jihad 
against the Rabbani government. RASHID believes that this religious title was not used 
in Afghanistan since the reign of Amir Dost Mohammad Khan in 1934, when he assumed 
the title before he declared jihad against the Sikh occupation of Peshawar.83 But Dost 
Mohammad Khan was fighting against foreigners, while Mullah Omar had declared jihad 
                                                 
83 Dost Mohammad was the first but not the last to use this title. The word Amir as the short for of the title was used till 
1929 by other rulers in Afghanistan (cf. Chapter 2). 
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against his own people (RASHID 2002:42) while supported by thousands of foreigners. 
 
This Shura, in theory, was the same as that which the Rabbani’s government had held 
earlier. In practice, its membership was restricted the Taliban and their external 
supporters while other groups of Mujahidin and political elites in the country were left 
out. Nevertheless, the election of the Taliban leader was crucial to their future strategy, 
especially their rapid advance toward Kabul supported the already existing assumptions 
and doubts about the existence of Afghan leadership behind the movement. After the 
Shura, Taliban foreign supporters decided how to take possession of the capital and other 
major cities controlled by the government. In July 1996, the Saudi Intelligence Chief, 
Prince Turki al Faisal, visited Islamabad and Kandahar and discussed a new plan to take 
the control of Kabul, according to which both Riyadh and Islamabad stepped up supplies 
to the Taliban (RASHID 2002: 48). Two months later, as a result of these efforts, the 
Taliban captured Jalalabad, and they now intensified their pressure on Kabul province 
now from East, too. On September 27, they captured Kabul while the ISA gave up almost 
without a fight (RUBIN 2002: xviii) and based its new fronts in the Shamali plain, at 60 
km North of the city. The Taliban without any delay, headed to the North and took over 
the control of the Charikar and the Salang Pass while the government troops led by 
Masoud were forced to move back to Panjshir valley, their stronghold.  
 
In order to maintain their rule in the capital, the Taliban set up a six-man Shura, none of 
whom were from Kabul, or most of them had never visited the city (RASHID 2002: 51). 
The Shura consisted of mullahs and mawlawis, religious titles which used to be 
mentioned before their names, who imposed the strictest rule on the city in the form of 
decrees issued by Mullah Omar. According to these decrees education for female was 
banned, women were ordered to stay at home; men were forced to grow their beards, 
dress traditionally, and take part in prayer at mosque five times a day. Furthermore, 
music, TV, pictures, many kinds of sports and games were banned. Radio Kabul, which 
was the main source of Taliban propaganda, was renamed to Radio Shari’at. Once in 
Kabul the Taliban also executed Najibullah, the former communist president, and his 
brother who had been residing in the UN compound in Kabul. This event in particular 
attracted the world’s attention to the Taliban’s ruling system and was strongly 
condemned internationally. 
 
In order to regroup and reorganize themselves against the Taliban, members of the ousted 
government met with Dostum, Khalili and other anti-Taliban forces in Salang on 14 
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October 1996, where they discussed forming a resistance force against the Taliban 
occupation of the country (ELMI 2000: 76). Dostom who had repeatedly switched sides 
between the rival parties in Afghanistan, now allied himself with the government.  He did 
this after he noticed the policy of the Taliban with regards to the fate of other political 
elements in the country, especially after the killing of Najibullah. The anti-Taliban 
resistance forces called their military front as Jabha-e Muttahid-e Mili baraye Nejat-e 
Afghanistan (National United Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan or NUFSA).  The 
Pakistani media, in order to denigrate NUFSA, called the new coalition the Northern 
Alliance, a name which falsely gained popularity even in academic literature. However, 
there are still scholars like MALEY who use the term United Fronts (UF) which is the 
short form of the right name (MALEY 2002: 260).  
 
In the North of the country the feud between Dostum and his chief commander General 
Malik provided an opportunity for the Taliban from which they benefited most in their 
initial advance to the North. This together with using bribes and promising special 
positions in the future to General Malik, persuaded him to support the Taliban. In 19 May 
1997, Malik let the Taliban forces advance to the North and helped them to oust Dostum, 
who fled to Uzbekistan and then to Turkey. Following the Taliban’s success in entering 
Mazar, the major city in the North, Pakistan prematurely recognized the movement as the 
legitimate government of Afghanistan, a step that was followed by Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates (PAHLAWAN 1999: 199). As a result, Afghanistan at this stage 
had two governments; the ousted Rabbani government based in Takhar and the Taliban 
who controlled major parts of the country including the capital. However, the countries 
who recognized the Taliban government never increased beyond their three supporting 
countries that had supported them all along. In contrast, the UN and many countries in 
the region recognized the government led by Rabbani despite the fact that it had just 
some parts of the country under its control.   
 
The Taliban, once having the control Mazar in the North, enforced their strict law and 
tried to disarm all other forces in the area. This policy soon led to severe clashes between 
Malik, Mazari and other local forces on one side and the Taliban on the other. As a result, 
the Taliban saw their first major defeat since the time the movement was established. 
They suffered 3,000 casualties, killed and injured, while 3,600 others were taken as 
prisoners (RASHID 2002: 59). Further the Taliban lost their control of Parwan and 
Kapisa after Masoud’s forces pushed them back to 25km North of the capital (MAGNUS 
and NABY2002: 199). These sudden losses confronted the Taliban with major manpower 
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challenges in their efforts to gain control of the whole country through eliminating all 
opposing forces. Moreover, with these losses the popular belief that the Taliban would 
succeed to expand their control lost its credibility. To solve the problem Taliban leader 
Mullah Omar asked Pakistani religious leaders to send more students from Pakistani 
madrasas to join alongside their forces: 
Samiul Haq is in constant touch with Omar, helps him deal with international relations and offers 
advice on important Shariah decisions. He is also the principle organizer for recruiting Pakistani 
students to fight for the Taliban. After the Taliban defeat in Mazar in 1997 he received a phone 
call from Omar asking him for help. Haq shut down all his madrasas and sent his entire student 
body to fight alongside the Taliban. And after the battle for Mazar in 1988, Haq organized a 
meeting between the Taliban leader and 12 madrasas in the NWFP to organize reinforcements for 
the Taliban army. All the madrasas agreed to shut down for one month and send 8,000 students to 
Afghanistan. The help the Taliban received from Pakistan’s Deobandi madrasas is an important 
level of support they can rely upon, quite apart from the government and the intelligence agencies 
(RASHID 2002: 91-92). 
 
Beside the manpower support Saudi intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal visited 
Kandahar and provided the Taliban with 400 pick-up trucks and financial help. At the 
same time the ISI prepared a budget of 2 billion Pakistani rupees (USD5 million) for 
logistical support of the Taliban (RASHID 2002: 72). This help increased the military 
capability of the Taliban forces as a result of which, in July 12th 1998, they launched their 
offensives for the control of Mazar again. On the other side Dostum managed to return 
from exile and take control of some provinces in the North of the country, and now 
forced Malik to exile in Iran. However, Mazar the major city and his stronghold, was 
under the control the Shii force of HWIA-M. 
 
During July and August 1998, the Taliban succeeded in taking control of the northern 
provinces from Maimana to Shiberghan. This happened after several of Dostum’s 
commanders accepted Taliban bribes and switched sides. As a result of a wave of 
desertion in his militias, Dostum fled to Uzbekistan and then to Turkey while the 1,500 
Wahdat forces (HWIA-M) were surrounded and killed by the Taliban. During this second 
occupation of Mazar, the Taliban took revenge for their previous losses. As a result they 
carried out a ‘brutal massacre’ which was ordered by their leader: 
Mullah Omar had given them permission to kill for two hours, but they had killed for two days. 
The Taliban went on a killing frenzy, driving their pick-ups up and down the narrow streets of 
Mazar shooting to the left and right and killing anything that moved – shop owners, cart-pullers, 
women and children shoppers and even goats and donkeys. Contrary to all injunctions of Islam, 
which demands immediate burial, bodies were left to rot on the streets. No one was allowed to 
bury the corpses for the first six days (RASHID 2002: 73). 
 
After this massacre, the Taliban targeted systematic ethnic cleansing in the North. The 
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Shii Hazaras were the primarily target of this brutal policy. The Taliban’s “mullahs were 
proclaiming from the city’s mosques that the city’s Shiis had three choices: convert to 
Sunni Islam, leave for Shii Iran or die…. The Hazaras are not Muslims and now we have 
to kill Hazaras. You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan (RASHID 2002: 
74).” 
 
In September 1998, after strengthening their position in the North, the Taliban launched 
their offensives on Bamiyan the stronghold of Hazaras in central Afghanistan, from three 
directions and finally brought it under their control (ELMI 2000:81). In another anti-Shii 
and anti-Iran attempt, the Taliban, together with Sepah-e Sahaba84 entered the Iranian 
consulate in the city of Mazar-e Sharif and killed 11 Iranian diplomats. This event, the 
fall of Bamiyan and the anti-Shii policy of the Taliban increased the tensions between the 
Taliban and Islamic Republic of Iran and caused thousands of Iranian regular troops to 
hold military exercises on the border to Afghanistan. There was a certain fear in the 
region of opening another front and rising exting the conflict beyond the borders of 
Afghanistan. The tension subsided when the UN intervened by sending Lakhdar 
Ibrahimi, its representative, to Kandahar. Ibrahimi met Mullah Omar, who agreed to 
return the dead bodies of the Iranian diplomats and release 45 Iranian truck drivers they 
had arrested earlier. Meanwhile the Taliban’s aim was to terrorize the population so that 
they would not rise against them, which cost the lives of a large number of population in 
the North. During their attempts to gain the control of the North the Taliban had killed 
between 5,000 to 6,000 of the Shii population in Mazar, and 6,000 to 8,000 Uzbeks and 
Tajiks in Maimana and Shiberghan (RASHID 2002: 74-76).  
 
By 2000 the Taliban expansion reached its peak, and with Pakistan’s full support they 
brought over eighty percent of the country under their control. At the same the ousted 
Rabbani government – still recognized as the legitimate government of the ISA by the 
UN   and some other countries (ELMI 2002: 84) - had controlled an area that stretched 
from Badakhshan in the Northeastern part of the country to some 30 km North of the 
capital. The Shii forces also managed to resist against the Taliban control of the central 
part of the country. In April 1999, Wahdat’s troops recaptured Bamiyan and much of 
Hazarajat and proved that the Taliban’s rule in these areas was extremely fragile.  
 
Moreover, the Taliban and their supporters tried to expand their military activities beyond 
                                                 
84 A Pakistani militant group mainly active in northern areas of Pakistan usually commits anti-Shii killings in major 
cities of Pakistan. This group like many other extremist groups joined the Taliban militias in Afghanistan. 
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Afghanistan. The victory of the Taliban prompted the activities of foreign Islamic 
militants among them Osama bin Laden the leader of Al-Qaeda, an Arab militant group. 
After the occupation of Kabul in 1996 the ISI introduced Bin Laden to the Taliban and 
managed to establish military training camps for him in Khost. Since then more than 
10,000 Pakistani militants have received training in the Al-Qaeda camps (HUSSAIN 
2007: 72). Some of these training camps in Afghanistan were in Nangarhar, Khost and in 
the South and East of the capital, e.g., Rishkhor and Sorobi. Following the rapid taking 
over of control of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, Bin Laden declared jihad 
against the United States and the Saudi Royal Family. On August 20, 1998, the US hit 
Bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan with dozens of cruise missiles, after Bin 
Laden’s group had attacked the American embassies in Nairobi and Darussalam. Bin 
Laden, in Afghanistan, was a strong supporter for Taliban movement. In 1997 and 1998 
hundreds of his Arab fighters were fighting alongside the Taliban and helped them to 
massacre the Shiis in the North. At the same time several hundreds of them were based in 
Rishkhor army garrison in the South of Kabul city and fought against the Rabbani 
government (RASHID 2002: 75,139). The close relationship of Bin Laden with the 
Taliban was further strengthened when Bin Laden married Mullah Omar’s daughter 
(MALEY 2002: 225).  
 
4.3.8 The US Invasion: ‘The War on Terror’ 
While the Taliban’s anti-Iran policy and the economic opportunities in Central Asia 
attracted the US support for the Taliban, the emergence of Bin Laden and his anti-
American activities distanced the US from the Taliban. This is to say that Bin Laden’s 
activities marked the start of an end to the rule of the Taliban in Afghanistan. All the 
attempts to gain support for recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan, 
especially those by the Pakistani government, failed. In 2000, the Taliban banned the 
cultivation of opium, which was another failed attempt to get international recognition. 
Instead, the US continued its pressure on Pakistan and the Saudis to use their influence on 
the Taliban regime to extradite Bin Laden from Afghanistan. But this pressure had little 
impact since it put Pakistan in a difficult position to decide about the extradition of Bin 
Laden. This was due to the fact that Bin Laden provided manpower for the Kashmir 
conflict and trained fighters in his training camp in Khost. More importantly, Bin Laden 
had now turned into a known figure among the large Islamic groups in Pakistan and any 
attempt to extradite him made by the Pakistani government would have destabilized 
Pakistan. The same was true for the Taliban, any probable extradition of Bin Laden 
(regardless of the family relationship between the Taliban leader and Bin Laden) would 
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have damaged the basis on which the movement was established. The Taliban also 
rejected the Saudis demand for the extradition of Bin Laden. In response, the Saudis 
suspended their diplomatic relationship with the Taliban authorities, but did not withdraw 
recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan (RASHID 2002: 138-139).   
 
Their activities as international terrorists and their pressure on the population in 
Afghanistan, particularly human rights abuse and sexual abuse, brought the Taliban under 
international pressure. In 1998, Kofi Annan said that “In a country of 20 million people, 
50,000 armed men are holding the whole population hostage (RASHID 2002: 78).” In 
October 1999, the UN implemented sanctions against the Taliban. The subsequent 
sanction of December 2000 further attracted the solidarity of 40 radical organizations in 
Pakistan convened by Sami-ul Haq (MARSDEN 2002: 131-132). At the same time the 
continuation of sanctions by the international community frustrated Pakistani authorities. 
Genral Parviz Musharaf Pakistan’s military ruler, argued that Bin Laden “can be sent to 
any third country” while defending the Taliban (HUSSAIN 2007: 40).  
 
At this time the Taliban’s advance was stopped and they failed to achieve their last goal, 
which was to eliminate all opposition forces in the country. There was a frontline 
between the Taliban and the NUFSA which began in Takhar in the North and continued 
to the North of Kabul and ended in the North of Nangarhar province. Moreover, there 
were Shii Islamic groups in central Afghanistan that resisted that Taliban rule. These 
groups were led by Haji Mohammad Mohaqiq and Karim Khalili, the two leaders of 
Wahdat Party. At the same time they failed to maintain security in the areas under their 
control. More importantly, corruption in the administration, particularly in the capital 
undermined their effective control of the situation. The defective judiciary system in the 
capital became one of the most corrupt parts of the Taliban administration, followed by 
security. The latter turned corrupt especially when the Taliban faced heavy losses in the 
conflict and they recruited people who were undisciplined and careless to follow their 
commands.  
 
Some believe that this pressure had significant effects in further radicalizing the Taliban 
(MARSDEN 2002:148 and MALEY 2002: 256) and their supporting foreign militants 
who continued terrorist activities in Afghanistan. In December 1999 Harakat-ul-
Mujahidin an Islamic militant group from Pakistan hijacked an Indian Airline flight en 
rout from Nepal to Delhi with more than 155 passengers on board to Kandahar. The 
hostages were released after the Indian government under pressures by the terrorists, 
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freed the militant’s leading figures from its prison in India. Both the Taliban and the ISI 
backed the hijacking and especially the later organized the instructions for the hijackers 
(HUSSAIN 2007: 63). On the other side the Uzbek government also broke off its 
relations with the Taliban movement and became more amenable to discussion with 
Rabbani’s government after the Taliban gave shelter to the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan (IMU) in Kunduz (MAGNUS and NABY2002: 204). In February 2001, the 
Taliban destroyed the giant Buddhas in Bamyan followed by systematic destruction of all 
historical monuments and figures in the country, including the remaining statues in Kabul 
museum, which were that was considered un-Islamic according to the Taliban.  
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4.3.9 The Fall of the Taliban 
On 9 September 2001 while carrying Belgian passports, two Arab suicide bombers 
masquerading as journalists assassinated Ahmad Shah Massoud during an interview in 
Khwaja Bahauddin in Takhar province (MALEY 2002: 251). Two days later, on 
September 11, the US faced the deadliest terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 
when three airplanes hijacked by terrorist groups hit the World Trade Center in New 
York and the Pentagon Building of the US Department of Defense, while the third plane 
crashed in Pennsylvania. The US, blaming Bin Laden, soon declared its policy of “either 
with us or against us” to those countries who were not members of the NATO and allies 
of the US. Pakistan became the focal point and was the door to the Taliban and Bin 
Laden. Therefore, the US authorities met General Mahmood (the second-most-powerful 
man in the Pakistani military junta after Musharaf), who was in Washington during these 
attacks- and handed him a “nonnegotiable list of demands,” which forced Pakistan to 
openly declare its full support for an American invasion of Afghanistan (HUSSAIN 
2007: 36). The most difficult part of the demands for the Pakistani authorities was to end 
their support for the Taliban and break their relations with them, something that would 
finally lead to the end of Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan (figure 16). 
 
On 13 September, Wendy Chamberlain, the newly appointed US ambassador to Islamabad, met with Musharaf
and conveyed a formal message from President Bush with the same list of demands which had earlier been 
handed over to General Mehmood in Washington. It read:
1. Stop al-Qaeda operations on the Pakistani border, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan and all 
logistical support for bin Laden.
2 Blanket over-flight and landing rights for US planes.
3 Access to Pakistan’s naval bases, airbases and borders.
4 Immediate intelligence and immigration information.
5 Curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism against the United States, its friends and allies.
6 Cut off fuel supply to the Taliban and stop Pakistani volunteers going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
7 Pakistan to break diplomatic relations with the Taliban and assist the US in destroying bin Laden and his 
al-Qaeda network.
 
Figure 16:  The US list of demands from Pakistan for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2001 
Source: HUSSAIN (2007: 36) 
 
According to the US list of demands, Pakistan provided its full support for the US 
invasion of Afghanistan. This invasion was called “Operation Enduring Freedom” and 
began with a US air assault that targeted the Taliban strongholds and frontlines. At the 
same time, on the ground, the UF intensified its operations against the Taliban on many 
different fronts in the country. As a result the Taliban, who lacked public support, soon 
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lost control of all the provinces in Afghanistan including Kandahar, their stronghold. 
Thousands of them fled to Pakistan while many of them were arrested. Of those arrested 
some were taken to the US prison in Guantanamo, Cuba, others were imprisoned in 
Afghanistan and hundreds were killed on the battlefields.  
 
4.3.10 A New Era in the State-Building Process 
By November 17, Rabbani, still recognized by the UN as the President of Afghanistan, 
returned to Kabul, held the office, and his ministers the cabinet. Rabbani declared his 
determination to form a “broad-based government” under the UN guidance 
(O’BALANCE 2002: 253). At the same time international attempts, especially by the 
UN, were on the way to nurture agreement between different groups that aspired to 
exercise power after the Taliban. The most important part, however, was to build a 
consensus between Afghanistan’s six neighbors plus Russia and the US, or 6+2. As a 
result of the UN attempts, these six countries agreed to the “establishment of a broad-
based, multi-ethnic, politically balanced and freely chosen Afghan administration 
representative of their aspirations and at peace with its neighbors” (MALEY 2002: 269). 
However, to support the implementation these political processes of state-building, 
Afghanistan desperately needed enormous international financial support and long term 
commitments. To achieve this goal the international community created a Steering Group 
(SG) of donor governments – co-chaired by the United States, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and 
the European Union – to enhance the international political support for the reconstruction 
process and provide strategic guidance. According to the SG’s request the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank (AsDB), and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) had produced a preliminary needs assessment for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. 
Later this assessment was presented at the International Conference on Reconstruction 
Assistance to Afghanistan in Tokyo in January 2002. The conference generated pledges 
of assistance for Afghanistan’s reconstruction totalling USD 4.5 billion, with USD1.8 
billion in pledges for the first year. 
 
As part of the international effort the German Government organized a meeting, held 
from 27 November – 5 December 2001 at Petersberg near Bonn, between key 
representatives of different political groups of Afghanistan. The representatives included 
delegates from the Rabbani government, who was still formally the president of the ISA, 
Zahir Shah the former King, and Dostum. Other political parties and fractions – those 
inside the country or in exile –like Khalili, Haji Qhadir, the Peshawar Group led by 
Gailani and small Group from Cyprus associated with Humyoun Jarir (Hekmatyar’s son 
 228 
 
in law) participated in this conference with the presence of many international observers 
(MALEY 2002: 269). 
 
On December 5th the meeting reached its final result, the “Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government 
Institutions,” which was endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolutions 1383, 1886. 
The agreement was a roadmap for the re-establishment of rudimentary state structures 
and provided an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) headed by a chairman accompanied 
with members. Hamed Karzai85 became the Chairman of the AIA for six months. At the 
same time known figures of the former Mujahidin government became the key members 
of the AIA. In June 2002, the AIA convened an Emergency Loya Jirga with 1,500 
delegates from around the country as well as Afghan delegates from abroad. The 
Emergency Loya Jirga approved an Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) replacing the 
AIA which was to be chaired by Karzai for a two year period. The main tasks of the ATA 
were to establish a new constitution and hold free presidential election.  
 
On 14th December 2003, a second Loya Jirga (Constitutional Loya Jirga) was convened. 
The Loya Jirga adopted a new constitution and paved the way for a presidential election. 
The new constitution, signed into law in January 2004, defines the state as the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (IRA), and provides for an elected president (along with his/her 
nominated two vice presidents), as well as a national assembly (Shura-e Milli) consisting 
of two houses – the Wolesi Jirga (the House of People) and Mashrano Jirga (the House 
of Elders). According to the new constitution members of Wolesi Jirga are elected by the 
people in free and fair elections, for a five years period. At the same time Provincial 
Councils (Shura haye Welayati) and District Councils (Shura haye Woleswali) each elect 
one-third of members of the Meshrano Jirga while the president appoints the remaining 
third. 
 
Meanwhile the presidential election held in October 2004 was a challenging task. In order 
to overcome this challenge the United Nations worked closely with the Afghan 
authorities in the management process of the election and provided the necessary tools 
for the registering of voters and the analysis of the votes. Eight million people 
participated in this election including 3.2 million women (UNDP 2005: 7). Despite 
                                                 
85 Karzai, a Pashtun tribal leader, who was the Vice Minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Mujahidin 
Interim Government, had later supported the Taliban hoping to get the foreign ministry. After the Taliban rejected his 
demand he joined the Pashtun groups who opposed the Taliban. See also  (COLL 2004: xvi, 287, 299).  
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security threats from the Taliban the election process was peaceful, with a turnout of 
about 70%. There were 18 eligible candidates from different political and ethnic groups, 
including a woman. However, four candidates succeeded in winning 93,4 per cent of 
votes. The remaining 14 candidates won the 6.6% of the votes, ranging from 1.4% to 
0.1%. The four successful candidates were Hamid Karzai with 55,4%, M. Yonus 
Qhanooni with 16,3%, Haji M. Mohaqiq with 11,7% and Abdurrashid Dostum with 
10,0% respectively (IEC 2009). It is interesting to see that all the four candidates belong 
to the four major ethnic groups in Afghanistan: they are Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and 
Uzbek, respectively. Apparently among these four, only Karzai was backed by the US 
and had nominated himself as an independent candidate. Although Qhanooni, Mohaqiq 
and Dostum were also nominated as independent members of their own parties, they had 
formerly been part of the coalition resistance forces known as United Front who fought 
against the Taliban invasion.  
 
This election was the first democratic presidential election in the history of Afghanistan 
and a positive step in the state-building process backed by the international community.  
However, media reported of fraud and irregularities in the process. In some cases the 
voters are said to have voted many times in different poll centers. This was due to the fact 
that an ink used to stain voters’ fingers, in order to prevent them from casting their ballot 
twice, could be washed away.  
 
The final stage in the political process according the agreement reached at the Petersberg, 
was the highly contested Parliamentary and Provincial Council election concluded in 
November 2005. This important step in the transition process was designed to put in 
place a representative government. At the same time, in practice, these highly contested 
elections provided a chance for heterogeneous political groups and social groups to 
compete with each other in gaining more votes instead of using force to get political 
power, as they used to do in the past. Among the candidates there were members of 
various political groups, including the Communists, Mujahidin, Taliban and the Afghans 
returned from exile, especially from the West. Meanwhile there were independent 
candidates who had no relation with any of these political groups (KOHISTANI 2006: 
15-17).  
 
The Bonn Agreement, which mandated the political and democratic infrastructure in 
Afghanistan in December 2001, is now in place. The Interim Authority became an 
elected central government with a progressive constitution. The people elected the 249 
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representatives of the Wolesi Jirga (the lower house of National Assembly) and 34 
Provincial Councils (Shura haye Welayati) on 18 September, 2005. Subsequently, 
internal elections and nominations by President Karzai selected the 102 senators of the 
Upper House (Meshrano Jirga). Finally, on 19 December 2005, the inauguration of the 
National Assembly (Shura-e Millli) took place. The significant thing about the Shura-e 
Milli is that 26 percent of its members are women (VARUGHESE 2006: 7). This is a 
remarkable achievement for women in a traditional country like Afghanistan. 
Interestingly, this is a unique situation in the region, too. For example the representation 
of women in India, the largest democracy in the world, has hardly crossed 10 percent in 
fifty years (KUMAR 2007: 44).  
 
In fact the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, providing for the “reestablishment of 
permanent governmental institutions” in Afghanistan, was fully completed by the 
adoption of a constitution, holding of the presidential and parliamentary election and 
finally the formation of the National Assembly in December 2005 (RUBIN 2006:1) 
(figure 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17:  The Bonn process   
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) modified after JOHNSON (2006:3) 
 
These objectives were achieved only through financial commitment from the 
international community. From December 2001 to the end of 2004 USD8,4 billion were 
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spent in Afghanistan, USD6.8 by the NGOs, UN and donor countries and the remaining 
by the government of Afghanistan (Jalali 2007: 38). Since the government was in a 
transition period and its institutions were not considered effective enough, especially in 
terms of weak capacity to manage the aid programs and control the political process, 
most of the money was spent through the international organizations.  
 
Beside aid the international community has maintained the security in the country. The 
US forces fights Al Qaeda and the remnants of the Taliban. The NATO and the 
International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) are in charge of the security sector in the 
county since early 2002. Meanwhile the Germans and the Americans each train the ANP 
and the ANA respectively. The Italians supports the government in the justice sector. The 
British work on the eradication of opium in the country. Besides these major countries 
there are thousands of NGOs busy in the reconstruction process of Afghanistan with the 
UN.  
 
Despite these major achievements in political aspects there is still a long way for the 
government to go in order to overcome the increasing challenges, especially in security 
sector and public service. The constitution is established and the national institutions are 
built. But the enforcement of the rule of law is flawed. The ANP and the ANA are 
incapable of bringing security and enforcing of the law while the justice sector needs both 
reform and professional trained staff. So far the government, together with its 
international partners has taken some initial steps toward improving the performance of 
these key state institutions. However, it seems unlikely to overcome the challenges in the 
near future. Although government institutions have been developed, they have no real 
influence and power in many of Afghanistan’s districts. Especially the security situation 
has deteriorated in the last two years. Taliban insurgencies are increasing. In the last two 
years they brought many districts under their control sever times.  
 
The situation of public service has not changed despite billions in aid given to 
Afghanistan. Corruption is booming and the police and justice are among the most 
corrupt institutions of the state. The government pays very low salaries to its staff, so low 
that is insufficient for the rising prices of living in the country.  The Taliban benefit from 
this situation. According to survey carried out by SENLIS in 2007, the main motivation 
for those joining the insurgents is that they either do not find jobs or if they have a job 
they are not paid enough. Furthermore, the Taliban normally pays a fighter USD 200 and 
USD 600 a month, while a policeman or a soldier in the Afghan National Army currently 
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earns between USD 50 and USD 60 monthly – after a pay raise of 25 percent in January 
2007 (SENLIS 2007: 38). 
 
The deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan became a point of consensus among 
international actors because it united the characteristics of a ‘failed state’ (RUBIN 2006: 
178-179). The media mention Afghanistan as a ‘Narco-State’ due to the increased opium 
production in the last few years.86 At the same time the current regime of Afghanistan is 
usually described as “Puppet State”, “Semi-Colonial State”, “Fragile State”, “Crisis 
State” and “Failed State” in the studies carried out by international organizations. 
However, it is agreed that the term “Failed State” fits more the situation in Afghanistan 
best (SENLIS 2007: 33-34).  
 
In fact the enormous level of destruction and paucity of national capacity required a much 
wider state-building investment than the restrained rehabilitation opted for by the 
international community. Securing Afghanistan’s future requires a long-term 
commitment by the international community, with a clear vision of making Afghanistan a 
self-supporting nation (JALALI 2007: 23). In the current situation the institutions are 
weak and incapable of providing basic services. There are many challenges that 
undermine the ability of institutions to function effectively, efficiently, transparently and 
with accountability, each of which needs to be focused on separately.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 CNN Special Report, September 30th 2007 at 21:30 
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5 The Role of Diversities in State-Building Processes 
From the beginning to the current situation, wars have mostly provided the reasons, 
motivations, materials and necessary instruments for state-building in Afghanistan.  The 
so called Great Game, the Cold War, the New Great Game and the War on Terror all 
constituted benchmarks for state-building projects. Generally there have been two factors 
that contributed the break out of wars at different periods: internal and external factors 
(figure 1). 
 
The external factors that contributed to war usually stem from the geopolitical position of 
Afghanistan. Its location more than anything else, has provided reason for interferences 
(military or political) of major world powers and neighbouring countriesin the region (cf. 
Chapter 2.1). Futhermore, the ethno-linguistic and socio-religious diversity of the 
population have provided instruments for such interferences. Within the diverse 
population the dominant tribal, religious and intellectual elites have seldom been at peace 
with each other because they had different ruling systems to maintain their own political 
interests in the country. They rarely shared the power or worked together. Almost each 
group ruled for a certain period of time but was challenged or overthrown by its 
opposition. This is to say neither the tribal nor the religious or the intellectual elites could 
secure and sustain their rule alone. In order oust the rival each searched help form 
outside. Therefore internal rivalry backed by external rival powers undermined the 
sustainability and legitimacy of the political system in the country.  
 
These two factors have continued through the course of history in parallel. The current 
situation demonstrates this very well. On the one side there are the newly built weak state 
institutions that exist only due to the extensive support (manpower, financial and material 
resources) of major outside powers. On the other side there are opposition groups who 
fight against the process of state-building while receiving extensive covert support 
(financial and material resources as well as manpower,) mainly through external 
channels. Therefore, TILLY’s statement that “war drives state formation and 
transformation,” or that “war made the states and vice a versa” (TILLY 1992: 20, 67) fits 
the situation of Afghanistan.  
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Figure 18 : The two main sources of instability: Internal and external rivalry from 1700-2001             
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
It is significant to see that building a state and its institutions has rarely been a national 
initiative, it has rather been imposed from the outside through certain elites influenced by 
different ideologies. Establishing a legitimate authority and the monopoly on the use of 
force has usually been undermined due to the internal and external rivalries. Although 
this situation continuedup to the beginning of 21st century, the post Taliban state-building 
process opened a new era for the country. In contrast to the past the importance of this era 
is that the state-building process has gained legitimacy and received massive international 
support from the UN, EU and the US. At the same time Afghanistan’s neighbouring 
countries declared their support for the state-building processes from the beginning of the 
so called ‘War on Terror’. They have demonstrated their support by taking part in the 
reconstruction of the country. Thus, unlike in the past when there were major rivalries 
between major powers (Russia and British or East and West), at least the region is not 
highly divided between major powers or blocks in the current situation. Though there is a 
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certain level of geopolitical interests by different countries in the region, however for the 
time being ‘the war on terror’ and the problems of extremism and opium now dominate 
local interests. This means that countries in the region need to have close cooperations 
which is demanded by international community. 
 
On the other side it is also important to see the internal combination of rival groups. In 
contrast to the past in the post Taliban state-building process all three rival oppositions 
joined the political process step by step in the AIA, ATA and finally the elected 
government and parliament. This participation of rival opposition groups became 
possible only though the help (and pressure) of the international community (UN, EU and 
the US). The co-existence of different rival elites of tribal, religious and intellectual 
groups in the process of state-building for the first time is a significant achievement, but 
the current presidential system has failed to minimize the tension and bridge the gap of 
trust among the rival groups. Instead it widens the gaps created by the last decades of 
wars and conflicts in the country. After eight years the current political structure fell short 
of transforming this traditional rivalry into a sound political competition between 
different parties. Instead tribalism, ethno-centrism and Qawm factors continue to 
determine the politics among the ruling elites while the entire population remains the 
victim of the policies being made. 
 
The external players involved in the process of state-building in Afghanistan also lack a 
unified strategy. Despite sharing common goals (e.g., the ‘War on Terror’, state-building, 
and eliminating opium production), the international community (UN, EU and the US) 
has failed to coordinate their efforts in achieving these goals. One of the main problems 
which still dominates the debate between the members of NATO in particular is the 
unequal share of responsibility in the so called ‘War on Terror’. The responsibilities 
include the number of troops each country deploys and the financial amount of money 
each country pays. The US provides the highest number of troops and pays the largest 
amount of money in Afghanistan. The US forces also carry out major combat operations 
and have so far suffered the highest number of losses. This factor, more than anything 
else, has negatively affected the cooperation between the US and EU members. Better 
described they are ‘disunited nations’ since they ‘disagree on the nature of the problem’ 
(KORSKI 2008: 9). More recently Barack Obama, the US President, has criticized the 
members of NATO and said that “It is absolutely critical that we are successful in 
dismantling, disrupting, destroying the Al-Qaeda networks, and we are effectively 
working with the Afghan government to provide the security necessary for that country… 
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this is not an American battle; this is the NATO mission as well” (DAILY OUTLOOK 
AFGHANISTAN 2009b).  Therefore the poor coordination and cooperation of the 
activities of external players have made tackling the problems of security and state-
building even more difficult.  
 
Altogether the uneasy combination of different external and internal players has made 
developing a unified strategy difficult. These different players have multiple approaches 
that are often contradict each other especially in terms of maintaining security and 
reconstruction. Taking the example of military issues there has been little cooperation 
between foreign troops and the central government. The US air forces unilaterally 
bombards whatever they consider to be Taliban and Al Qaeda positions, while the central 
government has no influence in such operations. At the same time these unilateral actions 
are sometimes based on false information from the ground. As a result, civilian casualties 
are often high which frustrates the public and turns the idea of the people’s opinion 
against foreign troops. More importantly, this situation leaves no space for the 
sovereignty of the country and further undermines the legitimacy of the central 
government. Therefore, in the last eight years there has been more contradiction and little 
cooperation between these external and internal players. That is why the situation has 
gotton worse through the course of time. 
 
5.1 Divisive Forces among the Population 
The driving force behind the instability and fragility of state in Afghanistan are the 
centrifugal forces that dominate the centripetal forces (cf. Chapter 1.5). The impact of the 
centrifugal forces is so powerful that it has disintegrated the political structure in the 
country several times. More important is the fact that the centrifugal forces were 
dominant and stronger among the elites who planned the process of state-building, 
nation-building and the building of institutions.  
 
5.1.1 Analysis of Separating and Integrating Factors in Social Groups 
Tribalism (Qabila-garayi) is one of the primary centrifugal forces that has undermined 
the creation of national institutions and a stable functioning state. Although the rise of 
religious fundamentalism has been considered as the main reason for the conflict, 
nonetheless there is evidence which shows that, beside other factors, tribalism also has 
played (and still plays) a major role. Today Taliban insurgents are the biggest challenge 
to security and peace, not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan. They are mainly 
composed of Pashtun tribes who live in the border areas between the two countries.  
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Their leadership (Mullah Omar and other key figures) in Afghanistan comes from the 
Ghilzai sub-tribes mainly the Hotakis (table 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 17: Senior Taliban leaders 1996 - 2001 
Source: JOHNSON and MASON (2006: 8) 
 
It is important to notice that Kandahar has been Taliban’s stronghold and seems to remain 
so. The Ghilzais and Abdalis have competed for the control of this city for centuries. The 
Ghilzais, under Mirwais, established their control in Kandahar in 1709 while the Abdalis 
were helped by the Safavid troops (Persians) to retake control of the city. In this conflict 
the Baluch tribes supported the Ghilzais. The Abdalis have traditionally been loyal to the 
Persians from whom they had inherited the power. From 1747 the Abdali (Sadozais 
bracnch) had control of this city and established it as their capital. Following the death of 
Ahmad Shah, his son, in order to sustain his rule, moved the capital to Kabul away from 
tribal rivalry since Kabul was populated mainly by Tajiks. However this did not end the 
problem and inter-tribal rivalries between the Abdalis (Sadozai and later Mohammadzai) 
and Ghilzai continued. During this long period, the Abdalis almost ended the Ghilzai 
control of from Kandahar and pushed them to Qalat, which, became known as Qalat-e 
Ghilzai. In order to sustain their control in the city, from 1747 to 1959 the landowners in 
Kandahar were exempted from the extremely low land tax (about 1 Afghani per half acre 
(DUPREE 2005: 536). Nevertheless the Ghilzai lost Kandahar but their power was not 
Kakar GharghashtChairman of Kabul ShuraMullah Mohammad Rabbani
Hotaki GhilzaiMinister of DefenseMullah Obaidullah
Hotaki, GhilzaiMinister of CommerceSadeq Akhond
Kakar GharghashtPersonal Secretary to Mullah OmarMaulawi Wakil Ahmad Mutawakil
Hotaki GhilzaiMinister of CommunicationsAlla Dad Akhund
Hotaki GhilzaiMinister of JusticeNuruddin Turabi
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reduced and they continuously posed a threat to Abdali rulers. Especially their position in 
Qalat, which is located between Kandahar and Kabul the capital made the 
communication between and eventually the control of, the two cities difficult. Therefore 
one reason to move the Pashtuns from the South to the North was to reduce the power of 
the Ghilzai and minimized the threat they posed. 
 
This shows that tribal conflicts played an important role in the disintegration of the 
political system several times. The disintegration of the Abdali dynasty in late 1773 was 
mainly due to tribal rivalry and the hereditary ruling system, which repeatedly conflicts 
among the succeeding rulers. This factor undermined the reestablishment of a unified 
state and paved the way for repeated foreign invasions. In the repeated conflicts between 
different tribal elites, either side even searched for the help of a major foreign power, e.g., 
Persia, the Sikh and the British. Thus the ruling tribal elite played an important role in the 
foreign invasion that occurred. More importantly, however, these foreign invasions 
created a strong response from the population. Since the ruler and the ruling system were 
perceived as divine, the population who had defeated foreigners remained silent toward 
the cruel rulers. Therefore they preferred a cruel ruler from their own country to foreign 
dominance. 
 
Another important issue is the idea that the rulers in Afghanistan must come from 
Kandahar. This idea has been created and injected into minds of the population. The main 
support for this idea may stem from the fact that the Abdalis (Sadozais and 
Mohammadzais), who for a long period dominated the power in the country, were from 
Kandahar. Perhaps among the Western scholars TICHY was the first who noticed this 
and mentioned: 
“Seit 1747 entstammt der jeweilege Herscher des Landes den Durrani [Abdali], und es 
wurde ein ungeschriebenes Gesetz, daß nur Durrani Herscher sein können (TICHY 1940: 
195).”  
 
The role of the former king in the post-Taliban political process gained its importance 
mainly due to the fact that he came from the Mohammadzais, the dominant ruling elite 
(roughly between 1863 – 1973) in the country. Zahir Khan failed to regain any significant 
political position in the government but his participation strengthened the political 
process. More important, however, is the fact that Karzai is also from the Abdalis 
(Popalzai) and from Kandahar. According to his claim since “300 years his family has 
great influence in that city” (SPIEGEL 2008: 128). Thus, being a Popalzai, being from 
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Kandahar, enjoying American support and finally his low profile in the civil war 
provided him with better criteria than any other candidates for the chairman position.  In 
contrast, these criteria were among the main reasons that he gained little popularity in his 
hometown Kandahar, the stronghold of the Ghilzai Taliban. The first assassination 
attempt on him occurred in Kandahar. In order to strengthen his position and win the 
loyalty of the population in that city, Karzai invested a lot in Kandahar since 2002. His 
brother Jamil Karzai heads the provincial council in Kandahar, Shura-e Kandahar and is 
in fact considered to be the strongest man in the South. One example for Karzai’s 
investment in Kandahar is the allocation and implementation of many reconstruction 
projects in Kandahar. As a result, Kandahar has received the highest number of projects 
compared to the other provinces country, including the capital. In other words Kandahar 
receives many times more projects than it should when taking its population figures into 
consideration. According to statistical figures Kabul, with a population of 3,138,100, 
received 71 projects with the total cost of USD 4,217, 847 while Kandahar, with a 
population of 1,011,700, received 371 projects with the total cost of USD13,300,039 
(map 18).  
 
 
Map 19: Distribution of reconstruction projects in provinces by the MRRD in 2007 
Source: MRRD (2007) 
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There may be a counter argument that the high level of projects is allocated in Kandahar 
in order to the attention of the population from drug production, a major challenge in this 
province. Such a possible argument cannot be justified since Hilmand province produces 
the highest amount of drugs while only 12 projects are allocated there.  
 
Beside the persistent rivalry that exists between the tribes there are other problems related 
to tribalism which challenge the unity of the population. The establishment of Arbaki 
(tribal militia), which has recently been carried out by the Afghan government and its 
international partners, is such an example. The government defends its policy of Arbaki 
and claims that the tribal people have the capability to provide security and prevent 
Taliban infiltration in their areas. However, this policy creates more challenges than 
providing a solution to security problems. Firstly there is no guarantee that the Arbaki 
will fight the Taliban insurgents, especially their strong tribal affiliations bring them 
closer to each other to fight against a government supported by foreign in Kabul. 
Secondly it undermines the role of state institutions in providing security and the rule of 
law in the country. Thirdly this policy of government may enjoy support among the 
Pashtuns while it has raised the concern of other ethnic groups. This problem has arisen 
especially when major non-Pashtun populated areas have been disarmed through the 
process of DDR since 2002, as establishing Arbaki means rearming the Pashtuns. Finally 
the policy of establishing Arbaki has already failed in the past. Especially the communist 
regimes recruited tribal militias to fill the gap the Soviet troops left behind following their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan.  
 
In addition to the reasons mentioned in the above the establishment of Arbaki will help to 
sustain the traditional inter-tribal animosities and tensions (cf. Chapter 2.3.1).87 This is 
particularly true because Arbaki and the Taliban represent different Pashun tribes, which 
is similar to the old policy of ‘divide and rule’ carried out in the past. The Persians and 
Moguls used Abdalis against Ghilzai and vice versa in order to maintain control in 
Kandahar they. The British authorities repeatedly carried out such policies in the tribal 
areas. The same is true of different regimes in Kabul who lacked popular support and 
relied upon supporting either side of the tension to keep hold of their power. Thus 
tribalism and the abuse of tribal systems by the government has failed and it has had 
                                                 
87 The most recent such clashes occurred last September in Khost. The fighting over land dispute between Mangal and 
Maqbil sub-tribes lasted for three days (from 2-5 September 2009),  20 people were killed and many more were injured 
(DAILY OUTLOOK AFGHANISTAN (2009a). 
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negative impacts. This policy will further widen the gaps that have been created as a 
result of past wars, social fragmentation and tribal rivalries, and its negative impacts will 
affect the whole population in general. 
 
Next to tribalism ethno-centrism88 (Qawm-garayi) is another centrifugal force which 
strongly undermines the effectuality of institutions and eventually leads to the 
disintegration of the state system. Ethno-centrism has usually led to ethno-nationalism 
(e.g. ‘Pashtunization’), the establishment of institutions for purely ethnic purposes and 
finally the ethnicization of the politics (cf. Chapter 2.3.2). It has contributed to the failure 
and disintegration of institutions in the past and it is one of the dominant challenges in the 
current situation of Afghanistan, as it undermines the creation of national institutions.  
 
In this context ethno-centrism is not what shapes the ethnic map of the country. Ethno-
centrism is rather the use or abuse of ethnicity by a certain group who claims to act on 
behalf of a particular ethnic group (Qawm). Different political parties and movements 
who were influenced by varieties of ideologies appeared and disappeared in Afghanistan 
in different periods. Yet these ideologies could not overcome the Qawm relationship 
between these political movements, parties and fractions. The division of the communist 
PDPA party into two rival fractions was mainly because of ethnic factors. The same is 
true of the Mujahidin parties, which are split into Pashtun and non-Pashtun parties in 
Pakistan and Iran. In the case of the Pashtuns and the Hazaras tribalism further divided 
them into different parties (cf. Chapter 2.3.1). The emergence of the Taliban, with their 
radical interpretation of Islam, gained little popularity beyond the Pashtun ethnic groups. 
Such an interpretation of Islam is more conform to tribal values and traditions rather than 
to the urban and non-tribal population. Arguably the close relationship between the 
Taliban and the Arabs is not only based on religion but also on the tribal and traditional 
values that they share. However, money plays the key role in the sustainability and 
effectiveness of these relationships. The way the Taliban ruled in major parts of 
Afghanistan was not different from what is common in Saudi Arabia, with the difference 
that education is not banned for females in the latter.  
 
Ethno-centrism also prevented the formation/creation of a national ideology. Afghan 
nationalism has been described as Pashtun nationalism (cf. Chapter. 2.3.1). Thus other 
                                                 
88 According to PETTIGREW ethnocentrism “refers to a belief in the cultural superiority of one’s own ethnic group. In 
this sense, ethnocentrism involves cultural provincialism. More recently, the concept has come to signify simply an 
unusually high regard for one’s ingroup” (PETTIGREW 2005: 827_831). So far the Farsi equivalent largely used is 
‘Qawm-garayi’ which literally means ‘loyalty and favoring of Qawm’ by its members. 
 242 
 
ethnic groups were alienated and could hardly find their cultural elements and values of 
their own in this type of nationalism. In the last few years the same problem has 
dominated the process of state-building. According to AKHGAR  
when the new currency was rolled out Karzai called it as national symbol. When I looked at it I 
did not find anything in it to show my presence. I speak Farsi and my mother tongue is also 
Farsi…...In these banknotes there is nothing from me. But this is our national symbol. There are 
many things like that. Thus nation means the dominant Qawm,, the one who ruled for over two 
hundred and sixty years. However, a national symbol is something in which a Hazara, a Tajik, an 
Uzbek and even a Hindu can be present. This is very unfair and fascistic that one Qawm considers 
its own symbols and claim that it belongs to all Aqwam (pl. Qawm) (AKHGAR 2009). 
 
It was due to this factor that many nation-building attempts by Afghan ruling elites failed. 
This means neither the ideology of nationalism and communism nor religion-based 
ideologies could supersede the ethnic and tribal factors. Thus ethnocentrism continues to 
be one of the main factors to preventing political movements or parties to extend their 
influence beyond their own ethnic group (Qawm). At the same time they lack support 
from the masses and even within their own Qawm and their influence remains on the 
surface. This is to say that the major Aqwam represent several millions of people, while 
the parties represent only a few hundred to, at its maximum, a few thousand.  
Nevertheless, political and financial support from the outside has guaranteed the 
dominance of the different tribal religious and intellectual elites in the country. 
 
Regionalism (Samt-garayi) is another centrifugal force which was created more by 
geographical factors, e.g., North and South and rural and urban. In Afghanistan the terms 
Shamali (North) and Junubi (South) are usually heard in political debates as well as in 
conflicts. On a broader scale the term North usually represents areas where a mostly non-
Pashtun population lives, and South is used to denote the areas where a mostly Pashtun 
population lives. There are also provincial affiliations within different groups of the 
population. This means the name of a certain province and a place provides its population 
with a regional identity. Such an identity is either preferred by its members or used by 
others to describe them, e.g., Kabuli, Kandahari, Herati, Mazari, Badakhshi, Pamjshiri, 
Wardaki, Khosti, and Kohistani. For the ruling elites in Afghanistan after tribal and 
Qawm relationships, regionalism is another instrument in achieving their political 
interests.  For example, the Khalqis and the Taliban were/are predominantly from the 
South. In contrast, Parchamis and Mujahidin are represented most strongly in the North. 
The stronghold of the communists, Khalq, and Taliban was/is in the South and extends to 
tribal areas in Pakistan. In contrast, the stronghold of their opposition groups are in the 
 243 
 
North. The same is true about the communist Parcham and Mujahidin groups who 
represented as Kabulis and by the North (cf. Chapter 4.4.2).  
 
Another aspect of regionalism is to be seen in the division of the population into rural and 
urban people. The physical barriers, such as high mountains and extensive deserts, have 
made communication difficult. Although overcoming these challenges has become easier 
by using modern technology to construct a transport system and road networks, the 
continuous war and its negative outcome made getting access to technology difficult. 
Particularly modern technology needs financial resources and qualified manpower to 
utilize it, the two aspects which hardly exist in Afghanistan. 
 
Lack of charisma and capability in leadership has been another centrifugal force in 
Afghanistan. First and foremost, legitimacy plays a key role in the leadership. Yet 
legitimacy itself depends to the enforcement of the rule of law. Thus leadership and the 
ruling system have very close relationship. Meanwhile legitimacy itself used to be a 
complicated issue because its concept changed from time to time. It has been influenced 
by tribalism, religion, ethnocentrism and different ideologies. Those in leadership 
positions often belong to one of the three different categories of tribal, religious and 
intellectual elites. This is especially visible in the name of the past rulers which started 
with Amir (a religious title) and ended with Khan (a tribal title). Taliban religious 
structure represents the most recent examples their leader being called Amir-ul-
Moamenin Mullah Mohammad Omar Akhund. In this only Mohammad Omar is the 
original name, which is without a tribal or family name while the rests are all religious 
titles. 
 
In the past religion founded some of the basic elements for the legitimacy, including the 
rule of Shariah law, leadership of Friday prayer or mentioning the name of the ruler in 
the Khutbah and the minting of coins. The latter two remained unchanged untill 1973 and 
the constitutions emphasized both. This was at least theoretically demonstrated the 
loyalty of the ruler to the Shariah law which in turn demanded the loyalty of people to 
the ruling system. Furthermore it assisted the idea of leadership to transcending beyond 
tribal and ethnic identities. Later the constitution of the republic ignored the leadership of 
prayer and the minting of coins. Thus it is significant to notice that since then the 
legitimacy has reached its lowest level, which, together with other major and more 
important factors, led to continuous war in the country. 
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Therefore the lack of legitimacy and charisma in the leadership at the national level 
provided multiple sources of leadership disputes on the ethnic and tribal level. The three 
decades of war and violence have further made the emergence of a popular leader 
difficult. The most negative impact of war in Afghanistan was that it strengthened 
centrifugal forces, e.g., tribalism, ethno-centrism and external influence. The latter is 
especially important because many in the leadership proved their loyalty to foreign 
powers rather than to the people of their country. This reliance provided them cash and 
weapons to extend their rule in the country and whenever outside help stopped the ruling 
system disintegrated.  
 
Meanwhile the confrontation between the intellectual elite on one side and the traditional 
and religious elites on the other can also be interpreted as a confrontation between the 
rural and the urban population, that further widened the gap between the two. It happened 
especially with the rise of the intellectual elites to power. At several times they had 
carried out attempts to eliminate the influence of traditional and religious groups in the 
urban areas. The two traditional and religious elites retreated to their strongholds in the 
rural areas. It was then that major confrontations between the rural and the urban 
population repeatedly occurred. Amanullah was the first who carried out military 
offensives against the rural population, and the communist regimes did so in the recent 
history of the country. In the current situation this factor plays an important role in the 
conflict, too. The ruling elite in Kabul often considered the rural people, especially the 
tribes, as primitive communities and discriminated their traditions and customs. This is 
especially visible at the earliest stage when Amanullah oppressed different Pashtun tribes 
in South and East of the capital. He built a minaret in Kabul in commemoration of 
hundreds of those soldiers who were killed in this conflict. The memorial called the 
minaret of Elm wa Jahl (knowledge and illiteracy or light and darkness)89, symbolizes the 
two sides of the conflict, the urban, literate and modern aas opposed to the rural, 
primitive, tribal, illiterate and in the darkness. This memorial is located in the West of the 
city center (around two kilo meters), and at its bottom part the name of hundreds of 
soldiers are written (figure 19). Its important to notice that later, when Habibullah II 
(from rural a area) celebrated the independence day, he ordered to cover this memorial 
with black cloths as a sign of grievance (KHALILI 1991:159-160).   
 
                                                 
89 Elm means knowledge and the one who has knowledge is called as Alem which is the singular form of Ulama used 
for Islamic experts. Jahl literary is the opposition of knowledge which may better suits with the word ‘illiteracy’.  
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It is significant to see that article 80 in chapter 4 of the constution describes some of the 
important elements which can be considered as centrifugal forces. It mentions that 
“Ministers during the course of their work cannot use their posts for linguistic, regional, 
ethnic (Qawmi), religious and partisan purposes.” However, neither this article nor the 
entire constitution give information regarding why only ministers are selected out and 
this does not include other decision makers in other institutions, including the president. 
Nevertheless at least it justifies the existence of such risks on the ministerial level.  
 
 
Figure 19 : The memorial of Elm wa Jahl  
Source: ISSA (2006) 
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By taking the above factors into consideration, a state functions effectively, efficiently 
and remains more stable when it overcomes the centrifugal forces. How to overcome 
these forces depends on the power of centripetal forces. The existence or creation of 
centripetal forces is fundamentally important to counter balance centrifugal forces. 
Centripetal forces are simply those elements that are lacking or weaknesses which help 
the creation of centrifugal forces. For example sovereignty, legitimate authority 
(leadership) and ruling system are some of the basic centripetal forces, a lack of which 
futhers the disintegration of a political system. The creation of a national ideology, 
national institutions, a national anthem and a national identity are other elements that can 
help to overcome the challenges of centrifugal forces. These are only some of the 
elements and many more can be created to counterbalance the centrifugal forces. 
However, the significant factor that can contribute to the achievement of these goals is 
the establishment of national institutions. It is the national institutions that create and 
strengthen the centripetal forces in a country. Therefore building national institutions is 
crucial, and arguably they are the main centripetal forces which gain the loyalty of 
diverse people.  
 
At the same time a decentralized structure for the institutions is more compatible with the 
geographical structure of the country. It is a clear fact that centre has never been able to 
dominate the periphery. Major factors like geography, ruling system, ethno-linguistic and 
socio-religious sensitivities have undermined the effectiveness of a centralized system. A 
rather decentralized system of power can help better administration of the periphery by 
local authorities. This will make the system easier, cheaper, and more effective. The 
central authority can keep monitoring the situation and provide transparency of the 
administrative processes. There will be no need for the population in remote areas to 
spend many days to come to Kabul to fulfilling their legal and official affairs. At the 
same time this will help the central authority to decrease the heavy financial and 
logistical costs of sending official missions from the capital to the provinces. For 
example, the Ministry of Higher Education sends many teachers from universities in the 
capital to remote provinces every year in order to carry out the entrance exam to the 
universities of Afghanistan. This costs a lot and takes much time for the Ministry of 
higher education. The administration process in general is very hierarchical between 
ministries located in the capital and departments in the provinces. The local officals are 
not authorized to make any decision and they have to come to the capital and discuss 
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their requirements with their related ministry. Thus decentralization of the institutions can 
facilitate the process of administration which will help the centripetal forces.   
 
The creation and strengthening of a popular idea is fundamentally important for a state to 
possess because it provides the reason for the existence, the ‘raison d’etre’ of that state. 
In Afghanistan the rivalry and competition of the three dominant elites (intellectual, 
religious and traditional) have made the creation of such an idea difficult. The theory that 
the country has a very long history (‘more than 5000 thousand years’) starting with 
Ariana, Khorasan and continuing to Afghanistan, was created to fill the gap of idea. This 
idea has largely dominated the Afghan literature, including the textbooks at school and 
university. Yet the creator of this theory is the intellectual elites who have been 
influenced by western ideologies. This theory gained little popularity, especially among 
the religious elites. For them the Shariah is not purely a religious law but also it shapes 
their ideology. The same is true for the tribal elites who follow their own customs, and 
for them tracing back their genealogy plays the most important role. Therefore neither of 
these concepts alone could provide the basis for an ideology in the country. Nevertheless, 
even despite the lack of a popular idea for the state Afghanistan is in a better position 
compared to its neighboring countries (except Iran), because Pakistan is created in 1947 
and the Central Asian states were established even more recently. Especially the victory 
of the people over the British in the three Anglo-Afghan wars is a very important part of 
history which strengthens the sense of unity and togetherness among the diverse 
population. The same is true for the uprisings and struggles against the Soviet invasion in 
the recent history. 
 
Thus the importance of centripetal forces has been largely ignored by the state elites in 
Afghanistan while their emphasis on particular issues strengthened centrifugal forces, 
which in turn triggered the disintegration of their rule. Furthermore, the ruling elites 
implemented certain ideologies that they had imported from the out side in different 
periods of time. Such policies implemented from the above little attracted public support. 
As a result, in Afghanistan, after nine decades of independence, the issues of nation, 
nationality and national ideology remain unclear. This obscurity has led to the 
sustainability of centrifugal forces, e.g., tribalism, Qawm-garayi, and regionalism in the 
country. 
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5.1.2 The Unclear Idea of Nationality in Afghanistan: What Does Nationality 
Mean in Afghanistan? 
In Afghanistan, there are locally used terminologies, especially concerning terms like 
‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’. Generally speaking, the Arabic word ‘Millat’ is used for 
the English ‘nation’.90 The same word stem is to be found in ‘Milli’ (national), and 
Milliyat (nationality), and Milli-sazi (nationalization), and Milli-garayi ‘nationalism’. 
However, unlike the word ‘nation’ in English (which comes from Latin natio meaning 
‘people’) the word ‘Millat’ historically referred to ‘religion’ or ‘sect’ and is mentioned 
around 15 times in the Koran. The Arabic word has systematically changed from its 
traditional religious meaning to the modern meaning of ‘nation’ in Farsi and Turkish 
(BOSWORTH 1993: 61, URSINUS 1993: 61-64).  In contrast to the word ‘nation’ there 
is little difference between the English word ‘citizenship’ and ‘Tabe-e-iyat’ used in 
Afghanistan.91 Especially the modern definition of ‘citizenship’ signifies this very fact. It 
is important to see that the concept of Millat imported from Europe, has significantly 
changed as a result of the rise of nationalism in the early twentieth century.  
 
Nationality is defined as belonging of a people, a group of people or individuals to a 
certain nation or a state (BECK 1986: 630).92 According to this definition the existence 
of either of the two elements (nation or state) is required to possess a nationality. In other 
words it stated that there is no nationality without a nation or a state. Moreover, it sounds 
similar to what WEBER stressed: that “nationality is both political and cultural” (SMITH 
1971: 20). Thus, from the term ‘nationality’, two different concepts can be drawn. In the 
political context ‘nationality’ becomes ‘citizenship’, because it “refers to the terms of 
membership of a political unit (nation-state) which secure certain rights and privileges to 
those who fulfill particular obligations (SMITH: 1996: 67).” Therefore the term 
citizenship is often fixed and regulated by law within a specific territorial limit or a state. 
 
In the cultural context ‘nationality’ determines relationship between a people or a group 
of people and a certain nation. At the same time, in terms of its cultural relationship this 
is what makes defining ‘nationality’ difficult. The complexity is due to the fact that there 
                                                 
90 The same is true in Iran and Turkey. 
91 The words ‘citizenship’ in English and the Arabic word ‘Tabe-e-iyat’ used in Afghanistan (also in Iran) have 
different roots.  The word ‘citizen’ historically referred to any member of a city (SCOTT and MARSHAL: 2009: 80), 
while ‘Tabe-e-iyat’ refers to the follower of a ruler, a ruling system,  or a state or equivalent of ‘citizenship’ in its 
modern concept. However, the Arab countries use the term ‘Jensiya’ for citizenship. 
92 According to BECK nationality or Nationalität, is: 1- Die Zugeoerigkeit eines Menschen oder einer Gruppe von 
Menschen zu einer bestimmten Nation. 2- Die Staatsangehörigkeit. Vor allem in Engl. und Frankr. wird der Begriff 
Nationalitaet (eng. Nationality, frz. Nationlite) in diesem Sinn gebraucht” (BECK 1986: 630). 
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is often no clear borderline for culture and it (or its impact and influence) often extends 
beyond the determined political borders. This is what supports the centrifugal forces and 
usually causes conflict between neighboring countries. It is often the extension of such 
cultural relationships that causes nationalism and leads to territorial ambitions. For 
example the tribal areas where Pashtuns live caused Afghan rulers to create and support 
the issue of Pashtunistan.  
 
The modern concepts of ‘nation’ and ‘citizenship’ were introduced in the first 
constitution of the country in 1923 (cf. Chapter 2.3.1) and repeated in the later 
constitutions as well. The new constitution defines nation and citizenship in Afghanistan 
in article 4, in chapter 1: the nation of Afghanistan is composed of all individuals who 
possess the citizenship of Afghanistan. The nation of Afghanistan shall be comprised of 
Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Turkman, Baluch, Pachaie, Nuristani, Aymaq, Arab, 
Qirghiz, Qizilbash, Gujur, Brahwui, and other tribes.  The word Afghan shall apply to 
every citizen of Afghanistan. 
 
This article highlights many significant points with regard to both terms. The first point is 
that the sentence starts with “the nation of Afghanistan” and ends with “citizenship of 
Afghanistan” rather than the ‘Afghan nation’ or ‘Afghan citizen’. In other words the 
sentence “the nation of Afghanistan is comprised of…” acknowledges the fact that the 
nation is not a unitary body as a whole but it has different ethnic components. The 
emphasis on ethnic identity created by listing the names of the main ethnic groups is an 
indication of the very fact that there are different conglomerate-like components of ‘the 
nation of Afghanistan’. None of the constitutions in the past ever mentioned the names of 
ethnic groups.93 Instead, the first two constitutions (Nezamnama in 1923 and Osulnama 
in1931) mentioned that “all individuals from Afghanistan regardless of their religion and 
religious school (bela tafriq-e Dini wa Mazhabi), are called citizens of Afghanistan.” 94 
The next two constitutions (in 1964 and 1977) mentioned that “the nation of Afghanistan 
is composed of all those individuals who possess the citizenship of the State of 
Afghanistan in accordance with the provision of law.”95 
 
                                                 
93 Except article 4 of the Nezamnama, the Pashtu version mentions a Millat da Pakhtana (lit. the nation of Pakhtana or 
Pashtun) while in the official Farsi version it is called Millat-e Afghaniya and Millat-e Najibiya-e Afghanistan (lit. the 
Afganiya or Afghan nation, and the noble nation of Afghanistan) (NEZAMNAMA 1923b: article 4 and 
NEZAMNAMA 1923: article 4), Farsi and Pashtu versions. 
94 NEZAMNAMA 1923b: article 8 and OSULNAMA 1952: article 9). 
95 Article 1 in chapter 1 of  the constitution of 1964 and article 21 in chapter 3 of the constitution of 1977 
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This stands in contrast to all the constitutions ratified during the communist regimes, 
which mentioned that “Afghanistan is a multi-nationality country (Kaseer-ul-Milliat)”. 
By the term ‘nationality’ the communist regimes meant ‘ethnic group’ even though the 
name of any particular ethnic group was not mentioned. These constitutions mentioned 
that “the citizens of Afghanistan, men and women regardless of their race, nationality, 
tribe, linguage, gender, place of birth and residence, religion, education, genealogy 
(Nasab), property and social status, have equal rights.”96 Although these last three 
constitutions of the post-monarchy era reflected some of the dominated problems in the 
society, they remained only theory while in practice the policy of these regimes further 
divided society. Even the members of the communist party who had created these 
constitutions were divided into two fractions (Khalqi and Parchami) both of whom 
represented different ethnic, tribal, rural and urban elites. 
 
The next significant issue in the Article is the application of the word ‘Afghan’ to every 
‘citizen’ in the in the country. This name appeared in the first constitutions, but was used 
slightly different than in the current version. The first two constitutions indicated that 
“the adjective of Afghaniya” citizenship (sefat-e Taabe-e-iyat-e Afghaniya) shall be 
applied to all citizens to indicate citizenship. The question why ‘Afghaniya’ or ‘Afghani’ 
and not ‘Afghan’, were mentioned, especially when Tarzi, prior to this constitution used 
the term “Afghan nation” (Millat-e Afghan) in his article. Nevertheless it was the 
constitution of 1964 that indicated the word ‘Afghan’ to be applied for every citizen of 
Afghanistan. 97 It was changed from ‘Afghani’ to ‘Afghan’ because the word ‘Afghani’ 
was also used for Pashtu language and later for the currency.  (cf. Ch. 2.3)  
 
Like the issue of languages, the word ‘Afghan’ and its application to every citizen has 
been a very controversial and problematic issue. This was due to the fact that the word 
‘Afghan’ used to be synonym for ‘Pashtun’. The first criticism of the use of this name 
arose during the constitutional debate in 1964 and the most recent discussion of the topic 
was during the constitutional debate in 2004. In both cases some non-Pashtuns criticised 
the application of the name ‘Afghan’ to all citizens of Afghanistan while Pashtuns in 
particular rejected such criticism strongly. It is also important to notice that except for the 
constitution of 1979, all other constitutions indicated that the adjective of ‘Afghaniya’, 
‘Afghani’ or ‘Afghan’ shall be applied to members of all ethnic groups. The constitution 
                                                 
96Article 28 in chapter 2, Osul-e Asasi 1980, article 38 in chapter 3 of the constitution of 1986, and article 38 in chapter 
3, constitution of 1990. 
97 Article 1 in chapter 1, constitution of 1964, and article 21 in chapter 3 constitution of 1977.  
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of 1979 did not indicate the word ‘Afghan’, probably because the Parchamis, who mainly 
consisted of non-Pashtuns, were in power and refused to apply this name to all people.   
 
Why was the name of Afghan selected for applying to citizens of the country, especially 
when the people refer to each other according to their ethnic and tribal identities? One of 
the possible answers to this question is that the word ‘Afghan’ has been used to the 
population of Afghanistan by outsiders. Thus the people are known collectively as 
‘Afghan’ and their land as ‘Afghanistan’. This argument was first mentioned by TARZI, 
the pioneer of the nation-building project. He said that “they [others] call us Millat-e 
Afghan  (Afghan nation) and our beloved soil [land] as Afghanistan” (TARZI 1915:1-2).’ 
The same argument was put forward in response to the criticism of some non-Pashtuns in 
the constitutional debate of 1964 and 2004 respectively. 
 
Meanwhile ‘nationality’ is not only ‘citizenship’ but it is also ‘national character’ 
(SMITH 1971: 120). In Afghanistan different regimes made several attempts in the past 
to create a ‘national character’ and ‘national ideology’, but they failed. Many factors 
contributed to this failure. However, it was mainly the wrong policy of nation-building by 
the regimes (top-down and ideologies imported by state elites), the persistent legitimacy 
crisis of state institutions, and the negative impact of the three decades of conflict which 
brought to surface tribal and ethnic identities. Therefore, usually there is confusion in 
publication about who is ‘Afghan’ when the population is referred to according to its 
ethnic identities.  The confusion even leads to the claim that the “country is founded in 
the name of Pashtuns” (SCHETTER 2005: 67). It is significant to see that SCHETTER 
contradicts himself when he says that the country “was created artificially” (SCHETTER 
2005: 54) an idea he borrowed from DUPREE (2005: XX), without even mentioning it as 
his source of information. Elsewhere he says “Afghanistan was founded as a buffer zone 
between British India and Russia after a protracted confrontation between both colonial 
powers in the 19th century…it was not until 1879 that British India and Russia agreed 
upon the creation of a state called Afghanistan” (SCHETTER 2006: 21-22). 
 
Nonetheless, according to the definition of ‘nationality’ given in the above, the 
citizenship of the people of Afghanistan with regard to the ‘state’ is definitely clear. 
Almost all constitutions have mentioned that all individuals from Afghanistan are 
‘Afghan citizens’ and none of them claimed that the word ‘Afghan’ is a synonym for 
‘Pashtun’. There is little doubt that the population considers itself as ‘Afghan’ 
particularly when the people are outside their country including the neighbouring 
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countries, e.g., Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian states where many of the same ethnic 
groups live. This is similar to the arguments raised by many in the country that ‘we’ are 
known as ‘Afghan’ by others (the outside world). Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries 
would hardly consider any of the ethnic groups from this country as their ‘citizens’. 
Millions of Afghans lived in Pakistan and Iran for more than a decade, they were largely 
seen as Afghan migrants. In contrast to the neighbouring countries, those Afghans who 
migrated to the West mostly of them received European or American citizenships.   
 
Meanwhile, despite the negative impacts of the conflicts the name ‘Afghan’ as referring 
to something beyond the concept of citizenship is still popular within the country. 
According to the questionnaire carried out for this study 188 out of 247 people, mainly 
university students and teachers, preferred to be referred as‘Afghan’, and 37 preferred to 
be called ‘Aryan’ while the rests preferred ethnic identities (figure 20).  
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Figure 20 : Status of nationality compared to ethnic identities in Afghanistan             
Source: Questionnaire Afghan Identity (2009) 
 
It is especially significant that those who replied to the questions come from different 
ethno-linguistic backgrounds. In terms of class reference they belonged to the 
intelligentsia and their views are especially important to be noticed because “nationalism 
is born among the intelligentsia” (cf. Chapter 2.3.2). In other words the intellectual elites 
play a key role in shaping the sense of nationhood, in particular through education and 
the establishment of institutions and certain symbols.  
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Thus ‘nationality’ is affected by the quality of ‘nation’, and ‘nation’ derives its character 
from cultural and historical forces. The more united a ‘nation’, the stronger the sense 
nationality among its members. In contrast, the more fragmented a ‘nation’ the weaker 
the sense of ‘nationality’ performed by its members. In Afghanistan the diverse 
composition of ethno-linguistic and socio-religious groups has created a mosaic culture. 
This in particular has made the development of a sense of ‘nationality’ and ‘national 
character’ difficult, but not impossible. There are elements, possibilities and centripetal 
forces which can help develop and strengthen ‘national character’ and pave the way for 
‘nationhood’. One of the main problems that undermined achieving these objectives has 
been the lack of national institutions. It is national institutions which create and 
strengthen the sense of ‘nationality and nationhood’, and if institutions are built on weak 
foundations then they will definitely support centrifugal forces which will lead to their 
disruption. 
 
5.2 The Role of National Institutions in State-Building 
In war-torn societies like Afghanistan overcoming centrifugal forces is only possible by 
establishing legitimate, effective, capable, accountable and functioning state institutions. 
The continuous wars have disintegrated the rudimentary state institutions several times 
while their negative impacts have badly affected national sovereignty and national unity.  
Meanwhile, building a stable state with functioning institutions is a complicated process. 
The most important part of this process is the availability of adequate qualified human 
and financial resources. According to the World Bank, state-building requires a number 
of interdependent processes. These minimally include: 
i. Demobilizing and dissolving all armed forces not controlled by the state. 
ii. Forming and training armed forces and police to protect international and domestic security in 
accordance with law 
iii. Forming and training all components of a legal system, from legislators to judges and 
prosecutors, to provide a legal framework for the functioning of the state and other social 
relations. 
iv. Raising revenue in accordance with law to pay for the functioning of the state. 
v. Creating and training an administration capable of raising revenue and providing services to 
citizens and other inhabitants.’ (WORLD  BANK 2005: 45) 
 
In general these points are similar to what WEBER described as the “monopoly of 
legitimate use of force” for a functioning state, something which is not possible without 
building institutions with ‘capable staff’. Nevertheless, these points are interrelated and 
fundamentally important for state-building. This means that without the “monopoly of 
legitimate use of force” maintaining law and order, raising revenue and public service is 
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impossible. However, how to create such institutions with capable staff is not answered 
in the above process.  
 
Afghanistan proves to be such a complicated case that even after eight years of efforts by 
Afghans and the international community there has been no success in creating a 
legitimate political system. Today the established institutions are very weak and cannot 
carry out their functions effectively, efficiently, transparently, and with accountability. 
The monopoly of legitimate use of force, establishing the rule of law and the provision of 
public service are still among the major problems for the government. There are many 
reasons behind this institutional failure: poor human and financial resources have made 
Afghanistan highly dependent on the outside world. An insufficient number of qualified 
staff, poor quality of training institutions and unequal distribution of opportunities 
throughout the country are among the major challenges. After eight years Afghanistan is 
still highly dependent on financial help and manpower from foreign resources. The 
deployment of tens of thousands of foreign troops and international NGOs, together with 
spending billions of dollars is an indication of the fact that the institutional capacity is 
weak and institutions are unable (and often unwilling) to perform their functions. It was 
the external players that provided the opportunity for the rival internal players to end the 
armed conflict and join a peaceful political process of state-building. At the same time 
the high profile of the external players has undermined the legitimacy and sovereignty of 
the established political system in Afghanistan. 
 
In addition to other factors mentioned the current political system has created obstacles 
that hinder the effective functioning of the institutions. They are highly centralized and 
can not respond to the requirements of the country. This is incompatible to the 
geographical, socio-economic and ethno-linguistic factors of the country. The major 
power is concentrated in the hand of an individual, the president, rather than an 
institution. 
 
In order to understand better each point mentioned in the above it is necessary to analyze 
them separately by starting with the recent structure of national institutions. 
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5.2.1 The Current Structure of ‘National’ Institutions 
One of the major tasks in the post Taliban state-building process undertaken by different 
Afghan political elites and the international community (UN, EU, USA plus 
Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries) was to establish national institutions. The 
promulgation of the new constitution is considered an important step in this regard. It 
identifies the state, the main national institutions and describes their functions and 
responsibilities. It also highlights whether members of these institutions are elected or 
selected and determines their period of term. The first article in Chapter 1 mentions that 
“Afghanistan shall be an Islamic Republic, independent, unitary, and indivisible state.” 
To organize the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (IRA) the constitution identifies three 
institutional bodies: legislative, judiciary, and executive.  
  
Thus, according to this constitution, Afghanistan is an Islamic Republic and “the 
President is the head of the state executing his authorities in the executive, legislative and 
judiciary fields (article 60, chapter 3).” The people elect the president for a five years 
term through general, free, secret and direct balloting in the country and he/she needs to 
win more than 50 percent of votes to rule. The president has two vice presidents whose 
names must be announced to the public prior to the election. The constitution authorizes 
the president to supervise the implementation of the constitution and to be the chief 
commander of armed forces. He/ she appoints all high-ranking officials to the different 
institutions (e.g., ministers, the attorney general, the head of central bank, the national 
security director, the head of the Red Crescent, justices and the Supreme Court and 
judges, the officers of the armed forces, police, national security)  (article 64 in chapter 
3).  
 
Furthermore, the constitution mentions that “the government shall be comprised of 
ministers who work under the chairmanship of the president” (article 71 in chapter 4).’ 
Ministers are appointed by the president and also approved by the parliament. Beside the 
ministries there are other government bodies like the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography 
Head Office (AGCHO), Afghanistan Bank, the National Security Council, the Chief of 
Staff and the Department of Disasters Preparedness (DDP). There are many ‘independent 
commissions’ for human rights, elections, anti-corruption, disarmament, administrative 
reform, national reconciliation as well as ‘independent agencies and departments’ like the 
national Olympic committee, the Red Crescent and the Science Academy. The president 
also appoints members of independent commissions (figure 20). 
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The legislative institution known as Shura-e Milli (national assembly) is defined as “the 
highest legislative organ, it shall manifest the will of its people as well as representing the 
entire nation” (article 81, chapter 5). It is composed of two houses (House of Elders and 
House of Representatives). The House of Elders (Mashrano Jirga or Majles-e Aayan) has 
102 members, one thirds who are selected by the president and the other two third is 
elected by the provincial and district councils. The House of Representatives (Wolosi 
Jirga or Majles-e Numayendagan) has 249 members, all elected by the people for a five 
years period through general, free, secret and direct balloting in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21 : Structure of institutions in Afghanistan             
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
The judiciary branch according to the constitution is an independent organ which is 
composed of one Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and Primary Courts. Among them the 
Supreme Court is defined as the highest judicial organ, heading the judicial power of the 
IRA (article 116 in chapter 7). It has nine members who are chosen by the president.  
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In terms of location these institutions are based in the capital which is also normal many 
other countries of the world. However the question is how these institutions extend their 
functions from the capital to the countryside. There are 34 provinces and 399 districts in 
Afghanistan and over 49000 villages.98 Each province (Welayat) is administered by a 
governor (Wali) and the districts (Woloswali or Hukumati) are administered by a district 
governor, (Woloswal or Hakem). The President appoints the governors, and the 
administration system in the provinces is carried out by departments (Reyasat ha). Each 
of these departments is under a ministry in the capital. The same is true of the judiciary 
sector: the Supreme Court is based in the capital and the second highest judiciary 
authority is located at provincial level. There are 34 Provincial Appeal Courts (Mahakem-
e Estinaf-e Welayat) and, in theory, each district should also have a Primary Court 
(Mahkama-e Ebtedaiya). At the same time, in order to involve the people in the political 
process, each province and district has its own Shura. This means there are 34 provincial 
councils (Shura-haye Welayaat) and 399 district councils (Shura-haye Woloswali or 
Hukumati wa Shahri). The existence of elected Shuras (councils) on the provincial and 
district levels is a positive factor which can contribute to people’s participation in the 
institutions. However, their role remains mainly that of a consultative body in the 
decision making process while decisions are usually made in the capital by central 
authorities.                                                                                                                                                      
 
It is significant to see that the central authority practices a maximum of power while the 
provincial administrations have very limited authority. Thus, according to its hierarchical 
structure, Afghanistan is not only politically centralized but also it is in theory, fiscally 
and administratively being one of the most centralized countries in the world (LISTER 
2005: 3). At the same time, despite the high degree of de jure centralization the de facto 
reality is that central control is very weak and has not been able to dominate the regional 
commanders (WORLD BANK 2005: 46). This centralized policy is emphasized in the 
constitution where the government is obliged “to preserve the principles of centralism” 
though it is added that the government “shall transfer necessary powers, in accordance 
with the law, in order to accelerate and improve economic, social as well as cultural 
matters, and foster peoples’ participation in developing national life” (article 137 chapter 
8). However, it is still the central authority who distinguishes what is ‘necessary power’ 
                                                 
98 This data was received from AGCHO during a field trip in Kabul in January 2009. The number of districts is in fact 
364 which plus 34 provincial centres and the city of Hayratan becomes 399. The number of villages is not finalized and 
so far the data processed covers around  90 percent of the villages. 
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and what is ‘in accordance with the law’. An example of this has already been presented 
in map 19, where it is to be seen that a less populated province received many times more 
reconstruction projects than the most populated provinces.  
 
In general there is little difference between the current system of administration and the 
traditional system, which was common in the country at the beginning of the 20th century. 
If in the past an amir or a king had the final word to say, the same is true of the position 
of the president in the current situation. The unlimited power of the president has also 
undermined the effectivity of other institutions. For example, according to the 
constitution, ministers are introduced by the president and approved by the House of 
Representatives. In 2006, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, failed to 
receive the approval of the House of Representatives. However the President kept Spanta 
in his cabinet and, to legitimize this decision, the Supreme Court had to approve Spanta’s 
position under President’s order. More recently, Karzai’s five years term came to an end 
on 21 of May 2009, and new election should have been held. However, he postponed the 
elections and again ordered the Supreme Court to extend his term for another three 
months. These two cases were both breaches of the constitution. 
 
The appointing of the governors by the president is another factor which undermines the 
effectiveness, transparency and credibility of institutions at local level. The governors 
appointed (or better imposed) by the president usually have little knowledge and 
administration and management skills. This situation exists despite the repeated demands 
made by the people from central authorities to be allowed to elect their governors. 
Another problem with these governors is that many of them were / are Mujahidin or 
Taliban commanders who are good fighters rather than good governors. Therefore they 
often have a reputation and an image problem in the provinces. The next concern is 
whether the governors are officially accountable to the Ministry of Interior, while the 
other administration departments (Reyasat ha) in the provinces are directed by other 
ministries. Thus the governors’ authority is restricted by the central authorities. 
 
The same hierarchy that exists between the capital and the provinces, strongly exists 
between the provinces and the districts. In terms of administration this means that when a 
district plans something it has to write a proposal to the provincial authority who in turn 
forwards it to the central authorities. For example, issues of justice and legal cases, 
employment, salary, budget allocation, construction and reconstruction plans and similar 
processes all need the approval of central authorities. When the proposals reach the 
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ministries they decide on them according to their budget. However, these proposals 
further need the approval of the National Assembly and the president.  
 
These factors all have created problems for the administration of the country especially at 
the local level the top-down and bottom-up bureaucracy has made the official system 
inefficient and unattractive. For example, if one debates a legal case in the district it takes 
much time there without reaching any solution. The district forwards the case to the 
province and after sometime the province forwards it to the capital. This long journey of 
bureaucracy is well known as a very inefficient system in Afghanistan. Therefore people 
usually refuse to refer their legal cases to provincial and district institutions due to this 
top-down bureaucracy. The same situation is more or less visible in other departments as 
well.  
 
Furthermore, the hierarchical political system has made the implementation of the 
constitution difficult, since the population is highly dispersed in many regions. The 
communication system is in a very poor condition, it takes a long time (a few days for 
some remote areas) to come from a village to a district, then to a province and finally to 
the capital. The same is true for central institutions, they have little possibility and ability 
to reach remote areas especially in terms of human resources. This remains one of the big 
challenges for the government to penetrate the rural areas and foster its influence.    
 
Nevertheless, the current structure more or less agrees with the constitution which was 
ratified by the Loya Jirga. The fractional rivalries between tribal, religious and 
intellectual elites during the constitutional debate left their impacts and undermined 
creating a document that would safeguard more national interests and a democratic 
system in the country rather than the fractional interests. The centralized system has 
failed repeatedly in the country and the central governments, in order to survive, have 
relied tremendously on feudal networks in the past. The survival of the central 
government in Kabul in the current situation is heavily dependent on foreign aid and 
troops on one hand and on the cooperation and support of Mujahidin and Taliban 
commanders in the provinces and districts on the other. Meanwhile, this dependence on 
external resources and this reliance on commanders has undermined the legitimacy of the 
government. 
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5.2.2 The Determining Role of Qawm in Creating Institution 
What the Bonn Accord agreed on was the establishment of broad-based, multi-ethnic, 
politically balanced and representative institutions. Since then institutions have begun to 
be built. The word ‘Milli’ (national) has been used together with the name of different 
institutions like Shura-e Milli (national assembly), Urdu-e Milli  (national army), Police-
e Mili (national police) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in order to 
demonstrate that these institutions represent the people of Afghanistan. This is also 
emphasized in other cases like the major reconstruction programs National Solidarity 
Program (Hambastagi-ye Milli) and Afghanistan’s National Development Strategy 
(ANDS). Nevertheless, only the name can hardly signify that these institutions are 
‘national’ and the programs are for national purposes. According to AKHGAR “basically 
there is no national institution in Afghanistan, no single one. However, under pressure it 
is possible to call them that they are national” (AKHGAR 2009). The major challenge 
has usually been how to avoid fractional interests and differences between different elites 
running these institutions. The nation is made up of several Aqwam (pl. of Qawm) whose 
members fill the institutions. Thus the dominating elites often mobilize and abuse Qawm 
affiliations to strengthen their individual power basis. This problem has undermined the 
creation of national institutions. Meanwhile, ethnically balanced and representative 
institutions were part of the aims of the Bonn Agreement and were later emphasized in 
the constitution. But how to measure ethnic balance has been one of the problematic 
questions. The political system, power structure and the institutions built in the last seven 
years highlight this problem.  
 
As figure 1 demonstrates, the whole mechanism of institutional administration runs 
around an individual power system. In other word the system is very much personified 
instead of being institutionalized. This means too much power and responsibility is 
concentrated in the hand of one individual (the president) rather than spreading the power 
between institutions although the president has two vice presidents with whom he can 
share some of the responsibilities which are too much for him to handle alone.  However, 
as shown in the figure, the authorities of the two vice presidents are limited to few minor 
ministries while the president holds the key ministries under his control. According to the 
constitutions only in the absence of the president (e.g., his death) the first vice president 
takes over most of the responsibility. The same applies to the second vice president who 
inherits power from the first.  
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Important to notice is the ethnic composition of these three posts in the last five years of 
the elected government in which three major Qawm dominated the three leading 
positions. Karzai, the president, is a Pashtun while his first and second vice presidents are 
Tajik and Hazara, respectively. Dostum, the most well-known Uzbek figure, was 
assigned as Commander in Chief of Armed Forces. Apparently the same hierarchy of 
ethnic groups mentioned in the constitution has been somehow applied in practice in the 
leadership of the institutions. However, the political and geographical background of 
these figures identifies further factors, especially regarding the selection of the two vice 
presidents (cf. Chapter 5.1.1). Ahmad Wali Masoud, the first vice president, is Ahmad 
Shah Masoud’s elder brother. He is from Panjshir province, the stronghold of anti-
Russian and anti-Taliban forces led by Masoud. On the other side Karim Khalili, the 
second vice president is the leader of the Wahdat party (he has succeeded Abdul Ali 
Mazari, Wahdat’s former leader, who was killed by the Taliban). Dostum’s political 
influence remained among the Uzbeks in the North. Furthermore in the 2004 presidential 
elections Muhaqiq and Dostum secured the third and forth place by wining 11.7 and 10 
percent respectively. Therefore holding these people together in the government meant 
keeping different regions connected to the capital. It was more their political influence 
(and the armed forces they had) in the country which assigned them to the leadership, 
especially as the President, who came from the outside and had little or no influence at 
all, desperately needed such alliances.  
 
More recently, in the second presidential election which were held on 20 August 2009, 
there were 41 candidates. By taking the same Qawm issue into consideration many of the 
candidates chose introduced their vice presidents from different ethnic groups. For 
example Karzai, despite repeated attempts in the last seven years was not very successful 
in expanding his influence, especially in his hometown Kandahar in the South and among 
the Pashtuns. A Taliban warning further affected the turnout to be lower, especially in the 
South. Karzai, knewing about this, turned to other ethnic groups in order to make a re-
election possible. He made a coalition with regional powerbrokers, as an alternative, to 
gain more than 50 percent of votes. His strategy was to replace Ahmad Wali Massoud 
with Marshal Qasem Fahim, who was one of Ahmad Shah Masoud’s famous aides. 
Initially, Fahim had been Karzai’s Minister of Defence, but following his removal this 
office he turned to one of Karzai’s major critics. Fahim, together with many others 
Mujahidin leaders, commanders, former communists and those from exile in the West 
(e.g., the former Mujahidin president Burhanuddin Rabbani, the former king’s son 
Mustafa Zahir, Sayid Mustafa Kazemi, Ismail Khan, Mohammad Yunos Qanuni, 
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Aburrashid Dostum, Ahmad Wali Masoud, Sayid Mohammd Gulabzoy) formed Jabha-e 
Mutahid-e Milli (the united national front)99 in order to counterbalance Karzai’s 
dominance. Soon many parties joined the JMM, especially those who were unhappy with 
Karzai administration. Through this coalition of many parties the JMM turned into one of 
the main political opposition of the government and criticized it on different issues. Thus, 
to assure his re-election, Karzai tried all possible ways to buy the loyalty of other political 
oppositions groups. The existence of the powerful JMM was one of the major challenges 
in achieving these goals. In order to weaken the political opposition, Karzai made a 
coalition with Fahim as one of the strongest figure in JMM and announced him as his 
first vice president. The position of Khalili as the Second Vice President remained 
unchanged. 
 
Meanwhile, there is competition and rivalry among the external supporters in favour of a 
particular figure or fraction in Afghanistan. It is like in the period of the communist 
regime when GRU and KGB were supporting Khalq and Parchm fractions separately, 
and they were competing in installing their own candidate into the system. A similar 
rivalry exists between the US Republicans and Democrats over the presidential 
candidates for Afghanistan.  Karzai, who used to be very close to the Republicans in the 
US, has gained little credibility to the Democrats since Barack Obama took over the 
office. Both Karzai and Obama have criticized each other on different issues. The Obama 
administration blamed Karzai for high corruption and Karzai blamed the US for civilian 
casualties in combat. The Democrats seem very reluctant to cooperate with Karzai. This 
became evident last August, when Afghanistan prepared for the second presidential 
election and Karzai nominated himself for a second term of presidency. Initially there 
were 41 candidates, among them Ashraf Ghani, Abudllah Abdullah, Ramazan 
Bashardost, and Mirwais Yasini.100 In the 2004 election Karzai was the only candidate 
supported by the US and European countries. However, the new candidates in the 2009 
election provided an opportunity for the external players to revise their strategy of 
supporting Karzai, whose reputation has sharply declined in the last few years. Therefore 
the US Democrats shifted their support from Karzai to other alternative candidates in the 
election. Prior to the election the US embassy in Kabul invited Ghani, Abdullah and 
Yasini, and these three candidates held a meeting with the ambassador. Karzai officially 
criticized the meeting and said that “foreigners should not intervene in the election 
                                                 
99 Hereafter it will be abbreviated as JMM 
100 Ghani, Abdullah and Bashardost held the ministries of finance, foreign affairs and planning respectively in Karzai’s 
earlier cabinet.   
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processes.” His spokesperson said that “the council of ministers approved that foreign 
ambassadors must organize their meetings through government offices”. At the same 
time, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that “guests [ambassadors] should 
respect the rules of the host” (8AM 2009a: 1, 8AM: 2009b: 2, 8AM 2009: 1, 7). 
 
Due to this tension Karzai could not hope for the support of the US Democrats in the 
coming election. While he was hopeless and worried about loosing the election he 
referred to Dostum and Muahqiq, the two most well-known figures among Uzbek and 
Hazara people. Especially their 21.7 percent share of votes in the last presidential election 
had made them attractive as figures. In order to gain their support Karzai has promised to 
give them some ministerial and other major posts.  This promise seems to have convinced 
them, since they announced their support for Karzai’s candidacy. It is important to know 
that Muhaqiq held Ministry of Planning in Karzai’s first cabinet, but later was fired out. 
Dostum was sacked from his position and the government sent him to exile in Turkey. 
Although he announced his support for Karzai from Turkey he was still not allowed to 
return to Afghanistan. He was allowed to return only three days before elections and after 
his supporters warned the government that they would boycott the election in the absence 
of their leader.101 Dostum’s return raised criticism from the US and its ambassador 
officially forwarded his concern to Karzai’s government. Probably in an attempt to break 
this coalition prior to the election, Obama announced his determination to investigate the 
massacre of Taliban prisoners in 2001 in the North of Afghanistan. This was an incident 
Dostum had been accused of and a case which the Bush and Karzai administrations 
largely ignored because at that time they needed his support in the so called ‘War on 
Terror’. 
 
To measure the ethnic representation balance in the House of Representatives the 
constitution mentions that the population number of each province determines the 
number of seats won by each province. Article 83 in chapter 5 mentions that “the election 
law shall adopt measures to attain, through the electorate system, general and fair 
representation for all the people of the country, proportionate to the population of every 
province, on average, and at least two females from each province shall be the elected 
members of the House of Representatives.” Therefore, the electoral law in chapter 7 and 
                                                 
101 During last field research I was in Kabul when local media showed Dostum being besieged in his house by police 
forces. He was accused of abducting and beating Akabar Bai the head of Turkmen’s Shura (cf. also THE 
AFGHANISTAN DAILY, Nr. 429, 19 Feb. 2008). 
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Article 28 mentions that “the number of each Provincial Council shall be determined in 
the following manner”: 
a) Provinces with less than 500,000 inhabitants: 9 members 
b) Provinces with less than 500,000 – 1,000,000 inhabitants: 15 members 
c) Provinces with less than 1,000,000 – 2,000,000 inhabitants: 19 members 
d) Provinces with less than 2,000,000 – 3,000,000 inhabitants: 23 members 
e) Provinces with more than 3,000,000 inhabitants: 29 members.102 
 
Based on this the number of population of each province became an indicator for 
determining the number of seats in the House of Representatives in the parliamentary 
election of 2005. This means provinces with a higher number of population won the most 
higher seats and those with a smaller number of population won fewer seats. However, 
lack of reliable data and census on the population made the allocation of seats 
controversial. The available census was an estimate based on figures from the year 1979. 
This estimate was without acknowledging the three decades of war and its outcome, 
including migration of millions of people to Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere in the world (cf. 
chapter. 2. 3. 1). In addition to this the allocation of seats according to the electoral law 
creates gaps of representation between provinces with small and large number of 
population. For example, provinces with less than a population of 500,000 (a) receive 
nine seats and provinces with a population of 1,000,000 (b) receive 15 seats. This means 
the difference of population between the two (a and b) is doubled while, in terms of seats, 
the difference is six seats only. The gap further widens when the population figure 
increases further while the number of seats to represent this number declines to four for 
(c) , and (d) provinces while (e) provinces gets six more seats.  
 
Another significant point is the allocation of seats for nomads who with an estimated 
population of 1.5 million, receive ten seats in the House of Representatives. Although a 
majority of the nomads, according to CSO are settled in the country (cf. chapter 2.3.4) 
they receive more seats than propotional to their estimated number. 
 
Nevertheless, the lack of reliable statistical figures and the dominance of the ruling elites, 
especially the Mujahidin, the former communists and the Taliban, undermined the 
representativeness of the House of Representatives. It is significant to see the decline of 
turn out from 70 percent in the presidential elections to 50 percent in the parliamentary 
                                                 
102 Electoral law mentioned in REYNOLDS, JONES and WILDER (2005: 30) 
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election. Elsewhere in the world democracy and parliament become more active through 
political parties.  However, in Afghanistan political parties seem to be little attractive, 
instead tribal and Qawm interests dominate politics. There are more than 105 parties 
officially registered in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ: 2009) but most of them are 
unknown to the public. The main parties that people are familiar with belong to the 
Mujahidin, communists and westernized Afghans, all of whom have reputation problems 
within society.  The government has also shown little interests to institutionalize parties 
and provide a party-based electoral system. The Joint Electoral Management Body 
(JEMB), whose members are employed by the government, claimed that implementation 
of the election under a party-based electoral system was difficult due to the state of 
development of the political parties in Afghanistan in its final report (JEMB 2005: 22).  
 
It is significant to see that after almost eight years, and despite huge international support 
in state-building, state institutions are still weak, society is fragmented and individual 
power bases are strong. State institutions are hardly reliable and representative of the 
population. Instead people rely more on their traditional social networks (family, tribal, 
religious) where they get support. This situation is similar to that of the 60s and 70s when 
a study concluded that “in Afghanistan many social, political and economic rights and 
obligations occur within kinship-oriented, not government-oriented institution” 
(DUPREE 1973: 415). Therefore, the institutions built with the help of the international 
community are fragmented, weak and ineffective. These challenges require a unified and 
effective strategy. However, the diversities of internal and external players in the state-
building process, and their different approaches to the task, have created serious obstacles 
toward developing such a strategy. In order to understand the role of internal and external 
players in the state-building processes it is necessary to analyze them separately.  
 
5.2.3 Identification and Stratification of Main Internal and External Players 
The capacity of a state is measured through the functions of its different institutions, like 
the judiciary, legislative, executive branch, which are among the leading institutions. 
Other indicators such as effectiveness, efficiency, transparency and accountability of 
institutions can be measured through the quality of performance in the determined 
functions of the different sectors. Meanwhile, the institutions are supposed to be the 
decision making bodies while, in practice, the institutional functions are carried out by 
‘capable staff’ like the armed forces, polices, judges, prosecutors and lawyers. They 
practice the ‘legitimate use of force’ and implement the rule of law and order and raise 
revenues. Public services are provided by capable staff like doctors, nurses, engineers, 
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architects, entrepreneurs, managers, planners, administrators and other qualified staff and 
workers in offices and factories. At the same time training this staff requires further 
capable staff like trainers, teachers, lecturers and professors with the appropriate 
educational background and functioning academic institutions. 
 
In the new era of state-building, one of the major challenges Afghanistan faced with is 
providing institutions with capable staff. There is little doubt that state institutions in 
Afghanistan have always been weak in terms of providing their basic services. However, 
the last three decades of war largely affected the population and further deepened the 
problem. Mass migration, which happened at several periods (the fall of monarchy, the 
Soviet invasion, the civil war and Mujahidin and Taliban fighting in the 1990s), caused 
brain drains and a large number of available trained staff was killed by different regimes 
or fled from the country. Many of these professionals also joined different political 
parties and fractions who actively took part in the wars (cf. Chapter 4).  
 
The so called ‘War on Terror’ and its outcome have paved the way for different internal 
and external players in the state-building process. The politically much securer yet still 
unstable situation has at least provided an opportunity for all Afghans to come forward 
and participate. Different groups – Afghans from exile in the West, communists, 
Mujahidin, Taliban and civilians – have seized the opportunity, but this has also created 
uneasy turbulence within the institutions. As time progresses splits between these groups 
are appearing in terms of ideology, identity, religion, ethnicity and professional carreer. 
The participation of these different rival internal groups in the political process became 
possible as a result of the presence, influence, pressure and huge financial resources of 
external groups. The latter often referred to as the ‘international community’, mainly 
consist of the US, NATO, ISAF troops, the UN and hundreds of NGOs, international 
organizations and foreign experts. Among the external players, too, there have been 
differences in terms of the approaches and strategies carried out in the state-building 
process. To analyse in which way different social and political groups participate in state-
building, one has to look at them separately. 
 
Civilian Population 
The civilian population forms the biggest group and is not affiliated to a particular 
political movement; its education is not very high and job skills are not very well 
developed. However, most of the people are high school graduates. Many have 
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experience in administrative work and have, on average, a better education than the 
Mujahidin and Taliban and a wider range of work experience than the Communists. 
 
Most of the students who have graduated from universities and have B. A. degrees but no 
job experience also belong to this group. Sometimes their new occupation does not match 
their backgrounds because of the ineffective distribution of the graduates by the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Affairs. They hold the lower ranks in the bureaucracy and yet groups 
in the higher ranks benefit from them as their B. A.s fill gaps of knowledge and 
experience.  
 
Communists 
The group of communists comprises members of the former PDPA (People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan), as well as the Khalqis and Parchamis fractions. Most were 
educated in former USSR and eastern bloc countries. Some of the key members of these 
groups either joined with the Mujahidin’s government or its opposition groups (the latter 
later merged with the Taliban), some fled to Russia and to the West. The majority of the 
low ranking members of this group remained in the country. Some of them have formed 
new parties and occupy some posts in the government and seats in the parliament.  
Looking at the failure of the Mujahidin in forming a stable functioning government and 
Taliban barbarism they feel a sense of justification.  
 
Mujahidin  
The Mujahidin consist of political and military personnel rather than any managerial or 
administration staff. In other words, they are better for military purposes than social 
services. This is true especially of most of the Mujahidin commanders and sub-
commanders while some of their leaders were students or professors at Kabul University. 
Their education is mainly limited to secondary level schools and training in religious 
schools and they have little knowledge of administration. Moreover, the group includes 
different Islamic parties that are not on very good terms with each other. Their number is 
low but they occupy the higher ranks in the institutions. The Mujahidin in general believe 
that they deserve these posts as a reward for their struggle against the communists and the 
Taliban.  
 
Afghan Taliban  
The Afghan Taliban group includes those who surrendered themselves to the US or 
Afghan forces or have been arrested during the war. Some have been made part of the 
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elected government and the parliament. Karzai’s administration has classified the Taliban 
into moderate and extremist groups. On the ground of this definition the government 
invites the moderate Taliban through regularly messages of welcome to join the 
government. For a few years this welcoming policy has been extended further and now 
covers all extremist members of the Taliban, even their leader Mullah Omar. Many of 
their prominent figures joined the new institutions, some were elected to the Loya Jirga 
of 2002 and others to parliament in 2005. Mullah Raketti is a known figure of the Taliban 
in the House of Representatives, and in last August’s election he was one of the 41 
candidates for the office of the president. In 2006 Sebghatullah Mujadidi, the head of 
House of Elders and the peace commission, announced that around one thousand Taliban 
joined the government and declared themselves committed to the peace process 
(MESHRANO JIRGA 2006: 32-33).  
 
Nevertheless, the main body of the Taliban (cf. Chapter 4.3) has rejected the idea of 
joining the peace process and increased their attacks against the government and 
international forces in recent years. The presence of foreign troops, a foreign backed 
government in power, and finally the modern ruling system in general have provided 
opportunity to manipulate the ideas of different tribes and getting them to join the war.  
In contrast the small number of Taliban that exists within the government has had 
growing influence in the last few years. The restrictive measures carried out by the 
government (banning some TV programs, limiting freedom of speech and arresting 
journalists) have raised public concern about the influence of Taliban ideology in the 
institutions. As a result of this policy Afghanistan’s position in the worldwide freedom of 
press ranking was place 142 between 2006 and 2007, while countries like Pakistan, China 
and Iran were on place 152, 163 and 166, respectably (UNDP 2008: 134). 
 
Returnees from the West “Westernized-Afghans” 
The group of returnees from exile in the West includes all Afghans who came from exile 
and joined the post-Taliban state-building process. They are known in the western media 
as technocrats while inside the country they are called ‘Westerners’ (Gharbi ha). Having 
been educated in and having lived many years in the West, they are very much supported 
by the USA and EU and are often sent to fill important posts in different institutions. 
They occupy very high-ranking posts in the government (ministers, vice ministers, 
advisors etc.) and receive extraordinarily high salaries paid in US dollars. This group find 
it difficult working in government institutions because of the high expectations from all 
staff, and also because of the lack of equipment and facilities.   
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Another problem with this group is that they are less reliable as state-builders, firstly 
because they are temporarily based in Kabul while their families are abroad, and, 
secondly, because with western passports they have a second identity. The issue of dual 
passport holders in particular is an obstacle to effective leadership in the country. 
According to OECD ‘ownership,’ which is defined as a “country’s ability to exercise 
effective leadership over its development projects and strategies”, is critical to achieving 
development results. In Afghanistan one of the major challenges to ownership is “the 
high level of dual passport holders” (OECD 2006b: 1). 
 
They will co-operate with the government (and foreigners) only as long as they receive 
high salaries and are incumbents of high ranking posts. Should these perks be terminated, 
they will leave the country.  However it is stated in the new constitution that the president 
and his ministers should be Afghan and that no one can be a minister while having two 
citizenships. This item was required to be mentioned in the constitution in an effort by the 
Mujahidin group to exclude the returnees from the high-ranking government posts.  
 
Foreigners  
This group consists of foreigners who indirectly run the government of Afghanistan. It 
carries out the main functions of the government like maintaining security and 
reconstruction programs. At the G8 meeting in April 2002 in Geneva the responsibility  
of leading the five pillars of Afghanistan’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme 
was assigned to the five leading donor-nations: military, the US; police, Germany; 
judicial reform, Italy; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-
combatants, Japan; and Counter-narcotics, the UK (WILDER 2007: 19, MOBEKK 2005: 
15). Unlike the case of other groups, for the foreigners there are figures which show their 
number and activities, especially for the US, NATO and ISAF forces in different parts of 
Afghanistan (map 20, table 18).   
 
As illustrated in map 20 and table 18, the number of foreign troops varies in terms of 
their country of origin as well as in the regional distribution in Afghanistan. The most 
significant message, however, is that the national institutions are very weak and have 
little capacity to maintain security, rule of law and public order the very basic functions. 
In other words foreign troops carry out the job of the Afghan army and Afghan police. 
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Map 20: Distribution of foreign troops in Afghanistan 
Source: ISAF (2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Number of foreign troops with reference to the sending countries 
Source: ISAF (2009) 
 
Moreover, this situation attributes to Afghanistan one of the characteristics of a ‘fragile 
state’, because if these forces pull out any time soon the government will not be able to 
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control the situation. As a result chaos will return to the country and whatever has been 
achieved in the last few years will be lost. Therefore foreign countries who send these 
troops are the key external players in the political process of Afghanistan.  
 
The number of external players extends beyond military forces and extends to civil 
services as well. This is because the government has been unable (and often unwilling) to 
provide other public services (e.g., healthcare, education, infrastructure, capacity-
building, training) properly as well. As a result, the gap is filled by a huge number of 
NGOs which have added to the number of actors. The idea of NGOs initially emerged in 
the late 1980s and with the break out of civil war and the disintegration of state 
institutions, their number has dramatically increased. In 2004 there were more than 2000 
NGOs registered with the Ministry of Planning (UNDP 2004: 158). This number, of 
course, included national and international NGOs. They usually carry out activities like 
reconstruction, provision of public services, education, training, and health across the 
country. They usually implement their projects independently from the government while 
enjoying large share of the aids (financial and material) provided for Afghanistan by the 
donor countries. Due to security problems most of these NGOs were and still are based in 
Kabul which turned the capital into “the chessboard of international donors” 
(DITTMANN 2006: 4). In 2005 Bashardost, Minister of Planning, criticized the role of 
NGOs and called them as “the new Al-Qaeda” (BUSSE 2005: 3). This criticism led to 
huge pressure on him, as a result of which he resigned and later the Ministry of Planning 
was dissolved. It is striking that since then many ministers have been appointed who had 
been working in NGOs. In other words they are NGO-made ministers, and following 
their appointment the criticism of NGOs has declined.  
 
To sum up the analysis of these different internal and external groups, there are three 
main problems among the staff of institutions. The first one is that there are remarkable 
differences in the terms of employment, salary, identity and political ideology among the 
staff members. The second problem is the insufficient number of staff in different 
institutions at national and sub-national level. The third problem is the insufficient 
qualification and experience of a huge portion of available staff. For better analysis each 
problem has to be highlighted (table 19). 
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Table 19: Internal and external layers in the state-building process 
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) 
 
 
In terms of hierarchy the groups with lower numbers are in the top positions. The 
returnees from the West are at the top while the communists, Mujahidin and Taliban 
remain in the second top positions. The civilians, representing the highest number possess 
the lowest position in this hierarchy. The ruling elite changed from time to time, 
however, the civilians constituted the more stable staff of the institutions. This does not 
deny the fact the rivalries of other groups largely affected the number and qualification of 
civilians at different periods. In this hierarchy the foreigners mainly support the returnees 
from the West while they criticize the Mujahidin and Taliban.  
 
There is also little difference between the four internal groups at the top (the returnees, 
the Mujahidin, the communists and the Taliban) and the three tribal, religious and 
intellectual elites who dominated the politics of the country in the last century. It can be 
said that the Mujahidin and the Taliban demonstrate a combination of religious and tribal 
elites respectively. The same holds true for the communists and the returnees from the 
West, both of whom represent the intellectual elites.  
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However, in terms of ethno-linguistic issues sometimes the distinction between these 
groups becomes very more complicated, especially when ethnic (Qawm), linguistic, 
regional, and religious affiliations precede political ideologies. This factor especially 
comprises the major characteristics of the intellectual elites (communists and returnees), 
since their members represent a high number of ethno-nationalists (Qawm-garayan) who 
established their parties between 1960 and the 1970s either officially or underground 
(e.g., Khalq, Parcham, Afghan Millat,Shula-e Jawid and Setam-e Milli). One of the 
reasons behind their ethno-nationalism (Qawm-garayi) may be that they lack popular 
support in society (especially in rural areas). They use ethno-nationalism as an instrument 
to maintain their influence and gain support. Although the Mujahidin and Taliban both 
have claimed their loyalty to religion and denied any ethno-linguistic favouritism, this 
has remained theory while in practice Qawm, tribe, and regional favouritism prevails. 
The composition of both groups highlights significantly how Qawm affiliations have 
been important among them (cf. Chapter 2.3.1).   
 
In general there have been serious problems between these rival groups in the past. 
However, in the last few years these rivalries have undermined the effectiveness of 
institutions (cf. Chapter 2.3.1). The rival groups support regionalism, Qawm and ethno-
linguistic and religious affiliations rather than the national interest of the entire 
population and the country. Institutions are fragmented, power rivalries continue, and 
cooperation among the groups has remained at its lowest level. More importantly, 
mistrust between rival groups has led to the exclusion of the opposition from the 
institutions. The situation is fragile and if there would be no foreign troops in 
Afghanistan to control the situation, a military rivalry among the groups would be 
imminent.  
 
The above classification of different groups in the decision making process highlights 
‘willingness’ as one of the main indicators of state fragility. However, to better 
understand the characteristics of Afghanistan as a ‘fragile state’, it is crucial to analyse 
the ‘capacity’ of its institution. In other words, while the three elites dominate the 
political power there is little information about their number. However, there is some 
quantitative data which can highlight the general number of staff and their quality of 
performance in the institutions.  
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5.3 Poor Institutional Capacity and the Insufficient Number of ‘Capable Staff’ 
In order to measure institutional capacity it is necessary to focus on the number of 
available staff and to analyse its quality of performance. This will help to understand 
whether state institutions have the necessary capacity and capability in different sectors.  
There are certain clear-cut functions for state institutions like the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, maintaining security, rule of law and public order. These 
functions are performed by the police and armed forces, and capable staff who carry out 
public service manage the bureaucracy of the state.  
 
In the last eight years the building institutions started almost from scratche especially in 
the security sectors like the ANA and ANP forces. There were thousands of armed 
groups belonging to different Mujahidin fractions in the country. In order to disarm and 
reintegrate these groups into political, social and economic life the government 
announced a three year Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) in 2002. 
This programme was backed by UNDP and UNAMA with Japan as the lead donor, and it 
implemented the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) process. By June 
2006 the DDR process was completed and, as a result, over 63,300 ex-combatants were 
disarmed and demobilized and 56,000 ex-combatants completed the reintegration phase 
(UNDP 2006: 12).  
 
5.3.1 The Weak Security and Justice Sector 
The Bonn Accord determined the number of ANA to be 70,000 and ANP 62,000 troops 
(AFGHANISTAN COMPACT 2006: 6). However, since 2002 when the recruiting and 
training started the initial estimates have proved to be insufficient. Therefore in every 
meeting the issue of increasing the number of ANA and ANP was one of the major topics 
between the Afghan government and the major international donors. Due to the growing 
demands in terms of maintaining security in the country, efforts were made to increase 
the number of ANA and ANP troops. Recently the number of ANA has reached around 
82,720 troops and the number of ANP to 76,000 troops (NATO 2009: 13, 16, ISAF 
2009). In February 2008, in Tokyo, the international community’s Joint Coordination and 
Monitoring Board (JCMB) endorsed a target ceiling for the ANA of 80,000 by 2010, 
including 6000 trainers. The target ceiling for the ANP that has been agreed upon is     
82,180 by the same date. (ANDS 2009: 56-58, NATO 2008: 8, NATO 2009: 16). 
However, a new target ceiling was agreed on later to increase the size of the ANA from 
80,000 at the end of 2010 to 134,000 by 2014 (MC KIERNAN 2008: 14). 
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The above figures are not the final target since the size of the ANA and ANP have 
changed from time to time and crossed the pre-determined specific targets.  This is to be 
seen in the rapid increase of ANA from its former target ceilings. By July 2009 the 
number of ANA reached to 91,900 troops which is significant. The JCMB had earlier 
ruled out increasing the size of the ANP to 94,000 (JCMB 2007: 4), but nowadays there 
are intentions both from the government and the international community to reconsider 
their earlier decision. 103 
 
Parallel to the growth of the ANA and ANP the number of ISAF forces from more than 
40 countries has also increased. In 2002, under UN mandate, ISAF forces were deployed 
to Kabul to maintain security in the capital and to provide the opportunity for the AIA, 
ATA and international organizations and NGOs to start their activities. In 2003 ISAF had 
5,581 troops, but later the demands on ISAF grew in other regions of Afghanistan. Since 
then the ISAF numbers have increased to 31,000 in October 2006, and by July 2009 they 
have reached 64,500 troops and their mission has been expanded to different regions of 
the country (figure 22).  
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Figure 22: The growth of ISAF, US, ANA, and ANP forces since 2003  
Draft KOHISTANI (2009) Source: Figures from ISAF (2009), MOD (2009), MARSDEN and ARNOLD-
FOSTER (2007: 25), UNDP (2004a: 135), UNDP (2007a: 32, 83, 167), NEW YORK TIMES (2009) 
 
                                                 
103 As part of his election campaign Karzai said that if he was re-elected he would increase the size of the ANA to 
260,000 and the ANP to 160,000 troops (DAILY OUTLOOK AFGHANISTAN 2009c: 2009). However, he gave no 
further details on how Afghanistan will be able to provide financial resources for such a big demand. 
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As shown in figure 22 the US forces constitute the major share of ISAF, however, it also 
unilaterally leads the OEF forces, which constitute around 32,000 troops.104 To make the 
OEF effective and to gain support form local people, the US and its allies carried out 
small scale reconstruction projects especially in remote rural areas which were and still 
are beyond the reach of the central government. In 2002 the US launched such programs 
under the name Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The aim of these programs was 
to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local people.   
 
Further, the idea of the PRT was to use small joint civil-military teams to expand the 
legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by supporting 
security reforms and facilitating the reconstruction process (JAKOBSEN 2005: 11). The 
PRTs have been involved in building schools, health clinics, bridges, roads and similar 
humanitarian activities, mostly in rural areas. Usually provincial and district Shuras 
cooperate by discussing their needs with the PRTs. 
 
Nevertheless, despite these attempts the high level of troops together with PRT programs 
had little success in reducing the violence in the country. Altogether, the total number of 
foreign troops exceeds 100,000 in Afghanistan. These together with more than 160,000 
ANA and ANP troops have not been able to defeat the Taliban, maintain security and the 
rule of law, or extend the control of central government to the provinces, districts and 
sub-districts. The Taliban are now stronger than in the first years following their removal 
from power in late 2001. They have many districts under their control and they 
occasionally target major cities, including the capital. This raise doubts that increasing 
the number of troops (Afghans and foreigners) has not been very effective in providing 
security and the rule of law, as had been anticipated earlier. However, the number is still 
far from enough for a country like Afghanistan, which has a highly dispersed population, 
poor communication systems, a rough topography and long permeable and uncontrollable 
borders. Moreover, if the ANA and ANP together with foreign troops cannot maintain 
security now, they will never be able to do so after the withdrawal of foreign troops. This 
means their number should be increased to a certain level so that they would be capable 
of maintaining security on their own and to fill the gaps once foreign troops withdraw.  
 
In addition foreign troops are equipped with highly developed technology and enjoy large 
financial resources, while both factors are hardly accessible for the ANA and ANP. 
                                                 
104 The number of US troops in Afghanistan is around 62,000 forces of which by last July 29,950 were part of ISAF 
and the rest 32, 050 troops, were under  US command in OEF.  
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Technically the ANA and ANP forces are badly equipped and they usually face 
challenges in operations. They lack air force and air power. The quality of the equipment 
they received is not satisfactory. This equipment has repeatedly undermined the ability of 
the ANA and ANP forces during field operations. The military equipment used to be 
imported from the USSR, and actually the entire military system was Russian. This 
military system, its infrastructure and equipment was destroyed during the civil war. In 
the past seven years ISAF and NATO have been reluctant to provide their own products 
to Afghan security forces. Instead they imported Russian system military equipment from 
Eastern European countries (e.g., the Czech Republic, and the Ukraine), that is often old 
and second-hand.   
 
There are other major factors like poor quality of training and low salary level which 
have made the available number of troops ineffective in their functions. Poor quality of 
training has been one of the major challenges for the ANA and ANP. In the last seven 
years the number of ANA and ANP has increased significantly. However, the quality of 
performance of the armed and police forces is very poor. The first problem is that those 
who joined the ANA and ANP have been poorly educated or they are illiterate. Most of 
the former Mujahidin fighters, after DDR105 process, were integrated into the ANA first 
and later more gradually into the ANP. Although there is little data to indicate the literacy 
rate among them, it can be estimated that the majority of the soldiers and policemen are 
illiterate. This factor of illiteracy of course affects their training and also their behaviour 
in public. This is especially the case with the ANP, who are in closer contact with people. 
The next problem is the new system of volunteer-based recruitment implemented by the 
government. Unlike in the past, when military service was compulsory, anyone (men) 
above 18 and below 35 can voluntarily join ANA in the current system. The high level of 
unemployment in the country usually attracts uneducated poor young men, especially 
from rural areas, to join ANA as the only alternative to survive.  
 
In the case of the ANP fractionalism has been a dominating factor from the beginning. 
Many commanders from different fractions succeeded in recruiting their own militia to 
sustain their rule. Training such trainees becomes useless since they remain loyal to their 
commanders or to the ‘strongmen’ who supported their recruitment. In the case of low 
discipline and disobedience even the foreign trainers could not expel them, because these 
                                                 
105 disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) 
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recruits will be backed by ‘strongmen’ in the government.106 As illustrated in (figure 22) 
the number of ANP had a sudden grow and started from a high level, unlike the number 
of ANA which started to grow gradually. This is possibly the result of a high level of 
nepotism and corruption, which has facilitated the process of recruitment.  
 
Meanwhile, poor education is a problem among most of the officers, too. Especially 
former Mujahidin have only a minimum of education (primary or sometimes secondary 
school), and those who have graduated from 12 years of school are rarely available. The 
non-Mujahidin officers (especially in the lower ranks), those who belong to the former 
communist regime, did not finish 12 years of school either. They joined military and 
police special courses from grade 6 to 9, which used to be the only requirement in that 
period to qualify them as officers. 
 
Apart from the level of education, the training quality that ANA and ANP forces receive 
has been very poor. Since the beginning of the training major efforts were concentrated 
on filling the gap of armed and police forces in a rapid way, while little attention was 
paid to the quality of training of these forces. In the 1980s the Soviet-backed regime in 
Kabul faced a similar shortage of personnel and security challenges, while thousands of 
Soviet troops filled the gap. In order to overcome this challenge, the government 
provided short term courses (usually three, six or nine months) which trained officers. 
However, the people in the country, finding the training period insufficient, made jokes 
about those who graduated these courses. They called graduated officers from these 
courses as ‘Zabetak haye Mashini’ (machine-made officers). There have been similar 
short-term courses to train officers in the post-Taliban era by NATO and ISAF. This time 
the trainees did not need a few months to become officers but only a few weeks. It is 
striking to see how these officers with very low qualification can train their soldiers and 
lead combat operations. Moreover, the number of trainers was also very insufficient. Out 
of 434 police and army foreign trainers promised by NATO only 93 were deployed last 
year (KORSKI 2008: 4).  
 
                                                 
106 “A Canadian trainer in Kandahar described the situation:  ‘Unfortunately, what's happening throughout the region 
[South] is that the initial influx of candidates that we're receiving for this training,….  majority of them are militias 
from governors… I actually witnessed, on the first ANP training course, we expelled a number of students for 
inappropriate behavior,…they refused to follow direction. The regional training commander wanted them expelled. 
Immediately, the phone calls started coming in from the governor, saying, 'Why are you doing this?' [and] from Wali 
Karzai, [President’s brother] saying, 'You know, these are good people, don't expel them.' And the very next day the 
governor came to the regional training centre." In fact, that group of recruits didn't drop out; they were kicked out, for 
refusing to follow orders” (WILDER 2007: 16).  
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The low salary of the ANA and ANP is another important factor which determines their 
performance. In the beginning of the training for they did not receive their salaries 
properly. Although later the payment came to a normal and proper level but the small 
amount paid monthly could hardly fulfil the needs of a family. On the other hand even 
this small salary amounts to a huge part of the government budget, especially if their 
number grows. In its annual report the Ministry of Finance mentioned that it “will only 
fund salary and fund food for a maximum number of 70,000 ANA personnel. The 
additional amount of budget can only be accommodated in the budget of the Ministry of 
Defence based on the firm commitment by a donor to support additional troops” (MOF 
2009 17).  
 
From the beginning of training the ANA, the international community has been paying 
the largest share of the budget. The main concern is how this volunteer-based system can 
survive, especially when there is no funding from the international community, the 
government will not be able to pay this huge expenditure. In the long term there are at 
least three major challenges ahead for ANA and ANP: filling the vacuum of foreign 
troops one day when they withdraw, sustaining themselves without foreign aid, and 
avoiding fractionalism and remaining loyal to the central government. 
 
Next to the security institutions it is the judiciary which remains very weak in performing 
its function. The main factors which contribute to its weaknesses stem from poor human 
resources, a small number of qualified judges, low salaries and inadequate facilities and 
infrastructure especially in provinces and districts. In 2007 one study reported the total 
number of judges to be 1107 (UNDP 2007a: 8). This number was distributed unequally in 
among 34 provinces: Kabul holding 14 percent of population, had 24 percent or 265 
judges, the highest number in the country. In the rest of 33 provinces the number of 
judges varied from 72 in Nangarhar (the second after Kabul) to 5 in Uruzgan. The 
distribution of judges did not fill the requirements of a number of districts, since each 
Primary Court at district level requires three judges. 
 
The judiciary sector has a hierarchical structure which has made difficult the possibility 
of communication between these institutions at the central, provincial and district level. 
According to a survey carried out in 2007, 82.8 percent of judges did not have access to 
written decisions of the Supreme Court based in Kabul. In addition, the judiciary sector 
suffers from a shortage of professional staff. Around 44 percent of the judges that have 
B.A. degrees have graduated from the faculty of theology (Sharaiyat), and 11.6 percent 
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from the faculty of law. The remaining 7.7 percent is constituted of those who were 
educated in other religious schools (inside and outside the country) (UNDP 2007a: 71). 
The high percentage of judges from the Faculty of Theology represents the strong role of 
Shariah law in the judiciary sector (cf. Chapter 3.2). 
 
The above factors have negatively affected the effectiveness of the judiciary sector in the 
country. In addition to that low salaries (between $35-50 a month) for the judges have 
further undermined their loyalty to the rule of law and increased corruption in the system. 
This factor has made the judiciary sector unattractive, since the public prefers to find 
alternative ways to solve their problems (e.g., traditional Shura and Jirga). This is 
because the official judiciary sector does not only cost much money but also because it 
takes more time, and, more importantly, the decision made at the end is often not fair due 
to corruption.  
 
5.3.2 The Insufficiently Qualified Administrative Staff 
There is available data which can highlight the general situation of governance and 
administration in the country. Such data helps to understand the capability of the 
available staff on the central and local level. According to CSO, in 2007, the total number 
of employees in different ministries and departments was 304,881 including the civil staff 
of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior. Comparing this figure with 2003 
and 2005, where the total number of staff was 239,081 and 295,169 respectively, the new 
figure shows a rapid increase in the number of staff (CSO 2007: 13). The general number 
of staff was divided into two categories, permanent employees and contract-based 
employees. The permanent staff, numbering 216,919 was constituted by the skilled and 
educated staff. The rest, 87,962, comprised the contract-based staff who were non-skilled 
and uneducated (table 20).107 In other words over 40 percent of the total number of staff, 
which is a high proportion, was not educated. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
107 The CSO described them as service personnel and worker (Parsonal-e Khedamati wa Kargaran) (CSO 2007: 13) 
which is an official and common term used for those female and male (often old) workers. They are responsible for 
carrying letters and document between offices, cleaning, cooking, making tea and they are often employed as 
caretakers. There is a very small number of educated staff among them which includes those who retired from one 
office and re-employed in another.  
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On the other hand the number of educated staff also varies in terms of their degree and 
their distribution in different sectors. From the total figure there were 19,565 with a B.A., 
3,597 with an M.A., and only 202 with Ph.D. degrees. Thus the number of Ph.D. and M. 
A. are strikingly low especially when it includes the ministry of higher education, and 
and ministry of education in the country. Out of 202 members of staff with a Ph.D. 
degree 119 were in the Ministry of Higher education. In contrast there is no single 
member of staff with a Ph.D. degree in many ministries, among them those of Education 
and Public Health. These two important ministries that deal with education and health 
care, two fundamental part of public service, also employ a large proportion of the staff. 
The education sector, for example, had the highest share with a number of 181, 603 staff 
or 60 percent of the total figure. This number includes all teachers and administration 
staff of schools and related offices in the country, including the Ministry of Education. 
The health sector comprised 13,371 staff, which constitutes 4.4 percent of the total figure. 
Both sectors filled the gap of Ph.D.s with those who had M.A. and B.A. degrees, whereas 
the Ministry of Education employs 400 people with M.A. and 7,677 with B.A. degrees. 
The Ministry of Public Health employed 890 people with M.A. and 2,414 with B.A. 
degrees (table 20).  
 
The next sectors which had the highest percentages of staff were Kabul Municipality and 
the Ministry of Agriculture, with 3.3 and 3.2 percent respectively. In Kabul Municipality, 
out of 10,063 members of staff none had a Ph.D., 102 had an M.A. and 129 B.A., while 
the remaining staff were between undergraduate to over 8,767 mostly illiterate workers.    
Meanwhile, despite agriculture being regarded as a very important sector in Afghanistan, 
it is striking to see that out of 9,770 members of staff in the Ministry of Agriculture only 
5 had Ph.D., 94 had an M.A. and 1,280 had only a B.A. degree (table 20). Thus there is 
little doubt that small numbers of qualified staff affect the functions and performance of 
institutions in different sectors and undermine the provision of effective public service. 
 
While the above figures illustrate the general number of staff in the country, the 
distribution of the staff varies greatly between the capital, the provinces and districts. In 
other words there is a huge geographical disparity and the number of staff is not 
distributed equally according to the share of population. Therefore the functions and 
capability of institutions varies between the centre and the provinces. Out of the general 
number of staff, 86038 were based in the capital and the remaining 218,843 constituted 
the official staff in 33 provinces. This is to say that Kabul with 14 percent of population, 
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enjoyed 28 percent of the staff, which is double than its share of population. In contrast 
Daikundi in the South with 1.8 percent of population received only 0.2 percent of staff 
which is eight times lower than its share of population (table 21). 
 
Population % of Popu. Total No. % of Total
No. of in Per of Staff per Staff per
Districts 2006-2007 Province Province Province Total Female Total Female
Kabul 14 3,138,100 13.9 86,038 28.2 56,546 23,144 29,492 4,316
Kapisa 6 382,600 1.7 6,702 2.2 4,601 433 2,101 19
Parwan 9 573,100 2.5 10,580 3.5 7,561 419 3,019 69
Panjsher 6 133,200 0.6 1,871 0.6 1,346 187 525 86
Bamyan 6 387,300 1.7 5,012 1.6 3,351 532 1,661 26
Maidan-Wardlak 8 517,200 2.3 6,856 2.2 4,934 298 1,922 9
Logar 6 339,700 1.5 5,702 1.9 3,897 72 1,805 23
Samangan 6 334,800 1.5 4,114 1.3 2,368 238 1,746 13
Balkh 14 1,096,100 4.9 19,007 6.2 13,957 3,513 5,050 250
Jawzjan 10 461,700 2.0 6,232 2.0 4,795 1,608 1,437 104
Sar-i-Pul 6 482,900 2.1 4,380 1.4 3,423 470 957 39
Faryab 13 858,600 3.8 8,720 2.9 7,074 1,644 1,646 114
Ghazni 18 1,062,600 4.7 8,269 2.7 6,503 669 1,766 226
Paktika 18 377,100 1.7 4,721 1.5 3,848 384 873 3
Paktya 10 477,500 2.1 6,336 2.1 4,167 396 2,169 135
Khost 12 498,000 2.2 6,150 2.0 4,995 35 1,155 105
Nangarhar 21 1,289,000 5.7 11,797 3.9 10,135 581 1,662 81
Kunarha 14 390,200 1.7 3,049 1.0 852 305 2,197 16
Laghman 4 386,400 1.7 4,713 1.5 3,771 314 942 6
Nooristan 7 128,400 0.6 2,154 0.7 1,585 49 569 7
Badghis 6 429,500 1.9 2,401 0.8 1,626 165 775 12
Herat 16 1,578,200 7.0 18,229 6.0 12,995 3,435 5,234 255
Farah 10 438,000 1.9 4,104 1.3 3,098 439 1,006 7
Ghor 9 598,600 2.7 4,158 1.4 3,142 178 1,016 7
Badakhshan 27 823,000 3.6 9,864 3.2 8,155 2,749 1,709 109
Takhar 16 845,300 3.7 10,865 3.6 9,481 1,547 1,384 209
Baghlan 14 779,000 3.5 14,751 4.8 11,026 1,456 3,725 100
Kunduz 6 851,300 3.8 8,512 2.8 6,039 1,267 2,473 89
Nimroz 4 141,400 0.6 1,663 0.5 1,223 628 440 38
Helmand 12 799,000 3.5 4,986 1.6 2,661 391 2,325 17
Kandahar 15 1,011,700 4.5 9,013 3.0 5,097 512 3,916 43
Zabul 9 263,200 1.2 1,556 0.5 1,081 49 475 7
Urozgan 4 303,600 1.3 1,673 0.5 1,250 112 423 31
Daykundi 8 399,600 1.8 703 0.2 336 214 367 14
Total 364 22,575,900 100.0 304,881 100.0 216,919 48,433 87,962 6,585
Provinces
Permanent Government
Permanent Staff Contract Workers
 
Table 21: Number of staff with reference their share in population and provinces 
Draft KOHISTANI (2009)       Source: Figures from CSO (2007) 
 
As illustrated in table 21, the disparity of staff between the capital and the provinces, and 
in different sectors is high. Though the figures gave no information about the number of 
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staff at district level, the disparity becomes even larger when considering population 
number and number of districts in each province. In other words the number of 
administrative staff declines sharply between capital and provinces, and between the 
provinces and districts. In the sub-districts there is often no sign of state bureaucracy and 
administration. State administration and bureaucracy have not yet reached beyond the 
district level. In the districts there are often only a few buildings that represent some 
minimal administration, usually for education, health and staff of the ministry of interior.  
 
Another significant factor is the existence of female staff, which plays an important role 
in increasing the number of staff. A higher number of staff is usually to be seen in 
provinces where there is also female staff. Thus the disparity in terms of gender is also 
high between the capital and the provinces. After the capital other major provinces like 
Balkh, Herat and Badakhshan have the highest number of female staff. The major 
difference is between the northern and the southern provinces, as the number of female 
staff is increasing in the North. This highlights the fact that in the South cultural issues 
prohibit women to work outside of their homes. 
 
Meanwhile there is a close relation between the availability of basic infrastructure for 
public services (e.g., hospitals, health clinics, and schools) and the staff who run them 
(e.g., doctors, nurses and teachers). In the provision of such services the geographical 
location of the provinces plays an important role. Kabul, with 22 hospital and 1,315 
doctors and 3, 665 nurses, again has the highest share compared to other provinces (table 
22). Next to that are other major provinces (e.g., Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, Jawzjan and 
Ghazni) with high numbers of doctors and nurses which are located along the main roads 
connecting these provinces. Other provinces, which are located away from the main roads 
(e.g., Bamyan, Daikundi Ghor, Nooristan, Kunar, Farah, Nimroz, Urzgan, Zabul), are 
marginalized and suffer from the small number of doctors and nurses.  
 
The number of hospitals and health clinics varies in the provinces beyond Kabul. There is 
little doubt that in the last few years the number of hospitals and health clinics has 
increased. As illustrated in table 5 there is still a disparity between the provinces. Except 
Nooristan all other provinces have at least one hospital, comparing the number of beds in 
these hospitals highlights their minimum capacity. This gives an indication of the fact 
that these hospital which are usually located in provincial centers are small and cannot 
respond the demands of the whole population of the province. Furthermore, there is 
usually no paved road system to link these provinces with the capital. Though the 
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centralized system emphasizes the close relation of center to the periphery, in practice 
this relationship is very poor. Topographical factors often create obstacles in 
communication between the capital and the provinces and villages and provincial centres. 
This especially is one of the major challenges in winter in some mountainous eastern and 
central regions where snowfall blocks the available unpaved roads.  
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5.3.3 The Challenge of Brain-Drain Posed by NGOs 
There is little doubt that the NGOs pose certain challenges to the effectiveness of state 
institutions in Afghanistan. One of the major challenges is that they cause brain-drain for 
the institutions. This factor in particular affects the capability of institutions. The NGOs 
often pay far more salary to capable and qualified staff than the government. This factor 
in particular makes jobs in NGOs more attractive and, as a result, many prefer to leave 
their official jobs and get a new one in NGOs. As the number of NGOs has grown 
dramatically to more than 2000 since 2004 (UNDP 2004: 158) so has the number of their 
staff. Although there is no precise data to show their number one estimate shows around 
50,000 employees working in different NGOs, UN and bilateral and multi-lateral 
agencies where they receive salaries up to USD 1000 per month (GHANI and 
LOCKHART 2008: 100). However, the level of salary varies according to the position of 
the employees. For example those employees with minimum or no education usually as 
caretakers, cleaners or drivers, receive lower salaries (approximately USD100 - 500 a 
month). Those who are better educated and are qualified are paid between approximately 
USD 600 up to few thousand a month. Better education here means a university level 
degree, knowledge of English and computer skills. The latter two are of fundamental 
importance in working in NGOs. 
 
Another impact of NGOs is that they undermine the credibility of the elected government 
in providing basic services for its growing population. The role of NGOs may be justified 
in short term where the government cannot alone respond to the problem the lack of basic 
services. However, as seen in the last years, the credibility, effectiveness and capacity of 
the elected government has not improved reasonably. In contrast, the role of NGOs has 
grown and their activities have expanded to different sectors and regions of the country.  
 
5.3.4 Corruption: 
Corruption is another main challenge which has weakened institutions in different sectors 
and undermined their effective functions. A recent study shows that within the Afghan 
state the courts are perceived as the most corrupt institutions, followed by the 
administrative braches of the government, mainly the Ministry of Interior, the 
municipalities and the National Security Directorate (UNDP 2007a: 61). The Afghan 
National Police (ANP), the job of whom it is to provide security is perceived to be the 
“most corrupt and criminal” organ of the state, followed by National Directorate of 
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Security (MUENCH 2009: 18).108 The government has also acknowledged the existence 
of corruption in different sectors and recognized it as a major challenge. In recent years 
the government came under huge pressure, especially from international donors, to 
reduce corruption, to bring order into institutions, and to improve governance. The 
government established the General Independent Administration of Anti-Corruption 
(GIAAC) in order to demonstrate its commitment in the struggle against corruption. 
However, the problem is so wide-spread and has manifested in so many different sectors 
across the country, e.g., security, judiciary and administration, that this task is beyond the 
capability of the GIAAC. The capability and performance of the GIAAC is limited to 110 
staff 60 of whom have only B.A. degrees, 17 who are undergraduates, and 32 who have 
little or no education at all.  
 
Meanwhile Afghanistan has an old administrative structure which has survived repeated 
political changes. According to the WORLD BANK, the administrative managements of 
Afghanistan is highly centralized, yet provides a coherent management and 
accountability framework for government. Nevertheless, the government administration 
is far from effective, and suffers from a number of systemic problems, including the 
following:  
I. Fragmented administrative structures, with many overlapping and unnecessary functions. 
II. Lack of skilled professionals with management and administrative experience, and the Taliban’s  
dismissal of women staff resulted in a very serious gender imbalance. 
III. Pay and grading structures are unable to attract, retain, and motivate skilled civil servants. 
IV. Merit-based recruitment procedures are absent, resulting in patronage appointments. 
V. Mechanisms for performance management are inadequate. 
VI. Administrative systems are slow and cumbersome, with virtually no delegation of authority to 
lower ranks or to provincial departments. (WORLD BANK 2005:44): 
 
 According to the traditional structure there are 1-10 ranks for the civil servants. In this 
rank structure 10 is the lowest and is given to the new employees who have only 
graduated from high school. Employees with B.A., M.A. and Ph.D. degrees get 9, 8, and 
7 respectively. The highest rank is the first, and the promotion to each rank needs three 
years. In order to restructure the old system the government passed the Priority Reform 
and Restructuring Decree (PRR), the aim of which has been to reform and modernize the 
most critical functions of the government. In June 2003 the government established the 
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), which 
                                                 
108 "Uebergreifend wird dabei die ANP als der korrupteste und kriminellste Teil der Sicherheitskraefte 
wahrgenommen, gefolgt vom staatlichen Nachrichtendienst (National Directorate of Security, NDS (MUENCH 
2009:18).“ 
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became responsible for appointments and appeals, civil service management and 
administrative reform. The WORLD BANK believes that the IARCSC is pivotal to 
achieving significant improvement throughout the civil services, especially in human 
resource management, and specifically in embedding the principle and practice of merit-
based recruitment and promotion (WORLD BANK 2005: 52). However, how can the 
IARCSC be good at the management of the human resource in different sectors while it 
has capacity problems within its own structure? Even two years after that estimate by the 
WORLD BANK the IARCSC had a staff of only 339 members one with a Ph.D., 12 with 
an M.A., 166 with a B.A.,  9 who had graduated 14 years of school and 55 who graduated 
from 12 years of high school. The remaining 95 persons are uneducated and unskilled 
workers (cf. table 20). 
 
The problem of corruption cannot be tackled only by restructuring the old system into a 
new one as long as the payment system remains remarkably low in different sectors. A 
recent study of the level of salaries among different social groups shows that the Taliban 
pays more than the government for its security forces and civil service staff (table 23).  
 
Afghanis USD
Workshop worker 1,125 $23
Nurse 1,500 $30
Teacher 2,500 $50
Doctor 2,500 $50
Afghan army soldier 3,000 $60
Afghan police soldier 3,000 $60
School principal 3,000 $60
Bazaar shopkeeper 3,000 $60
Construction worker 4,500 $90
Taliban fighter 20,000 $400
Member of Parliament 40,000 $800
Minister 50,000 $1,000
Average monthly earnings, from 
lowest to highestProfession
 
Table 23: Salaries in Afghanistan: The Taliban as a competitive employer  
Source: SENLIS (2007: 72) 
 
As illustrated in table 23, the level of salaries varies among different social groups. This 
highlights many facts about the security problems, rule of law and growing corruption in 
 290 
 
the state institutions. Thus, the level of salary matters significantly. Poor salaries have 
helped corruption grow in the entire administration system. 
 
Meanwhile, war, instability, insecurity and poverty have caused Afghanistan to remain 
one of the countries with with the poorest basic human development indicators in the 
world. According to the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) in 2005 
Afghanistan was among the least developed countries in the world and had one of the 
lowest income level 28 percent adult literacy, a life expectancy of 42.9 years, and a 
mortality rate of 257 per thousand children under the age of five: the latter figure is the 
highest in the world (UNDP 2007b: 233).  
 
The problem of opium adds to this complex. In the last few years insecurity and 
corruption have increased, which was also followed by a remarkable increase in the 
amount of opium production. This is to say there is a link between corruption, insecurity 
and the opium production. Opium production has helped the influence of drug dealers in 
different state institutions. Security forces arrested many drug dealers several times but 
they were release by higher-ranking officials later. Among them was Ahmad Wali 
Karzai, the president’s brother, who is known for dealing drugs. His opium fields and 
opium warehouse were guarded by the border police (STERN 2009: 39). The 
involvement of high-ranking officials in systematic and large corruption has become part 
of the institutional norm. Any effort to eradicate corruption will cause the break up of the 
entire political system. This is one of the most serious problems which the government 
officials publicly acknowledge. Due to this fear the government declined to declare the 
names of those high-ranking officials involved in high level corruption. In an interview 
Jalil Shams, the Minister of Finance, said that  
the international community has funded over USD40 billion to Afghanistan, some was paid in the 
past and the rest will be paid in the future. However, the international community, in Paris 
Conference, wanted the eradication of corruption in exchange for further aid. We are afraid to 
name those officials indicated because declaring their names will destabilize the government and 
create violence (ENSAF WEEKLY 2008: 1). 
 
It is significant to mention that the problem of corruption does not remain in state 
institutions alone. The NGOs and international organizations have also been highly 
involved in corruption. Many of the international NGOs do business rather than 
providing public service and humanitarian assistance. Despite they receive lots of fund 
from donor countries they usually lack capability of carrying out their projects. Due to 
this reason, the intenational NGOs involve national NGOs and local partners in their 
project who are more familiar with the ground and capable of implementing the 
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necessary projects. This issue has increased the demand for national NGOs and private 
sector to get projects from international NGOs. As a result a large proportion of the 
money for projects is spent on different dealers from the top to the bottom. Thus the 
quality of service the NGOs should provide declines.  
 
An study conducted by many European countries shows that the sharply rising level of 
corruption within NGOs and state institutions has reduced the amount of donor 
investments and poses a threat to the legitimacy of both the Afghan government and the 
aid implementers (DENMARK MINISTRY OF FOREING AFFAIRS 2005: 44). These 
factors all contribute to the spread of corruption and, as a result, Afghanistan remains the 
weakest country in maintaining the rule of law and control of corruption in the region 
(figure 22). Other indicators of governance and administration in Afghanistan, such as 
accountability and effectiveness, are slightly better but still worrying compared to 
average rate in the region. 
 
0 25 50 75 100
Afghanistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Iran
South Asia
%
Voice and Accountability
Government Effectiveness
Conrol of Corruption
Rule of Law
 
 
Figure 23: Regional position of Afghanistan in terms of governance, implementation of rule of law, 
accountability and control of corruption             
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) modified after RENNIE (2008: 137-138)109 
 
                                                 
109 RENNIE mentions these four indicators citing from KAUFMANN, KRAAY and MASTRUZZI 
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To sum up in the past years the internal and external players in state-building projects 
have not been very successful in their aim to provide security, establish legitimate and 
effective institutions, maintain the rule of law and install a sound justice system in the 
country. Despite the fact that the presidential elections in 2004 and parliamentary 
elections in 2005 were positive steps, their outcomes were something unexpected. The 
elected government and parliament of the past eight years has proved to be as ineffective 
and dependent as the other institutions. As a result the people of Afghanistan lost their 
trust in these two institutions.  
 
This pessimism is confirmed by the results of questionnaire distributed among 247 
students and professors from different universities in Afghanistan (cf. Chapter 1.6). The 
aim of the questionnaire was to measure the confidence of Afghans in their political 
institutions. The participants were asked whether they consider the central government as 
an independent institution and whether members of the parliament are trustworthy (figure 
24).  
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Figure 24 : Peoples’ perception of the government and the parliament  
Source: Questionnaire Afghan Identity 2009  
 
As shown in figure 5, the majority of those who answered do not trust to their 
government and parliament. It is striking to see that, despite so many efforts in the last 
years by the international community, the outcome has been so disappointing. This sends 
the clear messages that the institutions that have been built in the last eight years are 
weak and incapable of maintaining national interests. More significantly it shows that 
those different elites who have lead these institutions are ‘incapable staff’. Thus the 
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important role of qualified and capable staff in the state institutions is signified. How to 
provide such qualified staff depends on the quality and capability of training institutions. 
 
5.4 The Weak Training Institutions 
Training institutions are fundamentally important because they are the main providers of 
human resources in the country. In Afghanistan, till 2003/2004 there were 17 higher 
education institutions: 11 universities and 6 pedagogical institutes. Four of the 
universities were in Kabul and the rests were located in 13 other provinces. All of these 
17 institutions belonged to the state. It is significant to notice that education and higher 
education has always been free. Even accommodation and food for the students is 
provided in the available dormitories, which were free of charge. The Ministry of Higher 
Education spent a major share of its budget on providing food for the students in 
dormitories. Therefore the continuation of this situation was beyond the possibilities of 
the new government. There were often debates to charge students at least some small fees 
to reduce the financial pressure. However, the new parliament strongly rejected the idea 
of students in higher education paying fees.  
 
In the last four years the demand for education and higher education in Afghanistan grew 
rapidly. As a result the number of state-run universities and institutions increased from 
earlier 17 to 22, (14 universities and 8 institutions of higher education) in 18 provinces 
including the capital (map 21).  
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Map 21: Distribution of state / private universities and institutions of higher education in Afghanistan 
 
This development still could not adequately respond to the problem since the demand 
was higher and beyond the capacity and possibility of the state-run system. Therefore, 
like in other sectors, education in general and higher education into particular were given 
to private hands for the first time. As a result today there are 20 officially registered 
institutions of higher education and one university.110 The first university which was not 
run by the state was the American University in Kabul founded by Sharif Fayez, an 
Afghan-American entrepreneur and former Minister of Higher Education in Karzai’s 
cabinet. This university enjoys major support; the government provided the land and 
USAID is its main donor while there are many other donors as well. Thus, altogether 
there are 44 state-run and private universities and institutions of higher education in 
Afghanistan today.  
 
                                                 
110 There are also many private institutes active and not registered officially. The Ministry of Higher Education 
repeatedly warns them either to close or lawful measures will be dealt with.  
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As illustrated in map 21, there is a huge geographical disparity in the distribution of 
institutions of higher education in Afghanistan. This is to say that out of 34 provinces 11 
lack any institutes of higher education. The major question is how they can at least 
acquire teachers and staff for their schools and offices. Especially in war-torn 
Afghanistan, poor communication and road systems create obstacles for individuals to 
move from or come from other provinces. Even more important is the cultural issue, as 
family and relatives give individuals little chance to go to other provinces. For training 
teachers there are basic teacher training institutions one must go through for two years 
(plus 12 years school) in many provinces including the capital. However, 9 provinces 
lack such institutions.  
 
In addition to the unequal distribution of institutions between the provinces, the private 
system of higher education introduced in Afghanistan is highly expensive compared to 
the salary level of government officials. In the American University of Afghanistan a 
student in the undergraduate program or the Foundation Studies Program must pay 
approximately 250,000 AFS (around USD 5,000) per year for a full course load (ten 
courses). For part-time students, costs per course are 25,000 AFS. (around USD 500) and 
living expenses are also the responsibility of the student (AUAF 2009). Comparing this 
with the salary level of government officials, even the MPs who get USD 800 as the 
highest possible salary, cannot afford to send their sons and daughters to such private 
universities and institutions of higher education. However, many of the students at these 
institutes and universities are thought to be sons and daughters of high-ranking 
government officials and commanders.  
 
With this rapid expansion there are major concerns about the quality of higher education 
in Afghanistan. This issue is fundamentally important in both state-run and private 
universities and institutions of higher education. The insufficient number of qualified 
academic staff, poor infrastructure, inadequate teaching materials and facilities, and the 
accreditation of provided degrees are among the major challenges in both sectors. There 
is no official data about the number and degree of academic staff in private institutions. 
Nevertheless, the main founders of these institutions are usually Afghans who have 
returned from exile (from the West, Pakistan and Iran) while the teachers recruited are 
often from state-run universities and institutes of higher educations.111 The better salary 
paid in the private sector is the main reason which makes these institutions more 
                                                 
111 This is at least the case in Kabul where majority of private institutions of higher education exists. These information 
was gathered during my field trip to Kabul in Dec. 2008 to Jan. 2009. 
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attractive for poor teachers in state-run institutions. At the same time those who join 
private institutions usually do not quit their official position in the in state-run 
universities. Although this is not officially allowed by the government, it this has been 
common for some of the teachers in state-run institutions to work in government as well 
as in private institutions, NGOs and international organizations at the same time. There is 
also foreign teaching staff recruited in some of the private institutions (e.g., many from 
the West in the American University of Afghanistan, or Indian and Pakistani in others).  
 
The educational degrees of teaching staff in the 18 out 19 private institutions ranges from 
maximum M. A. to those who have passed short-term courses of specialization in 
computer science, software and technologies or the English language. With over 300 
students the American University of Afghanistan has around 19 members of teaching 
staff, 13 foreigners (mostly from the USA) while the remaining are Afghan-Americans 
returned from exile. Among them nine have a Ph.D. and the rests have an M.A. degree. 
This puts the university in a better position compared to the others. According to its 
founder “The American University of Afghanistan starts with the word "American" 
because it builds on the American system of higher education, which is increasingly 
being followed in high-quality universities throughout the world” (AUAF 2009).  
 
More significant is that all of the 19 private institutions award the B.A. as the highest 
degree. The Ministry of Higher Education does not allow them to train above the B.A. 
level because they do not have the capability. Meanwhile, they offer many programs and 
degrees, most of which were non-existent in Afghanistan before. For example programs 
like BBA (Bachelor of Business Administration), BCS (Bachelor of Computer Science), 
DBA (Diploma in Business Administration), DIT (Diploma in Information Technology), 
DEL (Diploma in English Language), ACCA (Association of Chartered Certified 
Accountants) and many others (figure 25 and 26). Most of these programs are taught in 
English and knowledge of English is crucial. These programs and the related degrees are 
referred to through acronyms, which make them hard for many to understand. Such 
programs are more common in South Asian countries like Pakistan, India, Nepal and 
Bangladesh, influenced by the British system. In other words whatever is taught in many 
of these private institutions of higher education in Afghanistan is hardly compatible to the 
requirements of the national institutions in the country. In contrast such graduates are 
easily employed in NGOs in the country because they have studied the English language 
and computer programs, which are among the basic requirements of employment there.  
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Figure 25: Ajir private institution of higher education in Kabul  
Source: KOHISTANI (2009)  
 
These facts support the idea that these private institutions are established more for doing 
business than training qualified people. The growing demands on the one hand and the 
massive corruption in the government on the other help their number grow. Among the 
private institutions at least two of them have been established for religious and political 
purposes by the Mujahidin leaders Ayatullah Shaikh Asef Mohseni and Abdurrab Rasoul 
Sayaf. It is important to notice here that Mohseni is a Shii and gets support from Iran 
while Sayaf, a Sunni, is known to receive support from Saudi Arabia (cf. Chapter. 3.2). 
 
For the state-run universities and institutions of higher education there are available 
figures which indicate the inability of these institutions to provide the qualified human 
resources required in the country. In 2003 there were 1846 teachers in 17 institutions in 
Afghanistan, among them 112 with a Ph.D., 719 with an M.A. and 1,015 with only a 
B.A. degree. This large number of teachers with B. A. degrees is a unique case in the 
world. Later the total number of teachers grew to 1,978 in 2006, and 2,090 in 2007, 14-15 
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percent of them being female (CSO 2007: 39) (table 20). While the total figure shows an 
increase, the number of Ph.D.s and M.A.s still remain strikingly low. As illustrated 
earlier in table 20, the Ministry of Higher Education has a staff of 119 with a Ph.D. and 
741 with an M.A., which is the highest number compared to other ministeries and 
institutions. At the same time there were 1,257 employees with B.A. degrees at the same 
ministry. Comparing these figures with previous years, the number of Ph.D.s and M.A.s 
did not change very much while the number of those with B.A. degrees significantly 
increased. However, it should be kept in mind that the last three figures show general 
number of staff of the Ministry of Higher Education. The increase can also represent 
those who are not teachers but part of the administrative staff. 112  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Khawaran private institution of higher education in Kabul  
Source: KOHISTANI (2009)  
 
                                                 
112 Lack of precise data caused the need to extract the number of Ph.D.s, M.A.s and B.A.s from the general staff figure. 
Nevertheless in the case of the Ph. D.s and M. A.s the numbers are mostly correct, they may change very slightly for 
the B.A.s only since there are few B.A.s in the administration. 
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Another important factor is the unequal distribution of available qualified teachers 
between the capital and the provinces. Taking the example of 2003/2004, when there 
were 112 Ph.D.s in Afghanistan, 96 of them were in Kabul. Out of these 96 Ph.D.s, 45 
were at Kabul University, followed by Kabul Polytechnic with 44, the University of 
Education with eight and the Institute of Medicine with two respectively. The remaining 
16 teachers with a Ph.D. were distributed in other provincial universities (e.g., Nangarhar 
nine, Balkh two, Kandahar two, Herat one, Alberuni one and Takhar one).  The situation 
at the Institute of Medicine in Kabul was striking with only two teachers with a Ph.D., 
one can imagine the situation in the faculties of medicine in other provinces. The 
situation has not gotten better yet taking into consideration the example of Ministry of 
Public Health which was mentioned earlier. 
 
There is also a huge gap between the number of students who take part in the entrance 
exam and the capacity of state universities and higher education institutions. Every year 
more than 70,000, upto 90,000 high school graduates, take part in the general entrance 
exam through which students are qualified to enrol in different faculties. The exam is 
conceived to select the students with top scores to go to the predetermined top faculties 
(e.g., medicine, engineering, law, journalism and the lowest pedagogical institutes). Only 
between 50-60 percent of those who take this exam can enrol, as this is the maximum 
capacity of the state higher education system. The government rarely provides any 
opportunities for the remaining potential students. At the same time there is a big 
difference in number between the newly enrolled and actually graduated students.  This is 
to say that between 2005 and 2007 an average of 11,777 students enrolled while in the 
same period an average of only 5,092 graduated (table 24).113 
 
As illustrated in table 7, the general number of teachers and students slightly increased in 
the last few years. This increase also includes the number of female teachers from 14 in 
2005 to 15 percent in 2007. In contrast the number of newly enrolled students declined 
from 19 percent in 2005 to 16 percent in 2007, while the number of male student 
increased from 81 percent in 2005 to 84 percent in 2007.  
 
 
 
                                                 
113 For such analysis figures from many years can provide a more precise view. Nevertheless, this table provides an 
overview of the number of newly enrolled and graduated students in the last couple of years. 
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2004-05 % 2005-06 % 2006-07 %
Male 1,615 86 1,676 85 1,774 85
Teachers Female 271 14 302 15 316 15
Total 1,886 100 1,978 100 2,090 100
Male 31,224 79 30,546 78 34,143 82
Students Female 8,290 21 8,808 22 7,749 18
Total 39,514 100 39,354 100 41,892 100
Graduated Male 1,704 81 4,786 76 5,284 77
Students Female 404 19 1,524 24 1,574 23
Total 2,108 100 6,310 100 6,858 100
Newly Male 10,868 81 8,205 82 10,003 84
Enrolled Female 2,631 19 1,770 18 1,855 16
Total 13,499 100 9,975 100 11,858 100
1383 1384 1385
 
Table 24: Number of teachers and students enrolled and graduated in state higher education 2004- 2007  
Source: Draft KOHISTANI (2009) based on figures from CSO (2007: 39, 55) 
 
To sum up this chapter, there are many interrelated factors that undermine the 
effectiveness of national institutions in Afghanistan. The highly centralized structure of 
the political system has been less effective in maintaining its rule from the centre to the 
periphery. In order to succeed in sovling this problem, the government has repeatedly 
made efforts to deal with regional Mujahidin and Taliban commanders. This policy 
helped little to expand the rule of government beyond the capital; instead it further 
undermined the legitimacy of the central government. Moreover, the general political 
system is personified rather than institutionalized. As a result Qawm persists to determine 
political decisions on different levels.   
 
Meanwhile there are different internal and external players who dominate these 
institutions. The internal players represent the tribal, religious and intellectual elites 
between whom traditional rivalry continues, while it takes new faces from time to time. 
The political alliance between these rival elites became possible in the last eight years 
due to pressure by external players, the latter providing financial and human resources for 
the poor country. These two factors gave the external players special privileges to 
maintain their strategic goals in the political process. Nevertheless, the multi-national 
composition of external players has been problematic and has undermined their capability 
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to initiate a unified strategy in dealing with the deteriorating and unstable situation of 
Afghanistan. 
 
Apart from rival dominant elites, the national institutions suffer from a number of factors 
which include insufficient number of staff, large number of unqualified staff and the 
unequal distribution of staff between provinces and districts. The problem of brain-drain 
in favour of NGOs continues, which further undermines the effectiveness of national 
institutions. Corruption has boomed in recent years and this factor has undermined good 
governance, the rule of law and the effectiveness of national institutions in Afghanistan.  
 
Finally the higher education institutions which should provide capable and qualified staff 
for the country have capacity problems as well. The provision of private sector 
institutions to respond to the growing demands, which were above the capacity of the 
state, has been less effective than expected. Both the private and the state-run higher 
education sectors have a huge number of unqualified staff and this affects the quality of 
higher education in general. 
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6 Conclusion:  
In order to conclude, there are certain important findings which highlight the role of 
institutional capacity in the state-building process of Afghanistan. In addition these 
findings will suggest possible measures to be taken to tackle and overcoming the problem 
of institutional capacity in Afghanistan. 
 
6.1 Important Findings: Weak Institutional Capacity as the Key Element behind 
the Fragility of State in Afghanistan 
According to the findings of the current study weak institutional capacity remains the 
major problem of the state-building process as a result of which Afghanistan as a state 
can not fulfill its basic functions. It is a ‘fragile state’ and weak institutional capacity is 
the main driving factors behind its fragility. The weakness of institutional capacity is the 
result of a legitimacy crisis, the incompatibility of the political system and the 
incapability of institutions in the country. These four problems are closely linked with 
one another.  
 
Creation of Institutions and Legitimacy Crisis 
In Afghanistan the changing political system and institutions are been the product of 
repeated wars. Wars directly affected the formation and transformation of political 
systems and institutions in the country. Two main factors have led to wars: internal and 
external factors. The internal factors comprise the actors who played the main role under 
the name of population. In the past they were known as tribal, religious and intellectual 
elites while at present they are known by different names, like communists, technocrats, 
Mujahidin and Taliban. In other words it is only a change in name while in reality these 
groups represent more or less the same traditional elites.  
 
Meanwhile, the concept of legitimacy changed parallel to the formation and 
transformation of political processes. In general it depended on the elites to determine 
legitimacy and define it according to their own interests. The dominant tribal, religious 
and intellectual elites have been the bi-product of Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic, socio-
religious diversity and the geopolitical tensions of the region. This provided different 
sources of legitimacy to the ruling elites. For example for the tribal elites, the tribal 
system (tribal code of conducts and Jirga) influenced the source of legitimacy. For the 
religious elites, Islam and Shariah were regarded as the main sources for legitimacy as 
well as the ruling system. Finally, the intellectual elites influenced by foreign ideologies 
imported from abroad, rejected traditional (tribal and religious) sources of legitimacy. 
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Instead they introduced the constitution and modernization plans as main sources for 
legitimacy. However, in the last four decades the geopolitical tension in the region and 
the expansion of radical ideologies from the Eastern and Western blocks and Islamic 
countries further complicated the sources of legitimacy for the ruling system in the 
country. 
  
The dominating elites in Afghanistan have been the actual decision makers and 
stakeholder of the country. The legitimacy of state and its institutions has always 
depended to the inclusion or exclusion of both of these elites in the process. Each of 
them, once in power, perceived itself as the legitimate ruler and its ruling system as the 
will of the entire population. For example, in the 1973 Daoud who toppled the monarchy 
regime, called it an illegitimate political system and declared his own established regime 
to be the only legitimate one. The same is true for the communists who toppled Daoud, 
the Mujahidin who toppled the communists, the Taliban who toppled the Mujahidin, and 
finally the Taliban who were toppled by the Mujahidin and NATO forces.  
 
Another important issue is that the crisis of legitimacy led to armed conflicts between the 
elites who dominated the power and the opposition who challenged them. The one 
excluded from power called the ruling elites and their system illegitimate. Thus the 
excluded elites became the major trouble makers for the ruling elites. They tried to 
mobilize the population against the government. Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic and 
socio-religious diversity was used as an instrument to achieve these goals. As a result the 
repeated conflict prevented the establishment of a legitimate, representative, stable and 
functioning state. None of Afghanistan’s rulers could ever lay a solid, sound, effective 
and sustainable political foundation for the country. That is why Afghanistan, following 
its independence, has experienced many changing rulers and ruling systems. Therefore, 
the legitimacy of the ruler and ruling system played an important role in the past and at 
present forms the root of the problems in the country.  
 
The external factors include Afghanistan’s geopolitical location which intertwines the 
three regions Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East with one another. These three 
politically vital regions were the central focus of major powers since the late 19th century.  
Any change in the political map of Central and South Asia left major impact on 
Afghanistan. Although it was never colonized and many foreign invasions to colonize it 
failed, the negative impact of wars undermined its stability and capability as a state. As a 
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result it remained a weak buffer-state and its successive rulers remained dependent on 
help from outside rival powers.  
 
Afghanistan’s diverse ethno-linguistic and socio-religious structure is closely linked with 
its neighboring countries. The changing map and geopolitical interests of neighboring 
countries have affected the stability of Afghanistan. The religious, cultural and, more 
importantly energy resources of Central Asia have attracted the attention of different rival 
countries in this region. The tension between India and Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, 
and between the Central Asian countries plus Russia and China on the one hand and 
Western nations and their allies in the region on the other influences the stability, security 
and political system in Afghanistan. For example, the communists, Mujahidin and 
Taliban are the bi-products of these tensions in the region.  
 
Both the internal and external factors have direct impact on institutional capacity, 
legitimacy, and effectiveness of the political system in Afghanistan. The state and its 
institutions demand loyalty from the population. In Afghanistan, loyalty to the family, the 
sub-tribe, the tribe and religious bonds are far stronger than to state and its institutions. 
The idea of state has repeatedly failed to win the trust of the people and provide a 
substitute for these traditional bonds, because the idea of state usually represented an 
oppressive and aggressive political body that emerged to maintain the will of certain 
groups (tribal, religious or intellectual elites), not the whole population.  The ruling elites 
created unbridgeable gaps between the people by abusing the traditional structures of the 
society for their own interests. The group that dominated the power profited most while 
the rest of the population was the victim of policies made by state authorities. This led to 
legitimacy crisis and, as a result, the top-down process of state-building and institution 
building never took roots and did not gain the acceptance of society. Thus, state-building 
represents a repeatedly failed project that has ended in disaster many times.  
 
On the other hand the dominating elites have been the main gate between Afghanistan 
and the outside world. No foreign incursion, invasion and occupation happened in 
Afghanistan without the involvement of either the tribal, religious or intellectual elites. 
This factor enabled them to mobilize the population for their own interests. In addition 
Afghanistan’s ethno-linguistic and socio-religious diversity provides instruments for the 
mobilization of the population. A high illiteracy rate (more than 70 percent), the large 
number of rural population (each more than 70 percent) and high poverty have paved the 
way for the rival elites to maintain and sustain their dominance in society. At the same 
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time rough topography, large mountainous areas, long deserts and similar natural 
phenomena have created obstacles between different groups of the population. There is a 
huge gap between the rural and the urban population and poor communication has made 
bridging these gaps difficult. In contrast, these factors strengthen the position of tribal 
and religious elites and to sustain their dominance in the isolated areas.  
 
Incompatibility: Personified Political System 
Another major finding is that the institutions are not representative, and that has led to a 
legitimacy crisis. In the past eight years, the rival political elites have, for the first time, 
joined together in the process of state-building and institutional building under the 
pressure from international community. Following the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan 
received major attention from the international community. This was a unique historical 
chance that could have led the war-torn country into development and prosperity. Billions 
of dollars of aid for humanitarian and reconstruction programs poured into the country. 
However, those who benefited most from these programs were again the dominating 
elites, not the population. The ruling elites, who have never practiced democratic norms 
of behavior, built personal power bases rather than representative institutions.  
 
The fact that the international community brought together many Afghans and provided 
them with the opportunity to join the political process was a positive step. However, the 
major problems were that the international community concentrated its focus on the elites 
rather than the population. It also ignored the political background of those elites who 
joined in the process. This means no participant was excluded, the regardless of the 
atrocities and crimes committed in the past. Thus the rival groups who fought against 
each other in the past now competed over maintaining their influence in the new political 
system and institutions. This political competition and rivalry in particular affected the 
formation of the political system, constitution, and institutions. As a result, the political 
system established is focussed on special persons rather than on institutions. It is highly 
centralized and the whole system is dominated by a person (the president) in the capital. 
This makes the current political system ineffective and incompatible with Afghanistan. 
The unlimited power of the president undermines the effectiveness of the other 
institutions (e.g., judiciary and legislative branches). The administration’s structure is 
very hierarchical, time-consuming, and expensive. The president employs the 34 
provincial governors and 399 governors and mayors who are all accountable to him. All 
policies have to be implemented in a top-down and bottom-up process. Although there 
are elected provincial and district Shuras (councils) their role remains as that of a 
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consultative body. Therefore the current centralized system maintains the interests of 
certain groups who dominate the power.   
 
Today the institutions suffer from fractionalism, nepotism, favoritism and corruption. 
These challenges have once more undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
institutions. As a result the institutions have failed to gain the confidence of the people 
because they can not provide basic functions like maintaining security, the rule of law, 
and public services. After eight years Afghanistan is still highly dependent on human 
resources and financial resources supplied from the outside. If the foreign troops 
withdraw and international funding stops, Afghanistan will not be able to overcome the 
massive challenges alone. Instead, the rudimentary political system and institutions 
established in the last eight years will disintegrate. 
 
Incapable Institutions and Poorly Qualified Staff 
The weakness of government and national institutions are the main cause for growing 
insecurity, the absence of rule of law, public order and basic public services. The police 
and judiciary sector are the most corrupt institutions in the country. Poor education and 
training of the staff, low salaries, and the lack of access to required facilities (e.g., 
infrastructure, communication and equipment) are among the main reasons for the 
growing corruption in these institutions.   
 
The institutions desperately need capable staff and financial resources in order to perform 
better Afghanistan, from its independence in 1919 to the current situation, has always 
suffered from these two crucial requirements. As a result, the country has been dependent 
on financial and human resources from abroad. These dependencies reached their climax 
in the last eight years. More than 100,000 foreign forces and thousands of foreign experts 
are busy to provide security, public order, and basic services for the population. In the 
short term Afghanistan will hardly be able to replace these foreign forces with capable 
staff.  
 
In recent years the number of Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police has 
increased significantly. Major attempts to increase the number of members of these 
institutions further are underway, both by the government and the international 
community, so that the Afghan forces will be able to take the responsibility of 
maintaining security on their own. However, major challenges still remain, as the loyalty 
of the forces to the political establishment remains questionable because of high level of 
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fractionalism, nepotism, and favoritism. These challenges persist because of the rivalry 
between the elites who dominate these institutions. As long as these challenges are not 
over, increasing the number of armed and police forces will remain fruitless. 
 
The training institutions (universities, institutions of higher education and training 
centers) are hardly able to provide the required capable and qualified staff for the 
country. There is a huge disparity in terms of the distribution of higher education 
institutions throughout the country. The capital enjoys the largest number of institutions, 
professional staff and a better infrastructure, which is more than it should have 
considering share of population. In contrast, in provinces such possibilities decrease 
sharply, and nine provinces even completely lack institutions of higher education.  
 
The analysis of the number of teachers by qualification revealed a very striking picture. 
In the entire system of higher education in the country, 55 percent of the teachers have 
only an undergraduate degree, which is not permitted in any institution of international 
standard. The number of teachers with only a low level of education is particularly high 
in the provinces, while this problem does not affect the capital so severely. Most qualified 
teachers are in Kabul while the other institutions in provinces suffer from the lack of 
qualified teachers. However, even in the capital the qualification of teachers varies 
significantly in terms of disciplines. This is a serious problem for higher education of 
Afghanistan.  
 
The inability of the state institutions has led to an education system (primary and higher 
education) which is provided by the private sector for the first time in the country. 
However, so far the results have showed that the private institutions have not been   
successful in training qualified manpower. They created more challenges rather than 
solving the problem of training staff. This is because they do not have qualified teaching 
staff or a functioning infrastructure. More importantly, the private sectors provides 
educational programs that do not transfer skills that are required in the state institutions. 
The programs they offer are more in accordance to the demands of NGOs and 
international organizations in Afghanistan. These institutions have been established by 
some individuals who have links abroad in order to do business and for political 
purposes. Thus the programs and the required resources are attained at least in some of 
them, mainly from abroad.  
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6.2 Suggestions:  National Institutions with Capable Staff as Precondition to 
Legitimate Authority, and a Stable Functioning State  
Building a stable state in Afghanistan crucially requires human and financial resources. 
The provision of these two elements is highly dependent on a sense of unity among the 
diverse population. Such a sense of unity can only be created and strengthened if the 
political structure matches the demands and requirements of the population. The state 
should no longer represent an oppressive and aggressive body. State institutions should 
no longer be abused by certain elites e.g. tribal, religious and intellectuals. Instead they 
should perform their functions for the welfare and prosperity of the population. This will 
help to minimize the traditional gap between the population and state authorities.  
 
Free and fair elections on the national and local level (presidential, parliamentary and 
councils) are fundamentally important for the creation of legitimate national institutions. 
However, elections are the initial step for such a purpose. Institutions will be regarded as 
legitimate and national when they provide basic services (e.g., security, the rule of law 
and public services) for the population. National institutions should not remain as 
symbolic political bodies in the hand of certain individuals.  They should demonstrate the 
will of the people regardless of their ethnic, linguistic, religious and political background.  
 
In order to make institutions more effective and accountable, the current political system 
needs basic reforms. To reform revising the constitution is crucial, as the current 
centralized presidential system has blocked all the ways to achieving national interests. 
The elected provincial and district councils should be given more authority because they 
know the peoples need better. In provinces and districts, the people should be given the 
right to elect their own governors. More authority and opportunities for the population 
will strength public trust in the institutions and facilitate governance on the local level. 
This will help meritocracy, transparency, efficiency, and accountability to replace 
nepotism, favouritism and corruption.  
 
In order to fill the gap of professionalism and overcome the challenges of unavailable 
required capable staff it is important to focus on training institutions. Education in 
general and higher education in particular needs attention. The huge disparity in the 
distribution of higher education has to be reduced by introducing equal opportunities all 
over the country. Moreover, higher education institutions need qualified teachers. This 
problem can be solved by providing fellowships abroad or providing distance learning 
opportunities within the country. This will take time and a lot of financial resources. 
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The international community can play a significant role in achieving these goals because 
Afghanistan’s problems (e.g., terrorism, opium and migration) extend worldwide. 
Therefore, security and stability in Afghanistan are important for global security and 
safety. The international community should focus on the population and strengthen the 
capability of the institutions that provide basic services for the population.  Financial aid 
alone cannot solve any problem when the institutions are incapable of spending the 
money for the welfare of the population. The international community should emphasize 
the capability, effectiveness, and accountability of institutions. The chances are still there 
to transform Afghanistan into a stable, legitimate and functioning state.   
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Results Questionnaire 
Count
m ale 185
female 45
Sum 230
15-20 47
21-25 149
26-30 19
31-35 7
36-40 4
41-45 1
46-50 1
51-55 1
56-60 0
61-66 0
>66 0
Sum 229
afghan 231
germ an 0
bri tish 0
am er ican 0
french 0
i ta lian 0
others 0
sw edish 0
denm ark 0
holland 0
canadian 0
Sum 231
Inside Afghanistan 230
Kabul 166
Other 56
Outside Afghanistan 2
Sum
student 181
sc holar 33
teacher 10
goverment em ployed 6
N GO employee 1
worker 0
unem ployed 0
Jobber 1
self employed 0
others 0
Sum 232
balooc hi 1
pashtu 61
noor istani 1
dari / farsi 169
pashai 3
uzbek 0
turkey 1
others 1
Sum 237
domicil  
mother tongue 
Demog raph ic Data Part icipants
 
age
sex
nationa li ty
profession
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Count
Ranking: 1st place 41
Ranking: 2nd place 17
Ranking 3rd place 2
Ranking: 1st place 3
Ranking: 2nd place 4
Ranking: 1st place 15
Ranking: 2nd place 2
Ranking 3rd place 2
Ranking: 1st place 12
Ranking: 2nd place 3
Ranking 3rd place 1
Ranking: 1st place 175
Ranking: 2nd place 2
Ranking: 1st place 25
Ranking: 2nd place 1
What type of Government do you think would be the best for the future 
of Afghanistan?
 
Is lamic
Other
Democrat
Monarchy
Federal
Dictator
 
 
 
 
 
Count
yes 57
no 172
yes 70
no 160
yes 148
no 69
yes 164
no 69
Could you explain the difference between loya jirga and 
parliament?
Do you think that the loya jirga is a trustworthy Afghan 
Institution?
Questions about Government & Institutions
 
Do you consider the Government of Afghanistan as a 
central independent Institution?
Do you think that the members of parliament are 
trustworthy representatives?
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